From the 26th of April until the 6th of June, Tampa and Port Tampa were
the military centers of greatest interest in the United States. Troops
were rushed into these places on special trains and camped on available
sites, pending the organization of a proposed expedition to—somewhere.
Supplies of every description came pouring in on long trains of express
and freight cars; mounted officers and orderlies ploughed their rushing
way through great heaps and dunes of ever-shifting sand, leaving behind
them stifling clouds of scintillating particles, which filtered through
every conceivable crevice and made the effort to breathe a suffocating
nightmare. Over all the tumultuous scene a torrid sun beat down from a
cloudless sky, while its scorching rays, reflected from the fierce sand
under foot, produced a heat so intolerable that even the tropical
vegetation looked withered and dying. In this climate officers and men,
gathered mostly from Northern posts, were to “acclimate” themselves for
a tropical campaign—somewhere.
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a more pernicious climate,
in Cuba nor in Porto Rico, than that of southern Florida. Its first
effect upon men just emerging from a bracing Northern winter was akin
to prostration. Then began to follow a decided tendency to languor;
after this one was liable to sudden attacks of bowel troubles. The
deadly malaria began to insidiously prepare the way for a hospital cot;
the patient lost flesh, relish of food became a reminiscence, and an
hour’s exertion in the sun was enough to put a man on his back for the
rest of the day. Exposure to the direct action of the sun’s rays was
frequently followed by nausea, a slight chill, and then a high fever.
The doctors subsequently called this “thermal fever,” which is
suspected to be a high-sounding name calculated to cover up a very
dense ignorance of the nature of the disease, because no one ever
obtained any relief from it from them. Recurrence of the exposure
brought recurrence of the fever, and, if persisted in, finally produced
a severe illness.
One reason for this was that the troops continued to wear the winter
clothing they had worn on their arrival. The promised “khaki” did not
materialize. Some regiments drew the brown canvas fatigue uniform, but
the only use made of it was to put the white blanket-roll through the
legs of the trousers, thereby adding to the weight of the roll, without
perceptible benefit to the soldier.
Such a climate, under such surroundings, was not conducive to original
thought, prolonged exertion, or sustained study. Everybody felt “mean”
and was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to listen to any new schemes.
The highest ambition seemed to be to get out of it to somewhere with
just as little delay and exertion as possible. It was at this juncture
that the plan of organizing a Gatling gun battery was conceived, and
the attempt to obtain authority began.
The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns adopted in the land
service of the United States. Not to enter into a technical
description, but merely to convey a general idea of its working and
uses, it may be described as follows:
The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without stocks, arranged around
a rod, and parallel to it. Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, and
the whole cluster can be made to revolve by turning a crank. The bolts
are all covered in a brass case at the breech, and the machine is
loaded by means of a vertical groove in which cartridges are placed,
twenty at a time, and from which they fall into the receivers one at a
time. As the cluster of barrels revolves each one is fired at the
lowest point, and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The gun is
mounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the lower end of the wye passes down
into a socket in the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as one
points a garden hose or sprinkler, with the advantage that the gun can
be clamped at any instant, and will then continue to sprinkle its drops
of death over the same row of plants until the clamps are released. The
axle is hollow and will hold about a thousand cartridges. It is
horizontal, and on its ends are heavy Archibald wheels. There is also a
heavy hollow trail, in which tools and additional ammunition can be
stored. The limber resembles that used by the Artillery, and is capable
of carrying about 9600 rounds of cartridges. The whole gun, thus
mounted, can be drawn by two mules, and worked to good advantage by
from six to eight men. It is built of various calibers, and can fire
from 300 to 900 shots per minute. The guns used by the Gatling Gun
Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, were built by the Colt’s Arms Co., were
the latest improved model, long ten-barrel gun, and fired the
Krag-Jorgenson ammunition used by the Regular Army.
The attempt to obtain authority to organize a machine gun battery met
with many discouragements and repeated failures. No one seemed to have
thought anything about the subject, and Tampa was not a good place nor
climate in which to indulge in that form of exercise, apparently.
Perhaps the climate was one reason why so little thinking was done, and
everything went “at sixes and sevens.”
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
The officer who had conceived the scheme was a young man, too. He was
only a second lieutenant (“Second lieutenants are fit for nothing
except to take reveille”), and had never, so far as his military
superiors knew, heard the whistle of a hostile bullet. He had made no
brilliant record at the Academy, had never distinguished himself in the
service, and was not anybody’s “pet.” He was, apparently, a safe man to
ignore or snub if occasion or bad temper made it desirable to ignore or
snub somebody, and, above all, had no political friends who would be
offended thereby.
“Politics” cut quite a figure in Tampa in some respects. An officer who
was known to be a personal friend of Senator Somebody, or protege of
this or that great man, was regarded with considerable awe and
reverence by the common herd. It was ludicrous to see the weight
attached to the crumbs of wisdom that fell from the friends of the
friends of somebody. They shone only by a reflected light, it is true;
but nobody there at Tampa had a lamp of his own, except the few who had
won renown in the Civil War, and reflected light was better than none
at all. A very young and green second lieutenant who was able to boast
that he had declined to be a major in a certain State was at once an
oracle to other lieutenants—and to some who were not lieutenants. The
policy which governed these appointments was not so well understood at
that date in the campaign as it is now.
When the court of a reigning favorite was established at the Tampa Bay
Hotel as a brigadier, and people began to get themselves a little
settled into the idea that they knew who was in command, they were
suddenly disillusioned by the appointment of another and senior
brigadier to the command. They settled down to get acquainted with the
new authority, and were just beginning to find out who was who, when
the telegraph flashed the news that the deposed potentate had been made
a major-general, and, of course, was now in command. The thing was
becoming interesting. Bets began to be made as to which would come in
ahead under the wire. The other also became a major-general. Then came
a period of uncertainty, because the question of rank hinged upon some
obscure and musty record of forgotten service some thirty-four years
before. From these facts will be apparent the difficulty under which a
subordinate labored in trying to create anything.
It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort to waste time with
subordinates. The projector of an enterprise had better go straight to
the one who has the necessary authority to order what is wanted; if
access to him can be had, and he can be brought to recognize the merits
of the plan—that settles it; if not—that also settles it. In either
case the matter becomes a settled thing, and one knows what to depend
upon.
But who was the man to see there at Tampa? Nobody knew.
The first officer approached was the one in direct line of superiority,
Col. A. T. Smith, 13th Infantry. The idea was to ascertain his views
and try to obtain from him a favorable endorsement upon a written plan
to be submitted through military channels to the commanding general at
Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; for the reply to a request
for a few minutes’ audience on the subject of machine guns was very
gruff and curt: “I don’t want to hear anything about it. I don’t
believe in it, and I don’t feel like hearing it. If you want to see me
about this subject, come to me in office hours.” That settled it. Any
effort to get a written plan through would have to carry the weight of
official disapproval from the start, and even a “shavey” knows that
disapproval at the start is enough to kill a paper in the official
routine.
The next officers approached were Major William Auman and Capt. H.
Cavanaugh, of the 13th Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two
officers, both of whom rendered very distinguished services on the
battle-field, listened with interest and were convinced. Their advice
was: “Get your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing just what
you propose; then go straight to the commanding general himself. If he
listens to you, he will be the responsible party, and will have waived
the informality; if he will not receive you, no harm is done.”
This advice was followed and the following plan prepared:
_Scheme for Organization of Division Galling Gun Detachment._
“_Material:_
“Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 horses and 16 saddles; 6 sets
double harness, wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team and driver; and
100,000 rounds, .30 cal.
“_Personnel:_
“One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 cook, and
35 enlisted men selected for their intelligence, activity, and daring;
volunteers, if possible to be obtained, as the service will be
hazardous.
“_Equipment:_
“Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field-glass.
“Enlisted men: Revolver and knife.
“Fifty rounds to be carried on person for revolver, and 50 in ordnance
train.
“_Camp Equipage:_
“Four conical wall-tents, 2 ‘A’ wall-tents, and the ordinary cooking
outfit for a company of 41 men.
“_Organization:_
“In the discretion of the detachment commander, subject to approval of
division commander; probably as follows, subject to modifications by
experience:
“Three detachments under a sergeant. A detachment to be composed of 1
gunner and 7 men. The gunner should be a corporal.
“_Administration:_
“The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be subject only to the orders
of the division commander, or higher authority. Its members are carried
on ‘d. s.’ in their respective organizations. Its commander exercises
over it the same authority as a company commander, and keeps the same
records. Returns, reports, and other business are transacted as in
company, except that the detachment commander reports directly to and
receives orders directly from Division Headquarters. The detachment is
not subject to ordinary guard or fatigue. When used as part of a guard,
whole detachments go with their pieces.
“_Instruction:_
“The organization is purely experimental; hence the greatest possible
latitude must be allowed the detachment commander, and he should be
held accountable for the results. He should not be subjected to the
orders or interference of any subordinates, however able, who have made
no special study of the tactical use or instruction for machine guns,
and who may not have faith in the experiment. It will be useless to
expect efficiency of the proposed organization unless this liberty be
accorded its organizer. The field is a new one, not yet well discussed
by even the text-writers. Organization and instruction must be largely
experimental, subject to change as the result of experience; but no
change from the plans of the organizer should be made except for good
and sufficient reasons.
“_Tactical Employment:_
“This organization is expected to develop:
“(_a_) The fire-action of good infantry.
“(_b_) The mobility of cavalry.
“Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and accuracy, both of fire
and movement.
“Its employment on the defensive is obvious. On the offensive it is
expected to be useful with advance guards, rear guards, outposts,
raids, and in battle. The last use, novel as it is, will be most
important of all. The flanks of the division can be secured by this
organization, relieving reserves of this duty; it will give a
stiffening to the line of support, and at every opportune occasion will
be pushed into action on the firing line. The _moral effect_ of its
presence will be very great; it will be able to render valuable
assistance by its fire (over the charging line) in many cases. Last,
but very important, the occupation of a captured line by this
organization at once will supply a powerful, concentrated, and
controlled fire, either to repulse a counter-charge or to fire on a
discomfited, retiring enemy. Being a horsed organization, it can arrive
at the critical point at the vital moment when, the defender’s first
line having been thrust out, our line being disorganized, a
counter-charge by the enemy would be most effective, or controlled fire
by our own troops on him would be most useful.
“It is urged that this last use of machine guns is one of the most
important functions, and one which has been overlooked by writers and
tacticians.
“There is one vital limitation upon the proposed organization; viz., it
must not be pitted against artillery.
“It is urgently suggested that this organization can be perfected here
and now without difficulty, while it will be very difficult to perfect
after the forward movement has begun. Horses and harness can be easily
procured at Tampa; there will be no difficulty if some energetic
officer be authorized to proceed with the work, and directed to attend
to the details.
“Believing earnestly in the utility of the proposed organization, which
will convert useless impedimenta into a fourth arm, and realizing the
dangerous nature of the proposed service, I respectfully offer my
services to carry these plans into effect.
“_John H. Parker_, “2d Lieut. 13th Infty.”
With this plan well digested and with many a plausible argument in its
favor all thought out, Col. Arthur McArthur, assistant adjutant-general
to Gen. Wade, who was at that moment in command, was approached.
Field Bakery.
Col. McArthur was a very busy man. He was also a very business-like
man, and one of handsome appearance, easy access, and pleasant address.
He sandwiched in a fifteen-minute interview between two pressing
engagements, and manifested both interest and approval. But nothing
could be done at that time. “Come again a week from to-day,” said he,
“and I will try to obtain you a hearing before one who can do what you
wish by a single word. I believe in your scheme and will help you if I
can.” The week rolled by and a change of commanding generals occurred.
Gen. Wade was ordered away, taking McArthur with him, and no progress
had been made. It was discouraging.
The next step in the plan was by lucky accident. Lieutenant (now
Lieut.-Col.) John T. Thompson, Ordnance Department, who was in charge
of the Ordnance Depot at Tampa, accidentally met the would-be
machine-gun man, and was promptly buttonholed over a dish of ice cream.
Thompson was himself a young man and a student. His department placed
an insuperable obstacle in the way of himself carrying out a plan which
he, also, had conceived, and he was keen to see the idea, which he
fully believed in, demonstrated on the battle-field. He had, moreover,
as ordnance officer, just received an invoice of fifteen Gatling guns,
complete, of the latest model, and he had access to the commanding
general by virtue of being a member of his staff. By reason of the
terrible rush of overwork, he needed an assistant, and it seemed
practicable to try to kill two birds with one stone. But all he said
was, “I believe in the idea; I have long advocated it. It may be
possible for me to get you your opportunity, and it may not. If so, you
will hear from the matter.”
The attempt to get the thing going had been apparently abandoned, when,
utterly without notice, the regimental commander received orders per
letter, from Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, which resulted in the
following orders:
“Headquarters 13th Infantry, in the Field, “Tampa, Fla., May 27, 1898.
“_Special Orders No. 22:_
“Pursuant to instructions contained in letter from Headquarters 5th
Army Corps, May 26, 1898,
2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry. Sergeant Alois Weischaar,
Company A, Sergeant William Eyder, Company G, Private Lewis Kastner,
Company A. Private Joe Seman, Company B, Private Abram Greenberg,
Company C. Private Joseph Hoft, Company D, Private O’Connor L. Jones,
Company D, Private Louis Misiak, Company E, Private George C. Murray,
Company F, Private John Bremer, Company G, Private Fred H. Chase,
Company H, Private Martin Pyne, Company H,
will report to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, ordnance officer, for duty in
connection with the Gatling Gun Battery.
“These men will be fully equipped, with the exception of rifle,
bayonet, scabbard, and blanket-bag, and will be rationed to include May
31, 1898.
“By order of Colonel Smith.
“_M. McFarland_, “1st Lieut. 13th Infty., Adjutant.”
These men were selected by their company commanders. It is not known
whether the selections were made with a view to special fitness or not.
They had no notice that the detail was to be anything but a transient
character; in fact, one company commander actually detailed the cook of
his private mess, and was intensely disgusted when he found that the
detail was to be permanent or semi-permanent. The men were sent fully
armed and equipped; carrying rifles, knapsacks, etc., and marched down
to the Ordnance Depot for instructions. These instructions were to
return to camp, turn in their rifles, bayonets, cartridges, belts, and
knapsacks, and return early the following morning equipped with
blanket-roll complete, haversack, and canteen. Each man, after full
explanation of the hazardous duty, was given a chance to withdraw, but
all volunteered to stay.
The instructions were obeyed, and the Gatling Gun Detachment was born—a
pigmy.
Awaiting Turn to Embark.