THE SOUDANESE AND SOUTH AFRICAN WARS.
In the two previously mentioned pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa argued at length
to prove that Canada had been led to intervene in the great European war
as a consequence of her intervention in the South African War. It is
well known throughout the Dominion that the South African conflict was
the occasion chosen by the "Nationalist" leader to proclaim his doctrine
that the autonomous colonies should have nothing to do with the wars of
the Empire--LES GUERRES DE L'EMPIRE. He then strongly opposed Canadian
support of Great Britain in her struggle in South Africa.
In one of his pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa affirmed that the Government of
Sir John A. Macdonald had, in 1884, refused the request of the Imperial
Government to interfere in its favour in the Soudanese war. Well aware
of the events of this struggle, I positively knew that the "Nationalist"
leader's assertion was not borne out by the facts, and was historically
false. I considered it my duty, in a special chapter, to explain fully
the circumstances of the case to my French Canadian countrymen.
It should be well remembered that England was brought into the Soudanese
conflict on account of her relations with Egypt, which she had delivered
from the Turkish yoke.
Mr. Bourassa prefaced his above mentioned affirmation by recalling the
fact that it was in consideration of the Soudanese difficulties that
"_for the first time in the history of the Colonial Empire of Great
Britain, offers of armed support were made by the autonomous colonies_."
Is it not evident that if--as was true--such offers were made
spontaneously by the Colonies, it cannot be pretended that the proffered
armed support was asked by England. If England did not solicit such
support, it is plain that Sir John A. Macdonald and his Cabinet could
not refuse what was never applied for.
What are the true historical facts?
In November 1884, General Laurie, who has represented one of the
electoral divisions of Nova Scotia at Ottawa, who has also held a seat
in the British House of Commons, took the initiative to propose to raise
a Canadian regiment for the campaign in the Soudan. In the regular
official way, General Laurie's offer was addressed to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, Lord Derby. The Imperial Government declined the
offer.
On the 7th of February, 1885, on hearing the news of the disaster of
Khartoum, which caused great excitement in England, and naturally
created a strong public feeling to avenge the outrage, General Laurie,
always enthusiastic, tendered anew his services. He was not the only
Canadian officer wishing to go and fight the cruel Soudaneses. A member
of the Canadian Parliament, Colonel Williams, commanding the 46th
volunteer battalion of Durham-East, also desired to take part in the
African campaign with his regiment. On the 9th of February, 1885, he
tendered his proposition to Sir Charles Tupper, then High Commissioner
in London, who sent it to the Colonial Office.
On the 10th of February, His Excellency the Governor General, Lord
Lansdowne, cabled to the Colonial Secretary that the offers of military
service were very numerous. This spontaneous movement, so rapidly
spreading, was the forerunner of those of 1899 and 1914. Thirty years
ago, and long before, there were brave men in Canada. There always have
been and ever will be.
These news were no doubt very encouraging for the Imperial authorities.
Lord Derby, thanking Lord Lansdowne, begged him to say "_Whether they_
(the offers of service) _are sanctioned and recommended by the Dominion
Government_."
On the 12th of February, Lord Lansdowne answered Lord Derby that the
Dominion Government was ready to approve recruiting in Canada for
service in Egypt or elsewhere, provided that the men would be enlisted
under the authority of the Imperial Army Discipline Act, and the expense
paid by the Imperial Treasury.
It consequently follows from the above despatches that the Soudanese
campaign offered to many officers of our volunteer Militia the long
wished for opportunity to freely tender their services to the Imperial
Government; that the British authorities never applied to the Canadian
Government, then presided by Sir John A. Macdonald, for armed support in
Soudanese Africa; that, on being officially informed of the offers of
service received by His Excellency the Governor General, the Colonial
Secretary, before accepting or declining them, enquired if the Canadian
Government sanctioned and recommended them; that the Governor General
answered him in the affirmative, the recruiting to be made according to
the Imperial Military Act at the expense of the Imperial exchequer.
On the 16th of February, the War Minister, then the Marquis of
Hartington, informed the Colonial Secretary that he had come to the
conclusion to decline with thanks the offers of service from Canada, for
the reason that it would have taken too long a time to recruit and
organize the regiments offered by General Laurie and Colonel Williams.
Was I not right, when I refuted Mr. Bourassa's assertion, in saying that
if a _refusal_ was _then_ given, it was by the British Government who
had received the freely tendered services, and not by the Canadian
Government, to whom no demand of armed support had been made by Great
Britain?
If it is indeed very astonishing that Mr. Bourassa should have taken the
responsibility to affirm that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald
had refused to help Great Britain in the Soudanese campaign, it is easy
to understand his object in so doing. His purpose was to convince his
French Canadian readers that the political leaders at the head of the
Government, in 1899 and 1914, together with the Canadian Parliament,
had, in a revolutionary way, reversed the traditional policy of Canada
of non-intervention in the "wars of the Empire"--_les guerres de
l'empire_. And to achieve his end, so detrimental to the best interests
of the Dominion, he did not hesitate to draw an absolutely erroneous
conclusion from undeniable historical facts.
The "Nationalist" leader was very anxious to charge the chieftains of
the two great political parties with an equal responsibility for what he
terms a "Revolution" in our relations with the Mother Country. With this
object constantly in view, he pretended that the intervention of Canada
in the South African War created the precedent which brought about the
Dominion participation in the European war, in 1914. In order to stir up
to the utmost the prejudices of the French Canadians, he boldly
qualified the South African conflict as an _infamous crime_ on the part
of England.
Unfortunately, the true history of the difficulties which culminated in
the Boer War of 1899, was at the time little known throughout Canada,
and even less particularly in the Province of Quebec. At the outbreak of
the struggle, wishing to form a sound opinion of the causes of which it
was the direct outcome, I made an exhaustive study of the South African
question, beginning at the very inception of the Dutch settlement dating
as far back as 1652, the year during which the Dutch East India Company
occupied Table Bay. Six years later, in 1658, French Huguenots reached
South Africa, joining with the Dutch Reformists, who rather
energetically did all they could to assimilate them. Still later on,
besides some few German immigrants, a third group of Europeans settled
on the African coast. They were Englishmen.
All the Europeans, on landing in South Africa, few in numbers, had at
once to contend with the black race numbering many millions. The history
of the long struggle between European civilization, represented by the
English and Dutch immigrants, and African barbarity, is indeed very
interesting. Carefully read and studied in all its bearings, it strongly
impressed upon my mind the conviction that had it not been for the
timely armed protection they often solicited and received from England,
the Dutch Boers would certainly have been annihilated by the tribes of
the black race. They could not hope to successfully resist the
onslaughts to which they were repeatedly submitted. They were saved from
utter destruction by the strong arm of Great Britain, occupying an
important strategical position by her Cape Colony. The British
Government had favoured the settlement of the sons of England in South
Africa, for the purpose of assuring, by a powerful naval station, the
freedom of communication with the great regions soon to develop into her
vast Indian Empire.
How, and under what circumstances, was British Sovereignty established
in South Africa? I considered this question the most important to
ascertain, in order to judge fairly the history of the last century in
those regions. It was settled by the Peace Congress of Vienna, in 1815.
All the European nations represented at that congress, have sanctioned
British Sovereignty in South Africa upon the condition of the payment by
England to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Holland was then a
part, of the sum of $30,000,000. Consequently the Sovereign Rights of
Great Britain in South Africa were henceforth undeniable.
In my French book, I somewhat extensively summarized the development of
the British and Dutch groups of settlers in South Africa. It is well
known that the Boers are of Dutch origin. That a rivalry did develop
between the two national elements, is not to be wondered at by any one
having some knowledge of the history of the world.
I do not consider it necessary to go at any length in relating the
vicissitudes of the conflict between the aspirations of the Boer element
and the undoubted rights of British suzerainty. As a rule they are
sufficiently well known by my English readers.
But I wish to emphasize the two undeniable facts: first, that throughout
this protracted contest, England did perseveringly try to favour South
Africa with the largest possible measure of political liberty. Second,
that the crisis was finally brought about by the persistent
determination of the Government of Pretoria to refuse justice to the
Uitlanders and to the British capitalists who, at the urgent request of
President Kruger, had invested many millions in the development of the
very valuable mines recently discovered in the Transvaal territory.
Though England had agreed to the establishment of the two Republics of
the Transvaal and Orange, she had maintained her suzerainty on those
territories, which suzerainty the Government of Pretoria had again
recognized by the Convention of 1884.
The most convincing proof that England did not intend any unfair design
against the South African Republics, is the fact that she did not
prepare to resist the armed attack of the Government of Pretoria which
could be easily foreseen by the intense organization they were evidently
making to impose Boer supremacy in South Africa.
In his very unjust appreciation of the policy of Great Britain in South
Africa, Mr. Bourassa kept no account whatever of the very important
fact that war was declared against England by the South African
Republic. How could Great Britain have been guilty of a hideous crime in
not bowing to the dictate of President Kruger and his Government, as the
"Nationalist" leader said, is beyond comprehension.
England was absolutely within her right in accepting the challenge of
the Government of Pretoria, and fighting to maintain her flag and her
Sovereignty in South Africa.
Fortunately, the South African War, characterized by deeds of heroism on
both sides, has had the most satisfactory conclusion. It is to be hoped
that for many long years the future of that great country is settled
with all the blessings that political liberty and free institutions will
surely confer on that important part of the British Empire. The Boers
themselves have fully recognized that their own national development
cannot be better guaranteed and safeguarded than by the powerful
Sovereignty pledged to their protection, on the only condition of their
loyal allegiance to the flag waving on the fair land where they can
multiply in peace, prosperity and happiness. The enthusiasm and the
admirable courage with which they have rallied to the support of Great
Britain and her Allies in the present war, is the best evidence how much
they appreciate the advantages of their new conditions in the great
South African Dominion destined to such a grand future.
I most sincerely deplore the persistent efforts of the "Nationalist"
leader to pervert more and more the mind of my French Canadian
countrymen by his so very unfair appreciation of the nature of the South
African conflict. It was with the hope of counteracting them that I
introduced a special chapter in my French edition explaining, as fully
as I could, though in a condensed form, the South African question.
The assertion that the participation of Canada in the present European
war was the sequence of the precedent of our intervention in the South
African struggle, is also most injustifiable and untenable. Had Canada
taken no part whatever in the South African War, it would not have made
the least difference with regard to the decision of the Canadian people
to support Great Britain and the Allies in their gigantic effort to put
an end to Prussian terrorism. The assertion which I most emphatically
contradict could have no other object but to prejudice the public mind
against Canadian intervention in any of the wars of the Empire--_les
guerres de l'empire_.