CHAPTER I

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:

—Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.

_My Reminiscences of East Africa_

[Illustration: General von Lettow-Vorbeck.]

_MY REMINISCENCES

OF EAST AFRICA_

_By General von Lettow-Vorbeck_

_With Portrait, 22 Maps and Sketch-Maps,

∷ ∷ and 13 Drawings ∷ ∷

By General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant_

_LONDON: HURST AND BLACKETT, LTD.

PATERNOSTER HOUSE, E.C._

PREFACE

IN all the German colonies, though but a few decades old, a life

full of promise was discernible. We were beginning to understand the

national value of our colonial possessions; settlers and capital were

venturing in; industries and factories were beginning to flourish.

Compared with that of other nations, the colonizing process of Germany

had progressed peacefully and steadily, and the inhabitants had

confidence in the justice of German administration. This development

had barely commenced when it was destroyed by the world war. In spite

of all tangible proofs to the contrary, an unjustifiable campaign of

falsehood is being conducted in order to make the world believe that

the Germans lacked colonizing talent and were cruel to the natives.

A small force, mainly composed of these very natives, opposed this

development. Almost without any external means of coercion, even

without immediate payment, this force, with its numerous native

followers, faithfully followed its German leaders throughout the whole

of the prolonged war against a more than hundredfold superiority. When

the armistice came it was still fit to fight, and imbued with the best

soldierly spirit. That is a fact which cannot be controverted, and is

in itself a sufficient answer to the hostile mis-statements.

It has not been possible for me to give an exhaustive account of the

operations of the German East African Protective Force. The existing

material is insufficient, much has been lost, and even now I am

unacquainted with various events, the actors in which have not yet

returned home. My own records have for the most part been lost, and I

had not the leisure to prepare a detailed description of the campaign

in East Africa in addition to my other duties. My account is therefore

necessarily incomplete. In the main I must rely upon my memory and on

my personal experiences. Errors in detail are unavoidable.

But in spite of this, the following account may not be without value,

nor perhaps without interest, since it shows how what is up to the

present the greatest drama in our colonial history was enacted in

the head of him who was destined to conduct the military side of it.

I have endeavoured to set down my recollections of East Africa as

they actually are, and thus at least to present what is subjectively

correct.

CONTENTS

PART I

EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS

PAGE

CHAPTER I.: BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 3

Reflections on the duties and purpose of the Protective Force.

Details of the defensive capacity of the Colony. Distribution,

armament and training of the Force. Military employment

and mental attitude of the natives. Economic value of the

country, and furtherance of the economic power of the natives.

Horse-breeding and hunting. Several tours of inspection.

National propaganda on the part of subsequently hostile

Missions in the neighbouring territories.

CHAPTER II.: THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR 18

Arrival of news of mobilization. Participation in the war

or neutrality? The strength of the Protective Force and the

English casualties. The English Consul and his activity. The

Governor of the Colony, the supreme military authority, and the

defence of the coastal towns. Preparations for mobilization.

Lines of communication, maintenance and supplies. Sanitation.

Malaria.

CHAPTER III.: THE FIRST ACTIONS 27

Bombardment of the wireless tower at Dar-es-Salaam.

Negotiations for capitulation by the civil authorities. The

_Königsberg_ and the _Möve_. Capture of Taveta. Transfer

of the main body to the Northern Railway. New telegraphic

communications. Bombardment of Bagamoyo. Attack on the British

Uganda Railway. Attacks on British Karunga on Lake Nyassa.

Guerilla warfare in the North.

CHAPTER IV.: THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA 35

Reconnaissances at Tanga. Appearance of an English landing

corps. Concentration of all available troops. First combats at

Ras-Kasone. Reconnaissance in abandoned Tanga. The surroundings

of the probable field of battle. Disposition of the companies.

The hostile landing. The attack. Unfavourable situation of

the defenders. Counter-attack by the reinforcements. Headlong

flight of the enemy. Failure of the pursuit. Harassing the

enemy at the landing-place. Enormous English losses. The

trained bees. Negotiations for release of the wounded. Great

booty. Our own losses. In the hospitals. Simultaneous events at

Longido Mountain.

CHAPTER V.: AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS 49

Withdrawal of the troops to New Moshi. Work at Headquarters.

Motor transport _versus_ carriers. Reconnaissances by motor.

Supply and transport. Roads on the lines of communication. The

burden of work and the joy of work. Abundant supplies. The

starving Lieutenant. The joys of Sunday sport. Meat supply for

the troops.

CHAPTER VI.: FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-EAST 56

Advance of hostile forces at Jassini. Reconnaissance in view of

a possible battle. Advance of the German Companies against the

English positions. Surprise and surrounding of the entrenched

enemy. Bad fighting of the Arab Corps. Gallant defence by the

enemy. Difficult situation of the attackers. The enemy hoists

the white flag.

CHAPTER VII.: GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER PREPARATIONS 63

Necessity for economizing men and stores. Care of the wounded.

A wireless message from home. Raids in the Longido district.

“A damned good piece of work.” Despatch of patrols to destroy

the railway. Suffering and death in the steppe. Arrival of a

relief ship. Feverish manufacture of ammunition. An advance

near Oldorobo Mountain. Abundance of raw material and lack

of finished articles. New industries to supply our needs.

Roadmaking. Increase in numbers and fighting value of the

troops.

CHAPTER VIII.: AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF

THE TIME AVAILABLE 73

CHAPTER IX.: THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR. GUERILLA WARFARE

ASHORE AND AFLOAT UNTIL NEW YEAR, 1916 82

Hostile Masai attack on Lake Victoria. The _Königsberg_ on the

Rufiji. Her glorious end. Another success near Kilimandjaro.

Determined attacks on the English railway. Attack and

occupation of the English Camp on Kasigao Mountain. The enemy’s

measures for protecting the railway. Fighting in the bush.

Consideration of the possibility of resisting an attack by

large hostile forces. Preparations for retiring to the South.

Removal of stores. Determined defence of the position on

Oldorobo Mountain. The new _Mungu_.

PART II

THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES

(From the arrival of the South African Troops to the loss of

the Colony)

CHAPTER I.: THE ENEMY’S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUNTAIN 103

Several advances by the enemy. The fantastic armoured cars.

The artillery combat. The South African troops. Alleged cruel

orders by the enemy. Reinforcement of the enemy near Mount

Longido. Fight with an Indian patrol. Chivalry of the white

officers. Our brave Askari and the misleading of the English.

CHAPTER II.: FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY AND THE ACTION AT

REATA 108

Spies at work. The routes of the enemy’s advance. Possibilities

of defence. The enemy attacks at Kitovo Mountain. The strong

position on the line Reata-Kitovo. The _Königsberg’s_ gun.

Reconnaissance by hostile cavalry. The enemy’s attack and

attempt to surround us. Occupation of new defensive positions.

The enemy’s withdrawal to Taveta. After the battle. Renewed

forward movement by the enemy. Headquarters at Neusteglitz. A

second relief ship.

CHAPTER III.: RETREAT BEFORE OVERWHELMING HOSTILE PRESSURE 119

Plans and considerations. Active attempts at reconnaissance by

the enemy. Preparations for fighting. An attack on the hostile

screen of patrols. Heavy losses. Fresh heavy attacks by the

enemy (21st March). Failure of the counter-attack. An alarmist

report: the enemy behind us. Retreat to Kissangire. The

alarmist report proves to be false. Good spirits of the troops.

Condition of the civilian population. Combat and surrender

of the 28th Company at Lokisale (5th April). Bringing up

auxiliaries. Concentration of the troops on the Central Railway.

CHAPTER IV.: THE ENEMY’S ADVANCE IN THE AREA OF THE NORTHERN

RAILWAY 129

Departure for Korogwe. At Handeni. News from Germany. Obstacles

on the road. The swollen river. On horseback and by light

railway to Kimamba. Reconnaissance south of Kondoa. Lines of

communication and commissariat. In touch with the enemy. In

position. The enemy seems to be evacuating his positions. An

unexpected fight in the night. Our heavy losses. Successful

patrols. Artillery duels. Obtaining supplies from the country.

Failure of an attack by the enemy.

CHAPTER V.: BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL RAILWAYS 140

The enemy advances on the whole northern front. Simultaneous

attacks from the South. Slipping away and outflanking the

enemy. Looking for the enemy’s weakest point. The smart patrol

leader. The enemy’s aerial activity increases. Further advance

to the South by General van Deventer. Weak German forces

resist on a long line. Fighting near the Central Railway.

Reconnaissances. Heavy fighting with the advancing enemy. On

the Wami River.

CHAPTER VI.: CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI 149

Hostile attacks from the south-west. What will the enemy do?

An attempt to surround us. The action at Mlali. Retreat to

Kissaki. The moral effect of our retreat. The Boma of Kissaki.

Securing our cattle supply. Defeat of the enemy on the 7th

September. Annihilation of another hostile detachment. German

humanity—English gratitude. A surprise attack at Dutumi (9th

September). Dutumi must be abandoned.

CHAPTER VII.: HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COLONY 159

Our unfavourable position at Kilwa. Futile attacks by the

enemy at Kissangire. Fat obtained from hippo and elephants.

At Mpaganya. A pessimist sent about his business. Advance on

Kissangire. The lost patrol. Successes at Kissangire. The

Portuguese defeated at Newala. In Utete Camp. In a strong

position at Kibata. Artillery preparations. Effect of heavy

shell. An unsuccessful infantry attack. The military situation

at the end of 1916. Powerful enemy attacks at Dutumi and

Kissaki. The enemy fails to get behind us.

CHAPTER VIII.: ANXIETIES AND HARDSHIPS DURING OUR STAY IN THE

RUFIJI COUNTRY 173

The march through the Pori. Camp at Ungwara. The troops lose

their way. Useless mouths. Steps to remedy the threatening

shortage of food. Reduction in the number of carriers.

Reduction of rations. Obstruction. The Askari women. Maize our

help in trouble. A supply branch of the commissariat. Minor

actions in the bush at Ungwara. The commencement of the rains.

Measures for the protection of women and children. The troops

continue their march to the South.

CHAPTER IX.: THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE SUBSIDIARY

THEATRES 182

On the Ruhuje and Ruaha Rivers. A hostile attack and its sudden

cessation. The enemy’s mistake. Surrender of Major Grabert.

Division of General Wahle’s force. The march to Tabora.

Back to Kilima Njaro. Major Kraut’s march to the Rovuma.

Supply difficulties and plans for the future. In the rich

Portuguese territory. Patrols towards Kilva. A heavy defeat

of the enemy. Experiments with bread-substitute. Primitive

boots. The crowing cocks. Salt, fat and sugar. The medical

service. “Lettow-Schnaps.” Bandages. Operations with primitive

appliances.

CHAPTER X.: LINDI AND KILWA 190

Hostile reinforcements from the direction of Lindi. Flood of

the Mbemkuru. German advance on Lindi. The enemy penetrates

into the German camp at Lutende. A smart counter-attack.

Further minor actions near Ulindi. We march off to the North.

At Narungombe. Another victory. Too late! Enemy spies under

the white flag. An Imperial greeting from home. The attack at

Narunyu. The bomb in the dentist’s study. Removal of women and

children to Lindi.

CHAPTER XI.: IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY 207

Concentric advance of the enemy. At Ruponda and Likangara. The

enemy’s uncertainty. Rumours. Action at Mahiva. A brilliant

victory. Changing the plan of attack. The tactics of the enemy

commander. The end of the battle. Losses and booty. Another

action at Lukuledi. Guerilla warfare.

CHAPTER XII.: THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY 216

Consultation with the Governor. Considerations. Departure from

Lukuledi. Minor actions in the bush. Shortage of ammunition

and its consequences. Continuous advance of the enemy to

Chivata. We avoid the blow by moving to Nambindinga. Schemes

for voluntarily restricting the strength of the troops. On

the Makonde Plateau. Shortage of water and food. Whither?

Reorganization of the Force at Newala. The hostile patrol and

its letter. At them! Out of sight of the enemy.

PART III

FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL

(From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice)

CHAPTER I.: ACROSS THE ROVUMA 229

Crossing the river. The enemy’s camp at Ngomano. Assault on the

Portuguese defences. The “Day of the old guns.” Rich booty.

Continuing the march up the Lujenda. Looking for supplies.

A transparent offer by the enemy. News of the surrender of

Captain Tafel. Partition of the Force. Difficulties and

unpleasantness. Capture of several Portuguese camps. Heroic

action of Lieutenant Kempner. At Nangvare. Buffalo fat and

forest fruits. Abundant supplies at Chirumba. Patrols. Approach

of the enemy. Skirmishes. Enemy propaganda. Fresh courage and

confidence.

CHAPTER II.: EAST OF THE LUDJENDA 245

Supply questions. In the rain. Tobacco. At Nanungu. Building

pontoons. Patrols across the Msalu River. News of events in

Europe. A pause in the fighting. Patrols to the coast. The

precious Pori-pig. A new hostile deployment. The patriotic

English. Defeat of the enemy at Mahue. Continual skirmishes.

Against the enemy at Kireka Mountain. An action in the bush.

A wrong report and its consequences. Casualties on both sides

in the last actions. Captain Koehl’s successes. Continuation

of the march to Koroma Mountain. A surprise. The Governor in

danger. Unpleasant losses.

CHAPTER III.: IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO RIVERS 259

On the road to Keriva. The sick and wounded. Camp on the Lurio.

Müller’s detachment captures the Boma of Malema. Hostile

forces approach from various sides. In a rich country. General

Edwards’ precautions. Fighting in the bush. The march continued

to Alto Moloque. The Orange-Boma. Continuous fighting by

patrols. Nampepo Station and other settlements. On the Likunga

River. Rich booty. The natives’ powers of estimation.

CHAPTER IV.: ON TO THE SOUTH 270

Where is the enemy’s ammunition dump? Looking for it.

Awkwardness of long columns. Kokosani-Namekurra. Across the

Lukungo. A success. At Namekurra. The fortified railway

station. Artillery preparations and assault. Flight of enemy

across the Namacurra River. The casualties on both sides.

Extraordinary quantities of supplies and ammunition captured.

CHAPTER V.: BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER 278

Obstacles in the way of continuing the march to the South.

The enemy’s operations and our own plans. Back across the

Likungo. Marching in several parallel columns. A remarkable

military situation. Looking for booty. At Ociva. The English

and Portuguese prisoners. Capture of the Boma of Tipa. March

to Namirrue. Reconnaissance of enemy’s position on the rocky

mountain. Another enemy appears. Victorious battle with him at

night. Confusion of the enemy’s columns. Fruitless pursuit of

the fleeing enemy. The trench mortar and its effect. Assault of

the rocky mountain. We march away to Pekera. Rest in the camp

at Chalau.

CHAPTER VI.: BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER 289

At Chalau. An English flag of truce. Approach of the enemy.

Withdrawal across the Ligonja. At Ili. March to Numarroe.

Preparing bread for the prisoners. A breakfast in the bush.

Boma of Numarroe. Success of Goering’s detachment. Capture of

the Boma. Casualties on both sides. On over the mountains to

Rigona. Skirmishes. What next? Heavy fighting at Lioma. Heavy

losses. No prospect of greater success. On to the North.

Confusion of the detachments. A difficult march through the

mountains. On the Lurio. Bad health of the troops. Heavy

casualties on both sides. The influenza epidemic.

CHAPTER VII.: ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE 303

Rapid march to the North. Across the Lujenda. A rest-day at

Mwemba. Hostile spies. Distant reconnaissance by patrols.

To Ssongea. Homesickness of the Samarunga. Pangire Mission

Station. Change of direction. Grave news from Europe. At Mbozi

Mission Station. Patrol reports.

CHAPTER VIII.: THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA 309

On the march to Fife. The enemy in a fortified position.

Fruitless bombardment and continuation of the march. Patrol

fighting. Abundant supply of quinine captured. Studying the

map. By forced marches into Rhodesia. Kajambi Mission Station

and its frightened inhabitants. Capture of Kasawa. Natives

pillaging by order of the English. On towards the Zambesi.

CHAPTER IX.: THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME 315

The lost English motor-cyclist. Armistice. By cycle to the

Chambezi ferry. Conditions of the Armistice. Conference with

the British Commissioner. Situation in Germany. The Armistice

and the situation of our troops. Release of the prisoners.

Difficulties in paying off the Askari. March to Abercorn.

“Surrender” and “Evacuation.” With General Edwards. Handing

over arms. Fruitless opposition to English interpretation of

agreement. By ship to Kigoma. Belgian hospitality. By rail to

Dar-es-Salaam. Internment. Influenza and its victims. The loyal

Askari. Endeavours to protect private property. Embarkation for

home. At Rotterdam and at home. Retrospect and a glance at the

future.

LIST OF MAPS

PAGE

Figs. i. and iii. Kilima Njaro 5

Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway 5

Fig. iv. Battle of Tanga 37

Fig. v. The Northern Railway 37

Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916 83

Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini) 105

Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert 105

Fig. ix. Battle of Reata 105

Fig. x. Battle of Kahe 105

Fig. xi. Invasion of German East Africa by Belgian and British

columns, middle of 1916 131

Fig. xii. Retreat of German Main Force, August, 1916 131

Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi 161

Fig. xiv. March of German Main Force, September, 1916, to

June, 1917 161

Fig. xv. March of Major-General Wahle in the West 183

Fig. xvi. March of Main Force during operations on interior

lines west of Lindi, June to November, 1917 191

Fig. xvii. Battle of Mahiwa 191

Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mountains 257

Fig. xix. The Action at Namirrue, July 23rd, 1918 285

Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa 297

Fig. xxi. The March into Rhodesia 311

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

General von Lettow-Vorbeck _Frontispiece_

General Map _Facing p._ 32

The Fallen ” 33

Native Women ” 96

Natives Bringing Food ” 97

Masai ” 128

European Dinner-time ” 129

Askari. A Halt ” 160

The Banyan Tree ” 161

Native Types (1) ” 192

Native Types (2) ” 193

Native Types (3) ” 224

Native Types (4) ” 225

Native Types (5) ” 256

Native Types (6) ” 257

PART I

EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS

My Reminiscences of East Africa

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

WHEN I landed at Dar-es-Salaam in January, 1914, I hardly suspected

the nature of the task that was to confront me in a few months’ time.

But during the past ten years the universal war had more than once

seemed so imminent that I was obliged seriously to consider whether the

force under my command would be called upon to take any part in that

conflict, and, if so, what its task might be. Owing to the position

of the Colony and the weakness of the existing forces—the peace

establishment was but little more than two thousand—we could only play

a subsidiary part. I knew that the fate of the colonies, as of all

other German possessions, would only be decided on the battlefields of

Europe. To this decision every German, regardless of where he might be

at the moment, must contribute his share. In the Colony also it was our

duty, in case of universal war, to do all in our power for our country.

The question was whether it was possible for us in our subsidiary

theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great decision at

home. Could we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers

of the enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other more important

theatres, or inflict on our enemies any loss of personnel or war

material worth mentioning? At that time I answered this question in the

affirmative. It is true, however, that I did not succeed in interesting

all authorities in this idea to such an extent as to cause all

preparations which a war of this kind rendered desirable to be carried

out.

It was to be considered that hostile troops would allow themselves to

be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the enemy at some

really sensitive point. It was further to be remembered that, with

the means available, protection of the Colony could not be ensured

even by purely defensive tactics, since the total length of land

frontier and coast-line was about equal to that of Germany. From these

considerations it followed that it was necessary, not to split up our

small available forces in local defence, but, on the contrary, to keep

them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ

his forces for self-defence. If this idea could be successfully carried

out, we should at the same time protect our coast and our infinitely

long land frontier in the most effective manner.

In examining the question where to find a point so vital to the enemy

as to afford us the prospect of a successful attack, or, at any rate,

of a threat of such an attack, one thought at once of the frontier

between German and British East Africa. Parallel with it, at a distance

of a few marches, runs the main artery of the British territory, the

Uganda Railway, an object which, with a length of quite 440 miles, was

extremely difficult for the enemy to protect, and would, therefore,

if effectively threatened, require a large part of his troops for the

purpose.

[Illustration: Fig i. and iii. Kilima Njaro.

Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway.]

On my first journey of reconnaissance and inspection, commenced in

January, 1914, I went by sea from Dar-es-Salaam to Tanga, thence to

Usambara, and then on into the country round Kilima Njaro and Meru

Mountain. At Usambara I met an old friend whom I had known well

since our military college days (_Kriegschule_), Captain von Prince

(retired). He was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that, in

case of a war with England, we East Africans should not remain idle

spectators, but should take a hand if there should be even a trace of a

prospect of relieving the pressure in Europe. At the same time, he was

in a position to inform me that in the Usambara country, round Kilima

Njaro, and near Meru Mountain, Volunteer Rifle Corps were being formed,

which in a short time would probably include all the Germans capable of

bearing arms in these northern territories. In view of the density of

the settlements in those parts, this was a fact of great importance.

The main contingent of the three thousand Europeans whom we were able

to enrol in the Protective Force during the course of the war was

furnished from these very territories lying along the Usambara Railway.

It was, indeed, difficult to introduce a workable military organization

among these voluntary associations, and to make effective use of their

abundant good will. Still, it was, on the whole, successfully arranged

that all, even those not legally obliged to do so, should be ready

in case of war to act under the orders of the Protective Force. The

District Commissioners also manifested the greatest sympathy; but they

also expressed the, unfortunately well-founded, doubt whether, in a

universal war which could certainly cut us off completely from the home

country and leave us to our own resources, such voluntary organizations

would possess the requisite cohesion. The armament was also in a bad

way; although almost every European possessed a useful sporting rifle,

the variety of patterns and the consequent difficulty of ammunition

supply had not yet been remedied. The proposals for arming these rifle

clubs with a uniform military weapon were still pending, and remained

undecided until the outbreak of war.

At Wilhelmstal I found a detachment of native police under an efficient

sergeant-major, who came from Ditmarschen. Whereas the Protective

Force proper was under the Commandant, the various police detachments

were under the civil authorities, and so each District Commissioner

had under his orders a detachment of one hundred to two hundred men,

for the purpose of collecting taxes and supporting his authority.

There prevailed a constant tendency to increase this police force more

and more, to the detriment of the Protective Force. In this manner,

alongside of the latter, a second force of the same strength had come

into being which was in its very nature a travesty of a military

organization, and could hardly be anything better. The District

Commissioner, a civil official, often understood little of military

matters, and handed over the training and command of his Police-Askari

to a sergeant-major of police. The latter often worked zealously,

with the old non-commissioned officer’s usual devotion to duty; but

he seldom received any guidance from a military superior, since the

police inspector, an officer, could only visit each district from time

to time. So the Police-Askari often became slack, and lacked the strict

discipline necessary to keep them fit for their duties, which demanded

reliability. To this was added a further defect which ought to have

been avoided. The police were partly recruited from the native N.C.O.’s

of the Protective Force. The latter was thereby deprived of its best

elements, who, after joining the police, lost their good military

qualities. This, of course, did not obtain in all cases. But, generally

speaking, it was the case that, in order to obtain a police force of

inferior military value which in the circumstances could never be of

any real use, the quality of the Protective Force was steadily impaired.

From New Moshi, the terminus of the Usambara Railway, I proceeded via

Marangu, where an English planter lived and where I met the English

Consul King, of Dar-es-Salaam, to the Kilima Njaro country, and thence

to Arusha. Several German planters, some of them former officers, whom

I visited at their estates during the march, assured me that the German

settlers in those parts formed a valuable source of military power.

At that time I made the acquaintance of the charming estate of

Commander Niemeyer (retired), whose wife entertained us with excellent

home-grown coffee. Later on she rather hindered us on one occasion:

when, during the war, her husband was in Engara-Nairobi Camp,

north-west of Kilima Njaro, we had temporarily lent her a telephone,

so that she could call up her husband. Immediately afterwards the

whole telephone service stopped, and after a long, long search, we at

last discovered that our kind former hostess had not switched off her

instrument and displayed no intention of doing so.

Close by was the plantation of Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld

(retired), who hospitably offered us a glass of very fine Moselle

wine, and did so with a military tone like a word of command which

even then characterized him as the energetic leader who was later to

defend the mouth of the Rufiji River against a superior enemy with such

stubbornness. Just short of Arusha we came to the coffee-plantation

of my old brother-cadet Freiherr von Ledebur, where at table I met

the charming old retired Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Bock. We

talked about the Volunteer Rifle Corps which were being formed near

Meru Mountain, and I did not dream that a few months later this old

gentleman of over sixty would be one of our toughest patrol leaders

on the east side of Kilima Njaro, and would often with his few men,

who were mostly recruits, successfully engage several companies of the

enemy. His true chivalry and fatherly care soon won him the hearts of

his black comrades, to such a degree that he was in their eyes the

bravest of all Germans, and they clung to him with touching loyalty.

At Arusha the first inspection of a company of Askari was held.

The spirit and discipline of the black unit revealed the admirable

education they had received at the hands of my predecessor, Colonel

Freiherr von Schleuntz; but, in accordance with the hitherto accepted

principles of their employment, their training for fighting against

an enemy with modern armament had been developed to a lesser degree.

Like the majority of the Askari companies, this company was still armed

with the old 1871 pattern rifle, using smoky powder. The opinion was

widely held that for black troops this was more suitable than a modern

rifle with smokeless powder, for they had hitherto never been employed

against an opponent with modern armament, but only in native warfare,

where the larger calibre is an advantage, while the disadvantage of

smoke is of no consequence. After the outbreak of war, indeed, the

enthusiastic supporters of the 1871 rifle changed their minds. Against

an enemy provided with modern smokeless equipment the smoky rifle was,

not only at the long ranges obtaining in the open plain, but also in

bush-fighting, where the combatants are often but a few paces apart,

decidedly inferior. The man using smokeless powder remains invisible,

while the cloud of smoke betrays the enemy with rapidity and certainty,

not only to the sharp eye of the native Askari, but even to the

European accustomed to office work. Thus, at the beginning of the war,

the greatest reward which could be earned by an Askari was to give him

a modern captured rifle in place of his old smoky one.

In distributing the force by companies throughout the country it had

been necessary to accept the disadvantage that in many cases it was

impossible to employ them in large formations, or to train the senior

officers in this respect. It was evident that in war the movement and

leading in battle of forces greater than a company would be attended

with great difficulty and friction. According to my view, the force

had the double duty of preparing to meet an enemy from outside with

modern armament, as well as a native enemy within our borders; their

training for battle had therefore to take account of two distinct sets

of conditions. The exercises in native warfare presented a spectacle

which differed widely from our European inspections. At Arusha, on this

occasion, the company marched through thick bush, the “Pori,” and was

in native fashion surprised on the march. The enemy was represented

by Meru warriors, who, arrayed in full war-dress, with spears and

head-dress of ostrich feathers, remained concealed, and then at only

a few paces distance fell upon the Safari, the column of route, with

loud war cries. A fight at such close quarters, like the one in which

Zelewski’s expedition had been overwhelmed in 1891 at Iringa, is

decided at short range and in a very few minutes. The troops quickly

rally round their leaders and rush the enemy. In accordance with this

whole character of native warfare, careful and thorough musketry

training in the modern sense had hitherto been unnecessary. It was,

indeed, at a pretty low level, and it may interest the soldier to

hear that in some companies the average at two hundred yards standing

without rest barely attained Ring 3, and that only a few companies

got beyond Ring 5. Neither did the nature of native warfare provide

a sufficient inducement for thorough training with the machine gun.

Fortunately, however, I soon discovered among all Europeans of the

force a complete understanding of the importance of this arm, in

particular in modern battle. In spite of this not particularly high

standard of training, the results of field-firing, even at long ranges,

were not unsatisfactory, and in this the Askari profited in a high

degree by his sharp eyesight, which enabled him to observe his fire and

correct his aim accordingly.

The journey was continued via Ufiome Mission, where the excellent

Father Dürr was settled, to Kondoa-Irangi, Kilimatinde and back to

Dar-es-Salaam. The impression left by this first inspection was that

from a military point of view there was still a great deal to be done

if we wished to be properly prepared in case the English should make

war on us. Unfortunately I did not succeed in arousing sufficient

interest in the matter on the part of the authorities. The ruling

opinion was that we were on exceptionally good terms with the English,

and that a war, if it came at all, was still in the distant future.

Thus it happened that when war actually did break out but a few months

later we were unprepared.

For me, a new-comer in East Africa, the journey had not only been of

military interest. At Boma la Ngombe, a place between Moshi and Arusha,

a number of old Askari had been settled by the late Lieutenant-Colonel

Johannes; they were mainly engaged in cattle-dealing, and had become

well-to-do. The news of my coming had preceded me, and the people

appeared in full strength to greet me on my arrival. I had the

impression that this was not a mere show of loyalty; the people not

only told me enthusiastically of Germans under whom they had previously

served, but after the outbreak of war, unasked and without the

slightest pressure, they placed a large sum of money at our disposal to

help the force. In that district I also saw the first Masai, who, in

contrast to the majority of the East African tribes, are pure Hamites,

and live in a special reservation. It may be mentioned that Merker,

the best authority on the Masai,[1] considers them to be the original

Jews. They possess to a marked degree the characteristics of the pure

inhabitant of the prairie. Occasionally, one of these tall, slim,

and very swift men acted as my guide on hunting expeditions; their

vision and skill as trackers are astonishing. In addition, the Masai

is intelligent, and, at any rate towards strangers, an extraordinary

liar. He lives in closed villages of mud huts, and, like all nomads,

wanders with his herds over the prairie. He seldom enlists in the

force. In agriculture the Masai engages hardly at all, whereas among

the other tribes this forms the chief occupation and is a necessary

condition for close settlement. Thus the banana districts on the

eastern slopes of Kilima Njaro support a native Wajagga population

of some twenty-five thousand souls, and this number could easily be

increased. The great wealth of cattle in the neighbourhood of Arusha,

on the Masai prairie, and near Kondoa-Irangi, showed me that the

tse-tse fly, the principal enemy of African cattle, is comparatively

rare in those parts. As a comparison, I may state that the cattle in

the single district of Arusha are estimated to be more numerous than

in the whole of South-West Africa. At Kondoa-Irangi and Singida the

people had come from a great distance, and had lined the road to greet

me. No traveller who visits these countries can fail to observe that

in the fertile, elevated interior there is room for the settlement of

hundreds of thousands of Europeans. Here I would like to record an

impression which I only obtained later, during the war. At times we

passed through fertile districts which were completely forsaken by the

inhabitants, but which were known not to have been occupied even in the

previous year. They had simply moved away, had settled somewhere else

in the abundantly available, empty and fertile country, and had there

begun to cultivate fresh fields. If the country capable of cultivation

were fully utilized, it would probably be possible to support in German

East Africa, which has hitherto been inhabited by about eight millions

only, a population barely less than that of Germany. An Englishman

captured during the war at Mahenge remarked that it would be possible

to make East Africa into a second India, and I think he was right.

My experience in the war has confirmed my opinion that there exist

many possibilities of economic development, of which we had hardly an

inkling before the war.

At Singida I saw one of the stud-farms of the country. For breeding

purposes there were two horse stallions, no mares, a few Muscat donkey

stallions, and mainly country-bred donkey mares. Of the objects it was

sought to attain I could get no clear idea; in any case, the crossing

of horse stallions and donkey mares had produced no results. But the

district is extraordinarily suitable for horse-breeding, and the

Government Veterinary Officer Hiffmeister, who was stationed there,

was very inclined to settle in the country as a private farmer and

horse-breeder. Similar stud-farms existed at Kilimatinde, Iringa and

Ubena. From Singida to Kilimatinde I followed the Mpondi River; the

sportsman will be interested to know that this is the district in which

the best buffaloes in East Africa are said to be found. A few days

before I had successfully hunted buffalo, but I had not succeeded in

getting a shot at a powerful bull, and so, as far as time permitted,

I was out for buffalo. Besides a native boy, I had as trackers two

excellent Askari of the Konda Company. As soon as I arrived in camp at

the end of a march and dismounted from my mule, I would ask Kadunda,

one of these Askari, who had done the march on foot, whether he was

ready to hunt. He always agreed with the greatest enthusiasm, and

away we went through the bush, which was sometimes so dense that

one had to crawl under the branches in order to get through at all.

For the European not yet accustomed to the African climate it is

extraordinarily fatiguing to follow a trail through dense bush and high

grass reaching over one’s head for hours on end in the blazing sun. The

wounded buffalo is considered to be the most dangerous game in East

Africa; he often charges at once with great determination. At Mpondi, a

short time before, a wounded buffalo had attacked a hunter so suddenly

that the latter did indeed find himself seated on its neck, but would

hardly have escaped with his life unless at the critical moment his

sun-helmet had fallen off. The animal then proceeded to attack the

helmet, and the man managed to get a shot at its heart. From this and

similar tales it will be understood that as the trail gets warmer and

warmer, one’s excitement becomes intense and one’s senses more acute.

But although I often heard the buffalo breathing only a few paces from

me, the bush was so thick that I could not get a shot. I had already

abandoned all hope of success and had marched off with my caravan for

good and all, when at seven in the morning we crossed a perfectly fresh

buffalo trail. At this point the forest was clearer, and the guides

seemed keen to follow the tracks. So we let the caravan go on, and

after four hours of exhausting tracking got a sight of the buffalo.

In a clearing, at one hundred yards, I raised my rifle, but Kadunda

would not allow it, and insisted on our stalking the quarry, which was

passing us in quite open wood without undergrowth, up to within thirty

yards. Luckily the bullet cut the main artery; the buffalo fell at

once, and so any further possible developments of the episode were cut

short. As often happens, we discovered in the animal’s body a bullet

from a native gun. Besides this buffalo I had got a large number of

antelope and gazelle of various kinds; lions we often heard, but never

caught sight of.

On this march through the “Pori” I learned, to my astonishment, that

even in the interior of Africa it is no easy matter to disappear

without a trace. I had marched off without leaving word what road I

intended to take. Suddenly, in the heart of the bush, a native met us

on the march, and handed me the oversea mail. The fact is that in their

interchange of information the inhabitants tell each other everything

that happens in their vicinity. Calls, fire signals, and the signal

drums serve to exchange and quickly spread all news. The incredible way

in which the innumerable rumours spread abroad, with which I became

acquainted later on, is mainly due to this communicativeness.

After returning to Dar-es-Salaam from the first journey of inspection,

I immediately made arrangements for re-arming three more companies; up

to date only three companies had been equipped with modern rifles. It

subsequently became a factor of the greatest importance that, at any

rate, these arms, with the necessary ammunition, reached the Colony

just in time for the outbreak of war.

During a tour of inspection in April to Lindi, where I saw the Third

Field Company, I fell into a rocky hole and got water on the knee

so that I could not start my next long journey till the end of May.

Although the Central Railway was open for public traffic only as far as

Tabora, the construction had proceeded so far that I could reach Kigoma

(on Lake Tanganyika) by rail, and was thus already enabled to acquire a

superficial knowledge of this important means of communication which

connected our coast directly with the Lake and the rich countries

bordering on it, and indirectly with the Congo basin. At Kigoma the

steamer _Coetzen_ was still building, and to reach Bismarckburg I

made use of the small steamer _Hedwig von Wissman_. At Baudouinville,

in the Congo Territory, I paid a short visit to the Bishop of the

White Fathers, without suspecting how soon we would be at war with

that country. The wonderful church would be an ornament to any of our

towns. It had been built by the Fathers themselves and the interior was

decorated with rich carvings. Extensive, splendid orchards surround the

station. The plague of lions must, however, be very great; the Fathers

told me that a short time before a lion had one night jumped the wall

into the court and killed an ox.

Our reception was very friendly, and we were made welcome with a glass

of fine Algerian wine. We were also well received at Mwasyl Mission

Station in German territory, where there were also White Fathers,

mostly Belgians. During the war, however, we captured correspondence

which proved that the French missionaries, who also lived at stations

in the Tanganyika country, by no means confined themselves to spreading

Christianity but intentionally carried on a national propaganda

as well. One missionary’s letter defines the difference between a

_missionnaire catholique_ and a _missionnaire français_, remarking

that the latter is bound, in addition to spreading the Christian

faith, to carry on French national propaganda. It is well known that

this national propaganda is a work from which the German missionaries

generally refrained.

These missions, which are naturally to be found in the densely

populated and well-cultivated countries, exercise a remarkable

influence on the education of the natives. The missionary is mostly the

only permanently settled white man; he becomes well acquainted with

the country and people, and wins their confidence. The missions have

deserved extremely well by introducing European handicrafts; everywhere

one finds carpenters’ shops, shoemakers’ shops and brickworks.

My later tours disclosed that the extremely fertile country around

Langenburg and Ssonga, where there are many wheatfields (the density

of population is indicated even on the map by the numerous mission

stations), was protected by only one company, which was not even

connected by a direct wire. A telegram could only reach Langenburg

from Dar-es-Salaam by the English line through South Africa. The

communication by heliograph from Iringa to Langenburg was too

unreliable to be considered an efficient substitute. It may be

mentioned that in that country the natives have not only been educated

up to agriculture by the Missions and by the German Administration,

but that considerable native industries have been indigenous there for

a long time past. Where iron occurs one finds numerous forges, the

bellows being made in the primitive manner out of hides and perforated

branches. Very beautiful are the native weavers’ products; basket-work

is also done here as almost everywhere else in the Colony, and the

work not only shows good taste, but is so close that the natives use

wickerwork cups for drinking. The large herds owned by a few European

farmers suffered, owing to the poorly developed communications, from

the difficulty of reaching a market; this is especially the case with

Mbeya Farm, between Lake Nyassa and Tanganyika.

I camped at Mbosi Mission, and the local missionary, Bachmann, who had

known the country and the people intimately for many years past, told

me that a striking change was taking place in the views of the natives.

Foreign Arabs and Swahili were appearing in the country, and were

telling the people that the Germans would soon be going, and that the

English would take possession of the land; that was in June, 1914.

The continuation of my journey to Iringa brought me to the places where

the great chief Kwawa had defied the Germans in the early days, and at

Rugeno some of the many assembled natives were able to relate to me

what they had witnessed of the annihilation of Zelewski’s expedition on

the spot.

In the short period of peace-work that was vouchsafed to me, my

endeavours to obtain a thorough grip of all my duties in East Africa

could not produce results sufficient to secure me great personal

authority among Africans of long standing. I was still considered a raw

hand. All the same, my career in the service had prepared me to some

extent for the work that Fate had in store for me.

It was probably about the time when, as a cadet who had been

transplanted at an early age from my home in Pomerania, I was studying

Cæsar’s Gallic War, that the German Fatherland was presented by

Bismarck with its first colonies. In the year 1899-1900, when employed

on the General Staff, I studied our own colonies as well as many

foreign ones. During the troubles in China (1900-1901) I made the

acquaintance, both officially and socially, of all the contingents

engaged with us in East Asia, particularly the English. The Herero and

Hottentot Rebellion in South-West Africa (1904-1906) introduced me

to the peculiarities of bush warfare. At that time I gained abundant

personal experience, not only of natives, but also of Boers, both

on the Staff of General von Botha and as an independent Company and

Detachment Commander. The excellent qualities of this Low German race,

that had for generations made its home on the African veld, commanded

my respect. That the Boers would later take a decisive—and in a sense

tragic—part in anglicizing the German part of Africa I never dreamt.

In 1906, in South-West Africa, I was wounded. This brought me to Cape

Town, so that I also acquired a superficial knowledge of Cape Colony.

On my return journey I also touched at the future scene of my work,

German East Africa, for the first time.

Later, my position as Commander of the Marine Battalion at

Wilhelmshaven afforded me an insight into the inner life of our

thriving and growing navy, which was so closely connected with German

work overseas. I took part in exercises and cruises on large and small

ships, in naval manœuvres, and in a visit by the Fleet to Norway,

during which new views of general and military life continually

presented themselves.

Even after my return to the Army the alternation between regimental

and staff employment afforded me much inducement and opportunity for

comparison. In this manner my development had rendered me capable of

rapidly accommodating myself to new conditions. Grateful as I was for

every expansion of my horizon, I owe the best of all to the Army at

home, in which I had the privilege, under the guidance of admirable

commanders, of learning to know the spirit of military life and true

discipline, a spirit which was then properly understood.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

EARLY in August, 1914, when on my way via the heliograph station of

Kidodi towards Kilossa, a special messenger brought me a telegram from

the Governor, to say I was to return immediately to Dar-es-Salaam; and

on the following day I received the news that His Majesty had ordered

mobilization, but that the state of war did not extend to the overseas

possessions. A telegram from the Secretary of State of the Imperial

Colonial Office called upon us to reassure the settlers.

In contrast to this a wireless message from the Admiralty Staff

mentioned England also among our probable enemies.

At Kilossa I managed to catch a goods train, and so arrived at

Dar-es-Salaam on the 3rd August. Here everyone was busy: the

declaration of war had arrived in the middle of the preparations for a

big exhibition, in the programme of which was included the ceremonial

opening of the Tanganyika Railway; numerous Germans had come on a

visit to Dar-es-Salaam and were now unable to get away. In order to

assist in the preparations for the exhibition, Captain von Hammerstein,

commanding the 6th Field Company in Ujiru, had also arrived there, and

it was very fortunate that I was able at once to employ this energetic

officer, who not only shared my views, but to whom I was also cordially

attached, for the work of mobilization.

The question which immediately forced itself upon us was whether,

in the now obviously imminent universal war in which England would

almost certainly join, the Colony would remain neutral or not. As I

have already explained, I considered it to be our military object to

detain enemy, that is English forces if it could by any means be

accomplished. This, however, was impossible if we remained neutral.

In that case the situation would be that we, who did not command the

sea, would have to remain inactive, with a force which, though small

at the moment, had behind it a loyal, very efficient population of

eight millions suitable for military service. England, on the other

hand, would have no need to employ a single man in East Africa on our

account; it would be able to take away the very last fit Askari, after

providing for internal security, for employment in other theatres more

important than East Africa. It would, therefore, obviously have been an

advantage for England if any agreement had existed which condemned us

to neutrality. But this was not the case: the Congo Act, which deals

with the Equatorial territories, only says that in case of conflict

between two of the Powers concerned, a third Power may offer its good

services as a mediator. But as far as I know this step was not taken

by any Power. We were therefore not obliged to restrict our operations

out of regard for any agreement. From a military point of view it was

a disadvantage, not for us, but for England, if war occurred in East

Africa. The fact that we were not obliged to remain neutral enabled us

to make use of our favourable coast as a base and refuge for the German

cruiser operations in the Indian Ocean. But, above all, we were able,

with our few thousand men, to contain throughout the whole duration of

the war an enormously superior force of the enemy.

At the outbreak of war the Protective Force consisted of 216 Europeans

(from whom a part must be deducted as on leave) and 2,540 Askari; there

were, further, in the Police Force, 45 Europeans and 2,154 Askari;

these were later increased by the ships’ company of the _Königsberg_

(which had put to sea), 322 men, and of the _Möve_, 102 men. The total

numbers enrolled in the Force during the war were about 3,000 Europeans

and 11,000 Askari.

These figures include all non-combatants, such as those employed on

police duty, medical personnel, supply and maintenance services, etc.

How many milliards it cost to try and crush our diminutive force the

English themselves will presumably some day tell us. We, on the other

hand, could probably have continued the war for years to come.

For the hostile strengths no authentic figures are at my disposal;

I quote from the statements of English officers and Press reports,

and they must bear the responsibility for them. According to them

over 130 Generals took the field against us, the total strength of

the hostile troops was about 300,000, the losses in European and

Indian dead amounted to 20,000; horses and mules, 140,000. These

numbers, especially those of the General Officers, seem even to me

rather exaggerated; I can therefore only repeat that they are taken

from English sources. In any event, however, their losses were very

considerable; and considering that the number of black soldiers who

were killed or died is not given, the total number of enemy dead can

hardly be under 60,000.

We should have been compelled, if a cruiser had sought shelter in our

harbours, to refuse to admit her, by reason of our neutrality, whereas

the favourable position and coastal development of East Africa made it

the natural hiding-place in cruiser warfare in the Indian Ocean. As

regards the agreements laid down in the Congo Act, it should be borne

in mind what it would have meant for our Navy if our colonies had been

declared neutral.

At Dar-es-Salaam it was very interesting during those days of tension

to watch the proceedings of the English Consul King. He was to be seen

everywhere, either in the Officers’ Club at a game of bridge, or at the

Post Office where our telegrams were handed in. The standing orders of

the English Expeditionary Force, which were subsequently captured at

Tanga, and which were mainly based on King’s reports, showed how active

this man had been in the time before the war, and how excellently he

was informed as to the internal conditions in our Colony. His judgment

on relevant matters extended so far that he even compared the relative

fighting value of the Europeans in different districts, and credited

those of Dar-es-Salaam with little “stomach for fighting.” To be

honest, it must be admitted that in the case of a large number of the

Germans in that place (and even of the local Government authorities)

it actually did take some time before they were imbued with that

warlike spirit without which the fulfilment of our task was simply

impossible.

Very difficult was the position of the coast towns, which were

inhabited by numerous Europeans (among them many women and children),

and which were of course exposed to bombardment by English men-of-war

at any minute. The Governor maintained that such a bombardment must

be avoided under all circumstances. According to an ordinance, which

certainly did not contemplate the case of foreign war, the supreme

military power in the Colony was in the hands of the Governor, and

communication with home having ceased, it was anyhow physically

impossible to get this altered. So I was obliged to make the best of

this, from a military point of view, very serious difficulty and to

reckon with the possibility that, if the Governor’s instructions were

faithfully executed, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga for instance, the termini

of our railways and the obvious bases for hostile operations from the

coast towards the interior, would fall into the enemy’s hands without a

struggle.

My view was that we would best protect our colony by threatening the

enemy in his own territory. We could very effectively tackle him

at a sensitive point, the Uganda Railway, and one might almost say

that the numerous German settlers in the country traversed by our

Northern Railway (Tanga-Moshi) were already deployed for this object.

The Governor, however, did not agree with the proposal I had already

previously put forward in case of war, namely, to concentrate our

forces in the North near Kilima Njaro. But, in order to act at all,

it was obviously necessary to collect our troops, who were scattered

all over the country. As this could not be effected in the Kilima

Njaro country, as I wished, the concentration took place on the

heights of Pugu, a day’s march west of Dar-es-Salaam. At this place

the Dar-es-Salaam Company met those from Kilimatinde, Tabora, Ujiji,

Usambara and Kissendji, which came partly by march routes and partly

by rail. The Police, who, in accordance with the scanty preparations

already made, were to join the Protective Force immediately, were in

part, at any rate, placed at my disposal, a number of old Askari were

called up, and in this way four new companies (No.’s 15 to 18) were at

once formed. The German Reservists were mobilized as required, and each

company was brought up to an establishment of about 16 Europeans, 160

Askari and 2 machine guns.

In some cases difficulties occurred in calling the Europeans to the

colours. By mistake, the crews of a few ships of the East African Line,

lying in the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were informed, in response to

their application, by the Officer in Command at the Railway Station,

that there was no room for them in the Protective Force. Then, at

the suggestion of the Governor’s representative, a declaration was

submitted to them, according to which they were to engage in writing

to remain neutral during the war. Later on the men saw that this

constituted an offence against the law relating to liability for

service, and their own sound feeling was opposed to it. They appealed

to me, setting forth the circumstances; I had had no inkling of these

proceedings, and fortunately, as the declaration had not yet fallen

into the hands of the enemy, the intended decision could be reserved.

The number of carriers allotted to each company varied, and may

have averaged about 250. The stores of arms, ammunition and other

war-material, which were lying unprotected in the harbour of

Dar-es-Salaam, were distributed among various places in the interior

along the railway, where depots were established. The training of

the troops was at once vigorously proceeded with, and even then we

realized the value of rendering our head-dress unrecognizable by

means of grass and leaves, a measure proposed by a practical Company

Commander, Captain Tafel. The question of course was whether we, with

our Askari, would be able to fight modern troops; it was denied by

many an experienced hand. But from what I had seen during the revolt

in South-West Africa, from 1904 to 1906, I believed that courage and

military efficiency could be awakened in the East African native also,

who belongs to that same great family, the Bantu, as the Herero. That

certainly was a proof; but the matter was greatly simplified by the

fact that there was no possible alternative.

All questions of organization, which are usually carefully prepared

and considered in time of peace, had now to be dealt with and decided

on the spur of the moment. One of them was the extraordinarily

important one of establishing a service of subsistence and a complete

system of supply from the rear. The main point was to consider, in

the first place, the main roads, which were also important in a

military sense. Which roads might these be? It was immediately found

how disadvantageous was the absence of railway communication between

the Central and Usambara Railways. In time of peace, communication

had been effected by sea between Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga; this was

now impossible. Obviously the importance of a military use of the

lines had not been thought of. As a substitute, we had to develop

a road between Morogoro and Korogwe, on the Northern Railway. The

second road ran past the western side of the Masai Reservation, from

Dodoma via Kondoa-Irangi, and Ufiome to Arusha, and the third from the

rich district of Tabora, the capital of the Wanyamwesi country, to

Muansa, on Lake Victoria, into the country of the Wassukume, who were

recognized even by Consul King as the most important of our tribes.

This road was also valuable because by it we could draw on the rice

crops of Lake Victoria as well as on the abundant stocks of cattle.

Other roads connected Kilossa with the rich territory of Mahenge,

Iringa, and even Langenburg, which last provided us with a large part

of our requirements in wheat flour.

The provisional organization of the supply system having been fixed in

broad and general outline, it was not possible for the details of its

development to be worked out at Headquarters. Someone had to be found

whose past military career rendered him capable of working the system,

not only from the administrative point of view, but also in accordance

with the sometimes very urgent military requirements, and of adapting

it to them. Major-General Wahle, a retired officer, who happened to

have arrived on the 2nd August, on a visit to his son, and to see the

Dar-es-Salaam Exhibition, at once placed himself at the disposal of the

Force, and at my request took charge of the Lines of Communication. His

task was particularly difficult, because where there were no railways,

the bulk of the work had to be performed by native carriers. I have at

my disposal no figures showing the total number of carriers employed

for the service of the troops, and it is very difficult to arrive at it

at all definitely. It included men who only carried the loads from one

place to another before the permanent carriers took them over, but I

am sure I do not exaggerate in saying that, on the whole, hundreds of

thousands of carriers worked for the troops; and all of them had to be

fed and medically looked after.

Of our many other difficulties one of a special nature may here be

mentioned. The peace-time existence of the Europeans in tropical

colonies had, even for reasons of health, accustomed them to a certain

degree of comfort. When on _safari_ (a journey) in East Africa, it

is generally impossible to buy European food; but few Europeans had

learnt to live on the vegetable products supplied by the natives or by

Nature. Shelter is rarely to be had. Against mosquitos it is, however,

imperative to protect oneself. So the white official or soldier seldom

travelled with less than eleven carriers, who, besides his tent,

camp-bed and clothing, also carried a considerable quantity of food.

Such large numbers of carriers were, however, impossible for a force

which was to be mobile. Another difficulty was that nearly every Askari

had a boy. With these simple people, whose predilection for their

ancient traditions and customs is further confirmed by Islam, and

who are besides very proud and vain, it is particularly difficult to

interfere with such Dusturis (customs). In individual cases it was not

always easy for a Company Commander to find the happy mean.

In the tropical warfare which was before us medical care is one of the

most important factors. Generally speaking, the native is in a great

measure immune against malaria, and it does not often happen that an

Askari gets really ill with it; some tribes, however, like the Wajagga,

on Kilima Njaro, who inhabit elevated, non-malarial districts, and are

therefore not immune from early youth, suffer severely from malaria

as soon as they come down to the plains. From the evening until well

into the morning mechanical protection against the malaria mosquito

(anopheles), by means of a mosquito net, was strictly enforced for

every European. For many months I slept on the ground, and even then

the mosquito-net afforded me a high degree of protection; even so I

had malaria ten times, for in the field it is not always possible to

employ preventive measures to the extent that is desirable from a

hygienic point of view. In our endeavour to attach a medical officer to

every company we received most welcome assistance from the fact that

there was a considerable number of them on Lake Tanganyika, and in

the Southern territories on the Rovuma, who had come out to study and

combat sleeping-sickness.

The work entailed by all this business of mobilization not only kept us

going day and night, but also the native telephonist at Pugu, and it

was extraordinary to see the skill with which the black man worked his

instrument, both there and elsewhere. His great technical talent proved

of the greatest value to us. Of difficulties there was, of course, an

infinity. During the early days it happened that cattle coming from the

country north of Tabora for the civilian population at Dar-es-Salaam

met other cattle going in the opposite direction to feed the troops.

To this day I feel something of a physical shock when I think of a

collision at Pugu, between a train laden with the finest show cattle

going at full speed, and another one, which nearly produced a serious

reduction in the personnel required for working out our mobilization

scheme.

Our place of concentration at Pugu is some twelve miles inland from

Dar-es-Salaam. Our camp was situated on the slopes of the Pugu

Mountains. The forest is extremely thick, and the country densely

covered by plantations of natives and Europeans. In spite of its

somewhat elevated position, Pugu is quite in the hot coastal area, and

although in August we were still in the cold season, the temperature

was still what we describe as “tropical;” it is that oppressive,

somewhat damp heat, which makes long marches so exhausting for the

European. At that time we had tents for the Europeans and a camp-bed

with the inevitable mosquito net for everyone, so that in this respect

there were no difficulties. In case of sickness we had established a

provisional field hospital in the neighbouring Wichmann Plantations.

Our horses did not suffer unduly. But one after another all our animals

went down with tse-tse. In camp it was not possible to provide them, as

we could at Dar-es-Salaam, with tse-tse proof stables, fitted with wire

gauze similar to fly-proof windows.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ACTIONS

IN this Manner We Were Fully Employed in the Camp at Pugu, when, on

the morning of the 8th August, we heard heavy artillery fire from the

direction of Dar-es-Salaam. According to reports which soon reached us,

it emanated from two English light cruisers, _Astræa_ and _Pegasus_,

who were aiming at the wireless tower. This tower had been erected in

this exposed position because on the coast it could reach further out

to sea; it was of importance to us because the high-power station at

Tabora was not yet finished, and the two smaller ones at Muansa and

Bukoba were of only local use. The tower was not hit by the English,

but blown up by us, from a rather excessive fear of its falling into

the enemy’s hands. A short time later an observation officer reported

that the enemy was apparently preparing to land at Konduchi, a day’s

march north of Dar-es-Salaam. The formation of the coast rendered it

not unlikely. I therefore immediately ordered the seven companies

of Askari[2] available to march off, so as to seize the favourable

opportunity of surprising the enemy in the act of landing.

Before they marched off I had a conversation at Pugu Station with the

Governor, Dr. Schnee, who was passing through by train to Morogoro. He

seemed quite surprised by the English hostilities, and entirely agreed

with my proposal to attack them at Konduchi. On the way there I met

two gentlemen belonging to the Government at Dar-es-Salaam, who showed

me a document dealing with negotiations for surrendering Dar-es-Salaam

to the English. As the Governor had said nothing to me about it, and

I was also rather in a hurry, I only glanced superficially at it. It

did not occur to me that this might be any kind of agreement drawn

up with the consent of the Governor. But when, during the night, the

force had reached a mountain ten miles north of Dar-es-Salaam, and on

the next morning we obtained a view of the harbour and the English

cruisers lying off it, it became clear that the report of an attempted

landing at Konduchi was a mistake. We were able to establish the fact

that the English ships had communicated with the shore, and now it

did appear to me probable that negotiations with the enemy had taken

place. I now advanced on the town, and, as I could not but fear that

in the confusion of the moment a disadvantageous agreement might be

concluded at Dar-es-Salaam, I sent Captain Tafel on ahead. He was

to announce that I was taking over the executive power, and that

negotiations with the enemy must be conducted through me alone. It was

only from Captain Tafel that I learned that by order of the Governor

negotiations for surrender had actually taken place. My intervention

was not approved by the Governor, in whose hands, according to a

Protective Force Ordinance intended to meet quite different conditions,

supreme military power was actually placed. For the moment this had no

practical consequences. Only a few English Marines had landed, and had

already gone on board again. But for a soldier it was not inspiring

to find that here, under the very eyes of a thousand good troops, an

agreement had been concluded which forbade us to undertake any hostile

act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy was not so bound, and that we had

received no information of a step of such great military importance.

The _Königsberg_ had already put to sea from Dar-es-Salaam several

days before, and the surveying vessel _Möve_, which was in harbour,

had been blown up by us on the 9th August. This brought the land

forces a valuable military increase, as the captain of the _Möve_,

Lieut.-Commander Zimmer, now came under my orders. Lieutenant Horn at

once proceeded with a few seamen to Kigoma, where he manned and armed

the small steamer _Hedwig von Wissmann_. On Lake Tanganyika he chased

the Belgian steamer _Delcommune_, which he surprised and shot to

pieces after a few days, thereby securing to us the extremely important

command of the lake. The ability rapidly to transfer troops from the

Central Railway towards Bismarckburg or Usambara depended entirely

upon unimpeded transport on Tanganyika, and played a part in the later

course of the operations.

In the north of the Colony, the 1st Company at Arusha had been

reinforced by the 13th Company, coming by rapid marches from Kondoa,

and by another company formed at Moshi from Police Askari. Further, a

large part of the Europeans of the northern districts had combined to

form a detachment under Captain von Prince. Most of those troops were

in the neighbourhood of Moshi. Taveta, which lies to the eastward,

in English territory, was held by the enemy, who thereby secured a

valuable sally-port against our European settlements in the north;

it was, therefore, an urgent matter for us to capture this important

point without delay. It took considerable time before we were able to

set the force in motion for this purpose. Many people believed that

on the strength of the Congo Act we were bound to remain neutral, and

naturally had little confidence in the instructions they received

from the new Commandant. It was not until the 15th August that the

weakly-held place was taken. The course of the fight proved that

the force still required much further training to render it fit to

carry out combined operations in unison in the dense bush. In this

area the command was assumed by Major Kraut, who happened to be in

the north-eastern frontier district for the purpose of frontier

delimitations. During the next few days the holder of the supreme

military power was successfully persuaded to agree to moving the bulk

of our forces to the Northern Railway. Simple as was this movement in

itself, under the conditions then existing, it required considerable

preparations. There were few Germans to be found who were so well

acquainted with the whole country between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro

on one side, and Tanga and Mombo on the other, that they could give

reliable information about roads and conditions of subsistence. It was

necessary to send out reconnaissance officers in order to determine

the roads on which a suitable quantity of supplies could be found. But

we could not afford to await the results of all these reconnaissances;

the marches had to be begun. According to European ideas the country

was sparsely populated; and on the existing maps the only notes as to

water and food showed whether the supplies available would suffice for

bodies of a strength equal to a company at most. Without preparation

one could therefore hardly put more than one company on each road

without distribution in depth; the training and skill in the collection

of supplies which the force had acquired by the end of the war were

at that time non-existent. Taking it all round, it came to this, that

the march and supply of a single company in the conditions there

prevailing required about the same consideration as would a division in

Germany. It was also necessary in this move to take into account the

risk arising from the fact that companies would for a prolonged period

be out of reach of orders. The only telegraphic communication between

the Central Railway and the north ran close along the coast, and could

therefore be interrupted whenever the enemy intended to do so.

However, the Director of the Postal Service, Rothe, and Secretary

Krüger displayed such adaptability in meeting the wishes of

the troops, and such energy in starting work on the new line

Morogoro-Handeni-Korogwe, and, under the pressure of circumstances,

temporarily overcame the normal torpor of the Tropics with such

success, that the line was completed in only a few weeks. Owing to the

destructiveness of the termites (white ants) it is the rule in time of

peace to employ iron telegraph poles, which, owing to the prevalence

of giraffe in this particular district, have to be very tall and carry

very heavy conductors. In the first instance, however, the construction

in this case had to be of a provisional nature, and this, and the use

of cable, caused continual breakdowns and repairs.

In the meantime I received reports of the advance of small hostile

detachments at Jassini, two marches north of Tanga, and this confirmed

me in the belief that the enemy intended to land in that district,

and would then rapidly advance into the interior along the Northern

Railway. Consequently, the various companies had marched off from

different points on the line Dar-es-Salaam-Mpapua, and were for the

most part converging on Handeni, while some were directed on other

points on the line Tanga-Korogwe, when I was called up on the telephone

at Pugu on the afternoon of August 23rd, by Lieutenant von Chappuis,

who was encamped at Bagamoyo with the 17th Field Company. He reported

that an English light cruiser was lying off Bagamoyo, and had called

upon the local Civil Administrator to destroy the telegraph station,

threatening to bombard the place in case of refusal. I ordered him to

assume control of the executive and to prevent a hostile landing by

force of arms. A boat from the man-of-war that attempted to land under

the white flag was therefore sent back, and the place was bombarded

in consequence, to the great amusement of the company and the native

inhabitants, since the enemy scored practically no hits.

At the end of August, Headquarters moved by rail to Kirnamba, near

Morogoro. On the way, General von Wahle, who was directing the service

on the Lines of Communication from Morogoro, wished me the best of

luck in the decisive action which we expected in the neighbourhood

of Handeni, and to which his son was also proceeding. From there

Headquarters travelled on towards Handeni in two requisitioned motors.

After about twenty miles we had to leave them, as the improvement

of this road had not been completed beyond that point. Captain von

Hammerstein and I went on on bicycles, and gradually caught up the

companies on the march. The anticipated landing of the enemy did not

take place, and early in September we reached Korogwe. In the meantime

an English cruiser had appeared at Tanga and towed away some lighters

lying there.

Our next duty was to organize the supply and transport services in

the north. Captain Schmid, who had until then directed them as Field

Intendant, had become sick, and it was difficult to find a suitable

successor. Fortunately we discovered one in Captain Feilke, of

the Landwehr, who had for many years directed the Prince Albrecht

Plantations in Usambara, a man of great experience. He was at the time

in the vicinity of Tanga, and had placed himself at the disposal of

the force. He had formerly been Adjutant of the 8th Jäger Battalion,

was fifty-two years of age, a man of much knowledge of the world and a

skilful officer; he thus combined in the happiest manner the military

knowledge and business talent necessary for the difficult post of

Intendant. He came immediately, and we drove to New Moshi together.

There I met Captain Kraut. On Kilima Njaro preparations had been made

for guerilla warfare by establishing supply depots, our patrols were

pushing beyond Taveta towards the British Uganda Railway, and numerous

minor encounters had already taken place. At that time, however, the

force lacked the experience necessary for carrying out distant patrols

like those which at a later stage led so successfully to interruptions

of the line. The first patrols had arrived at the Uganda Railway in

a half-starved condition and had been captured. From New Moshi I

went to Himo Camp, where Captain von Prince was holding a fortified

position. He accompanied me to Taveta, which was held by an advanced

post under an officer. Now we could discuss on the spot the problem of

transferring the main body of the Northern Force to Taveta. The local

native population was very numerous and placed entire confidence in

the European administrators appointed by the force: they continued to

sell their products in the market, and our mutual relationship was

completely satisfactory.

Directly war broke out the fear of a native rising had been expressed

in many quarters. Along the Central Railway there were wild rumours

about a revolt of the Wahehe—the warlike tribe who had so long defied

German authority in the Iringa country—and around Kilima Njaro a

rising of the Wajagga was feared. The authorities also thought that

the large number of black labourers on the European settlements in

the north were unreliable on account of difficulties of subsistence.

But none of these fears turned out to be justified. Later, a very

intelligent captured Belgian Askari told me outright: “You know quite

well that the natives always side with the stronger party,” and an

English Masai admitted frankly: “It is all the same to us whether the

English or the Germans are our masters.”

[Illustration: General Map of the Campaign in East Africa.

—— Track of the German Main Force. 1916-1918.]

[Illustration: The Fallen.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

It was not till later, after the enemy had penetrated the country, that

the native became a real danger to us: and then it was, indeed, very

great. The native has a fine sense of the transfer of real power from

one hand to the other.

After returning for a short time to Korogwe, Headquarters moved to

New Moshi, and shortly afterwards to Taveta. Three companies who had

reached the Northern Railway from the Central Railway were concentrated

at Tanga, the remaining five were moved into the Kilima Njaro country.

At Dar-es-Salaam there remained for the moment only Captain von

Kornatzki with the newly-formed 18th Field Company.

During the following period several enterprises were carried out by

flying columns, of the strength of one company each, the intention

being to drive away the hostile detachments who were reported to be

guarding the watering-places in the adjoining English territory, to

inflict losses upon them, and so to open the way for our patrols to

operate against the Uganda and Magad Railway. Thus, at the end of

September, Captain Schulz had marched with his company from Kilima

Njaro down the Tsavo River to the Uganda Railway, where he had met

an enemy detachment of several companies, who had probably been

concentrated by means of the railway. North of Kilima Njaro Captain

Tafel had with his company and a detachment of fifty Europeans pursued

a column of English Horse, but had then been attacked by the latter

in his camp in the dense bush on Engito Mountain. This was the first

serious engagement fought by our Askari in the north. Although the

enemy consisted of English and Boer farmers, who were therefore good

horsemen and good shots, our Askari attacked them with the bayonet with

such dash, that out of a strength of eighty Europeans some twenty dead

were left behind, and their total casualties may therefore be estimated

at half their number.

In the same way the expeditions undertaken by Captain Baumstark, who

commanded the three companies at Tanga, led to fighting in the frontier

districts between Jassini and Mombasa. An equally important object of

all these enterprises was to secure the most indispensable information

about this theatre of operations, as it had not been reconnoitred in

time of peace, and the conditions as to water-supply and cultivation

were unknown to us. In this manner we gradually obtained a clear

idea of the country and its inhabitants. Along the coast the English

frontier district was well settled and highly cultivated. Further

inland it is a dry desert covered with thorn scrub and partly with

thick bush. Out of the desert rise a number of mountain ranges, which

often attain the character of steep masses of rock. The troops were

quartered in several fortified camps east of Kilima Njaro, but, owing

to the difficulty of communication from Taveta, Headquarters were moved

back to Moshi. Later, when the Director of the Field Postal Service

arrived, and I asked him what he thought of the line between Moshi and

Taveta, he could only describe it as “pretty.” The insulators were made

from knocked off bottle-necks, fastened to poles or branches of trees,

the wire had been taken from the fences of the plantations. But the

breakdowns really were so frequent that the great volume of reports and

information in connection with the working of Headquarters could not

have been carried on this line for a prolonged period.

Since the outbreak of war our communication with the outside world had

been to all intents and purposes cut off; at first, indeed, we did pick

up wireless messages from Kamina (in Togo), and then occasionally,

under favourable weather conditions, from Nauen (Germany); but

otherwise we had to depend for fresh news on picking up enemy wireless

messages, or on obtaining possession of enemy mails or other papers.

CHAPTER IV

THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA

CAPTURED English newspapers stated that it would be particularly

painful to Germany to lose her beloved colonies, its “little chicks,”

and that German East Africa was the most valuable mouthful. Captured

mails spoke of an impending attack by an Indian expeditionary force of

10,000 men, and, as I had from general considerations always expected a

hostile attack on a large scale in the neighbourhood of Tanga, I went

there at the end of October, drove all over the country in a car I had

brought with me, and discussed the matter on the spot with Captain

Adler, commanding the 17th Company, and with District Commissioner

Auracher. I was pleased to find that the latter was of my opinion that,

in the event of Tanga being seriously threatened, the prime necessity

would be unity of action, and I assured him that I would, of course,

undertake the responsibility for any consequences that might ensue.

This was particularly important for the reason that, according to the

Governor’s instructions, a bombardment of Tanga was to be avoided under

all circumstances. Opinions as to what should be done or left undone in

any given case might therefore differ very widely.

On the 2nd November, a few days after my return to New Moshi, a wire

from Tanga informed me that fourteen hostile transports and two

cruisers had appeared off the place. They demanded unconditional

surrender of the town; the negotiations were protracted, as District

Commissioner Auracher, who had gone on board, pointed out that he must

obtain special instructions, and prevented the threatened bombardment

by remarking that Tanga was an open and undefended place. Captain

Baumstark, who was with two companies in the frontier district

north of Tanga, was at once moved off towards Tanga. Similarly the

two companies of Europeans and the Askari companies were moved by

forced marches from near Taveta and Kilima Njaro to New Moshi. Two

lorries which were employed on supply work between New Moshi and

Taveta rendered valuable service in this move. My intention to collect

all available troops as rapidly as possible, to meet the obviously

impending landing at Tanga, could only be executed, in spite of

the long marches expected of the troops, if the Northern Railway

exerted its capacity to the utmost limit, and this, with only eight

locomotives, was asking a great deal. The railway is a narrow gauge

line of 190 miles, on which, in a fully-loaded train of 24 to 32

axles, only one company could be carried with complete baggage, or two

companies without either baggage or carriers. That the transport of the

troops could be carried out at all is entirely due to the willingness

of all those connected with it—I specially mention Railway Commissary

Kröber, who had been called up to the Force as a 2nd Lieutenant, and

the traffic director Kühlwein—who at Tanga conducted the trains up on

to the actual battlefield under fire. As early as the 2nd November the

troops actually at New Moshi, one and a half companies, were pushed

off by train, followed on the morning of the 3rd by Headquarters and

another company. Three other companies followed later. Similarly, all

the smaller detachments employed on railway protection duty were moved

to Tanga. The spirit of the departing troops was magnificent, but this

may have been due, not so much to the fact that the Askari clearly

understood the gravity of the situation, as that for him a trip in a

railway train is at all times a great delight.

[Illustration: Fig. iv. Battle of Tanga. Fig. v. The Northern Railway.]

Headquarters reached Korogwe in the evening of the 3rd November. I

went to the hospital that had been established there and talked to

the wounded who had come in from the action at Tanga on the 3rd. One

of them, Lieutenant Merensky, of the Landwehr, reported to me that on

the 2nd November, outpost and patrol encounters had taken place near

Ras-Kasone, and that on the 3rd the enemy, apparently several thousand

strong, who had landed at Ras-Kasone, had attacked the 17th Company

east of Tanga. The latter, reinforced by the Europeans and Police

Askari from Tanga under Lieutenant Auracher, had withstood the attack

until the first one and a half companies coming from New Moshi joined

in, rushing at once to attack the left flank of the enemy and driving

him back. Lieutenant Merensky had the impression that the enemy was

completely defeated, and that the attack was unlikely to be repeated.

The telegrams coming in piecemeal during the railway journey had not

afforded me a clear idea of the situation, when at 3 a.m. on the 4th

November, Headquarters left the railway four miles west of Tanga,

where we met Captain Baumstark. He had formed a different estimate of

the situation, and believed that, owing to the great superiority of

the enemy, Tanga could not be held against another attack. He had,

therefore, on the evening of the 3rd November, collected his own two

companies coming from the north, and the troops who had that day been

in action at Tanga, at a point four miles west of the town, leaving

patrols only in the place itself.

Whether Tanga was held by the enemy or not was not certain. Strong

officers’ patrols were at once pushed forward beyond Tanga towards

Ras-Kasone. Luckily Headquarters had brought a few bicycles, and so, in

order to satisfy myself quickly by personal observation, I was able to

go off at once with Captain von Hammerstein and Volunteer Dr. Dessel

to the railway station at Tanga, where I found an advanced post of the

6th Field Company. They, however, could give no accurate information

about the enemy, and so I rode on through the empty streets of the

town. It was completely deserted, and the white houses of the Europeans

reflected the brilliant rays of the moon into the streets which we

traversed. So we reached the harbour at the further edge of the town.

Tanga was therefore clear of the enemy. A quarter of a mile out lay the

transports, a blaze of lights, and full of noise: there was no doubt

that the landing was about to commence at once. I much regretted that

our artillery—we had two guns of 1873 pattern—was not yet up. Here,

in the brilliant moonlight, at such close range, their effect would

have been annihilating, the hostile cruisers notwithstanding.

We then rode on towards Ras-Kasone, left our bicycles in the German

Government Hospital, and went on foot to the beach, close to which,

right in front of us, lay an English cruiser. On the way back, at the

hospital, we were challenged, apparently by an Indian sentry—we did

not understand the language—but saw nothing. We got on our cycles

again and rode back. Day began to break, and on our left we heard

the first shots. This was the officers’ patrol under 2nd Lieutenant

Bergmann, of the 6th Field Company, who had met hostile patrols west

of Ras-Kasone. One of my cyclists now brought Captain Baumstark the

order to advance at once with all the troops to Tanga Station. For

the manner in which I proposed to fight the action, which was now to

be expected with certainty, the nature of the country was one of the

decisive factors. In the north, the houses of the European town at the

harbour provided cover from view, and therefore also from the fire of

the cruisers close by. The town was surrounded by continuous cocoanut

and rubber plantations, which extended almost to Ras-Kasone, and in

which, besides the native town, a few native patches of cultivation

were scattered about. Undergrowth occurred along a few points and the

ground was absolutely flat. It was probable that the enemy, whether he

landed at Ras-Kasone only, or simultaneously at several points, such

as Mwambani, for instance, would press upon our south, or right, wing.

Here, to the south of Tanga, the ground afforded us also the prospect

of greater power of manœuvre. I decided to meet the attack, which I

expected with certainty, on the eastern edge of Tanga, and to echelon

strong reserves behind our right wing for a counter-attack against the

enemy’s flank.

In allotting the various duties it was necessary to consider the

peculiarities of the different units. At that time each company had

different characteristics, according to its composition and its state

of training. The good 6th Field Company, which had in time of peace

received a careful training at Ujiji with both rifle and machine-gun,

was ordered to hold the eastern edge of Tanga on a broad front. On

its right rear, outside Tanga, was echeloned Baumstark’s battalion,

consisting of the 16th and 17th Companies, formed from the Police, and

several small units amalgamated into one company. To the right rear

again, on the telegraph-road Tanga-Pangani, I kept three good companies

at my own disposal, the 7th and 8th Rifle Companies, with three

machine-guns, composed of Europeans, and the 13th Field Company with

its four machine-guns. Headquarters remained for the present on the

Tanga-Pangani road and connected up to the telegraph line there. The

4th and 9th Field Companies and the two field guns (Captain Hering’s

Battery) were still on the way, and the time of their arrival was

uncertain. So the situation remained essentially until the afternoon.

In the hot sun of the Coast area we suffered not a little from thirst,

but quenched it with the milk of the young cocoanuts. There were other

drinks as well in Tanga at that time; we still had wine and soda-water.

Master-butcher Grabow even brought the troops hot sausages.

The proceedings on board the hostile ships were kept under constant

close observation. We saw every boat that left them, and its load.

I estimated the total troops landed up to midday at 6,000. But even

on this too low estimate I had to ask myself whether I dared risk a

decisive engagement with my thousand rifles. For various reasons I

decided that I would do so. It was too important to prevent the enemy

from gaining a firm footing in Tanga. Otherwise we should abandon to

him the best base for operations against the Northern territories; in

his advance the Northern Railway would afford him an admirable line

of communication, and he would be enabled continually to surprise

us by bringing up and pushing forward fresh troops and stores. Then

it was certain that we would be unable to hold the Northern Railway

any longer and that we would be obliged to abandon our hitherto so

successful method of warfare. Against these all-important practical

reasons, limited considerations such as the Governor’s order to avoid a

bombardment of Tanga under all circumstances could not prevail.

A few circumstances there were that favoured us. For one thing, from

personal experience in East Asia, I knew the clumsiness with which

English troops were moved and led in battle, and it was certain that

in the very close and completely unknown country in which the enemy

would find himself directly he landed, these difficulties would grow

to infinity. The slightest disorder was bound to have far-reaching

consequences. With my troops, of whom the Europeans were well

acquainted with the country round Tanga, while the Askari were at home

in the bush, I had a reasonable prospect of taking advantage of the

enemy’s weak points by skilful and rapid manœuvre.

On the other hand, if the affair miscarried, it would be a bad

business. Already my method of waging active war had met with

disapproval. If on top of that we were to suffer a severe defeat the

confidence of the troops would probably be gone, and it was certain

that my superiors would place insuperable difficulties in the way of my

exercising command. My decision was not easy, and as if the military

situation alone did not render it difficult enough, it was made

unnecessarily harder by the fact that the regulations did not allow

sufficient freedom to the responsible commander. But there was nothing

for it: to gain all we must risk all.

The same morning I personally ordered Captain von Prince to move into

Tanga with his two companies of Europeans, so that, in case of an

attack on the Askari Company holding the eastern edge of the place,

he could intervene rapidly without orders. I had already begun to

doubt whether the enemy would attack at all on the 4th November, when

at 3 p.m. an Askari reported to me in his simple, smart way: “Adui

tayari.” (The enemy is ready.) Those two short words I shall never

forget. The next moment the rifle fire opened along the whole front,

and one could only judge of the rapid development and the ebb and

flow of the action from the direction of the firing. One heard the

fire draw in from the eastern edge of the town to the middle: so the

6th Company had been driven back at this point. The enemy, with odds

twenty to one in his favour, had penetrated close up to the station

and into the town. Captain von Prince had immediately rushed up his

two companies of Europeans and at once prevailed upon the brave Askari

to stand and then to advance once more. The British North Lancashire

Regiment, consisting only of long-service Europeans, 800 strong, was

driven back with heavy losses, and the houses captured by the Indian

Brigade (Kashmir Rifles), who were advancing between that regiment and

the beach, were re-taken in stubborn street-fighting. But on the south

side of Tanga Captain Baumstark had also brought his companies into

action on the front, and after about one hour’s fighting I observed

the Askari at this point retiring through the palm-trees to the

Tanga-Pangani road. The European members of Headquarters at once ran

there and stopped them. To this day I can see the fiery and determined

Captain von Hammerstein, full of fury, throwing an empty bottle at the

head of a retreating Askari. After all, they were for the most part

young companies, only just formed, who were fighting at this point,

and they had been staggered by the intensity of the enemy’s fire. But

when we Europeans got in front of them and laughed at them they quickly

recovered themselves and saw that every bullet did not hit. But on the

whole the pressure on our front was so strong that I thought I could

not delay the decision any longer and must start my counter-stroke.

For this I had now but one company available, but it was the good 13th

Field Company. The 4th Company, whose arrival I was most anxiously

awaiting every minute, had not yet arrived.

The course of the action up till now had shown that the enemy’s front,

of which the flank was unprotected, did not reach further south than

the right wing of our own. Here, therefore, the counter-stroke must

prove annihilating, and no witness will forget the moment when the

machine-guns of the 13th Company opened a continuous fire at this

point and completely reversed the situation. The whole front jumped up

and dashed forward with enthusiastic cheers. In the meantime the 4th

Company had arrived; although, in consequence of a misunderstanding,

it did not prolong the outer flank of the 13th, but pushed in between

the latter and our front, still it did take an effective part in the

battle before dark. In wild disorder the enemy fled in dense masses,

and our machine-guns, converging on them from front and flanks, mowed

down whole companies to the last man. Several Askari came in beaming

with delight with several captured English rifles on their backs and an

Indian prisoner in each hand. The handcuffs, however, which we found in

their possession for use with German prisoners, were not used on them

by any of us.

At this time, in the dense forest, all units, and in many instances

friend and foe, were mixed up together, everybody was shouting at

once in all sorts of languages, darkness was rapidly setting in; it

is only necessary to conjure up this scene in imagination in order to

understand how it was that the pursuit which I set in motion failed

completely. I had been stationed on the right wing, and had quickly

despatched such units as were within reach at the moment to push with

energy towards Ras-Kasone. Then I had gone to the left wing. There

I found hardly any of our people at all; it was not till some time

afterwards, in the night, that I heard the sound of the nailed boots of

a party of Askari. I was glad at last to have a force in hand, but was

somewhat disappointed to find it was a detachment of the right wing,

under 2nd Lieutenant Langen, who had missed the way to Ras-Kasone and

had thus got on to our left wing. But even these difficulties were not

all. In some inexplicable way the troops imagined a Headquarter order

had been issued that they were to return to their old camp west of

Tanga. Only during the course of the night, at Tanga Railway Station,

did it become clear to me that nearly all the companies had marched off

for that destination. Of course they were ordered to return at once.

But unfortunately this caused so much delay that it was impossible

to bring Hering’s Battery, which had arrived later, into action by

moonlight against the ships.

The troops, whose great exhaustion was quite comprehensible, did not

get back to Tanga until the morning of the 5th November, and occupied

essentially the same position as the day before. It was not now

advisable to advance with all our forces against the enemy, who was

re-embarking at Ras-Kasone, as the country there was entirely open,

and commanded by the cruisers lying in its immediate vicinity. All the

same, the strong patrols and individual companies, who advanced towards

Ras-Kasone, in order to harass the enemy, succeeded in surprising

him by machine-gun fire directed on various detachments, a few boats,

and even the decks of the cruiser lying close to the hospital. During

the day, the impression that the enemy had suffered a tremendous

defeat grew stronger and stronger. It is true, the full extent of his

losses did not become known to us all at once; but the many places

where hundreds and hundreds of dead were piled up in heaps, and the

smell of putrefaction which the tropical sun brought out all over the

district, gave us some indication. Very cautiously we estimated the

killed at about 800, but I believe this number to be far too low. A

senior English officer, who had accurate knowledge of the details,

told me later, on the occasion of an action in which he stated the

English casualties to have been 1,500, that the losses at Tanga had

been considerably greater. I now think that even 2,000 is too low an

estimate. Even greater was the enemy’s loss in _moral_. He almost

began to believe in spirits and spooks; years afterwards I was asked

by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga, but I

may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive moment all the

machine-guns of one of our companies were put out of action by these

same “trained bees,” so that we suffered from this new “training” quite

as much as the English.

The enemy felt himself completely defeated, and he was. His troops

had fled in wild confusion and thrown themselves head over heels

into the lighters. The possibility of renewing the attack was not

even considered. From prisoners’ statements and captured official

English documents it was ascertained that the whole Anglo-Indian

Expeditionary Force of 8,000 men had been thus decisively beaten by

our force of little more than 1,000 men. Not till the evening did we

realize the magnitude of this victory, when an English officer, Captain

Meinertshagen, came under a flag of truce to negotiate with Captain von

Hammerstein, my representative, for the handing over of the wounded.

Captain von Hammerstein proceeded to the hospital, which was full of

severely wounded English officers, and in my name agreed to their being

removed by the English on giving their word of honour not to fight

against us again in this war.

The booty in arms enabled us to re-arm more than three companies with

modern weapons, for which the sixteen machine-guns were particularly

welcome. The _moral_ of the force and its confidence in its leaders had

enormously increased, and at one blow I was delivered from a great part

of the difficulties which so greatly impeded the conduct of operations.

The continuous fire of the ships’ guns, which the closeness of the

country had rendered ineffective, had lost its terrors for our brave

blacks. The quantity of stores captured was also considerable; besides

600,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition the enemy had left behind

the whole of his telephone gear and such quantities of clothing and

equipment that we were able to meet all our requirements, especially in

warm coats and blankets, for at least a year. Our own losses, painful

though they were, were numerically insignificant. About fifteen (?)

Europeans, among them the splendid Captain von Prince, and fifty-four

(?) Askari and machine-gun carriers, had fallen. The Europeans were

buried in a worthy warriors’ grave in the shade of a fine Buyu tree,

where a simple memorial tablet is inscribed with their names. The work

of clearing up the battlefield and burying the dead meant several

days of most strenuous work for the whole force, as the streets were

literally strewn with dead and badly wounded. In unknown tongues they

begged for help which, with the best will in the world, could not

always be accorded at once.

At our main dressing station, in Tanga itself, our male and female

nursing personnel had conscientiously cared for friend and foe even

under the fire of the heavy guns of the ships. As recently as the

evening of the 4th November I had been to see the wounded. I little

thought that Lieutenant Schottstaedt, who was sitting there on a chair

with a severe wound in the chest, had but a few minutes to live. The

English Lieutenant Cook, of the 101st Indian Grenadiers, lay there with

a bad gun-shot wound in the leg. This bright young officer, who had

fallen into our hands in the hottest part of the fight on the Indian

left wing, maintained his cheerfulness in spite of his wound. With the

bulk of the other wounded, he was treated for nine months in the Field

Hospital at Korogwe by our best surgeon, _Stabsarzt_ Dr. Müller. He

was already walking about once more, when an unfortunate fall on the

stairs caused his death.

The fighting at Tanga was the first occasion on which heavy demands

were made on our arrangements for the care of the wounded. For this

purpose, hospitals had been established at Korogwe and at various other

points on the Northern Railway, to which the sick could be taken by

rail without being transferred from one method of transport to another.

No special hospital arrangements of a permanent nature had been made

for transport, but we never had any difficulty in improvising what was

necessary.

In spite of their undoubted defeat at Tanga it was probable that

British determination would not accept this decision as final. Even

after his defeat the enemy was still several times as strong as we

were, and would not improbably attempt another landing elsewhere. But

a cycle ride on the 6th November to Mansa Bay, in the North, convinced

me that the hostile ships had run in there only for the purpose of

attending to their wounded and burying their dead and had no intention

of landing. And the ships actually did steam off towards Zanzibar soon

after. At that time it was interesting to me to visit our Government

Hospital near Ras-Kasone, which had in the meantime been evacuated by

the English wounded released on parole. Among others I saw here two

German officers who had been wounded at Tanga on the 3rd November, and

others who had been wounded in an earlier action; from the hospital

they had been able to observe events behind the English front on the

4th November, the day when the principal fighting took place. With the

greatest excitement they had watched the landing at Ras-Kasone and the

advance on Tanga; in the afternoon they had heard the opening of our

decisive machine-gun fire and the bombardment by the ships’ guns, and

had then witnessed the wild flight of the enemy close by the hospital.

The numerous shells that had fallen near the hospital had fortunately

done no damage. Quite early on the 5th November they had suddenly heard

guns firing again, this time from the direction of Tanga; they realized

that they must be German guns. They were in fact our two 1873 pattern

field-guns, which, though too late to deal with the English transports

by moonlight, had at least managed to secure a few hits after daybreak.

A prolonged fire for effect was now unfortunately impossible, as the

smoke disclosed the positions of the guns at once and drew the fire of

the ships.

In the meantime it had become evident that the attack at Tanga was

not an isolated enterprise, but had been intended to form part of a

simultaneous operation on a large scale. Suddenly in the morning mist,

on the 3rd November, English troops appeared north-west of Kilima

Njaro, at Longido Mountain, which was held by Captain Kraut with three

Companies of Askari and a Mounted Company of Europeans. Just as orders

reached Longido Mountain by heliograph directing Captain Kraut to move

off to Moshi, the first shell arrived. The enemy, about 1,000 strong,

had ascended the great mountain, which lies by itself in the open

plain, at several points, being guided by Masai, who called out to

the outposts: “We belong to Captain Kraut’s men.” But our three Field

Companies deployed rapidly and succeeded in working round the enemy

detachment in the rocky ground and quickly repelled them. A hostile

detachment of mounted Europeans who became visible in the plain at the

foot of the mountain, and apparently intended to ascend it from the

south, or to act against our communications, was fired upon with effect

and quickly driven off.

Probably in connection with these events on the Northern Railway,

hostile enterprises took place on Lake Victoria. At the end of October

numerous Waganda warriors had penetrated from the North into the Bukoba

district. To meet this menace, a force of 570 rifles, 4 machine-guns,

and 2 guns left Muanza on the 31st October on board the small steamer

_Muanza_, with 2 tugs and 10 dhows (boats). Soon after the landing

these transports were attacked by English steamers, but got back to

Muanza without damage. An English attempt to land at Kayense, north of

Muanza, broke down under the fire of our detachment posted there.

Thus, at the beginning of November we were confronted with a concentric

attack on our Colony, planned on a large scale. Its failure made

everyone expect that we would be able to hold our own as long as the

home country could do so. But such scanty information as we could get

from there gave us confidence. At the time of the action at Tanga we

had, indeed, not heard the name of Hindenburg; but on the other hand we

knew nothing of our reverse on the Marne, and were still buoyed up by

the impression created by our victorious invasion of France.

CHAPTER V

AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS

THE danger threatening the Kilima Njaro country appeared to me to be

by itself a sufficient reason for rapidly moving the troops back to

the vicinity of New Moshi after the decisive success of Tanga, which

in any event could not be further exploited. The joy of the Northern

settlers, who, it should be noted, had furnished the bulk of the

Europeans who fought at Tanga, was indescribable. The first train,

which carried the European Company, returned to New Moshi bedecked

with flowers. I myself had still enough to do at Tanga, and did not

follow the troops to New Moshi for several days, where Headquarters

was reopened. Shortage of personnel prevented us from having separate

people for each duty. Officers of Headquarters had sometimes in an

emergency to act as riflemen or cyclists, the Intendant occasionally

did duty as an orderly, the clerk went into action with a rifle and

acted as orderly in battle. The work was greatly facilitated by the

fact that the railway station, constructed on European lines, afforded

us accommodation which, in spite of being rather small, enabled us to

settle most matters affecting the Staff only by word of mouth. We had

good telephone and telegraph installations, and were situated centrally

as the telephone and road systems, which we had either made or

perfected, and which led out in both directions towards Tanga, Taveta,

East Kilima Njaro, West Kilima Njaro and Longido, as well as to Arusha.

Sometimes the work would go on for a week at a time almost as in peace,

although the volume of work to be dealt with was greater. But although

hardly anybody at Headquarters was either trained or prepared for his

functions, harmonious and successful co-operation was secured. It was

based upon the best spirit, devotion to the cause, and the support of

good comradeship.

I myself went by car—for we had made a motor-road right up to Longido

Mountain—to the Engare-Nairobi (cold river), a small stream rising on

the northern slopes of Kilima Njaro, and flowing between it and Longido

through the prairie in a north-westerly direction. In this country

a number of Boer families were settled on farms. Kraut’s detachment

had moved their camp there, as their supplies, if they had remained

on Longido Mountain, would have had to make a two-days’ march across

the prairie, where they could not be protected, and were, therefore,

too uncertain. I satisfied myself that there was at this time no

opportunity for any enterprises north of Kilima Njaro, and returned

to New Moshi. The distance from New Moshi, where we collected a large

proportion of the supplies coming from Usambara and the country further

south by rail to Taveta, is thirty miles. Although we had available

only a few motors, namely, three cars and three lorries all told, they

were in the circumstances a considerable help. The road being well

made, the three-ton lorries could do the trip out and back in one

day in dry weather. As carriers took at least four days for the same

journey a calculation showed that one lorry could do the work of six

hundred carriers, who required subsistence in addition. The principle,

later maintained by the English, of replacing carriers and pack-animals

by mechanical transport, is further supported by the fact that men and

animals suffered severely from tropical diseases, whereas mosquitos

are powerless against automobiles. We, however, could not derive full

benefit from this advantage, since we had so few motors. Even in this

period, which, as far as transport was concerned, was one of quiet

and regularity, we had constantly to fall back upon carriers. To this

day I remember the joy of the Intendant when a column of six hundred

Wassukuma carriers arrived at New Moshi from about Muanza; they brought

rice, which was urgently needed, from Lake Victoria, via Kondoa-Irangi

to Kilima Njaro. If one remembers that this march required at least

thirty days, that the carrier needs one kg. (two lbs.) of food a day,

and that his maximum load is twenty-five kg. (fifty-five lbs.), it

is clear that these marches have to be arranged with great care and

directed through well populated and fertile districts if this method of

transport is to be of any value. If, in spite of these disadvantages,

carrier transport had to be resorted to on a large scale, it only shows

up the supply-difficulties we had to contend with. The Intendant,

Captain Feilke, was, however, a past master in handling the men and

looking after them. The carriers felt that they were well cared for,

and the word “Kommando,” which some of them took as a personal name,

became quite common. I myself was able, by means of the motors, to

carry out many reconnaissances and inspections of the troops. I could

reach Taveta, to which place some of the troops from Tanga returned, in

two hours from New Moshi; this would otherwise have taken four days;

later on I drove in one day from New Moshi to the Engare-Nairobi, round

the west side of the whole of Meru Mountain, and back to New Moshi, a

journey which could hardly have been accomplished with carriers in less

than ten days.

The success at Tanga called forth and revived the determination to

resist all over the Colony.

At Morogoro, on the 26th November, the Inspector of Lines of

Communication, Major-General Wahle, succeeded in obtaining the

Governor’s consent to the defence of Dar-es-Salaam in case of

attack. As luck would have it, this consent was given just in time.

On the 28th, two men-of-war, a transport and a tug, appeared off

Dar-es-Salaam, and demanded to inspect our ships lying in the harbour.

Among others, there was the _Tabora_, of the German East African Line,

which had been converted into a hospital-ship. As the English had on a

previous occasion declared that they did not consider themselves bound

by any agreement about Dar-es-Salaam, fresh negotiations would have

been necessary every time we wanted to escape a threatened bombardment.

Thus an endless screw was created. I now wired that the entry into

the harbour of a pinnace, demanded by the English, was to be resisted

by force of arms. Unfortunately, however, it had been conceded by the

German civil authority, against my opinion, and the Senior Officer

present at Dar-es-Salaam felt himself bound. The English, however,

came in, not with the one pinnace which had been agreed to, but with

several small vessels, and then proceeded to carry out demolitions on

board the _Tabora_, and even took some of her crew prisoners. This made

it only too evident, even to those who had hitherto been doubtful, how

misplaced our previous compliance had been. Captain von Kornatzky was

just in time to open effective machine-gun fire on the small English

vessels as they passed out by the narrow English harbour entrance.

Unfortunately, on this occasion, one of the German prisoners was also

hit. The necessary defensive measures had simply not been adopted in

time. This is a small example of the dangers and disadvantages that

arise when, in time of war, the military commander is constantly

interfered with in his decisions, and in the execution of operations

which are in the nature of things inevitable.

And, after all, the subsequent bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam did no harm

worth mentioning, for the damage done to a few houses can hardly be

considered as serious.

During the time of comparatively sedentary warfare at New Moshi the

material side of life was also pleasant. The Europeans, who mostly

belonged to the settler community of the northern territories, provided

most of their subsistence themselves; abundant supplies of rice,

wheat-flour, bananas, pineapples, European fruit, coffee and potatoes,

came in from the plantations. Sugar was provided by the numerous

factories, and our principal supply of salt came from the Gottorp salt

works, on the Central Railway, between Tabora and Lake Tanganyika. Many

plantations devoted themselves entirely to supplying the troops, and,

owing to the abundant labour available this change in production caused

no difficulties. But the transport system had also to work at high

pressure. The great road leading from Kimamba to Mombo and Korogwe,

on the Northern Railway, was continuously improved, so as to carry

the transport of the products from the area of the Tanganyika Railway

and further South, to the North. On this line alone at least eight

thousand carriers were continuously employed. It soon proved to be

practical not to make the carriers do the whole distance of a hundred

and ninety miles, but to distribute them on different stages. This made

it possible to quarter them permanently and to look after their health.

Experts in hygiene travelled up and down the road, and did what was

humanly possible for the health of the carriers, especially against

dysentery and typhoid. In this manner we established along this very

frequented route permanent carrier-camps a day’s march apart, in which

the men were accommodated at first in extemporized huts, which were

later properly completed. Camp discipline was strictly regulated. In

order to provide also for the many Europeans passing through, small

houses with concrete floors were put up; and individuals were enabled

to subsist on the supplies held on the line of communication, without

having to burden themselves with provisions to last for a prolonged

period, as is customary on journeys in Africa. The work on this line of

supply was the object of constant attention. Both Europeans and natives

had still to learn how to ensure the co-operation of such masses of

men, and to understand the importance of order and discipline in the

working of the transport for the health of all concerned.

At New Moshi Station both telephone and telegraph were working day

and night. Where the whole organization had to be improvised friction

was not altogether unavoidable. All the members of Headquarters were

extraordinarily hard-worked. But we did have bright intervals during

the strenuous work. The abundance of creature comforts enjoyed by

the Europeans in the North was shared by us at Headquarters. We were

literally spoilt by the number of gifts sent us by private individuals.

If one of us travelled on the Northern Railway, on which in time of

peace it was difficult to obtain a little food for love or money, he

was now cared for by someone at almost every station. I remember when

Lieut. Freiherr von Schroetter returned to New Moshi, very famished,

after carrying out some very exhausting patrols in the country north of

Erok Mountain. After having, according to normal ideas, been thoroughly

well fed from seven o’clock till eleven, he shyly asked if he might

have some supper. The next morning he started on fourteen days’ leave

to his plantation in Usambara, in order to recuperate and attend to

his business. After breakfast we gave him coffee, bread, butter and

meat, to take with him in the train, and had warned the various railway

stations to look after this completely famished patroller. So, after

half an hour, the station guard at Kahe offered him another breakfast,

at Lembeni the charming wife of the Station Commandant had baked him

a cake, and at Lame he was looked after by the commander of the local

Recruit Depot, Sergt.-Major Reinhardt. At Makanya the guard, Planter

Baroy, who belonged to the country, brought him home-made chocolate and

bullocks’ hearts—a fruit the size of a melon—at Buiko the hospitable

traffic manager of the Northern Railway, Kuehlwein, who had so often

entertained us in passing through, had prepared him a delicate meal. At

Mombo, where the supplies from the Usambara Mountains were collected,

and where we had established most of our workshops, our protégé was met

by Warrant Officer Meyer, of the Navy, with a sustaining supper. But

then we got a telegram: “Please do not order any more, I can’t eat any

more.”

Although this continuous feeding shows a spirit of sympathetic chaff at

the expense of the starving subaltern, it also proves, better than any

theoretical dissertations, how intimately all classes of the population

of the northern districts worked in with the troops, and how they tried

to anticipate our every wish. This co-operation continued as long as

the troops remained in the North.

Whenever duty gave us a chance we arranged for change and recuperation.

On Sundays we often went out together near New Moshi for a cheery day’s

shooting. Both carriers and Askari soon picked up their business as

beaters, and drove the game towards us in exemplary order, with loud

shouts of “Huyu, huyu:” “There he is.” For variety of game the country

provided more than one would be likely to find anywhere in Europe:

hare, various dwarf antelopes, guinea-fowl, several relatives of the

partridge, duck, bush-buck, water-buck, lynx, several kinds of wild

boar, small kudu, jackal and many other kinds of game abounded. Once, I

remember, to my astonishment, a lion silently appeared fifteen paces in

front of me. Unfortunately I had my gun in my hand, and before I could

put up my rifle, which was on my knees, he had as silently disappeared.

In the teeming Kilima Njaro country, and even more east of Taveta, our

shooting expeditions provided a welcome increase to our meat supply.

But in the main this depended on the cattle which the Masai brought us

from the Kilima Njaro and Meru country, but which also came from far

away near Lake Victoria.

CHAPTER VI

FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-EAST

BY the time we kept Christmas in the Mission Church at New Moshi, and

afterwards in our mess in the Railway Station, the military situation

north of Tanga had become sufficiently acute to indicate that decisive

events in this quarter were probable. During the last days of December,

our patrols, who in that district were on British territory, had been

gradually pushed back, and had concentrated south of Jassini, on German

territory. The combined force amounted to two companies and a corps of

some two hundred Arabs. The enemy had obviously been reinforced, and

occupied the buildings of the German plantation of Jassini. It looked

as though he intended to push gradually forward along the coast to

Tanga, securing the occupied country by a system of block-houses. In

order to investigate matters on the spot, I travelled early in January

with Capt. von Hammerstein to Tanga, and thence by car to Capt. Adler’s

camp at Mwurnoni, using the newly-completed coast road to the north, a

distance of thirty-eight miles. Lieut. Bleeck, of the Reserve, whose

numerous successful patrols in that country rendered him particularly

suitable for the purpose, accompanied me on my reconnaissance, from

which I learned that the country for miles round Jassini consisted

principally of a cocoanut plantation belonging to the German East

African Company, which was also planted with sisal, a species of agave

with sharp thorns. This sisal, which formed a dense undergrowth among

the palms, was in many places so interlaced that one could only force

one’s way through by enduring a quantity of very unpleasant pricks. It

is, of course, always difficult to make plans for an action in country

so totally unknown to one without the aid of a map, and relying only

on the reports of patrols. In this case we got over the difficulty as

Lieut. Schaefer, of the Reserve, who had been called to the colours,

had for years held the post of Assistant on this plantation, and could

therefore furnish exact information. A tolerably accurate sketch was

prepared, and the battle-names allotted to various localities were

entered on it. The general situation appeared to be that Jassini

was an advanced post, and that the main body of the enemy was in

fortified camps further north. It was to be assumed that an attack

on the advanced post of Jassini would entice the main body to leave

its camps and fight in the open (sic!). My plan was to take advantage

of this possibility. In order to engage the enemy while hurrying

from his places of assembly to the assistance of the advanced post,

in favourable tactical conditions, I intended to place my troops in

readiness on his probable lines of advance, in such a manner that he

would have to run up against them.

In this closely-settled country supply presented no difficulty, and

the necessary carriers could be provided by the numerous European

plantations. So the companies ordered up by telegraph from New Moshi

had only to be accompanied by their machine-gun and ammunition

carriers, a considerable advantage in arranging for their railway

journey. This was accomplished rapidly and without friction, thanks to

the proved capacity of the Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber,

retired, of the Landwehr, and the understanding and consuming zeal with

which the whole personnel of the railway bore the unavoidable strain

without a murmur.

By the 16th January the companies from New Moshi had detrained a couple

of miles west of Tanga, and at once marched off towards Jassini,

as well as the troops from Tanga, for the immediate protection of

which only one company was left behind. On the evening of the 17th

January the force of nine companies, with two guns, was assembled at

Totohown plantation, seven miles south of Jassini, and orders for the

attack were issued for the following morning. Major Kepler, with two

companies, was directed to attack the village of Jassini, working

round by the right, and Captain Adler, with two more companies,

had a similar task on the left. To the north-west, on the road from

Semanya, was posted the Arab corps. Captain Otto, with the 9th Company,

advanced frontally by the main road on Jassini, followed immediately

by Headquarters and the main body, consisting of the European Company,

three Askari Companies, and two guns. The marches were so arranged that

the attacks on Jassini should take place simultaneously at daybreak,

and that all columns should mutually support each other by pushing on

with energy. Even before daybreak the first shots fell in the vicinity

of Kepler’s column, a few minutes later firing began in front of us

with Otto’s column, and then became general. It was impossible in the

endless dense palm forest to obtain an even approximate idea of what

was really happening. We were, however, already so close up to the

hostile position at Jassini, that the enemy seemed to be surprised,

in spite of his excellent intelligence service. This supposition was

afterwards, in part at least, confirmed. Of our rapid concentration

south of Jassini, and our immediate attack with such strong forces, the

enemy had actually had no idea.

Otto’s column quickly drove back an entrenched post in its front, and

Headquarters now made a circuit to the left through the forest, where

first one, and then two more companies, were put in so as to outflank

Jassini. What seemed curious was that in this move we came under a very

well-aimed fire at short range, possibly no more than 200 yards; and

it was not till much later that we learned that the enemy had not only

a weak post in Jassini, but that four companies of Indians were also

established there in a strongly constructed and excellently concealed

fort. Suddenly Captain von Hammerstein, who was walking behind me,

collapsed; he had been shot in the abdomen. Deeply as this affected me,

at the moment I had to leave my badly-wounded comrade in the hands of

the doctor. A few days later the death of this excellent officer tore a

gap in the ranks of our Staff which was hard to fill.

The fighting had become very hot. Two companies, although their

commanders, Lieuts. Gerlich and Spalding, had fallen had quickly

captured the fortified buildings of Jassini by a brilliant charge, and

had now established themselves close in front of the enemy’s position.

Soon the intervention of the enemy’s main force made itself felt. From

the direction of Wanga, in the north-east, strong hostile columns

arrived and suddenly appeared close in front of our companies, lying

close to the fortifications of Jassini. The enemy made three strong

attacks at this point and was each time repulsed. Hostile columns also

arrived from the north and north-west. Against that from the west the

Arab corps had done badly; the day before many of them had urgently

demanded their discharge. Now, when they were to lie in ambush on

the enemy’s road of advance, the tension became too great for them.

Instead of surprising the enemy by an annihilating fire, they fired

blindly into the air and then bolted. But luckily these hostile columns

then came on Captain Adler’s two companies, and were repulsed with

slaughter. Up till then the whole action had been in the nature of an

energetic assault; even the last reserve, the European Company, had, at

its urgent request, been sent into action. Towards noon the fighting

had everywhere become stationary before the strong defences of the

enemy. We had, as a matter of fact, no means of making a sufficient

impression on them, and even our field-guns, which we placed in

position at two hundred yards, produced no decisive effect. The heat

was insupportable, and, as at Tanga, everyone quenched his thirst with

young cocoanuts. I myself went with Lieut. Bleeck to the right wing, to

find out how things were going with Major Kepler’s column. At that time

I had not yet obtained a clear idea of the enemy’s defences, and so, on

the sands of a clear and open creek, which was then dry, we again came

under a very well-aimed fire. From a distance of five hundred yards

the bullets fell close to us, and the spurts of sand they threw up

made correction easy. The sand was so deep and the heat so great that

one could only run, or even walk quickly, for a few paces at a time.

Most of the time we had to walk slowly across the open and bear the

unpleasant fire as best we could. Fortunately it did no serious harm,

although one bullet through my hat and another through my arm showed

that it was well meant. On the way back from the right wing our thirst

and exhaustion were so great that several gentlemen, who were usually

by no means on bad terms with each other, had a serious difference of

opinion about a cocoanut, although it would not have been difficult to

get more from the countless trees all round us.

Headquarters had now returned to the Totohown-Jassini road. Along this

ran a light railway for the work of the plantation, the wagons of which

were now continuously employed in taking wounded back to Totohown,

where a hospital had been established in the European buildings.

Ammunition—of which the Askari carried about 150 rounds—began to

run short, and reports from the firing line that they could not hold

on longer became more frequent. Slightly wounded who had been tied up

and a mass of stragglers collected at Headquarters, whole platoons

had completely lost themselves, or had for other reasons left the

places assigned to them. All these men were collected and reorganized,

and thus a fresh reserve was made available. The ammunition in the

machine-gun belts was to a great extent expended, and fresh supplies

came up from Totohown by the light railway. The belt-filling machines

were fixed to the palm-trees and kept incessantly at work. It was

evident that we had already suffered considerable casualties. A

few wished to break off the action, as there seemed no prospect of

capturing the enemy’s defences. But the thought of the unpleasant

situation of the enemy, shut up in his works, without water, and having

to carry on all the occupations of daily existence in a confined space,

in a burning sun and under hostile fire, made it appear that if we only

held on with determination we might yet achieve success. The afternoon

and night passed in incessant fighting; as is always the case in such

critical situations, all sorts of rumours arose. It was said that the

garrison of the enemy’s works consisted of South African Europeans, who

were excellent marksmen; some people even declared they had understood

their speech perfectly. It was indeed still very difficult to form

a clear idea. My orderly, Ombasha (Lance-Corporal) Rayabu, at once

volunteered to make a close reconnaissance, crawled close up to the

enemy’s line, and was killed there. The native, who is at all times

easily excitable, was doubly so in this critical situation at night,

and I frequently had to take the men severely to task for firing

blindly into the air.

* * * * *

Early on the 19th January the fire broke out again with the greatest

intensity. The enemy, who was surrounded on all sides, made a sortie,

which failed, and soon after hoisted the white flag. Four Indian

companies, with European officers and N.C.O.’s, fell into our hands.

We all remarked the warlike pride with which our Askari regarded the

enemy; I never thought our black fellows could look so distinguished.

Both friend and foe had been in an unpleasant situation, and were near

the end of their nervous strength. That is usually the case with any

soldier who takes his duty seriously. But the Askari now learned that

one must overcome one’s own feelings in order to obtain the superior

moral force necessary for victory.

I estimated the enemy’s casualties at 700 at least; the captured

documents gave a clear indication of his strength, which was more than

double our own. According to them, General Tighe, commanding the troops

in British East Africa, who had landed a short time before at Wanga,

had more than twenty companies assembled at and near Jassini, most of

whom had come by march route along the coast from the direction of

Mombasa. They were to push forward towards Tanga.

With the aid of the mechanical transport and the rickshaws, which

worked between the Field Hospital at Totohown and Tanga, the wounded

were moved from Jassini to the hospitals on the Northern Railway

quite easily in a few days. These rickshaws, small spring-carts (like

dog-carts), drawn by one man, which take the place of cabs at Tanga,

had been requisitioned for carrying wounded by the Senior Medical

Officer. The enemy had withdrawn into his fortified camps north of

the frontier, and a fresh attack on them did not seem to me very

promising. We immediately commenced patrol operations, as a support to

which we left a detachment of a few companies at Jassini; the bulk of

the troops was moved off again to the Kilima Njaro country. On the

march to the entraining station on the Northern Railway the troops

passed through Amboni Plantation. There the inhabitants of Tanga had

voluntarily provided food and refreshments; and after the tremendous

exertions entailed by the expedition to Jassini, with its continuous

forced marches, the exhausting heat, and the uninterrupted fighting by

day and night, the sulphur-laden Sigi stream was soon alive with white

and black bathers. All our toil was forgotten, and our spirits rose to

the highest pitch on receiving at this very moment, after a rather long

interval, another wireless message from home. It indicated that news of

the fighting at Tanga had probably just reached Germany, and contained

His Majesty’s appreciation of the success we had gained there.

CHAPTER VII

GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER PREPARATIONS

DOCUMENTS which we captured later proved by figures that the enemy

moved troops from Lake Victoria towards Kilima Njaro. So the battle

actually did relieve other, far distant theatres. This observation

bore out the original contention that the best protection of the whole

territory consisted in taking a firm hold of the enemy at one point.

Whether the remainder of the Colony was also locally protected with

energy was not as important. All the same, I was greatly rejoiced when

in February, 1915, the Governor was persuaded to issue the order that

the coast towns were to be defended if threatened by the enemy. The

successes obtained hitherto had demonstrated that this local defence

was not hopeless, even against the fire of ships’ guns.

Although the attack carried out at Jassini with nine companies had been

completely successful, it showed that such heavy losses as we also had

suffered could only be borne in exceptional cases. We had to economize

our forces in order to last out a long war. Of the regular officers,

Major Kepler, Lieuts. Spalding and Gerlich, Second-Lieuts. Kaufmann and

Erdmann were killed; Captain von Hammerstein had died of his wound. The

loss of these professional soldiers—about one seventh of the regular

officers present—could not be replaced.

The expenditure of 200,000 rounds also proved that with the means

at my disposal I could at the most fight three more actions of this

nature. The need to strike great blows only quite exceptionally, and

to restrict myself principally to guerilla warfare, was evidently

imperative.

The guiding principle of constantly operating against the Uganda

Railway could, however, be resumed, as here it was in any case

impossible to act with larger forces. For it was necessary to make

marches of several days’ duration through the great, waterless and

thinly populated desert, which provided little sustenance beyond

occasional game. Not only food, but water had to be carried. This

alone limited the size of the force to be employed. Such expeditions

through districts providing neither water nor food require a degree of

experience on the part of the troops which could not possibly exist at

that stage of the war. A company even was too large a force to send

across this desert, and if, after several days of marching, it really

had reached some point on the railway, it would have had to come back

again, because it could not be supplied. However, these conditions

improved as the troops became better trained, and as our knowledge of

the country, which was at first mainly _terra incognita_, increased.

So there was nothing for it but to seek to attain our object by means

of small detachments, or patrols. To these patrols we afterwards

attached the greatest importance. Starting from the Engare-Nairobi,

small detachments of eight to ten men, Europeans and Askaris, rode

round the rear of the enemy’s camps, which had been pushed up as

far as the Longido, and attacked their communications. They made

use of telephones we had captured at Tanga, tapping in on the

English telephone-lines; then they waited for large or small hostile

detachments or columns of ox-wagons to pass. From their ambush they

opened fire on the enemy at thirty yards’ range, captured prisoners

and booty, and then disappeared again in the boundless desert. Thus,

at that time, we captured rifles, ammunition, and war material of all

kinds. One of these patrols had observed near Erok Mountain that the

enemy sent his riding-horses to water at a certain time. Ten of our

horsemen at once started out, and, after a two days’ ride through the

desert, camped close to the enemy. Six men went back with the horses;

the four others each took a saddle, and crept at a distance of a few

paces past the enemy’s sentries close up to the watering-place, which

lay behind the camp. An English soldier was driving the horses, when

suddenly two men of our patrol confronted him out of the bush and

covering him with their rifles ordered “Hands up!” In his surprise he

dropped his clay pipe out of his mouth. At once he was asked: “Where

are the missing four horses?” for our conscientious patrol had noticed

that there were only fifty-seven, whereas the day before they had

counted sixty-one! These four needed light treatment and had been left

in camp. The leading horse and a few others were quickly saddled,

mounted, and off they went at a gallop round the enemy’s camp towards

the German lines. Even in the captured Englishman, who had to take part

in this _safari_ on a bare horse, without much comfort, the innate

sporting instinct of his nation came out. With great humour he shouted:

“I should just like to see my Captain’s face now!” and when the animals

had arrived safely in the German camp he remarked: “It was a damned

good piece of work.”

This capture, increased by a number of other horses and mules we had

picked up, enabled us to form a second mounted company. We now had

two mounted companies, composed of Askari and Europeans mixed, an

organization which proved successful. They provided us with the means

of sweeping the extensive desert north of Kilima Njaro with strong

patrols who went out for several days at a time; they penetrated even

as far as the Uganda and Magad Railways, destroyed bridges, surprised

guards posted on the railways, mined the permanent way and carried out

raids of all kinds on the land communications between the railways and

the enemy’s camps. In these enterprises our own people did not get

off scot free. One patrol had brilliantly surprised two companies of

Indians by rifle fire, but had then lost their horses, which had been

left behind in hiding, by the fire of the enemy; they had to make their

way back across the desert on foot, which took four days, and they had

no food. Luckily they found milk and cattle in a Masai kraal, and later

on saved themselves from starvation by killing an elephant. But success

whetted the spirit of adventure, and the requests to be sent on patrol,

mounted or on foot, increased.

The patrols that went out from the Kilima Njaro in a more easterly

direction were of a different character. They had to work on foot

through the dense bush for days on end. The patrols sent out to destroy

the railway were mostly weak: one or two Europeans, two to four Askari,

and five to seven carriers. They had to worm their way through the

enemy’s pickets and were often betrayed by native scouts. In spite of

this they mostly reached their objective and were sometimes away for

more than a fortnight. For such a small party a bit of game or a small

quantity of booty afforded a considerable reserve of rations. But the

fatigue and thirst in the burning sun were so great that several men

died of thirst, and even Europeans drank urine. It was a bad business

when anyone fell ill or was wounded, with the best will in the world it

was often impossible to bring him along. To carry a severely wounded

man from the Uganda Railway right across the desert to the German

camps, as was occasionally done, is a tremendous performance. Even the

blacks understood that, and cases did occur in which a wounded Askari,

well knowing that he was lost without hope, and a prey to the numerous

lions, did not complain when he had to be left in the bush, but of his

own accord gave his comrades his rifle and ammunition, so that they at

least might be saved.

The working of these patrols became more and more perfect. Knowledge

of the desert improved, and in addition to patrols for destruction

and intelligence work, we developed a system of fighting patrols.

The latter, consisting of twenty to thirty Askari, or even more, and

sometimes equipped with one or two machine-guns, went out to look for

the enemy and inflict losses upon him. In the thick bush the combatants

came upon each other at such close quarters and so unexpectedly, that

our Askari sometimes literally jumped over their prone adversaries and

so got behind them again. The influence of these expeditions on the

self-reliance and enterprise of both Europeans and natives was so great

that it would be difficult to find a force imbued with a better spirit.

Some disadvantages were, however, unavoidable. In particular, our

small supply of ammunition did not enable us to attain such a degree

of marksmanship as to enable us, when we did get the enemy in an

unfavourable situation, completely to destroy him. In technical matters

we were also busy. Skilled artificers and armourers were constantly

engaged with the factory engineers in the manufacture of suitable

apparatus for blowing up the railways. Some of these appliances fired

according as they were set, either at once, or after a certain number

of wheels had passed over them. With the latter arrangement we hoped

to destroy the engines, even if the English tried to protect them by

pushing one or two trucks filled with sand in front of them. There was

abundance of dynamite to be had on the plantations, but the demolition

charges captured at Tanga were much more effective.

We occasionally got German newspapers, but we had had no private mails

for a long time. On the 12th February, 1915, I was sitting at dinner

in the Railway Station at New Moshi, when I got a letter from Germany.

It was from my sister, who wrote to say she had already repeatedly

informed me of the death of my brother, who had been killed on the

Western Front at Libramont on the 22nd August, 1914.

In April, 1915, we were surprised by the news of the arrival of a

store-ship. When entering Mansa Bay, north of Tanga, she was chased and

fired at by an English cruiser, and her captain had to run her aground.

Although during the ensuing weeks we salved almost the whole of the

valuable cargo, we found that unfortunately the cartridges had suffered

severely from the sea-water. The powder and caps deteriorated more and

more, and so the number of miss-fires increased. There was nothing for

it but to break up the whole of the ammunition, clean the powder, and

replace some of the caps by new ones. Luckily there were caps in the

Colony, though of a different pattern; but for months all the Askari

and carriers we could lay hands on were employed at Moshi from morning

till night making ammunition. The serviceable cartridges we had left

were kept exclusively for the machine-guns; of the re-made ammunition,

that which gave about 20 per cent. of miss-fires was kept for action,

while that giving a higher percentage was used for practice.

The arrival of the store-ship aroused tremendous enthusiasm, since it

proved that communication between ourselves and home still existed.

All of us listened with eagerness to the stories of the Captain,

Lieutenant Christiansen, when he arrived at my Headquarters at New

Moshi after his wound was healed. The terrific fighting at home, the

spirit of self-sacrifice and boundless enterprise which inspired the

deeds of the German troops, awakened a response in our hearts. Many

who had been despondent now took courage once more, since they learned

that what appears impossible can be achieved if effort is sustained by

determination.

Another means of raising the spirit of the force was by promotion.

Generally speaking, I could only make promotions to non-commissioned

rank, and within the commissioned ranks; but the grant of a commission,

which would in many cases have been well-deserved, was beyond my power.

Each case was very carefully considered, so as to determine whether

really good work had been done. In this way unmerited promotions, which

ruin the spirit of the troops, were avoided. On the whole, however,

we had to cultivate the moral factors less by rewards than by other

means. Decorations for war service were practically unknown among

us. It was not personal ambition to which we appealed; we sought to

arouse and maintain a real sense of duty dictated by patriotism, and an

evergrowing feeling of comradeship. Perhaps it was the very fact that

this lasting and pure motive remained unsoiled by any other purpose

that inspired Europeans and Askari with that endurance and energy which

the Protective Force manifested until the end.

In the Kilima Njaro country the English were not inactive. From

Oldorobo Mountain, seven and a half miles east of Taveta, which was

held by a German detached post under an officer, an attack by two

Indian Companies was reported by telephone one morning. Thereupon

Captain Koehl and the Austrian Lieutenant Freiherr von Unterrichter at

once marched off from Taveta; the two companies had become immobilized

on the steep slopes of the mountain, and our people attacked them on

both flanks with such vigour that they fled, leaving about twenty dead

behind, while one machine-gun and 70,000 rounds fell into our hands.

Other hostile expeditions were undertaken along the Tsavo River to the

north-east side of Kilima Njaro; they were based on Mzima Camp on the

Tsavo, which was strongly fortified and held by several companies.

The patrol encounters that took place north-east of Kilima Njaro all

ended in our favour; even the young Askari of the Rombo Detachment,

which had a strength of sixty and was named after the mission on

the Eastern Kilima Njaro, had unbounded faith in their commander,

Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock, who was over sixty years old. I remember

a wounded man who came from him to New Moshi, with a report for me,

and refused to be attended to so as to lose no time in getting back to

his commanding officer. In several fights, when the enemy occasionally

amounted to two companies, these young troops were victorious, and it

is a significant fact that among the English all manner of tales were

current about these actions. The British Commander-in-Chief sent me a

written complaint, saying that a German woman was taking part in them,

and perpetrating inhuman cruelties, an idea which was, of course,

without any foundation, and merely served to show the degree of nerves

with which the enemy authorities had become afflicted.

Notwithstanding the great amount of booty taken at Tanga, it was

evident that, as the war seemed likely to be prolonged, the stocks

in the Colony would become exhausted. The natives at New Moshi began

all of a sudden to wear silk: this was by no means a sign of special

extravagance: the stocks of cotton clothing in the Indian shops

were simply coming to an end. We had seriously to think of starting

manufactures ourselves, in order to convert the abundant raw material

into finished products. A curious existence now developed, reminding

one of the industry of the Swiss family Robinson. Cotton fields

existed in plenty. Popular books were hunted up, giving information

about the forgotten arts of hand spinning and weaving; white and

black women took to spinning by hand; at the missions and in private

workshops spinning-wheels and looms were built. In this manner, in

a short time, the first useful piece of cotton cloth was produced.

After various trials, the most suitable dye was obtained from the

root of a tree called Ndaa, which imparted a brownish-yellow colour,

very inconspicuous both in the grass and in the bush, and therefore

specially suitable for uniforms. The rubber gathered by the planters

was vulcanized with sulphur, and we succeeded in producing efficient

tyres for motors and bicycles. At Morogoro a few planters successfully

produced a motor-fuel from cocos, known as trebol, which was like

benzol, and was employed in the automobiles. As in former times,

candles were made out of tallow and wax, both by private persons and by

the troops, and also soap. Then again, the numerous factories on the

plantations in the northern territories and on the Tanganyika Railway

were adapted to produce various means of subsistence.

A particularly important item was the provision of foot-wear. The raw

material was obtained from the plentiful skins of cattle and game;

tanning materials from the mangroves on the coast. In peace time the

missions had already made good boots; their activity was now further

developed, while the troops also established tanneries and shoemakers’

shops on a larger scale. It is true some little time elapsed before

the authorities complied with the urgent and inevitable demands of the

troops in an adequate manner, and, in particular, before they placed

at our disposal the buffalo-hides necessary for making sole-leather.

So the old historic fight for the cow-hide revived again, _mutatis

mutandis_, in East Africa. The first boots made in any quantity were

turned out at Tanga. Although at first their shape needed improving,

they at any rate protected the feet of our white and black troops when

marching and patrolling in the thorn bush of the Pori. For the thorns

that fall to the ground bore into the feet again and again. All the

small beginnings of food-stuff production that had already existed on

the plantations in time of peace were galvanized into more extensive

activity by the war, and by the need of subsisting large masses. On

several farms in the Kilima Njaro country butter and excellent cheese

were produced in great quantities, and the slaughter-houses round about

Wilhelmstal could hardly keep up with the demands for sausages and

other smoked meats.

It was to be anticipated that quinine, which was so important for the

health of the Europeans, would soon become exhausted, and that our

requirements could not be met by capture alone. So it was a matter of

great importance that we succeeded in producing good quinine tablets at

the Amani Biological Institute in Usambara out of bark obtained in the

North.

The provision of proper communications for ox-wagons and motors

involved the construction of permanent bridges. Engineer Rentell, who

had been called to the colours, built an arched bridge of stone and

concrete, with a heavy pier, over the Kikafu torrent, west of New

Moshi. During the rains, particularly in April, no wooden structure

would have withstood the masses of water coming down the steep

river-bed, which was nearly 70 feet deep.

These examples will suffice to show the stimulating influence of the

war and its requirements on the economic life of the Colony.

The organization of the Force was also constantly improved. By

transferring Europeans from the Rifle Companies, when they were

numerous, to the Askari Companies, the losses of Europeans in the

latter were made good; Askari were enrolled in the European Companies.

In this way the Field and Rifle Companies became more similar in their

composition, which during the course of 1915 became identical. At

Muansa, Kigoma, Bismarckburg, Lindi, Langenburg, and elsewhere, small

bodies of troops had been formed under various designations, of the

existence of which in most cases Headquarters only became aware after

a considerable time. These units were also gradually expanded into

companies; in this way, during 1915, the number of Field Companies

gradually rose to 30, that of the Rifle Companies to 10, and that of

other units of company strength to about 20. The maximum total attained

was thus about 60 companies. Owing to the limited number of suitable

Europeans and of reliable Askari N.C.O.’s, it was not advisable still

further to increase the number of companies: it would only have meant

the creation of units without cohesion. In order, however, to increase

the number of combatants the establishment of the companies was raised

from 160 to 200, and the companies were allowed to enrol supernumerary

Askari. To some extent the companies trained their own recruits; but

the great bulk of Askari reinforcements came from the Recruit Depots

established in the populous districts of Tabora, Muansa and the

Northern Railway, which also provided for local security and order. But

owing to the great number of newly-raised companies the depots could

not furnish enough men to bring them all up to their establishment

of 200. The maximum strength attained by the end of 1915 was 2,998

Europeans and 11,300 Askari, including Naval personnel, administrative

staffs, hospitals and field postal service.

How necessary were all these military preparations was proved by the

news received at the end of June, 1915, that General Botha was coming

to the East African theatre from South Africa with 15,000 Boers. That

this information was highly probably correct had to be assumed from

the outset. The scanty wireless messages and other communications

about events in the outside world were yet enough to indicate that our

affairs in South-West Africa were going badly, and that the British

troops employed there would probably become available for other

purposes in the immediate future.

CHAPTER VIII

AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF THE TIME AVAILABLE

AT first, it is true, the anticipated intervention of the South

Africans did not seem to be materializing; the English were evidently

trying to subdue us with their own forces, without their assistance.

In July, 1915, they attacked the Colony at several points. East of

Lake Victoria large bodies of Masai, organized and led by Englishmen,

and said to number many thousands, invaded the country of the German

Wassukuma, which was rich in cattle. However, in the matter of

cattle-lifting the Wassukuma stood no joking; they gave our weak

detachments every assistance, defeated the Masai, recaptured the stolen

cattle, and, as a proof that they had “spoken the truth,” laid out the

heads of ninety-six Masai in front of our police station.

Against the main body of our force in the Kilima Njaro country the

enemy advanced in considerable strength. In order, on the one hand,

to ensure effective protection of the Usambara Railway, and the rich

plantations through which it passes, and, on the other, to shorten

the distance the patrols had to go to reach the Uganda Railway, a

detachment of three companies had been pushed out from Taveta to

Mbuyuni, a long day’s march east of Taveta. Another day’s march to the

east was the well-fortified and strongly-held English camp of Makatan,

on the main road leading from Moshi, by Taveta, Mbuyuni, Makatan,

and Bura, to Voi, on the Uganda Railway. Vague rumours had led us to

surmise that an attack on a fairly large scale in the direction of

Kilima Njaro was to be expected from about Voi. On the 14th July a

hostile brigade, under General Malleson, appeared in the desert of

Makatan, which is generally covered with fairly open thorn-bush. The

fire of a field battery, which opened on the trenches of our Askari,

was fairly ineffective, but the enemy’s superiority of seven to one was

so considerable that our position became critical. Hostile European

horsemen got round the left wing of our own; however, our line was

held by the 10th Field Company, which had distinguished itself in the

fighting near Longido Mountain, under Lieutenant Steinhäuser, of the

Landwehr, and it is a credit to this officer, who was unfortunately

killed later, that he held on, although our mounted troops fell back

past his flank. Just at the critical moment, Lieutenant von Lewinsky,

who was also killed later, immediately marched off to the scene of

action, arrived with a patrol, and took this dangerous flank attack in

rear. The English troops, consisting of natives, mixed with Europeans

and Indians, had very gallantly attacked our front, over ground

affording very little cover. The failure of the English flank attack,

however, set the seal on their defeat. At New Moshi Station I was kept

accurately informed of the progress of the action, and thus, although

at a distance, I shared in all the excitement from the unfavourable

period at the beginning until complete success was assured.

This success, together with the considerable booty, still further

increased the spirit of adventure among both Europeans and Askari.

The experience and skill that had by now been acquired enabled us

henceforth to prosecute our plan of sending out a continuous succession

of fighting and demolition patrols. I do not think I exaggerate in

assuming that at least twenty English railway trains were destroyed,

or, at least, considerably damaged. Picked up photographs and our own

observation confirmed the supposition that a railway was actually

being built from Voi to Makatan, which, being so easily accessible to

us, and so important, formed a glorious objective for our patrols.

The construction of this military line proved that an attack with

large forces was in preparation, and that it was to be directed on

this particular part of the Kilima Njaro country. The anticipated

intervention of the South Africans was therefore imminent. It was

important to encourage the enemy in this intention, in order that

the South Africans should really come, and that in the greatest

strength possible, and thus be diverted from other and more important

theatres of war. With the greatest energy, therefore, we continued

our enterprises against the Uganda Railway, which, owing to the

circumstances, had still to be mainly carried out by patrols, and could

only exceptionally be undertaken by a force as large as a company.

Closer acquaintance with the desert country between the Uganda Railway

and the Anglo-German border had revealed the fact, that of the various

mountain groups rising abruptly out of the plain, the Kasigao was well

watered and moderately populous. Being only from twelve to twenty

miles from the Uganda Railway, Kasigao Mountain was bound to afford a

favourably situated base for patrol work. The patrol of Lieut. Freiherr

Grote had already made a surprise attack on the small Anglo-Indian camp

situated half-way up its slopes. The riflemen of Grote’s patrol had

worked round the camp, which was surrounded by a stone wall, and fired

into it with effect from the dominating part of the mountain. Very

soon the white flag appeared, and an English officer and some thirty

Indians surrendered. A part of the enemy had succeeded in getting away

to the mountain and fired on the patrol as it marched off. It was then

we suffered our only casualties, consisting of a few wounded, among

whom was a German corporal of the Medical Corps. We had also, on one

occasion, surprised the enemy’s post on Kasigao Mountain by the fire of

a 2.4-inch gun.

Towards the end of 1915, the enemy having in the meantime shifted his

camp on Kasigao Mountain, we attacked him once more. During the night a

German fighting patrol, under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, had ascended

the mountain in nine hours, and arrived rather exhausted near the

enemy’s work. A second patrol, under Lieutenant Freiherr Grote, which

was co-operating with Ruckteschell’s, had been somewhat delayed by the

sickness and exhaustion of its commander. Lieutenant von Ruckteschell

sent a reliable old coloured N.C.O. to the enemy to demand surrender.

He observed that our Askari was cordially welcomed by the enemy; he had

found a number of good friends among the English Askari. But, in spite

of all friendliness, the enemy refused to surrender. Our situation was

critical, in consequence of exhaustion and want of food. If anything

was to be done at all, it must be done at once. Fortunately, the enemy

in their entrenchments did not withstand our machine-gun fire and the

assault which immediately followed it; they were destroyed, and a

large number of them were killed in their flight by falling from the

steep cliffs. The booty included abundant supplies, also clothing and

valuable camp equipment.

The feeling of comradeship which our Askari had for us Germans, and

which was tremendously developed by the numerous expeditions undertaken

together, led on this occasion to a curious incident. After climbing

Kasigao Mountain by night, among rocks and thorn-bushes, an Askari

noticed that Lieutenant von Ruckteschell was bleeding from a scratch

on his face. He at once took his sock, which he had probably not

changed for six days, and wiped the “Bwana Lieutenant’s” face with it,

anticipating the somewhat surprised question with the remark: “That is

a custom of war; one only does it to one’s friends.”

In order to study the situation on the spot and to push on the attacks

on Kasigao, I had gone by rail to Same, thence by car to Sonya Mission,

and then either by cycle or on foot in the direction of the mountain

to the German border, where a company was encamped at a water-hole.

From there we had fair communication to Kasigao by heliograph, and we

were thus enabled to make good the success we had gained there. Troops

were at once pushed up, so that until the arrival of the South Africans

the mountain was held by several companies. It was, indeed, decidedly

difficult to keep them supplied; for although the German frontier

territory west of Kasigao was fertile, it could not permanently support

a force which with carriers amounted to about one thousand.

I then drove in the car round the South Pare Mountains, on a road

that had been made in time of peace. The construction of this road had

been dropped on account of expense, and for years the heaps of metal

had been lying unused at the roadside. The culverts—consisting of

pipes passing under the road—were to a great extent in good order.

But little work was needed to make this road suitable for supply by

lorry. Supplies were sent from near Buiko on the Northern Railway

by lorry to Sonya, and thence to Kasigao by carriers. The telephone

line was already under construction as far as the frontier, and was

completed in a few days’ time. From then on patrols pushing out from

Kasigao had several encounters with detachments of the enemy, and did

some damage to the Uganda Railway. But the ruggedness of the country

and the dense thorn-bush made movement so difficult that by the time

the South Africans arrived, we had not derived full benefit from

Kasigao as a base for patrols. However, the continual menace to the

railway had, at any rate, obliged the enemy to take extensive measures

for its protection. Wide clearings had been made along it, of which

the outer edges had been closed by thick zarebas (abattis of thorns).

Every couple of miles there were strong block-houses, or entrenchments

with obstacles, from which the line was constantly patrolled. Mobile

supports, of the strength of a company or more, were held in readiness,

so that, whenever the railway was reported to be in danger, they could

at once go off by special train. In addition, protective detachments

were pushed out in our direction, who tried to cut off our patrols on

their way back on receiving reports from spies or from observation

posts on the high ground. We also identified English camps on the high

ground south-east of Kasigao, as far as the coast, and also in the

settled country along the coast. They also received attention from our

patrols and raiders. Our constant endeavour was to injure the enemy, to

force him to adopt protective measures, and thus to contain his forces

here, in the district of the Uganda Railway.

While thus establishing points of support for our fighting patrols

from the coast to Mbuyuni (on the Taveta-Voi road), we worked in the

same sense further north. The enemy’s camp at Mzima, on the upper

Tsavo River, and its communications, which followed that river, were

frequently the objective of our expeditions, even of fairly large

detachments. On one occasion Captain Augar, with the 13th Company, was

surprised south-west of Mzima Camp in thick bush by three European

companies of the newly-arrived 2nd Rhodesian Regiment. The enemy

attacked from several directions, but being still inexperienced in bush

fighting, failed to secure concerted action. So our Askari Company was

able first to overthrow one part of the enemy’s forces, and then by

quickness and resolution to defeat the other, which had appeared behind

it.

Further north, also, there was some fighting in the bush which went in

our favour; we worked with whole companies and inflicted painful losses

on the enemy, who was often in greater force. North of the Engare Len

the 3rd Field Company from Lindi worked with special energy, and sent

its fighting patrols out as far as the Uganda Railway. The mere fact

that we were now able to make raids with forces amounting to a company

and more in the midst of a desert devoid of supplies, and in many

places waterless, shows the enormous progress the force had made in

this type of guerilla warfare. The European had learned that a great

many things that are very desirable when travelling in the Tropics

simply have to be dispensed with on patrol in war, and that one can at

a pinch get on for a time with only a single carrier-load. The patrols

also had to avoid camping in such a way as to betray themselves, and

as far as possible to carry food ready prepared. But if food had to be

cooked, this was particularly dangerous in the evening or morning; the

leader had to select a concealed spot, and invariably shift his camp

after cooking before going to rest. Complete hygienic protection was

incompatible with the conditions of patrol duty. A number of cases of

malaria invariably occurred among the members of a patrol after its

return. But as, in spite of the continual damage done to the enemy,

patrol duty only required comparatively few men, only a part of the

companies had to be kept in the front line. After a few weeks each

company was withdrawn to rest camps in healthy regions, European and

Askari were able to recover from their tremendous exertions, and their

training and discipline could be restored.

Towards the end of 1915 the shortage of water at Mbuyuni Camp had

become so serious, and supply so difficult, that only a post was left

there, the detachment itself being withdrawn to the westward to the

vicinity of Oldorobo Mountain. Meanwhile, the enemy’s camp at Makatan

grew steadily larger. A frequent train service was maintained to it,

and one could clearly see a big clearing being made to the west for

the prolongation of the railway. Our fighting patrols had, indeed,

many opportunities of inflicting losses on the enemy while at work, or

protecting his working parties, but the line continued to make progress

towards the west.

It was necessary to consider the possibility of the country through

which the Northern Railway passed soon falling into the hands of the

enemy. Steps had, therefore, to be taken to safeguard the military

stores in that district in time. Where railways were available this

was, of course, not difficult; but the further transport by land needed

much preparation. The bulk of our stocks of ammunition, clothing and

medical stores was at New Moshi and Mombo. It was evident that we would

be unable to carry away the factories, or parts of them, by land;

they must, therefore, be made use of and kept working for as long as

possible where they were. Assuming the enemy would attack from the

north, our evacuation would obviously be towards the south, and not

only the preparations, but the movement itself, must be started without

loss of time—that is, as early as August, 1915.

The Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber, retired, therefore, in

an able manner, collected light-railway material from the plantations,

and built a line from Mombo to Handeni, at the rate of about two

kilometres (one and a quarter miles) per day. The trucks were also

brought from the plantations, and after mature consideration, man

draught was decided on in preference to locomotives. Thus our stores

were moved from the north by rail, complete, and in time, to Handeni.

From there to Kimamba, on the Central Railway, we principally used

carriers, except for a few wagons. It was, after all, necessary

not to hurry the movement unduly, for, in spite of all the visible

preparations for a hostile attack on the Kilima Njaro country, I still

thought it possible that the main force of the enemy, or at least a

considerable proportion of it, would not operate there, but in the

Bagamoyo-Dar-es-Salaam area.

At the end of 1915 the enemy was pushing his rail-head further and

further westward, and Major Kraut, who was opposing him, reinforced

his position on Oldorobo Mountain with three companies and two light

guns. This mountain rises from the flat thorn desert near the main

road, seven and a half miles east of Taveta, and dominates the country

for a great distance all round. Entrenchments and numerous dummy works

had been made, part being cut out of the rock, and formed an almost

impregnable fort. The disadvantage of the position was the complete

lack of water. A planter who had been called to the Colours, Lieutenant

Matuschka, of the Reserve, was an expert water finder; at Taveta he

had discovered excellent wells; but on Oldorobo no water was found,

although at the points he indicated we dug down more than one hundred

feet. Water had therefore to be taken from Taveta on small donkey-carts

to Oldorobo, where it was collected in barrels. This carriage of water

was an extraordinary strain on our transport. Strangely enough, it did

not occur to the enemy to interfere with it, and thus render Oldorobo

Mountain untenable. Instead of that, basing himself on his railway,

he pushed up to within about three miles of the mountain, where he

established strongly fortified camps. We had been unable to prevent

this, as, owing to difficulties of water and transport, larger forces

could only move away from Taveta for short periods. The enemy obtained

his water supply by means of a long pipe-line, which came from the

springs in the Bura Mountains. The destruction of the enemy’s reservoir

by patrols under Lieutenant von S’Antenecai, of the Reserve, only

caused him temporary inconvenience.

At this time, also, the first hostile aeroplanes appeared, and bombed

our positions on Oldorobo Mountain, and at Taveta and later even

New Moshi. On the 27th January one of these airmen, while on his way

back from Oldorobo, was successfully fired on and brought down by

our advanced infantry. The English had told the natives that this

aeroplane was a new “Munga” (God); but now that this new Munga had been

brought down and captured by us, it rather increased our prestige than

otherwise.

CHAPTER IX

THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR. GUERILLA WARFARE ASHORE AND AFLOAT

UNTIL NEW YEAR, 1916

WHILE employing the bulk of the Protective Force in the regions on the

Northern Railway we could not afford entirely to denude the remainder

of the Colony. In the interior it was essential to remain undisputed

master of the natives, in order, if necessary, to enforce the growing

demands for carriers, agriculture, supplies, and all manner of work.

Accordingly, the 12th Company remained at Mahenge, and the 2nd at

Iringa. In addition to their other duties both of them acted as large

depots, serving to fill vacancies at the front, and providing the

machinery for raising new units.

The commanders of detachments on the frontiers, who were far away from

Headquarters and beyond the reach of the telegraph, rightly endeavoured

to anticipate the enemy and to attack him in his own territory. Owing

to the lack of communications on our side this fighting resolved itself

into a series of local operations, which were quite independent of

each other. It was different with the enemy, who clearly endeavoured

to establish a proper relationship between his main operations and the

subsidiary enterprises at other points on the frontier.

In October, 1914, before the fighting at Tanga, Captain Zimmer reported

from Kigoma that there were about 2,000 men on the Belgian frontier;

and Captain Braunschweig sent word from Muansa that at Kisumu on Lake

Victoria there were also strong hostile forces, about two companies

at Kisii, and more troops at Karungu. According to independent native

reports, Indian troops landed at Mombasa in October and were then

transported towards Voi. In the Bukoba District English troops crossed

the Kagera, and the sub-station at Umbulu reported that the enemy was

invading the Ssonyo country. Obviously these movements were preparatory

to the operations which were to be co-ordinated with the great attack

on Tanga in November, 1914.

[Illustration: Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916.]

The means of intercommunication in the Colony were not sufficiently

developed to enable us rapidly to concentrate our main force, first

against one and then against another of these hostile detachments

deploying along the frontier. We had, therefore, to adhere to the

fundamental idea of our plan, of vigorously attacking the enemy

opposed to us in the area of the Northern Railway and on the Uganda

Railway, and of thus indirectly relieving the other points where

operations were in progress. Of necessity, however, these subsidiary

points had occasionally to be reinforced. Thus, in September, 1914,

Captains Falkenstein and Aumann, with portions of the 2nd Company,

had moved from Iringa and Ubena into the Langenburg District. In

March, 1915, the 26th Field Company was pushed up from Dar-es-Salaam

via Tabora to Muansa. In April, 1915, hostile concentration in the

Mara Triangle (east of Lake Victoria) and at Bismarckburg caused us

to waste much time in moving troops up from Dar-es-Salaam via Muansa

to the Mara Triangle, and via Kigoma to Bismarckburg. The latter move

was particularly delayed on Lake Tanganyika owing to the slow progress

being made on the steamer _Götzen_, which was building at Kigoma.

At first, the enemy’s attacks were principally directed against the

coast.

At the commencement of the war our light cruiser _Königsberg_ had left

the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam and had, on the 29th September, surprised

and destroyed the English cruiser _Pegasus_ at Zanzibar. Then several

large enemy cruisers had arrived and industriously looked for the

_Königsberg_. On the 19th October, at Lindi, a pinnace steamed up to

the steamer _Praesident_, of the East African Line, which was concealed

in the Lukuledi river. The local Defence Force raised at Lindi, and the

Reinforcement Company, were at the moment away under Captain Augar,

to repel a landing expected at Mikindani, so that nothing could be

undertaken against the pinnace.

It was not till the 29th July, 1915, that several whalers went up the

Lukuledi and blew up the _Praesident_.

After successful cruises in the Indian Ocean the _Königsberg_ had

concealed herself in the Rufiji river, but her whereabouts had become

known to the enemy. The mouth of the river forms an intricate delta,

the view being obstructed by the dense bush with which the islands

are overgrown. The various river-mouths were defended by the “Delta”

Detachment, under Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld; this detachment

consisted of Naval ratings, European reservists, and Askari, and its

strength was about 150 rifles, a few light guns, and a few machine

guns. The enemy made many attempts to enter the river-mouths with light

craft, but was invariably repulsed with severe loss. The _Adjutant_, a

small steamer which the English had taken as a good prize, and armed,

was recaptured on one occasion, and was used thenceforward by us as

an auxiliary man-of-war on Lake Tanganyika. Some English aircraft

had also come to grief in the Rufiji delta. A blockship, which the

English had sunk in the most northerly of the river-mouths, did not

close the fairway. The frequent bombardments by ships’ guns, which he

had no means of opposing, Lieut.-Commander Schoenfeld defeated by the

skilful design of his positions, and by shifting them in time. Early in

July, 1915, the English had brought to the Rufiji two shallow-draught

gun-boats, armed with heavy guns. On the 6th July they made the first

attack with four cruisers and other armed vessels, and two river

gun-boats. The enemy bombarded the _Königsberg_, which was at anchor

in the river with aeroplane observation. The attack was beaten off,

but when it was repeated on the 11th July, the _Königsberg_ suffered

severely. The gun-detachments were put out of action. The severely

wounded captain had the breech-blocks thrown overboard and the ship

blown up. The loss of the _Königsberg_, though sad in itself, had at

least this advantage for the campaign on land, that the whole crew and

the valuable stores were now at the disposal of the Protective Force.

Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld, who was in command on land at the

Rufiji delta, at once set himself with great forethought to raise the

parts of the guns that had been thrown overboard. Under his supervision

the ten guns of the _Königsberg_ were completely salved and got ready

for action again; five were mounted at Dar-es-Salaam, two each at

Tanga and Kigoma, and one at Muansa. For their transport he made use

of several vehicles constructed for heavy loads which were found on a

neighbouring plantation. In their concealed positions on land these

guns rendered excellent service, and as far as I know not one of them

was damaged on this service, although they were often bombarded by the

enemy’s vessels.

On the 26th September, by night, the steamer _Wami_ was taken out of

the Rufiji to Dar-es-Salaam.

At the end of August several boats came to Lindi from Mozambique with

men belonging to the steamer _Ziethen_, in order to join the Force.

On the 10th January, 1915, about 300 Indian and black troops with

machine guns landed on the island of Mafia. Our police detachment,

three Europeans, fifteen Askari, and eleven recruits, opposed them

bravely for six hours, but surrendered when their commander, Lieutenant

Schiller of the Reserve, was severely wounded, who had been maintaining

a well-aimed fire on the enemy from a mango tree. The English held

Mafia with a few hundred men, and also established posts of observation

on the smaller islands in the vicinity.

It was apparently from here that the work of rousing the natives

against us was undertaken. On the night of the 29th-30th July, 1915, we

captured a dhow at Kisija carrying propaganda papers.

The events at Dar-es-Salaam, where, on the 22nd October, the captain of

an English cruiser declined to be bound by any agreement, have already

been discussed.

On the outbreak of hostilities an aeroplane, which had been sent to

Dar-es-Salaam for the Exhibition, was taken into use, but was destroyed

by an accident at Dar-es-Salaam on the 15th November, when Lieutenant

Henneberger lost his life.

At Tanga things had been quiet since the big battle of November, 1914.

On the 13th March, 1915, a ship went ashore on a reef, but got off

again on the spring-tide. We at once began salving 200 tons of coal

which had been thrown overboard.

Several rows of mines which had been made on the spot, and could be

fired from the shore, proved ineffective, and it was found later that

they had become unserviceable.

On the 15th August, 1915, the _Hyacinth_ and four guard-boats appeared

off Tanga. Our two 2·4-inch guns were quickly moved from their

rest-camp at Gombezi to Tanga, and with one light gun from Tanga, took

an effective part on the 19th August, when the _Hyacinth_ reappeared

with two gun-boats and six whalers, destroyed the steamer _Markgraf_

and bombarded Tanga. One gun-boat was hit twice, the whalers, of which

one steamed away with a list,[3] four times.

Bombardments of the coast towns were constantly taking place. On the

20th March a man-of-war bombarded Lindi, when its demand for the

surrender of the troops posted there was refused. Similarly, the

country south of Pangani was bombarded on the 1st April, the island of

Kwale on the 12th, and the Rufiji delta on the night of the 23rd-24th.

For some months past hostile patrols had been visiting the Ssonyo

country, between Kilima Njaro and Lake Victoria, and the natives

seemed inclined to become truculent. As a result of their treachery,

Sergeant-Major Bast, who was sent there with a patrol, was ambushed

on the 17th November, 1914, and lost his life with five Askari. The

District Commissioner of Arusha, Lieutenant Kaempfe of the Reserve, who

had been called up, undertook a punitive expedition which reduced the

Ssonyo people to submission.

It was not until July, 1915, that any further patrol encounters

took place in this country; in one of them twenty-two hostile armed

natives were killed. At the end of September and early October, 1915,

Lieutenant Buechsel’s mounted patrol spent several weeks in Ssonyo and

in the English territory without meeting the enemy, as an English post,

which had evidently been warned, had made off.

On Lake Victoria the 7th Company at Bukoba and the 14th Company at

Muansa could communicate with each other by wireless. The command of

the Lake was undisputedly in the hands of the English, as they had

on it at least seven large steamers. But in spite of this our small

steamer _Muansa_ and other smaller vessels were able to maintain great

freedom of movement. While the Resident at Bukoba, Major von Stuemer,

protected the frontier with his police and with auxiliaries furnished

by friendly sultans, Captain Bock von Wülfingen had marched with

the main body of the 7th Company from Bukoba to Muansa. From here he

marched early in September, 1914, with a detachment composed of parts

of the 7th and 14th Companies, Wassakuma recruits, and auxiliaries,

along the eastern shore of Lake Victoria to the north, in the direction

of the Uganda Railway. On the 12th September he drove back a hostile

detachment at Kisii, beyond the border, but on hearing of the approach

of other forces of the enemy he withdrew again to the south. After

that the frontier east of Lake Victoria was only defended by weak

detachments.

Warfare near Lake Victoria was for us very difficult; there was always

the danger that the enemy might land at Muansa, or some other place

on the south shore, seize Usukuma and threaten Tabora, the historic

capital of the country. If, however, our troops remained near Muansa,

the country round Bukoba, and therefore also Ruanda, would be in

danger. The best results in this area were to be expected from active

operations under a united command. But the execution of this idea was

not quite easy either, for Major von Stuemer, who was the most obvious

officer to be entrusted with it, was tied by his work as Resident to

the Bukoba District, while that of Muansa was the more important of the

two.

At the end of October, 1914, an attempt to take back part of the troops

in boats from Muansa to Bukoba had been frustrated by the appearance

of armed English ships at the former place. Apparently the enemy had

deciphered our wireless messages and taken steps accordingly. On the

31st October a force of 570 rifles, 2 guns and 4 machine guns, left

Muansa for the relief of Bukoba on board the steamer _Muansa_, 2 tugs

and 10 dhows, but was scattered the same morning by hostile steamers

which suddenly appeared; they were, however, collected again at Muansa

without loss soon afterwards. On the same day the English tried to land

at Kayense, north of Muansa, but were prevented; a few days later, the

English steamer _Sybil_ was found on shore at Mayita and destroyed.

On the 20th November, in a twelve-hours’ action, Stuemer’s detachment

repulsed the English troops who had penetrated into German territory,

north of Bukoba, and defeated them again, on the 7th December,

at Kifumbiro, after they had crossed the Kagera river. On the 5th

December, the English bombarded Shirarti from the Lake, without

success, and Bukoba on the 6th.

Minor encounters between patrols constantly took place east and west of

Lake Victoria. On the 8th January the enemy attempted a more ambitious

operation; he bombarded Shirarti from the Lake with six guns and

with machine guns, and landed two companies of Indians as well as a

considerable number of mounted Europeans. Lieutenant von Haxthausen,

who had only 22 rifles, gave way before this superior force after

fighting 3-1/2 hours. The enemy’s strength was increased during the

next few days to 300 Europeans and 700 Indians. On the 17th January,

von Haxthausen defeated 70 Europeans and 150 Askari with 2 machine

guns on the frontier, and on the 30th January the enemy left Shirarti

and embarked for Karungu. I believe this withdrawal was a result of

the severe defeat sustained by the enemy at Jassini on the 18th. He

considered it desirable to re-concentrate his forces nearer the Uganda

Railway, where they would be more readily available.

On the west side of the Lake, Captain von Bock surprised a hostile post

of 40 men north of Kifumbiro and drove it off with a loss of 17 killed.

On the 6th March, 1915, English vessels had attacked the steamer

_Muansa_ in Rugesi Passage. _Muansa_ had sprung a leak and went

ashore close to the land. The enemy attempted to tow her off, but was

prevented by our fire, so that we were able, the next day, to salve

the steamer and get her away to Muansa, where she was repaired. The

difficulty of moving troops by water between Muansa and Bukoba rendered

the continuation of the single command unworkable; the officers

commanding the two Districts were therefore placed directly under

Headquarters.

The English attempted to land at Mori Bay on the 4th March, at Ukerewe

on the 7th, and at Musoma on the 9th; all these attempts were defeated

by our posts. At the same time, several patrol encounters occurred near

Shirarti, in which the commander, Lieutenant Recke, was killed, and our

patrols were dispersed. On the 9th March, Lieutenant von Haxthausen,

with 100 Europeans and Askari, defeated an enemy many times his

superior at Maika Mountain; the enemy withdrew after having 17 whites

and a considerable number of Askari killed. On our side, one European

and 10 Askari were killed, 2 Europeans and 25 Askari wounded, while one

wounded European was taken prisoner. Besides the 26th Field Company

already mentioned, Muansa was reinforced by 100 Askari from Bukoba

District, who arrived on the 6th April.

Early in April a few places on the eastern shore were again bombarded

from the Lake; at the same time some Masai made an invasion east

of the lake, killed a missionary and several natives, and looted

cattle. In the middle of April, Captain Braunschweig left Muansa with

110 Europeans, 430 Askari, 2 machine guns, and 2 guns, for the Mara

Triangle, and reinforced Lieutenant von Haxthausen. Over 500 rifles

remained at Muansa.

On the 4th May, in Mara Bay, an English steamer was hit three times by

a ’73 pattern field-gun, which apparently prevented a landing. On the

12th May 300 men landed at Mayita; but they steamed off again on the

18th June, towing the wreck of the _Sybil_ with them. By the 20th May

the enemy, who had 900 men there, had also evacuated the Mara Triangle,

and entrenched himself on several mountains beyond the frontier.

Bombardments of the shore took place frequently at that time.

Since early December, 1914, Major von Stuemer had held a very extended

position on the Kagera. Gradually the enemy, who was estimated at about

300 men, became more active. He seemed to be collecting material for

crossing the Kagera, and his ships appeared more frequently in Sango

Bay.

On the night of the 4th-5th June, on the Shirarti frontier, Becker’s

post of 10 men was surrounded by 10 Europeans and 50 Indians of the

98th Regiment. An armed steamer also took part. But the enemy was

beaten, losing 2 Europeans and 5 Askari killed.

I may here mention that the enemy’s armed scouts used poisoned arrows

on the Shirarti frontier also.

On the 21st June the English, with a force of 800 Europeans 400

Askari, 300 Indians, 3 guns and 8 machine guns, and supported by the

fire of the armed steamers, attacked Bukoba. Our garrison of little

more than 200 rifles evacuated the place after two days of fighting.

The enemy plundered it, destroyed the wireless tower, and left again

on the 24th towards Kissumu. He had suffered severely, admitting 10

Europeans killed and 22 wounded. The Germans had, however, observed

that a steamer had left with about 150 dead and wounded on board. On

our side 2 Europeans, 5 Askari, and 7 auxiliaries had been killed, 4

Europeans and 30 coloured men wounded, and we also lost the gun.

Of the events of the ensuing period it may be remarked that Bukoba was

bombarded without result on the 18th July. In Mpororo a great chief

went over to the English.

On the 12th September one of the _Königsberg’s_ four-inch guns arrived

at Muansa, where we had in process of time raised five new companies

among the Wassukuma people.

It seemed as though the enemy were rather holding back at Bukoba, and

moving troops from there to Kissenyi. On the 29th October the English

attacked with some one hundred rifles, machine guns, a gun, and a

trench mortar, but were repulsed, apparently with heavy casualties.

Hostile attacks on the lower Kagera on the 4th and 5th December were

also unsuccessful. Several detachments of the enemy invaded the Karagwe

country. The command at Bukoba was taken over by Captain Gudovius,

hitherto District Commissioner in Tangarei, who marched off from Tabora

on the 21st December, and was followed by the newly-raised 7th Reserve

Company as a reinforcement for Bukoba.

In Ruanda the energetic measures adopted by the President, Captain

Wintgens, produced good results. On the 24th September he surprised the

island of Ijvi in Lake Kivu, and captured the Belgian post stationed

there, and its steel boat. Another steel boat had been captured by

Lieutenant Wunderlich, of the Navy, who had moved to Lake Kivu with

some men of the _Moewe_, where he had requisitioned a motor-boat. On

the 4th October, Wintgens, with his Police Askari, some auxiliaries,

and a few men of the _Moewe_, drove back several companies of Belgians

north of Kissenyi, inflicting heavy casualties on them. After some

minor engagements, Captain Wintgens then inflicted a partial defeat

on the superior Belgian force of seventeen hundred men and six guns,

north of Kissenyi, on the 20th and 30th November, and again on the 2nd

December, 1914. Near Lake Tshahafi he drove out an English post. One

Englishman and twenty Askari were killed; we had two Askari killed and

one European severely wounded.

After that, in February, 1915, several minor actions were fought

near Kissenyi and on the frontier. On the 28th May, Lieutenant Lang,

commanding the small garrison of Kissenyi, beat off the Belgians, who

had seven hundred men and two machine guns. The enemy sustained heavy

losses; we had one European killed.

In June, 1915, it was said that over two thousand Belgian Askari, with

nine guns, and five hundred English Askari were concentrated near Lake

Kivu, the fact that the Belgian Commander-in-Chief, Tombeur, went to

Lake Kivu makes this information appear probable. On the 21st June the

Belgians attacked Kissenyi with nine hundred men, two machine guns and

two guns, but were repulsed. On the 5th July they again attacked the

place by night with four hundred men, and suffered severe losses. On

the 3rd August Kissenyi was ineffectively bombarded by artillery and

machine guns. In consequence of the crushing superiority of the enemy,

the 26th Field Company was transferred from Muansa to Kissenyi.

Immediately after the arrival of this company at Kissenyi, on the

31st August, Captain Wintgens defeated the Belgian outposts, of whom

ten Askari were killed. On September 2nd he took by storm a position

held by one hundred and fifty Askari, with three guns and one machine

gun. During the next few weeks minor actions were fought every day. On

the 3rd October an attack on Kissenyi by two hundred and fifty Askari

with a machine gun was repulsed, and fourteen casualties were observed

among the enemy. After that, possibly in consequence of the action at

Luwungi on the 27th September, considerable forces of the enemy were

discovered to have marched off for the south.

On the 22nd October another Belgian detached post of three hundred

Askari, with two guns and two machine guns, was surprised, when

the enemy had ten Askari killed. On the 26th November the Ruanda

Detachment, with one platoon of the 7th Company, which had arrived

from Bukoba, in all three hundred and twenty rifles, four machine guns

and one 1.45-inch gun, drove the enemy, numbering two hundred, out of

a fortified position, when he lost two Europeans and seventy Askari

killed, five Askari prisoners, and many wounded. We had one European

and three Askari killed, four Europeans, five Askari and one auxiliary

wounded. On the 21st December the enemy once more attacked Kissenyi

with one thousand Askari, two machine guns and eight guns, including

four modern 2.75-inch howitzers. He left behind twenty-one dead Askari,

three were captured, wounded, and many wounded were carried away. Our

force of three hundred and fifty rifles, four machine guns and two

guns, had three Askari killed, one European and one Askari severely

wounded.

On the 12th January, 1916, Captain Wintgens surprised a Belgian

column north of Kissenyi, killing eleven Belgian Askari. On the 27th

January Captain Klinghardt, with three companies, beat off an attack

on the Kissenyi position made by two thousand Belgian Askari with hand

grenades and twelve guns, inflicting severe casualties on them.

* * * * *

In the Russissi country there were also numerous engagements.

Successful minor actions between German patrols and Congo troops had

taken place on the 10th and 13th October, 1914, at Changugu, on the

21st and 22nd at Chiwitoke, and on the 24th at Kajagga.

On the 12th January, 1915, Captain Schimmer attacked a Belgian camp at

Luwungi, but the intended surprise was unsuccessful. Captain Zimmer and

three Askari were killed and five wounded.

Then, on the 16th, 17th and 20th March small patrol skirmishes took

place, and on the 20th May a Belgian post was surprised. There was thus

incessant fighting, which continued in June and July. In August the

enemy seemed to be increasing his forces in that region. The command on

the Russissi was now taken over by Captain Schulz; the forces we had

there now consisted of four field companies, part of the crew of the

_Moewe_, and the Urundi Detachment, which about equalled one company.

There were also two light guns there. On the 27th September Captain

Schulz attacked Luwungi, when we were able to establish that the enemy

lost fifty-four Askari killed, and we also counted seventy-one Askari

hit. So the enemy’s losses amounted to about two hundred, as confirmed

by native reports received later. We had four Europeans and twenty

Askari killed, nine Europeans and thirty-four Askari wounded.

Owing to the nature of the country and the relative strengths, we were

unable to achieve a decisive success on the Russissi. Only the Urundi

Detachment and one field company were, therefore, left there; two

companies left on the 18th and 19th December, 1915, to join Captain

Wintgens in Ruanda; three others moved to the Central Railway.

On the 19th October the enemy met the 14th Reserve Company, and

although outnumbering it by two to one, lost twenty Askari, while we

had three Askari killed and twelve wounded. Although the Belgian main

camp, which reliable natives reported to contain two thousand Askari,

was so near, it was possible to reduce the troops on the Russissi in

favour of other districts, since on both sides the conditions seemed

unfavourable for an offensive. The Urundi Detachment and the 14th

Reserve Company remained on the Russissi under Major von Langenn.

* * * * *

On Lake Tanganyika, at the beginning of the war, Captain Zimmer had

collected about one hundred men of the _Moewe_, and in Usambara, about

one hundred Askari; in addition, he had a few Europeans who were called

up in Kigoma, also some one hundred Askari belonging to the posts in

Urundi and from Ruanda (Wintgens)—all told, about four hundred rifles.

On the 22nd August, 1914, Lieutenant Horn, of the _Moewe_, commanding

the small armed steamer _Hedwig von Wissmann_, fought a successful

action against the Belgian steamer _Delcommune_. The captain of the

_Moewe_, Lieutenant-Commander Zimmer, had gone to Kigoma with his crew,

after destroying his ship, which had been blown up in August, 1914. The

steamer _Kingani_, which had also been transported to the same place by

rail from Dar-es-Salaam, and several smaller craft on Lake Tanganyika,

were then armed and put in commission by Lieutenant-Commander Zimmer.

He also mounted a 3·5-inch naval gun on a raft and bombarded a number

of Belgian stations on the shore. He strongly fortified Kigoma itself,

and developed it into a base for naval warfare on Lake Tanganyika.

On the 20th November, 1914, the Bismarckburg Detachment (half company),

co-operating with the small armed steamers _Hedwig von Wissmann_ and

_Kingani_, drove off a Belgian company in the bay west of Bismarckburg,

captured four ·43-inch machine guns and over ninety miles of telegraph

wire, which was used to continue the line Kilossa-Iringa up to New

Langenburg, a work which was, from a military point of view, extremely

urgent.

Early in October attempts were made to complete the destruction of the

Belgian steamer _Delcommune_, which was lying at Baraka, on the Congo

shore, but without success. After bombarding her once more on the 23rd

October, Captain Zimmer looked upon her as permanently out of action.

On the 27th February, 1915, the crew of the _Hedwig von Wissmann_

surprised a Belgian post at Tombwe, and captured its machine gun.

One Belgian officer and ten Askari were killed, one severely wounded

Belgian officer and one Englishman were captured. We had one Askari

killed, one European mortally wounded, one Askari severely wounded.

In March, 1915, the Belgians made arrests on a large scale in Ubwari,

the inhabitants of which had shown themselves friendly to us, and

hanged a number of people.

According to wireless messages which we took in, several Belgian

whale-boats were got ready on Lake Tanganyika during June, and work

was being carried on on a new Belgian steamer, the _Baron Dhanis_. On

our side the steamer _Goetzen_ was completed on the 9th June, 1915,

and taken over by the Force. She rendered good service in effecting

movements of troops on Lake Tanganyika.

The Police at Bismarckburg, under Lieutenant Haun of the Reserve,

the capable administrator of the Baziots, had joined the Protective

Force. Several skirmishes took place in hostile territory, and in this

district also the enemy was, on the whole, kept successfully at a

distance.

It was not till early in February, 1915, that several hundred hostile

Askari invaded Abercorn, and some of them penetrated to near Mwasge

Mission, but then retired.

Then, in the middle of March, Lieutenant Haun’s force was surprised in

camp at Mount Kito by an Anglo-Belgian detachment. The Commander was

severely wounded and taken prisoner, and several Askari were killed.

Lieutenant Aumann, with a force subsequently formed into a company,

was detached from Captain Falkenstein, and covered the German border

in the neighbourhood of Mbozi, where, in February, 1915, detachments

several hundred strong had frequently invaded German territory; at the

end of March an unknown number of Europeans were reported in Karonga,

while at Fife and other places on the frontier there were some eight

hundred men. So the enemy appeared to be preparing to attack. He was

patrolling as far as the country near Itaka, and early in April it was

reported that Kituta, at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, had been

entrenched by the Belgians. Major von Langenn, who, after recovering

from his severe wound—he had lost an eye—was working on the Russissi

river, was entrusted with the conduct of operations in the well-known

Bismarckburg-Langenburg country. Besides the 5th Field Company, which

he had formerly commanded, and which was stationed at Ipyana and in the

Mbozi country, he was also given the Bismarckburg Detachment, strength

about one company, and three companies which were brought up from

Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma. During their passage to Bismarckburg on the

Lake successful actions were fought east of that place by our patrols

against hostile raiding parties of fifty to two hundred and fifty men.

[Illustration: Native Women.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

[Illustration: Natives bringing food.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)]

By the 7th May, 1915, Major von Langenn had assembled four companies at

Mwasge; a Belgian detachment stationed in front of him withdrew. On the

23rd May Lieutenant von Delschitz’s patrol drove off a Belgian company,

of which two Europeans and six Askari were killed. On the 24th orders

were sent to Langenn to move with three companies to New Langenburg to

meet the attack which was reported to be impending in that quarter.

General Wahle took over the command in the Bismarckburg area. The

latter arrived at Kigoma on the 6th June, and collected at Bismarckburg

the Bismarckburg Detachment, now re-formed as the 29th Field Company,

as well as the 24th Field Company and a half-company of Europeans

brought up from Dar-es-Salaam.

On the 28th June General Wahle attacked Jericho Farm with two and a

half companies, but broke off the engagement on realizing that this

fortified position could not be taken without artillery. We had three

Europeans and four Askari killed, two Europeans and twenty-two Askari

wounded. General Wahle was reinforced by two companies from Langenburg.

Since the 25th July, 1915, General Wahle was besieging the enemy,

who was strongly entrenched at Jericho, with four companies and two

1873-pattern guns. Relief expeditions from Abercorn were defeated, but

the siege was raised on the 2nd August, as no effect could be produced

with the guns available. General Wahle returned to Dar-es-Salaam with

three companies. The 29th Company remained at Jericho, the two guns at

Kigoma.

On the 19th June the _Goetzen_ towed off the steamer _Cecil Rhodes_,

which was lying beached at Kituta, and sank her.

During September and October there were continual skirmishes between

patrols on the border near Bismarckburg; Belgian reinforcements again

invaded the country about Abercorn. On the 3rd December it was observed

that the defences of Jericho had been abandoned and dismantled. A new

fort, north-east of Abercorn, was bombarded by Lieutenant Franken on

the 6th December with one hundred rifles and one machine gun; the enemy

appeared to sustain some casualties.

The English Naval Expedition, the approach of which, by Bukoma and

Elizabethville, had long been under observation, had reached the

Lukuga Railway on the 22nd October, 1919. We picked up leaflets which

stated that a surprise was being prepared for the Germans on Lake

Tanganyika; this made me think that we might now have to deal with

specially-built small craft which might possibly be equipped with

torpedoes. We had, therefore, to meet a very serious menace to our

command of Lake Tanganyika, which might prove decisive to our whole

campaign. The simultaneous transfer of hostile troops towards Lake Kivu

and Abercorn proved that an offensive by land was to be co-ordinated

with the expedition. In order to defeat the enemy if possible while

his concentration was still in progress, Captain Schulz attacked the

Belgians at Luwungi on the 27th September, inflicting heavy loss.

On the night of the 28th October the steamer _Kingani_ surprised a

Belgian working-party, who were constructing a telegraph line, and

captured some stores. In the mouth of the Lukuga river a railway

train was observed on the move. At last, the _Kingani_ did not return

from a reconnaissance to the mouth of the Lukuga, and, according to

a Belgian wireless message of the 31st December, she had been lost,

four Europeans and eight natives were said to have been killed, the

remainder to have been captured. Evidently, the favourable opportunity

for interfering with the enemy’s preparations for gaining command of

the Lake had passed.

Then, on the 9th February, 1916, another of our armed steamers was

captured by the enemy.

On Lake Nyassa the German steamer _Hermann von Wissmann_, whose captain

did not know that war had broken out, was surprised and taken by the

English Government steamer _Gwendolen_ on the 13th August, 1914.

On the 9th September, 1914, Captain von Langenn, with his 5th Field

Company, which was stationed at Massoko, near New Langenburg, had

attacked the English station of Karongo. In the action with the

English, who were holding a fortified position, Captain von Langenn

himself was severely wounded. The two company officers were also

severely wounded and taken prisoners. The German non-commissioned

officers and the Askari fought very gallantly, but were obliged to

recognize that they could do nothing against the enemy’s entrenchments,

and, therefore, broke off the hopeless engagement. Over twenty Askari

had been killed, several machine guns and light guns had been lost.

Reinforcements from the 2nd Company at once arrived from Iringa and

Ubena, and several hundred Wahehe auxiliaries were raised. Gradually

it turned out that the enemy had also suffered severely. He avoided

expeditions on a large scale against the Langenburg District, and so

this fertile country, which was so necessary to us as a source of

supply, remained in our possession for eighteen months.

Later on our company at Langenburg moved its main body nearer the

border to Ipyana Mission. On the 2nd November an affair of outposts

occurred on the Lufira river, and the steamer _Gwendolen_ on Lake

Nyassa was hit several times by our artillery.

Early in December, 1914, some fighting between patrols took place

north of Karongo, on the Ssongwe river. Lieutenant Dr. Gothein, of

the Medical Corps, who had been returned to us from captivity by the

English in May, 1915, told us that in the first action at Karongo, on

the 9th September, 1914, the enemy had had six Europeans and fifty

Askari killed, and seven Europeans and more than fifty Askari severely

wounded. The English spies were very active, especially through the

agency of the “Vali,” the native administrative official, on the

Ssongwe.

In May, 1915, we were able to effect several successful surprises

on the frontier. The rains were late, so that we could consider the

southern part of Langenburg District as safe from attack until the end

of June.

In June, 1915, when Major von Langenn had arrived with his

reinforcements, there were, contrary to our expectations, no

considerable actions. We made use of the time to dismantle a telegraph

line in English territory, and to put it up again in our own, in the

direction of Ubena. In August, the rumours of an intended attack by

the enemy were again falsified. It was not till the 8th October that

considerable hostile forces of Europeans and Askari arrived at Fife.

On this border also there were numerous little skirmishes. Towards the

end of the year the arrival of fresh reinforcements at Ikawa was also

established. In that region, on the 23rd December, 1915, Captain Aumann

repulsed a force of about 60 Europeans with 2 machine guns, who were

attempting a surprise.

On the shores of Lake Nyassa there were only insignificant encounters.

On the 30th May the English landed 30 Europeans, 200 Askari, 2 guns

and 2 machine guns at Sphinx Harbour. We had there 13 rifles and one

machine gun, who inflicted on them, apparently, over 20 casualties,

whereupon, after destroying the wreck of the _Hermann von Wissmann_,

they retired.

PART II

THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES

(From the arrival of the South African troops to the loss of the

Colony)

CHAPTER I

THE ENEMY’S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUNTAIN

EAST of Oldorobo the enemy now frequently showed considerable bodies of

troops, amounting to 1,000 or more men, who deployed in the direction

of the mountain at great distances, but did not approach it closely.

These movements, therefore, were exercises, by which the young European

troops from South Africa were to be trained to move and fight in the

bush.

Early in February the enemy advanced against Oldorobo from the east

with several regiments. For us it was desirable that he should take

so firm a hold there that he could not get away again, so that we

could defeat him by means of a counter-attack with Captain Schulz’

Detachment, encamped at Taveta. Other German detachments, of several

companies each, were stationed west of Taveta on the road to New Moshi,

and on that to Kaho, at New Steglitz Plantation.

On the 12th February again, European troops, estimated at several

regiments, advanced to within 300 yards of Oldorobo. Headquarters at

New Moshi, which was in constant telephonic communication with Major

Kraut, considered that the favourable opportunity had now presented

itself, and ordered fire to be opened. The effect of our machine-guns,

and our two light guns, had been reported to be good, when Headquarters

left New Moshi by car for the field of battle. Schulz’ Detachment was

ordered to march from Taveta along the rear of Kraut’s Detachment,

covered from the fire of the enemy’s heavy artillery, and to make a

decisive attack on the enemy’s right, or northern, wing. The troops at

New Steglitz advanced to Taveta, where some fantastic reports came in

about hostile armoured cars, which were alleged to be moving through

the thorn-bush desert. The imagination of the natives, to whom these

armoured cars were something altogether new and surprising, had made

them see ghosts. On arriving on Oldorobo, Headquarters was informed

by telephone that the enemy, who had attacked our strongly entrenched

front, had been repulsed with heavy losses, and that Schulz’ Detachment

was fully deployed and advancing against his right flank. The numerous

English howitzer shells which fell in our position on Oldorobo did

hardly any damage, although they were very well placed. In contrast

to the great expenditure of ammunition by the hostile artillery, our

light guns had to restrict themselves to taking advantage of specially

favourable targets, not only because ammunition was scarce, but also

because we had no shrapnel. The enemy retreated through the bush in

disorder. We buried more than 60 Europeans. According to prisoners’

statements and captured papers, three regiments of the 2nd South

African Infantry Brigade had been in action. According to the documents

it appeared that in recruiting the men the prospect of acquiring farms

and plantations had been used as a bait. The sudden illness of the

British General Smith-Dorrien, who was already on his way out to take

over command in East Africa, may not have been altogether inconvenient

to the English. The transfer of the command to a South African, General

Smuts, re-acted favourably on recruiting in South Africa. The training

of these newly raised formations was slight, and the conduct of the

Europeans, many of whom were very young, proved that many had never yet

taken part in a serious action. After the action of Oldorobo, however,

we observed that the enemy sought very thoroughly to make good the

deficiencies in his training.

In spite of pursuit by Schulz’ Detachment, and repeated fire opened

on collections of hostile troops, the enemy, owing to the difficult

and close nature of the country, made good his escape to his fortified

camps.

[Illustration: Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini).]

[Illustration: Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert.]

[Illustration: Fig. ix. Battle of Reata.]

[Illustration: Fig. x. Battle of Kahe.]

It was interesting to find, in several diaries we picked up, notes to

the effect that strict orders had been given to take no prisoners. As

a matter of fact the enemy had taken none, but it seemed advisable

nevertheless to address an inquiry to the British Commander, in order

that we might regulate our conduct towards the English prisoners

accordingly. There is no reason to doubt Brigadier-General Malleson’s

statement that no such order was given; but this case, and several

later instances, show what nonsense is to be found in private diaries.

It was quite wrong on the part of the enemy if he accepted the German

notes which fell into his hands as true, without detailed investigation.

At this time also the hostile troops on Longido Mountain had been

considerably reinforced. This mountain had been evacuated by the

enemy, probably owing to difficulties of supply, but had latterly

been re-occupied. The rock is covered with dense vegetation, and our

patrols had several times ascended it and examined the enemy’s camps at

close quarters. It is at any time difficult correctly to estimate the

strength of troops, but in bush country, where more than a few men are

never to be seen at a time, and where the view is constantly changing,

it is impossible. The reports of the natives were too inaccurate. On

the whole, however, we could but conclude from the general situation,

and from the increased quantity of supplies which were being brought

to Longido from the north, by ox wagon, without interruption, that the

enemy was being considerably reinforced.

His raids into the Kilima Njaro country had been repulsed with

slaughter. When a squadron of Indian Lancers moved south, between

Kilima Njaro and Meru Mountain, it was at once vigorously attacked

by one of our mounted patrols under Lieutenant Freiherr von Lyncker.

Our Askari had come to understand the great value of saddle-horses in

our operations, and charged the enemy, who was mounted, with the cry:

“Wahindi, kameta frasi!” (“They are Indians, catch the horses!”) The

Indians were so surprised by the rapidity of our people that they fled

in confusion, leaving some of their horses behind. Among others the

gallant European commander had been left dead on the field; he had not

been able to prevent his men from losing their heads.

I should like to remark generally that during this first period of

the war the conduct of the British regular officers was invariably

chivalrous, and that the respect they paid us was fully reciprocated.

But our Askari also earned the respect of the enemy by their bravery

in action and their humane conduct. On the 10th March the English

Lieutenant Barrett was severely wounded and fell into our hands;

owing to false accounts he thought his last moment had come, and was

surprised when our Askari, who had no European with them, tied him up

as well as they could and carried him to a doctor. In his astonishment

he remarked: “Why, your Askari are gentlemen.” How greatly the English

soldiers had been misled I learned on the 12th February from a young

South African captured on Oldorobo, who asked whether he was going to

be shot. Of course we laughed at him. No doubt, in a long war, cases of

brutality and inhumanity do occur. But that happens on both sides, and

one should not generalize from isolated cases, and exploit them for the

purpose of unworthy agitation, as has been done by the English Press.