CHAPTER II. Inception Of The Scheme. CHAPTER III. The Ordnance Dépôt.
CHAPTER IV. The Voyage And Disembarkation.
CHAPTER V. The March.
CHAPTER VI. The Battery In Camp Wheeler.
CHAPTER VII. The Battle.
CHAPTER VIII. Tactical Analysis Of The Battles At Santiago.
CHAPTER IX. The Volunteers.
CHAPTER X. The Sufferings Of The Fifth Army Corps.
CHAPTER XI. The Cause.
CHAPTER XII. Home Again.
Appendix I.
Appendix II.
Appendix III.
Index.
The photographic illustrations in this work are due to the courage and
kindness of Mr. John N. Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man was
first sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, and took with him a large
supply of material. It was his delight to photograph everything that
occurred, and his pleasure to furnish a set of photographs for the use
of the author. Mr. Weigle was recommended for a commission in the
Regular Army of the United States, for his extreme gallantry in action,
and is a magnificent type of the American youth. The thanks of the
author are tendered to him for the photographic illustrations so
generously supplied.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th US Infantry, Late Commanding Gatling Guns
at Santiago.
Map—Santiago and Surrounding Area.
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
Field Bakery.
Awaiting Turn to Embark.
Baiquiri.
The “Hornet.”
Waiting.
Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri.
The Landing.
Pack Train.
Calvary Picket Line.
San Juan Hill.
Cuban Soldiers as They Were.
Wagon Train.
Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso.
Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fire by Sergeant
Weigle).
Fort Roosevelt.
Sergeant Greene’s Gun at Fort Roosevelt.
Skirmish Line in Battle.
Fort Roosevelt.
A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought.
Map—Siege Lines at Santiago.
Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt.
Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grew on Low Ground.
Spanish Block-House.
Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns.
Tentage in Cuba.
After the Rain.
Native Industry.
Charge on San Juan Hill.
Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front.
Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving.
Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench.
Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in Spanish Fort,
Silenced by Gatlings July 1, ’98. 2. Rear Sight of same Gun. 3. Fuse
picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge used by the
Spanish Volunteers, the so-called “Explosive” Brass-covered Bullet. 5.
Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs.
Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.
Undergrowth in Cuba.
Cuban Residence.
“Reina Mercedes” Sunk by the “Iowa” near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago.
PREFACE.
On the morning of July 1st, the dismounted cavalry, including my
regiment, stormed Kettle Hill, driving the Spaniards from their
trenches. After taking the crest, I made the men under me turn and
begin volley-firing at the San Juan Blockhouse and intrenchments
against which Hawkins’ and Kent’s Infantry were advancing. While thus
firing, there suddenly smote on our ears a peculiar drumming sound. One
or two of the men cried out, “The Spanish machine guns!” but, after
listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and called, “It’s the Gatlings,
men! It’s our Gatlings!” Immediately the troopers began to cheer
lustily, for the sound was most inspiring. Whenever the drumming
stopped, it was only to open again a little nearer the front. Our
artillery, using black powder, had not been able to stand within range
of the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident that the Gatlings
were troubled by no such consideration, for they were advancing all the
while.
Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, after one false start, we in
turn rushed the next line of block-houses and intrenchments, and then
swung to the left and took the chain of hills immediately fronting
Santiago. Here I found myself on the extreme front, in command of the
fragments of all six regiments of the cavalry division. I received
orders to halt where I was, but to hold the hill at all hazards. The
Spaniards were heavily reinforced and they opened a tremendous fire
upon us from their batteries and trenches. We laid down just behind the
gentle crest of the hill, firing as we got the chance, but, for the
most part, taking the fire without responding. As the afternoon wore
on, however, the Spaniards became bolder, and made an attack upon the
position. They did not push it home, but they did advance, their firing
being redoubled. We at once ran forward to the crest and opened on
them, and, as we did so, the unmistakable drumming of the Gatlings
opened abreast of us, to our right, and the men cheered again. As soon
as the attack was definitely repulsed, I strolled over to find out
about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut. Parker with two of his
guns right on our left, abreast of our men, who at that time were
closer to the Spaniards than any others.
From thence on, Parker’s Gatlings were our inseparable companions
throughout the siege. They were right up at the front. When we dug our
trenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and put them in the
trenches. His men and ours slept in the same bomb-proofs and shared
with one another whenever either side got a supply of beans or coffee
and sugar. At no hour of the day or night was Parker anywhere but where
we wished him to be, in the event of an attack. If a troop of my
regiment was sent off to guard some road or some break in the lines, we
were almost certain to get Parker to send a Gatling along, and, whether
the change was made by day or by night, the Gatling went. Sometimes we
took the initiative and started to quell the fire of the Spanish
trenches; sometimes they opened upon us; but, at whatever hour of the
twenty-four the fighting began, the drumming of the Gatlings was soon
heard through the cracking of our own carbines.
I have had too little experience to make my judgment final; but
certainly, if I were to command either a regiment or a brigade, whether
of cavalry or infantry, I would try to get a Gatling battery—under a
good man—with me. I feel sure that the greatest possible assistance
would be rendered, under almost all circumstances, by such a Gatling
battery, if well handled; for I believe that it could be pushed fairly
to the front of the firing-line. At any rate, this is the way that
Lieut. Parker used his battery when he went into action at San Juan,
and when he kept it in the trenches beside the Rough Riders before
Santiago.
_Theodore Roosevelt._
Map—Santiago and Surrounding Area.
CHAPTER I. L’ENVOI.
The history of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, is to a
certain extent the history of the Santiago campaign. The detachment was
organized on the spur of the moment, to utilize material which would
otherwise have been useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all the
campaign. It participated in all the fighting of that campaign, except
the fight at La Guasimas, and was disbanded upon the return of the
Fifth Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships were endured by the Fifth
Corps were shared by this detachment; whatever dangers were faced by
the Fifth Corps were faced by it also; where the hottest fighting
occurred this detachment went in and stayed; and at the surrender it
was paraded, to use the words of General Shafter, “Upon that portion of
the line which it occupied so promptly and defended so well.”
But this memoir is not intended as a history of that campaign nor of
the Fifth Corps. The author has not the data available to cover so
large a field, nor the ability to do justice to the courage, fortitude,
and endurance so heroically displayed by that gallant army. That story
will be written by abler pens, and will be the wonder of the world when
it is told.
This story is that of an experiment. It is told to lay before the
general public, as well as the military critic, the work of a little
detachment of thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon, organized
in the short space of four days preceding July 1, 1898, and which
without proper equipment, adequate instruction, or previous training,
in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in spite of obstacles
enough to make the mere retrospect sickening, still achieved for itself
a warm place in the hearts of all true soldiers, and covered itself
with glory upon the hardest fought battle-field of the Hispano-American
War.
This story is to commemorate the gallantry of the enlisted men who
helped to make history and revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It will
tell of the heroism of the plain American Regular, who, without hope of
preferment or possibility of reward, boldly undertook to confute the
erroneous theories of military compilers, who, without originality or
reason, have unblushingly cribbed the labored efforts of foreign
officers, and foisted these compilations of second-hand opinions upon
the American Army as military text-books of authority and weight. These
literary soldiers declared, following the lead of their foreign guides,
that “The value of machine guns on the battle-field is doubtful,” and
that “Their offensive value is probably very small.” They also agreed,
with most touching unanimity, that “A direct assault upon a fortified
position, occupied by good, unshaken infantry, armed with the modern
rifle and plentifully supplied with ammunition is sure to fail, unless
made by overwhelming numbers and prepared by strong and accurate fire
by artillery.”
These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers were destined to see
all their pet theories exploded by the grim old mountain puma from
California and his brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, so far as
they are capable of learning, that the American Regular makes tactics
as he needs them; that the rules of war established by pen soldiers do
not form the basis of actual operations in the field; that theories
must go to the wall before the stern logic of irrefutable facts; and
that deductions based on the drill-made automatons of European armies
are not applicable to an army composed of American Volunteer Regulars,
led by our trained officers.
We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, and hence without
“eyes”; not supported by artillery; in the most difficult country over
which soldiers ever operated, and without maps or reconnaissance—in
twenty days shut up and captured an army of twice its own effective
strength, in a strongly fortified city, with better served and more
numerous artillery.
We shall find that when the “sledge” was not at hand, American
ingenuity was able to use the “mallet” instead, making light machine
guns perform all the function of artillery, and dispensing altogether,
so far as any practical results were concerned, with that expensive and
much overrated arm; that the Regular private is capable of meeting all
demands upon his intelligence, and that the American non. com. is the
superior of foreign officers.
It is also hoped to place before the intelligent American public some
correct ideas of the new arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiago for
the first time in the history of the world. The machine gun is the
latest practical product of American inventive genius applied to war.
The first form of this weapon tried, the mitrailleuse, was not very
successful. It failed, not on account of faults of construction, or
imperfect mechanism, but because its proper tactical employment had not
been thought out by the French army. Since that time machine guns have
been greatly improved, but no one has succeeded in making their great
value appreciated by military authorities. The failures of the French
brought the gun into disfavor, and created a prejudice against its
employment.
The Artillery of the world, which poses in every country as an _élite_
body of scientific fighters, and is often found on the battle-field to
be an aggregation of abstruse theorists, were jealous and contemptuous.
They said, “See how easily the artillery knocked out machine guns at
Gravelotte.” The Cavalry of the world, famous everywhere for an
_esprit-du-corps_ which looks haughtily down on all other arms of the
service, were too deeply absorbed in the merits of saber vs. revolver,
and in the proper length of their spectacular plumes, to give a second
thought to this new, untried, and therefore worthless weapon. The
world’s Infantry, resting upon the assumption that it is the backbone
of all armies, and the only real, reliable fighting body under all
conditions, left the consideration of these vague dreams of mechanical
destructiveness to lunatics, cranks, and philanthropists.
In our own country the Ordnance Department, which is the trial court
before which all military inventions must appear, scouted the idea of
usefulness of machine guns even after war was declared, and adhered to
the view that machine guns, in the very nature of things, could never
be useful except in the defense of fortified positions; that they never
could be brought up on the battlefield, nor used if they were brought
up. This view was that of a prominent young officer of that department
who wrote a report on the subject, and it seemed to express the views
of the department.
This view must have been that of our War Department, for it did not
even acknowledge the receipt of drawings and specifications for a
machine gun carriage, offered freely to the Government as a gift by the
inventor six months before the war, together with the first correct
tactical outline of the proper use of machine guns ever filed in any
War Office in the world. This invention was designed to facilitate the
use of the machine gun by making its advance with the skirmish line
possible on the offensive, and was recommended by the whole staff of
the Infantry and Cavalry School as a meritorious device, worthy of
trial. The discussion filed with the invention pointed out, for the
first time, the correct tactical employment of the weapon, and staked
the military reputation and ability of the author and inventor on the
correctness of his views.
From these facts it may be gathered that there was required a certain
degree of originality and energy to get together and organize a machine
gun battery for the Santiago campaign.
The project was conceived and executed. The service rendered by this
battery has forever set at rest the question of the proper tactical use
of the machine gun arm, both on the offensive and defensive. These
things are now beyond the realm of theory. They are a demonstrated
problem. The solution is universally acknowledged to be correct.
This is the history of that detachment.