POLITICS IN TUNIS.
A survey of the situation — M. Roustan’s policy — The first
campaign — The Treaty of the Bardo — The insurrection —
Bombardment of Sfax — Occupation of Tunis — March upon Kairwan
— Capture of Kairwan — Results of the French policy — English
interests — Estrangement of Italy.
I have completed the record of my visit to Tunis, but I shall hardly
have accomplished my whole task until I have said something regarding
the remarkable political situation which I found in existence
there. From the foregoing pages I have excluded politics as far
as possible; but the political problem which Tunis at this moment
presents to the world is so remarkable, that it is impossible to pass
it by unnoticed; and I shall attempt, therefore, in this concluding
Chapter, by giving some extracts from my diary referring to this
aspect of my visit, to convey to the reader an idea of the state of
things existing in the Regency at the time when I was there. Those who
trouble themselves to read these pages will see that more than once I
have indulged in the gratuitous blunder of prophesying. My prophecies
were not only written on the dates mentioned, but were printed a few
days afterwards in the _Standard_ newspaper. I do not think however
that my predictions as to what must be the result of M. Roustan’s
adventures in Tunis have proved to be very far wrong. Writing several
weeks before the famous Roustan-Rochefort trial, I gave in outline
most of the facts which were brought to light during the course
of that trial, and upon some other points of interest, such as the
probable action of the insurgent Arabs after the fall of Kairwan, I
foretold with tolerable accuracy what has actually come to pass. Let
me say at once, however, that the credit of this is not due to me,
but to those clear-sighted and dispassionate men with whom I had the
good fortune to be brought in contact during my stay in the Regency,
and who did so much to enlighten my mind as to the real nature of
the situation existing there.
And here it may be proper to observe, by way of showing that England
is not without an interest of her own in Tunisian politics, that
not fewer than 10,000 subjects of the Queen are to be found in the
Regency. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that these are almost
all Maltese, the number of actual Englishmen in the Regency being
probably under twenty. As coachmen, boatmen, gardeners, artisans,
and coffee-shop keepers, the Maltese find plenty to do in all parts
of Tunis. Their moral character is not very high, and at times they
give her Majesty’s Consul-General not a little trouble; but they
are English subjects, protected by treaty; and it is the undoubted
duty of our government to watch over their interests. That recent
events in Tunis have not been very favourable to these persons is
only too certain. Some thirty British subjects have been killed
during the course of the war between the French and the Arabs,
and an enormous quantity of property, belonging not merely to
Maltese, but to English merchants trading through agents in the
Regency, has been destroyed. The loss of life is chiefly due to
the Arabs; but the loss of property is almost entirely due to the
French, who have peculiar notions as to the rights of neutrals,
where a question of loot is concerned. English trade with Tunis
is very large. The esparto grass, which is exported from Sfax and
other places on the coast, is almost all brought to this country;
and the name of one English firm, Messrs. Perry, Bury, and Co.,
of Manchester, seemed to be on the lips of all the traders in the
Gulf of Hammamet. England as a great consumer of the products of
Tunis, naturally supplies that country in turn with many of the
articles required by her inhabitants, and it was pleasing to see
that genuine English goods—Manchester cottons, Sheffield knives,
and London pickles, sauces, and tinned meats—enjoyed a practical
monopoly in the towns of the Regency. It is not, therefore, correct
to represent this country as having no interest in Tunis. At the
same time it would be a mistake to exaggerate the extent of that
interest, or to give way to any imaginary fears, because France,
by one of the most cynical acts of aggression on record, has made
herself the mistress of the destinies of the country. Her act is
a serious one so far as the Italians are concerned; but England, so
long as she retains Malta can afford to look on at the endless schemes
and counter-schemes of the rivals, with something like indifference.
When I reached Tunis the second act in the comedy devised by
M. Roustan was in full progress. The Bey had succumbed to the
inevitable, when the French Consul waited upon him in his palace at
Manouba, and, pointing to the Republican troops drawn up within sight
of the windows of the room where they were seated, warned the unlucky
Ruler that the occupation of Tunis would be immediately effected,
unless the treaty which was presented to him were signed. Those who
were in Tunis at that time know what anguish prevailed, not merely
at the palace but in the capital, during this crisis. Mr. Reade
had been the adviser of the Bey up to this point. His Highness had
placed himself entirely in his hands, and the English Consul-General
had given him the best possible counsel. It was at Mr. Reade’s
instigation that the Bey had not only desisted from offering any
resistance to the progress of the French troops through his territory,
but had despatched his brother, the heir apparent, Si Ali Bey, at
the head of the Tunisian army, for the purpose of cooperating with
the French commander in his operations against the “Kroumirs.”
Everybody in Tunis knew then what everybody in France knows now,
that the ravages of the so-called Kroumirs were a mere pretext for
the invasion of the Regency, and that the expedition was sent forth
in the interests of French financiers, who found their interests
threatened by the schemes of Italian rivals.
The first and natural wish of the Bey was to oppose the French
invasion by force; for he was perfectly conscious of the fact that
the Republic had not the shadow of justification for its attack
upon his territory. Mr. Reade, by his urgent solicitations induced
the Bey to abstain from the fatal step of resistance; he even went
further, and, as I have shown, got him to send his own brother and
the Tunisian army, not to oppose but to cooperate with the French. In
the meantime, it was hoped that by urgent diplomatic representations
to the different courts of Europe some steps might be taken to avert
the impending catastrophe. M. Roustan and his friends were greatly
disappointed when they learned that the Bey, by the wise advice
of Mr. Reade, was not going to fall into the trap they had laid
for him, by offering any resistance to the advance of the French
troops. To most men this step on the part of his Highness would have
seemed a fatal bar to further action on their part. M. Roustan,
however, did not allow himself to be materially hindered by
the Bey’s discreet conduct. Abandoning even the semblance of a
pretext he brought the French troops up to the village of Manouba,
within four miles of Tunis, and within sight of the Bardo and the
Bey’s private palace. Then, as we have seen, he presented his
monstrous treaty for signature. The Bey’s agony, as I have said,
was intense. He knew that to permit the occupation of Tunis would
be to seal his own doom. Henceforth he would be merely a puppet in
the hands of M. Roustan, and the greater part of his Arab subjects
would treat him with the contempt due to a traitor. On the other
hand, he could not fail to see that the Roustan treaty was merely
the prelude to the seizure of his sceptre by the French. With the
aid of Mr. Broadley, an English barrister, he drew up a dignified
protest against the action of France, and telegraphed this to all
the courts of Europe, during the few hours which his hard taskmaster
was good enough to allow him for consideration. Up to the date of
my leaving Tunis—November 3rd—not one of the recipients of this
protest, which was sent off in May, had found time to acknowledge
its receipt. So, deserted by Europe, and alas! no longer allowed to
feel confidence in Mr. Reade’s power to help him, the Bey signed
the treaty, and placed himself in the hands of M. Roustan.
This was the first act of the comedy. It was followed by an interval,
during which there was apparent peace in the Regency. Mustapha,
the barber’s boy who had become Prime Minister, was shipped off to
Europe, and M. Roustan installed himself as master of the land. All
manner of concessions were granted to French companies. Railways,
harbours, agricultural banks, public works of every description were
projected. The Italians found themselves driven to the wall. Even
English subjects, like Mr. Levy, saw their rights rudely interfered
with; for M. Roustan was master, and all others had to submit. But
presently there came a change. The French troops were returning to
their own country. It did not suit the purpose of the Ministry to
allow the people of France to imagine that anything like a war was
in progress. So it was announced in the Chambers that the Treaty of
the Bardo had settled everything, and that it was no longer necessary
to keep any large army of occupation in Tunis. It was at this moment
that the insurrection broke out at Sfax. The Arabs there proclaimed
themselves independent of the Bey, who had sold them to the infidel,
and invited their countrymen to join them. The first news of this
insurrection was sent up to Tunis by Mr. Gallia, our Vice-Consul at
Susa, who happens to have also a residence and place of business
at Sfax. Mr. Gallia’s reward was to have his house plundered by
the French troops when they entered Sfax. Of the bombardment of
that place by the French, and of its capture, and the loot by the
victorious troops, I need only say here that it resulted in the
spread of the insurrectionary feeling throughout the Regency. The
whole Arab race boiled over with indignation; and outrages, and
murders as horrible as that which occurred at the railway station at
Oued Zergha, became common. The French troops were hurried back to
the Regency; three columns were formed for the advance of an army
against Kairwan, the sacred city, which was suspected of being the
centre of disaffection, and Tunis itself was occupied by a large
force of Republican troops. It was at this moment that I arrived
in the Regency, and from this point the following extracts from my
letters will afford some idea of the political situation.
_Tunis, October 18th._—It is difficult to convey to the mind of
the English reader an idea of the state of things now prevailing in
Tunis, at a distance of barely four days from London; and it would
probably be still more difficult to make any man of ordinary honesty
understand the full meaning of that drama—half comic half tragic,
and wholly disreputable—which is now being played out by the most
cynical of actors under the eyes of the entire world. The visitor
to Tunis at this moment finds himself in a country in which a state
of war prevails. At Goletta immense French transports may be seen,
disembarking troops and stores sufficient for a campaign against
Germany. All along the short line of railway between the port and
the capital, French camps are scattered; trains of artillery may be
seen in slow progress towards the front, and ambulances provided
with all the appliances which modern surgery has invented are
also visible. Here, in Tunis, French sentries are mounted upon the
crumbling white walls of the Kasbah, the great citadel of the place;
French camps are pitched in the open spaces within the forts; French
patrols pass through the streets at regular intervals, and the Grand
Hotel, where a French general is installed, is the real headquarters
of the Government of the city. Yesterday three columns of French
troops, numbering in all some 30,000 men, began their march—two from
the neighbourhood of Tunis, one from Susa—towards the sacred city of
Kairwan, which has been selected as the special place to be honoured
by a demonstration of French valour. If ever there was a country in
a state of war, it is Tunis at the present moment. And yet no war has
been declared; no pretext for military operations has been discovered,
and a portion at least of the Parisian press maintains that no war
exists. Even more startling than the contrast between the state of
things visible here, and that in the existence of which official
France pretends to believe, is the contrast between the condition of
Tunis now and its condition twelve months ago, or even more recently.
At the beginning of the present year there was no European country
which could vie in peacefulness, in security of life and property,
with Tunis. There were of course certain tracts of wild mountainous
country in the north-west portion of the Bey’s territory, where
it would have been unsafe for any European to venture. But apart
from these very limited districts, there was no part of Tunis where
life was not perfectly safe. So recently as last April, Lord and
Lady Bective visited Kairwan; and they not only did so in perfect
safety, but they were received as honoured and welcome guests by
the Arabs of that famous city. Here in Tunis no one thought for a
moment of any danger from the native population. The tourist could
wander at his will among the interesting ruins which abound in the
neighbouring country, not only without dread of being subjected to
violence, but with a feeling of absolute security which he could
hardly entertain in London or Paris. Now, all this is changed. No
man would dare to travel half a dozen miles from the city—to do
so would be to court almost certain death. It would be almost as
dangerous to venture into any of the villages which lie under the
very shadow of the walls of Tunis. And even within the city itself,
Europeans are warned on no account to venture out after dark. If you
walk through the Arab quarter, averted faces and muttered curses
meet you on every side; while the air is filled with rumours of
an impending catastrophe. Twice during the present week the French
troops in the city have been roused in the dead of night, and marched
hurriedly to a central point, in order to resist a general rising
of the Arabs, which everybody expected, and which it was believed
had already begun. The imaginations of the non-Mussulman population,
stimulated by all that they see around them, are still further excited
by the horrible and, alas! true stories of tortures perpetrated upon
unhappy Christians who have fallen into the hands of the Arabs; and
everywhere a feeling not only of insecurity but of positive dread,
has replaced that which prevailed last year. And these are the first
results of that famous treaty which M. Roustan wrung from the Bey less
than six months since, and by which France, or rather her Consular
Agent, was made absolute master of the properties and the destinies
of the Tunisian Government and people. It is obvious to everybody now
that a fatal blunder was made by the French Cabinet when it placed
itself in the hands of M. Roustan. It is a blunder which has already
cost an enormous sum of money, and a serious expenditure of life,
and it is one which may yet have consequences of the gravest kind,
affecting not merely France but other European countries whose
interests are still dearer to the Englishman.
It is not my business, however, to enter into a political disquisition
on the origin and objects of the Tunisian expedition. I have done my
duty when, as an eye-witness, I point out the extraordinary results of
the Roustan policy up to the present moment. That policy has, in the
first place, compelled France to enter upon a war on a large scale
against a nation with whom it professedly has no quarrel; and, in
the second place, it has entirely destroyed the security of life and
property in Tunis, and has made one of the most peaceful and harmless
races in the world, the bitter enemies not merely of France, but of
all the powers and peoples of Europe. With more than 50,000 French
soldiers in Tunis, and yet with the very streets of the capital itself
in such a state that Europeans dare not move about them freely, it can
hardly be contended that the civilizing and pacifying mission of the
French Consular Agent has been altogether as successful as might have
been desired. As to the secret history of that mission—the history
which is upon the lips of everybody in Tunis—it is not for me to
tell it here; but there is some probability that the revelation of the
truth will not be long delayed. M. Camille Pelletan and other French
deputies have come to Tunis for the special purpose of learning the
truth on the subject; and some startling revelations may be expected
when the debates begin in the Chambers.
Within the next fortnight it is believed that decisive military
operations will have been carried out against Kairwan. Yesterday,
as I have stated already, three French columns started for that
place. The first column, under the command of General Saussier,
to whom the command in chief is entrusted, has started from Tunis,
and advances by way of the famous Enfida estate. The suggestion
made here is, that this column will accomplish a double purpose;
it will not only aid in the conquest of Kairwan, but will put the
French in possession of that particular piece of property the name
of which was mixed up so prominently with the early history of
the Tunisian question. The second column, under General Logerot,
has marched from Zaghouan, and will make a slight _détour_ to
the west, on its way to the sacred city. The third has the port
of Susa as its point of departure; and it is to advance by means
of a temporary railway which is to be constructed to Kairwan. The
distance from Susa to Kairwan is barely thirty miles, so that there
ought to be no difficulty in the construction of this line. Another
column, intended for the pacification of the country as well as the
conquest of Kairwan, is now moving across the Bey’s territory from
Tebessa. The distance it has to traverse is, however, so great that
it can hardly take part in the operations against the city itself,
unless those operations should be unexpectedly delayed.
No one, of course, can entertain any doubt as to the result of the
operations against Kairwan. The famous city is doomed. Optimists
now can only pray that its captors will show respect for the
feelings not merely of the Mussulman, but of the whole civilized
world. The “loot” of a place like Kairwan would be a disgrace
and a disaster. The world as it watches this great expedition against
Kairwan, undertaken, as I have shown, upon a scale of such magnitude,
ought to bear in mind the fact that Kairwan itself has been guilty
of no offence. It has offered, and is offering, no resistance to
the French army, although naturally enough the Arabs of Kairwan,
like the rest of the world, fail to see what special reason can
be alleged for the course now being pursued by France in a country
with which it does not pretend to be at war, and which it professes
that it has no desire to annex. No plea of military necessity can
therefore be put in on behalf of the expedition to which the French
are now committed. It is an expedition undertaken for the purpose
of giving the Gambettist Republic a new dose of “glory,” and of
putting an end, if possible, to awkward discussions in the French
Chambers. That is the plain truth about this march upon the sacred
city—a march which is regarded by all the Arabs, I need hardly say,
as being in itself an act of sacrilege. That it will not result in the
pacification of the country is firmly believed by competent military
authorities here. The Arabs, save a few of the more fanatical,
will in all probability escape into the mountainous districts of
the interior, or—and this is an eventuality which it is necessary
that English statesmen should seriously consider—they will make
their way across the frontier into Tripoli, and throw themselves
into the arms of the great Mussulman force already assembled there,
where they will nurse their indignation against the assailants of
their brethren in race and religion.
_Tunis, October 25th._—The truth about Tunis has not yet been
told to the world. Part of it has, it is true, been revealed in the
columns of certain of the ultra-Radical journals of Paris; but,
partly because of the quarter in which the revelations have been
made, and partly, also, because of the evident bias of the writers,
those stories have not attracted so much attention as they might
reasonably have been expected to do. It will not, however, be from
any want of zeal on the part of inquirers after it, if the whole
truth regarding the Tunisian question is not made known to the world
at no distant date. This city is now swarming, I shall not say with
spies, but with investigators of all descriptions, bent upon learning
everything regarding the proceedings of M. Roustan and his wonderful
_entourage_. We have here, among others, M. Camille Pelletan, the
lieutenant of Dr. Clémenceau, and M. Pelletan does not even affect
to conceal the fact that he is preparing the materials for a savage
indictment, not merely of M. Roustan and the French Ministry, but of
M. Gambetta himself, when the Chambers meet. That he is satisfied
with the success that has attended his efforts to unravel all the
mysteries of the Tunisian question, I have the best authority for
saying; and there can be no doubt that when he makes his promised
statement to the Chamber of Deputies he will have a tale to tell
which must produce a very lively sensation. It is not only, however,
among French Deputies and Special Correspondents that the inquiries
after the truth are to be found. Strange as it may seem, at least
one other country besides that immediately concerned in the Tunisian
expedition is interesting itself in what is passing or has passed
here. Tunis has lately witnessed a remarkable influx of mysterious
Germans—gentlemen, for the most part, of a decidedly military
bearing, whose sauerkrautish French would alone suffice to betray
their nationality to the observant. These gentlemen are by no means
obtrusive in their demeanour. They frequent none of the hotels; they
might even seem to be anxious to escape the observation of the French
authorities. They are chiefly to be found in certain small cafés
in the European quarter which do not appear to have been discovered
as yet by the officers of the French army. Here they are, however,
and for what purpose? They are not bent on seeking pleasure. It is
only a mad Englishman who will come to Tunis for pleasure at a time
like the present. They are not engaged in commercial pursuits; they
are not even the correspondents of German newspapers. All that can
be said about them is that they show a most unwearied assiduity in
collecting facts, both political and military, with regard to the
past and the present of French rule in Tunis. They also will aid
the world, it may be assumed, in arriving at a full knowledge of the
truth regarding one of the most remarkable episodes in modern history.
And what is that truth? For obvious reasons my pen is restrained
from writing of it. It will be better to wait till the debate in
the French Chambers for the full chronicle of the scandals that
surround this question; yet even now not a little may be said. I see
it still repeated in certain newspapers in England, that after all
the French have only done in Tunis what we did in Afghanistan. More
amazing ignorance of actual facts than that which is shown by this
assertion, it would be difficult to conceive. Granting for the
moment that our policy in Afghanistan was as bad as these papers
believe it to have been, there would still be not even the faintest
similarity between the two cases. I have never seen it hinted that we
entered Afghanistan in order to advance the pecuniary interest of a
coterie of adventurers at Calcutta or London; nor has it ever been
suggested that a fair and frail Helen was closely connected with
the origin of our expedition to Cabul. It is said here, however,
upon authority which is unimpeachable, that the violent seizure of
Tunis by the French, and all the misery, loss of life, and confusion
that have resulted from that step, can be traced directly to the
visit of a certain Tunisian lady to Paris, and to the acquaintances
she there formed amongst a band of well-known financiers. This lady
had exceptional influence over a very powerful person in Tunis. She
had exercised similar influence over other powerful persons in the
place before she made the acquaintance of this particular gentleman,
and altogether she occupied a very extraordinary and important place
in Tunisian affairs. On the particular visit to Paris to which I
refer, her sympathies were enlisted on behalf of the speculators
in question. She returned to Tunis resolved to procure for them a
most important concession from the Bey—a concession which would
practically have placed the greater part of the country in pawn
to them. By means of the gentleman whose movements she controlled,
she brought the matter under the notice of the Bey. His Highness,
however, refused to grant the concession, pleading the perfectly
accurate reason that he could not do so without violating his treaty
engagements with England and other countries. Thereupon he was
bluntly told that he would live to repent his decision; and that
the concession he had been asked to make voluntarily was trifling
compared to that which would within twelve months be wrung from him
by force. In fact, it was by no means obscurely hinted that the days
of his rule and of Tunisian independence were numbered. Little more
than six months afterwards the “ravages” of the Kroumirs were
discovered; French journalists declared it to be intolerable that
their country should be exposed to insults and injuries at the hands
of a horde of savages; and one of the gentlemen who had been most
urgent in seeking the concession of which I have spoken from the Bey,
himself proposed in the Chamber of Deputies that an expedition should
be undertaken for the purpose of vindicating the dignity of France,
and chastising the aggressors. From that expedition came, I need
hardly say, the Treaty with M. Roustan, the cession of Bizerta and
a considerable tract of territory, the submission of the Bey’s
Government to that of France, and now the occupation of Tunis itself
and the practical conversion of the Regency into a French dependency.
All these facts have been hinted at, if they have not been
clearly stated before; but it is well that they should be stated
again. Connected with them are numberless scandals, some of so
flagrant a character that I cannot even hint at their nature. But, as
I have said, the searchers after truth are abroad, and we shall have a
highly spiced dish of Tunisian facts served up in the French Chambers
at no distant date. The Enfida case, which is one of the side issues
connected with the affair, is in itself a very remarkable instance
of the manner in which those who represent France in this country
are trifling with the national honour. A few months ago, before the
great blow had been struck, and when Tunis was still independent, the
French authorities, after much correspondence, professed themselves
anxious to submit Mr. Levy’s claim to arbitration. England saw then
no reason for withdrawing it from the ordinary tribunals. Suddenly,
however, the attitude of France has undergone a curious change. Now
that Tunisian independence is completely at an end—now that the
Bey is little more than a prisoner in his own palace—now that the
French flag floats above the Tunisian one on the towers of the Kasbah,
and now that French soldiers and policemen are patrolling the streets
of Tunis itself—now, in fact, that France is omnipotent and can
control or crush any Tunisian institution, M. Roustan has turned round
upon himself, refuses to submit the Enfida dispute to arbitration,
and has actually sent it before one of those local tribunals the
integrity and competency of which he stoutly denied so long as there
was the remotest chance of their acting in an independent manner. I
am glad to say that the English Government seem to be inclined to
insist upon arbitration by some wholly independent party as the only
satisfactory solution of the question, and in this resolve it may
be hoped that the French Government will eventually acquiesce.
The diplomatic struggles and rivalries of places like Tunis are
proverbial, and there is no need to say that the hottest warfare
has been waged here between the representatives of the different
European powers. I am glad to say that amid the strife Mr. Reade,
the English representative, has been able to keep himself entirely
aloof from all personal jealousies or local scandals; and that,
whilst maintaining with firmness and dignity the interests and honour
of his country, he has not given offence even to the most arrogant of
his colleagues. On the other hand, M. Roustan is now being denounced
by everybody, and particularly by Frenchmen themselves. Except in
his own immediate circle nobody seems to have a good word for him,
and his early downfall is freely predicted. Among the offences laid
to his charge are the contradictory promises he is said to have
made to many of the prominent actors in this Tunisian question. He
is believed to have intrigued not merely with the Bey, but with his
Prime Minister, the ex-barber’s-apprentice Mustapha, with Ali Bey,
the Bey’s elder, and with Taib Bey his younger, brother. It follows
from all that has happened, and from all that is now being brought
to light, that Frenchmen themselves are most anxious to secure his
removal. The misfortune is, that his removal will now exercise but
small appreciable influence upon the future of Tunis. It is in the
possession of France at this moment. The noble Gulf of Tunis, the
trade of the country, all its strategical points, are in the keeping
of the French; and though the latter will have to pay a heavy price
in blood, money, and reputation for the prize they have thus secured,
they are not likely to relinquish it merely because M. Roustan has
been exposed and punished.
It is not merely on the side of the French that curious intrigues
are just now in full progress under one’s very eyes. The Bey,
as I have said, is practically a prisoner in his palace at Goletta,
utterly dejected and heartbroken, and so completely devoid of spirit
that he has just conferred—need I say at whose bidding?—his
highest decoration upon the French general commanding the troops
in occupation of Tunis—an occupation which every Arab resents as
an insult to his nationality and his creed. It is not surprising
in these circumstances that rumours should be current regarding a
probable change in the nominal rulership. Ali Bey, the next brother
of the Bey, who is known as the Bey of the Camp, eagerly puts himself
forward as the supplanter of the reigning Bey. Unfortunately for his
chances he is very deaf, and, moreover, he is more than suspected of
complicity in many of the intrigues of M. Roustan. His own troops are
at this moment in a state of almost open mutiny against him, and more
than once he has been denounced when riding through his own camp, as a
traitor who had sold his country. The third brother, Taib Bey, lives
a retired life at the Marsa, in a large and beautiful country-house,
not far from the residence of the English Consul. He seems to be
a man of considerable shrewdness and intelligence. Last of all on
the list of Pretenders is Mustapha, whose friends openly declare
that he is about to return to this country as Governor-General—a
French Governor-General of course. I should imagine, however, that
his chances are dependent upon the fortunes of his friend M. Roustan.
_Tunis, October 30th._—There is something very amusing in the manner
in which the capture of Kairwan has fallen flat upon the European
community here. How the intelligence may have been received in Paris
I am not of course aware. Perhaps the _coup de théâtre_ of General
Farre and M. Roustan may have been successful, and the Parisians may
have applauded the occupation of the sacred city as though it were
an achievement equal to another Solferino or Magenta. But here even
the dullest of persons sees too much of what is passing behind the
scenes to be deceived. It was known early last week that Kairwan was
to be occupied exactly in time to allow of the news reaching Paris
on Friday evening. The day before, I received a note from an officer
with General Etienne’s force, dated Tuesday, and telling me that
they were in sight of Kairwan, never having fired a shot during the
march. I was therefore quite prepared for the receipt of the news of
the occupation. On Friday morning, about ten o’clock, the transport
_Sarthe_ steamed into Goletta, bringing the expected tidings; and
two hours afterwards everybody in Tunis was—laughing at it. The
prodigious achievement, which was to crush the insurrection and strike
terror into the hearts of the Arabs in North Africa, had resolved
itself into a simple promenade across forty miles of sandy desert,
and the holy city had been yielded up without a blow being struck
in its defence. It was quite evident that the Arabs were too clever
to fall into the trap which had been so ostentatiously laid for them
by the French. A battle at Kairwan would, according to French ideas,
have justified the destruction of the city; whilst it would at the
same time have crippled the power of the Arabs. But the Arabs are
as far from subjection as they ever were.
We have a fresh instance of mismanagement in this capture of
Kairwan. The plan of campaign was that the two columns of Susa and
Zaghouan should meet in front of the city on Tuesday last. Somehow or
other, however, they “missed their connexions,” as the Yankees
would say. General Etienne performed his part; General Saussier,
the superior officer, failed in his. Although he encountered but
trifling resistance, his straggling and ill-arranged column could not
arrive at Kairwan on Wednesday night. The funny thing is, that there
is much indignation among the leading officers here against General
Etienne! It is said that it was his first duty to await the arrival of
his superior, and that he has shown “indecent haste” in fulfilling
his instructions and reaching and occupying Kairwan. General Etienne,
however, is the only man who has shown himself up to his work during
this campaign. The work has not been very heavy, but such as it is
he has done it well. On reaching the city, Colonel de Moulin was
sent forward to communicate with the Governor, one of the Bey’s
servants, and a man of much intelligence. A white flag had previously
been hoisted on the tower of the great Mosque of Okba. The Governor
explained to Colonel de Moulin that he was the loyal subject of the
Bey, and was prepared to receive the French army as the allies of his
Highness. He only begged that the mosques might be held inviolate,
and that the army would be content with passing through the town, and
would not attempt to take up quarters in it. Colonel de Moulin asked
the Governor to come with him to the spot where General Etienne was
awaiting the result of the interview. This the Governor did. After
some conversation the French general intimated that he must take
possession of the Kasbah, or citadel within the walls, but that in
all other respects he would comply with the Governor’s wishes. The
French column was thereupon formed up, and each battalion being
headed by its trumpeters marched into the sacred city to the sound of
shrill martial music. The streets were crowded with Arabs, arrayed
in their burnouses of many colours, and all watched with interest
the passage of the troops. Anger and indignation were depicted upon
every countenance. Very little else was to be seen that was worthy of
notice by the unwelcome guests for whom the city had opened its gates.
The streets are narrow, tortuous, and ill-paved; the houses of the
prevailing Moorish type; and the great mosques are not particularly
conspicuous so far as their exteriors are concerned. Within they
contain many noble columns and antiquities, and _curios_ of enormous
interest and value. But no one was allowed to violate these shrines,
within which no Christian foot has yet penetrated. There was general
disappointment on the part of all when, the march through having been
finished, the troops were brought out of the city, at the opposite
gate to that by which they had entered. The detachment occupying
the Kasbah was a small one, General Etienne feeling justified,
in the absence of all resistance, in making this concession to
the wishes of the Governor. He had previously given the latter to
understand that he would hold him personally responsible for the
maintenance of order within the walls. The situation chosen for
the camp is good. It is within easy distance of the city, and has
been entrenched—not because there is any fear of attack from the
people of Kairwan themselves, but because of the possibility of a
sudden raid from the neighbouring hills, into which the insurgent
Arabs have fled for refuge.
Such is the story of the occupation of Kairwan by General Etienne;
and it will be seen at once how tame a story it is. But though there
has been nothing brilliant in this mean achievement, and though
the struggle with the Arabs has been hardly advanced a single step
by the occupation of this city, it has a degree of importance. The
excitement and resentment among the Arab population of the Regency
has been greatly intensified by an outrage upon a shrine which they
have long regarded as sacred. Here in Tunis, the Arabs openly declare
that the insult thus put upon their faith must be avenged in blood;
and outside the city walls the populace is seething with rage. The
hope which apparently prevails is that the Sultan may come to their
assistance even now, and that with the aid of his troops they may
avenge themselves upon the invader. It is to put an end to this hope
that the Bey has been induced, or compelled, to issue a proclamation
to his people. This proclamation, which appears on all the walls
in the Arab quarter, states that the Sultan has sent his troops to
Tripoli merely to preserve order, and that they are now about to
be withdrawn. Still, the very fact that it should have been thought
necessary to issue such a notice, shows how strongly the French are
impressed with a sense of the danger which threatens them on that
side. Nor is their anxiety groundless. Advices from Tripoli show
that the excitement among the Mussulman population there is intense,
and is being fomented by the action of fanatical preachers, who are
passing from place to place, stirring up popular hatred against the
infidel. Many hundreds of Tripolitans, including a large number
of Turkish soldiers, have crossed the frontier, and are joining
the Tunisian Arabs in these mountain fastnesses, in which they are
preparing for the guerilla operations they evidently contemplate. It
is, therefore, in that direction that the Tunisian question will
probably next appear in a serious form.
_Malta, Nov. 5th._—The rains were beginning to set in over Tunis
when I left the Regency, and with the commencement of the rainy
season the best authorities were agreed in believing that the
fighting would cease. The Arabs have spent several months, during
which no work could be done upon the land, in assailing their hated
enemy, and they have inflicted upon him not only severe losses,
but the necessity of taking the most costly and extensive measures
for maintaining his hold upon the country. Now that the time is come
when the natives must either attend to their fields or allow the next
harvest to be entirely lost, those who know them best feel convinced
of the course they will take. They will leave the mountains and come
down to the plains, not to fight, but to work. A few months hence,
when the harvest has been secured, there will probably be another
insurrectionary movement, which will break out sporadically in all
manner of unexpected places, and cause fresh trouble and expense to
the French. For the present, however, there will be something like
peace, save where General Saussier pursues his favourite occupation
of having some unfortunate Bedouin hanged, simply to encourage the
others. The moment seems, therefore, a favourable one for attempting
some review of the situation as a whole.
Whatever may be thought about the morality of the transactions which
have placed the French in command of Tunis—and I have spoken already
with quite sufficient plainness on that point—the English public
must make up their minds to one thing—that is, that France will not
quit her hold of the prize she has now got within her grasp. I have
spoken to many Frenchmen of influence and position who have visited
Tunis during the past month for the purpose of learning the truth
about the Tunisian question. There is not one of them who does not
admit that the series of transactions which have ended by placing
the tricolor on the Kasbah of the capital and the walls of Kairwan
reflect dishonour upon the national name; there is not one who is not
prepared to insist upon the exposure and punishment of M. Roustan
and his _entourage_. But I have not met a single Frenchman who has
expressed his willingness to retire from the country now that he
sees France in actual possession of it. “What! give up Tunis now,
after all the lives and the money we have spent in getting hold of
it! Give it up after the tremendous price in honour we have paid
to secure it! Never!” This is the French view of the matter; and
even the Englishman who has been educated by recent transactions in
Afghanistan and South Africa, must admit that there is some force
in the prevailing French sentiment upon the subject. But whether
that sentiment be just or not, let us at least not shut our eyes
to the plain fact which stares us in the face—the fact that,
whether M. Roustan is retained or dismissed, whether his conduct is
denounced or applauded, nobody believes that France will retire from
Tunis. There she is, and there she will stay, if for no other reason
than because she has now such extensive financial interests in the
country, that the clique of capitalists and jobbers who secretly
control her foreign policy cannot afford to let those interests
be sacrificed. But what must be the probable consequences of her
retaining the prize she has succeeded in seizing by an act of
international brigandage?
So far as other powers are concerned, there can be no doubt that Italy
is the heaviest sufferer for the moment. The interests of Italy in
Tunis far surpass those of any other country. Italian has hitherto
been the European language used there in all commercial transactions;
Italian capital has been most largely invested in the native
industries; and the vast majority of the Christian population have
hitherto claimed the protection of the Italian Consul-General. The
Italians themselves will not deny that they have for a long time
entertained a desire to do that which France has now done. They were
the keen and eager rivals of Frenchmen in all the various enterprises
designed for the development of Tunis. But either they were less bold
or were more scrupulous than their competitors. At all events they
had no M. Roustan to take the lead on their behalf, and thus, when
the moment for action arrived, they were left hopelessly behind. It is
impossible to exaggerate the rage and bitterness which now fill them
against the French. If the two nations were actually at this moment
at war with each other, the feeling could not be more hostile. Nor
need we be surprised at this. The loss of the Italians in actual
money in consequence of this transfer of Tunis to France is a very
heavy one. The French, it must be understood, are not doing things
by halves. They are already boasting that they will soon drive the
last Italian capitalist out of Tunis, that the Goletta Railway (the
purchase of which by an Italian company was the incident which fired
the train of subsequent events) will soon be in their hands, and
that before long they will be financially and commercially supreme.
All this the Italians see for themselves, and they are overwhelmed
with chagrin at the spectacle. But they feel also that their
_prestige_, and even their military position, has received a most
serious blow. With the French at Bizerta and Goletta they maintain
that they are unexpectedly outflanked. Various schemes have been put
forward in Italy in order to secure some compensation for the injury
thus inflicted upon the country. I find that in the important coast
towns the favourite idea of the Italian residents is that Tripoli
should be seized, in order to counterbalance the French acquisition
of Tunis. But at Tripoli itself that idea finds no favour, even
among the Italians; and the reason for this it is not difficult
to discover. Neither from a financial, a military, nor a political
point of view is Italy strong enough to secure Tripoli. Those who
are on the spot are well aware of this, and they are most anxious
to counteract the Chauvinist ideas of their fellow-countrymen at
a distance. Let me add, that France herself would be worsted in any
attack upon Tripoli. She may have the money and the men, but she lacks
the power necessary to enable her to defy, not merely the Tripolitan
Arabs, but the forces of united Europe. For the Italians to thrust
themselves into the wasp’s nest from which the insurrectionary
movement in Tunis originated, would be an act of supreme folly. To
say nothing of the course which England would be bound to take in
such a case—to say nothing of any resistance which might be offered
by the regular Turkish army—the Arabs of Tripoli are themselves
formidable enough to make any attack upon them by a State like Italy,
a most dangerous if not a hopeless undertaking. They are far more
fanatical than their co-religionists in Tunis; they are rich and
brave; and at this moment they are eager to throw themselves across
the border in order to revive the insurrectionary movement in the
Regency. The attempt of any Christian power to interfere with them
on their own territory would be the signal for the outbreak of a
“Holy War,” compared with which that which has been waged in
Tunis would be utterly insignificant.
Let me state, in proof of what I say as to the spirit which animates
these Tripolitan Arabs, that I have ascertained during my trip
down the coast that a subscription is actually being raised in
Tripoli among the wealthier Moors for the equipment of a local
militia, which may be ready to take its part in that war of race
and religion for which every Tripolitan longs so earnestly. Italy
must therefore give up the idea of Tripoli as an utterly hopeless
one. It is difficult to see in what other direction she can obtain
the compensation she covets. Nothing, for example, can counterbalance
the French occupation of Bizerta, that noble harbour which may justly
be styled the pride of North Africa—a harbour which, if improved,
at a comparatively small expenditure, may be made equal to the
requirements of the greatest naval power in the world. It has been
suggested that Italy, which now holds Pantellaria, might convert
that island into a naval and military position of value. No doubt,
looked at simply upon the map Pantellaria seems to be in an admirable
strategical position. It appears to guard the Malta channel and to
cover the Tunisian coast. But I have been to Pantellaria, and I find
it destitute of anything in the shape of a harbour. It can never vie
either with Goletta or Bizerta as a naval station; and to make it even
a position of moderate strength would demand that which Italy cannot
afford—the expenditure of an almost unlimited amount of money.
It does not seem, therefore, that the Italians can obtain any adequate
compensation for the loss of influence they have sustained through
the action of the French. They must just submit, as other nations
have had to do before them, to the aggressions of the strong. But
the temper in which they have accepted that which they conceive to
be the loss and humiliation to which they have been subjected does
not bode well for the future peace of Europe.
I turn now to the position of England, and to the effects upon our
own country of the French action in Tunis. In the first place, it
cannot be doubted that down to the beginning of the present year
the political position of England in Tunis was incomparably better
than that of any other power. This was partly, it must be admitted,
due to the exceptionally favourable way in which we were represented
at the Court of the Bey. Mr. Reade has not only personal qualities
and a vast experience which combine to make him a peculiarly able
and powerful representative of his country in a State like Tunis,
but he is the owner of that which in this part of the world may be
called a really great name. His father, Sir Thomas Reade, who lies
buried in the little English cemetery at Tunis, was for many years
the most powerful and popular personage in the country. He was known
by all the Arabs not as “the English Consul,” but as “the
Consul.” Mr. Reade himself was born in Tunis, and his return to
it to fill the place once occupied by his father was hailed with
universal delight by the Tunisians themselves.
But since the signature of the May treaty he has occupied an
entirely different position. Up to that time he was regarded as the
representative of the nation which was the disinterested friend of
Tunis; and from the Bey downwards the people of the country consulted
him and trusted him. Since then, however, it has been seen that
England either will not or cannot interfere to save the Regency
from the clutches of the French; and as a natural and inevitable
consequence, Mr. Reade is no longer regarded as a powerful mediator
on behalf of Tunis. In one word, our political influence in the
country, once all-powerful, has now been completely destroyed, as
the result of the French aggression. That our commercial influence
will suffer can hardly be doubted. At present England supplies Tunis
with the greater part of the European goods she consumes. Manchester,
Birmingham, Sheffield, and London stock her bazaars, and everywhere in
the shops familiar English names meet the eye. But this cannot last
under the existing state of things. The French are pushing their way
with the keenest anxiety to drive us out of the market, and they are
not slow to turn political events to their own advantage and to our
detriment. We must therefore lose considerably from what has taken
place in Tunis; whilst the position of our Maltese fellow-subjects,
who have hitherto led prosperous lives there, must necessarily be
changed very much for the worse.
There is, however, one point on which England suffers no material
injury from French aggression in Tunis. So long as she continues
to hold Malta she can afford to leave France to do as she pleases
at Bizerta and Goletta. Neither of those ports can ever really
compare in military strength with our grand harbour of Valetta;
while the position of Malta, in the very centre of the Mediterranean,
gives it strategical advantages of which no North African port can
boast. I say nothing of what has been done by the Englishmen of past
generations to increase the military and political value of Malta,
though as one stands on the Barecca and surveys the splendid lines
of fortification protecting the impregnable harbours in which our
ironclads float in security, one cannot but feel grateful to the men
who not only won this place for us, but who have guarded it since
so well. Italy may feel that she has been outflanked by the seizure
of Tunis; England, from the white heights of Malta, can watch the
proceedings of the French with complete equanimity.
It remains for me to say a few words as to the effect of this Tunisian
aggression upon France herself. Every man who is acquainted with the
facts must feel that France will have to pay an enormous price for the
“conquest” of M. Roustan—a price not to be measured in blood,
money, or honour alone. She is already experiencing some of the
results of the policy into which she has been lured. The exposure
of military weakness and incompetence which has been made during
the course of the campaign—a campaign which has been jealously
watched on the spot by German observers—has done much to destroy the
_prestige_ and influence she was rapidly acquiring at Berlin. Prince
Bismarck may now make his mind easy. The war of revenge is postponed
indefinitely. But, on the other hand, Italy is not only estranged,
but outraged. People in England have little idea how intense is
the feeling of anger burning in the breasts of the Italians at
this moment. You must go to Italy in order to learn the truth upon
this point. The old sentiment of friendship which showed itself so
strongly in 1870, no longer exists, and the Italians are longing for a
chance of punishing France for what she has done in Tunis. The Arabs,
again, are for ever estranged from their conquerors. They cannot hold
their own against them. They have no arms capable of competing with
those of France; nor have they military knowledge. But it is safe
to predict that for years to come, under the new state of things,
both in Algeria and Tunis there will be a constant waste of French
life and money—a waste which might have been avoided but for the
intrigues of M. Roustan. And at any moment France may find herself
confronted by a deadly peril. She may have to choose between a
dangerous rebuff in Tunis itself, and an attack upon Tripoli—an
attack which would bring her into collision not only with Turkey,
but with England, Italy, and Austria. Such are the Dead Sea apples
borne by the tree she is now watering with her blood in Tunis.
THE END.
* * * * *
PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LIMITED, ST. JOHN’S SQUARE.
Transcriber's note:
pg 114 Changed: at any noment to: moment
pg 142 Changed: to be forgotton to: forgotten
pg 260 Changed: spendid interior to: splendid
pg 298 Changed: the excitewent among to: excitement
Minor changes in punctuation have been done silently.
Other spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.