attorney, a man who had fraudulently lived by his wits for years.
Immediately after the fire this plausible old fakir was cared for by a
religious society which asked for special clothing for him because he
was “an odd size.” He applied to the Rehabilitation Committee for $1,500
to rebuild a lodging house he claimed to have owned. The visitor found
that he had not owned a house and lot before the fire, that the old
woman relative whom he professed to have supported was another fraud,
and that his only real claim on charity was that he was too fat to wear
ready made clothes. In the summer of 1909 he was again heard of at a
summer resort earning his living by assisting an evangelist in religious
meetings.
Three years after the grants were made the condition of the 18 men who
were aided was ascertained to be as follows: three were found to be
self-supporting; for four no definite information was obtained but they
were believed to be independent; eight were dependent, and three had
died. The eight dependent cases, all elderly men, were with one
exception being cared for at the Relief Home; one was in an insane
asylum.
A young seaman who is recorded as having died after being aided,
committed suicide. He had had a leg amputated, had been in the hospital
for sometime after the fire, and then had gone to Ingleside to
convalesce. The Relief Committee gave him an artificial leg, and he was
in and out of the Relief Home several times trying unsuccessfully to
find work. On his return from one of the attempts he killed himself. The
other two who died were elderly men.
To put the case from the financial point of view, $1,389 was given to 18
men; $620 has made seven of them possibly self-supporting, and $769 was
expended upon 11 who failed. Those who were not found at the address
given may be self-supporting as they have not drifted back to the
Rehabilitation Committee. A single fact is sufficient to explain the
success of one group and the failure of the other. The seven successful
ones averaged fifty years of age, while omitting the exceptional case of
the young seaman 10 of the 11 averaged sixty-seven years. Again, the
occupations of the unsuccessful are seen to be unskilled and common
labor. Incompetence, physical or mental, added to age in most instances,
brought these men to Ingleside.
Twelve of the 17 women who applied for business rehabilitation were
given aid. One of these, a lodging-house keeper who expected to receive
$2,500 in insurance, was granted only $75. When the insurance was
received it amounted to but $700, and as she invested in a large rooming
house, heavy debts were incurred. Though she was running behind she may
not have failed. She blamed the Rehabilitation Committee for not having
given aid sufficient to insure success. Two milliners, each about forty
years of age, together received $699 and had not re-established
themselves. One, however, had had typhoid fever after the fire, and
never fully recovered. Both were doing a little casual work. Five
others who were given grants amounting to $560 were dependent. None of
these had given much promise of self-support but were given the full
benefit of the doubt. One of them, later in the Relief Home, lost $100
in the fire, which she had painfully saved for proper burial. The
Rehabilitation Committee replaced this money for funeral expenses.
One of the five women who were denied business rehabilitation was
refused because she owned real estate which when sold would provide
sufficient capital.
HOUSEHOLD REHABILITATION. The records of application for household
relief by single or widowed inmates present quite another aspect of the
relief situation than that exhibited by the data regarding business
rehabilitation. The 43 people in this group[274] asked for very little
more than the two essentials--furniture and clothing. Clothing had been
given in quantities immediately after the fire, and these applicants,
aged and infirm people, re-applied months later when winter was coming
on. The heavier part of their demand was, however, for furniture to
start bachelor housekeeping. Before the fire San Francisco abounded in
furnished lodgings at all prices; but afterward there were almost none
to be had at prices within the means of those whose age and incapacity
prevented them from earning more than minimum wages. Furniture for the
shacks, cottages, and tenements was necessary, but because of the dearth
of second-hand stuff, the prices of new pieces, even of the meanest
sort, were very high. The average grant of $59 per person, therefore,
was not too much with which to buy a bed and bedding, a table, chairs,
and cooking utensils, and, in some cases, to pay the first month’s rent.
A visitor of much experience, in commenting on such cases, said, “It is
appalling to think that mere beds and tables may make the difference
between pauperism and independence.” Grants were refused to three
applicants; two of them drank to excess, and the third was in need of
permanent care.
[274] See Table 120, p. 344.
When one considers that these applicants above sixty years of age were
sewing women, charwomen and cleaners, cannery workers, peddlers, and
laborers who must regain their patrons or find new work, the results are
very encouraging. One-third only were in 1909 found to be dependent on
charity; another third were living with relatives or had died or been
lost to view; while the last third were presumably self-supporting.
TRANSPORTATION. The 27 persons who applied for transportation were
rather more homogeneous than those of any other group. In 15 cases
transportation was granted. These 15 individuals were maintained for
months at Ingleside until assurance was obtained that they would have
proper care if transported; and yet, the experiment was not always
successful. For instance, an old nurse was sent to Chicago where her
nephews and nieces, although poor, had offered her a home which was
visited and approved by the Chicago Bureau of Charities. After some
months in Chicago the exacting old woman became so burdensome that the
relatives could not care for her. With the advice of the Bureau of
Charities she was sent back to San Francisco and placed in the home for
the aged. In a few cases careful plans came to nothing, because erratic
old people would not consent to be transported.
The case of an old woman of 97 is very pathetic. She had formerly lived
in San Francisco and had stored her furniture when she went away. She
happened to be visiting in the city on April 18, 1906, in the district
burned. The step-daughter to whom she went first abused her and then
sent her to Ingleside. The poor old woman while waiting to be given
transportation to join her husband in Utah fell ill and just after the
coveted transportation was given “died of disappointment.” No judgment
can be formed as to whether there was unnecessary delay on the part of
the visitor of the Rehabilitation Committee but after the shock of the
earthquake, “disappointment” can scarcely be regarded as the chief cause
of death.
The war veterans, four of whom were transportation cases and not less
than a dozen of whom were at Ingleside, gave trouble quite
disproportionate to the hoped-for results. They were traveling paupers
each of whom had either been discharged for bad conduct from some
soldiers’ home or more probably had left because of restless and vicious
habits. Two were given transportation to Washington, District of
Columbia, where they belonged, but neither ever arrived. Two others were
refused transportation because they belonged in a veterans’ home in
California.
To summarize the 15 cases to whom about $1,000 was given in
transportation and money, four in 1909 were still, in spite of what
seems to have been reasonable precaution, dependent on the charity of
San Francisco and one on the charity of Philadelphia. The burden of the
other 10 was transferred to relatives or to communities to whom it
rightly belonged and San Francisco was relieved from a possible future
obligation greater than that represented by the $1,000 expended.
Transportation was not given in 12 cases. The principal reason for the
refusal of transportation was the lack of assurance that the persons
applying would not become charges on the communities to which they
wished to go. Six are now in homes for the aged, one died shortly after
applying, two may have returned to the soldiers’ homes where they
belonged, and three are possibly self-supporting. Their circumstances
and condition are shown by the following transcript from the records.
GRANT REFUSED:
Night clerk; age 61. Applied for transportation to San Diego.
Recommendations not sufficient. Got job as watchman. In Relief Home.
Watchman; age 43. Applied for transportation to Los Angeles.
Physically incapacitated. In Relief Home.
Hotel runner; age 47. Asked for transportation to family in Spokane.
Able to work.
Peddler and war veteran; age 80. Applied for transportation to
brothers in New York with whom he had quarreled long ago. Had left
Veterans’ Home in 1904. Got work.
Ship joiner; age 75. New York relatives refused to receive him because
of his vicious habits, but would pay for him in Relief Home, where he
remained.
Chiropodist and war veteran; age 83. Son in New York surprised that he
had left Soldiers’ Home. Would receive him if fare was paid.
French cook; age 68. Asked for transportation to brother in France,
but brother did not reply to letters. Went to work.
Longshoreman; age 57. Wished to go to Los Angeles. Had been in
hospital for weeks, unable to care for himself. Died shortly afterward
in camp.
Teamster (Negro); age 65. Applied for transportation to wife in
Washington, D. C. No reply from wife. In Relief Home for third time.
Carpenter; age 57. Wished to go to Seattle to collect debt of $50. Was
advised to write. In Relief Home.
GRANT CANCELED:
Car builder; age 69. Granted $100 and transportation to sister in
Northern California. Went to Iowa instead. Check for $100 cancelled.
NO ACTION:
Cigar clerk; age 69. Applied for transportation to sister in Kansas.
Could not be found by visitor. Later, in Relief Home.
SPECIAL RELIEF. The 38 single or widowed inmates whose applications fall
under the head of “Special Relief” were nearly all in need of special
medical or surgical attention, or of convalescent care.
From the standpoint of restoration to self-support this group, as shown
by the abstract given below, is discouraging, but it is doubtful if the
Rehabilitation Committee in granting the special relief, expected the
recipients to regain economic independence. Owing to the crowded
condition of the hospitals in 1906 and 1907 it was necessary to avoid
sending to them persons who could be provided for otherwise. The yet
greater overcrowding in the institutions for the aged and infirm made it
compulsory, until the Relief Home was completed, to give some outdoor
relief to those who did not imperatively require institutional care.
Those still independent three years after the grant was made averaged
twelve years younger than those then receiving relief. The financial
showing is not so discouraging as the social. The 29 persons received
grants amounting to $2,955, an average of $102 each. This sum would have
paid for keep in an institution, if there had been room, for not more
than seven months. The average time that elapsed before each became
dependent is, in the known cases, considerably more than seven months.
The money therefore was not wasted. Moreover, those objecting, as most
of them did, to going to an institution, had the comfort of attempting
self-support.
GRANT MADE:[275]
(a) Not Dependent (probably):
Domestic servant; age 68. Granted $150. No information could be
obtained in 1909.
Domestic servant; age 35. Granted $75 for an operation.
Self-supporting.
Cook; age 66. Granted $50. No information could be obtained in 1909.
Housewife; age 50. Granted $75 for washing machine. Ejected from
Ingleside. Small amount for current expenses.
Cannery clerk; age 61. Granted $20, and later $75, to go to hospital
and then to the country. Now with friends.
Plasterer; age 56. Granted $50. Later arrested and in jail three
months.
Peddler; age 54. Granted $60 and a free license. No information
obtained in 1909.
Carpenter; age 32. Tuberculous. Granted $300 to go a warmer climate.
Now recovering.
(b) Dependent:
Cook; age 61. Living on savings before fire. Granted $100. Later
assisted by A. C. In Relief Home.
Seamstress; age 59. Granted $100. Assisted by private charity.
Bookkeeper; age 65. Granted $100. In Home for the Aged.
Janitress; age 50. Granted $50. Sent to hospital.
Domestic servant; age 38. Granted $75. Partially self-supporting; in
and out of Relief Home.
Nurse; age 78. Granted $200. Went to niece. Assisted by several
charities.
Housewife; age 95. Granted $25 and later $125. In Home for the Aged.
Rooming-house keeper; age 72. Granted $75. Went to hospital. Assisted
by private charity.
Nurse; age 65. Granted $100. In Relief Home.
Cloak maker; age 65. Granted $100. Assisted by charity. In Relief
Home.
Housewife; age 81. Granted $140 in instalments. In Relief Home.
Dressmaker; age 57. Granted $100 and sewing machines. In Relief Home.
House worker; age 60. Granted $100 and truss. In Relief Home.
Seamstress; age 65. Granted $125 and sewing machine. In Relief Home.
Peddler; age 60. Granted $20. In Relief Home.
(c) Dead:
Seamstress; age 75. Granted $150 in instalments. Died September, 1907.
Nurse; age 79. Granted $100 “till well enough to work.” Died April,
1908.
Janitor; age 58. Granted $50 for stove and bedding. Died February,
1907.
Lecturer on psychology; age 70. Granted $75 and transportation to San
Diego. In Relief Home. Died 1908.
Housewife; age 67. Granted $150. Went to relatives. Died 1907.
GRANT REFUSED:
Seamstress; age 36. Because earning $12 per week.
Nurse; age 64. In need of permanent care. Died in Relief Home June,
1909.
Chambermaid; age 70. In need of permanent care.
Children’s nurse; age 73. In need of permanent care. In Relief Home.
Domestic servant; age 70. Asked for money to pursue invalid claim to
property.
NO ACTION--CHECK CANCELED:
Housewife; age 55. Could not be found by visitor.
Dressmaker; age 73. Granted $100 and sewing machine. Could not be
found.
Cannery worker; age 40. Granted $75. Could not be found by visitor.
Assisted later by Associated Charities to go to the country.
Maker of knitted articles; age 68. Granted $100 and sewing machine.
Drank to excess. In Relief Home.
[275] No information is available as to occupation, age, or present
status of one of the 29 persons to whom grants were made.
HOSPITAL CARE. The small group of 11 persons who applied for hospital
care, were of the same general character. Illnesses of a serious nature
required special treatment either at Ingleside or other institution. Two
of the 11 were sent to an insane asylum, two died at Ingleside, and
five were in homes for the infirm. Two became self-supporting.
GENERAL RELIEF. There remains a heterogeneous group of applicants for
general relief, most of whom asked for money for living expenses, or for
such inexpensive things as false teeth, trusses, and spectacles. Of the
50 persons who applied for general relief, 20 were refused. The total
amount paid out in grants to the remaining 30 was $1,735.70.
Three years after the grants were made 10 of these persons, five of whom
received less than $25 each, were believed to be independent, 15 were in
the Relief Home, one was dependent on other charity, and four were dead.
* * * * *
2. Between April, 1907, and April, 1909, 68 persons who had been at
Ingleside Model Camp at some time, in addition to the 14 persons in the
seven families already considered in Table 119 and on page 342, applied
to the Associated Charities.[276] Since these 68 persons did not apply
to the Corporation during the first year after the fire they must either
have gone from Ingleside to friends or must have expected to be
self-supporting. More than half of them were over fifty years of age and
nearly all were more or less incapacitated; in short, they do not seem
to have differed from those who before the fire found their way to the
almshouse. On April 18, 1909, 39 of these were in the Relief Home, four
were in asylums or hospitals, four had left the city, and three were
self-supporting. With regard to 18 persons of this group no information
could be obtained.
[276] See Table 119, p. 336.
* * * * *
3. The most conspicuous thing about those who did not apply for
rehabilitation, both men and women, is their high proportion of
disabilities, a proportion even higher than that of the applicants. Of
the 585 non-applicants among the single or widowed men and women,[277]
no less than 330, 56 per cent, were infirm or crippled, or needed
special care for some reason. Table 121 shows the nature of their
disabilities.
[277] See Table 119, p. 336.
TABLE 121.--DISABLED SINGLE AND WIDOWED INMATES OF INGLESIDE MODEL CAMP
WHO DID NOT APPLY FOR REHABILITATION, BY SEX AND NATURE OF DISABILITY
=============================+========================
|NON-APPLICANTS WITH EACH
| SPECIFIED DISABILITY
Nature of disability +-------+--------+-------
| Men | Women | Total
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Infirm or crippled persons: | | |
Too infirm to work | 33 | .. | 33
Lame or crippled | 19 | 11 | 30
Feeble | .. | 21 | 21
Without one leg or one arm | 19 | .. | 19
Blind or very deaf | 9 | 6 | 15
Paralyzed | 11 | 1 | 12
Bed-ridden | .. | 3 | 3
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Total | =91= | =42= | =133=
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Persons needing special care:| | |
Sick | 44 | 23 | 67
Normally convalescent | 31 | 17 | 48
Injured in accidents | 33 | 2 | 35
Senile or demented | 16 | .. | 16
Severely rheumatic | 15 | 4 | 19
Tubercular | 4 | 8 | 12
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Total | =143= | =54= | =197=
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Grand total | =234= | =96= | =330=
-----------------------------+-------+--------+-------
Four-fifths of the 585 non-applicants were over fifty years of age.
Nevertheless, they applied for no relief other than shelter for a longer
or shorter time at Ingleside. Their neglect to make application for
rehabilitation may be set down in a great measure to the want of
initiative due to infirmity (more than one-seventh of the number have
since died), and to the apathy that comes to the inevitable institution
inmate. In 1909 one-third of this group were in the Relief Home or in
some other charitable refuge. But the margin of over one-third of the
remainder whose condition was known, who went to work or to friends and
were not as yet dependent on charity, is surprisingly large.
Table 122 shows what became of the non-applicants as far as the facts
are known.
TABLE 122.--SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF SINGLE AND WIDOWED INMATES OF
INGLESIDE MODEL CAMP, WHO DID NOT APPLY FOR REHABILITATION BY SEX
=================================================+=================
Subsequent history | INMATES WHOSE
| HISTORY WAS AS
| SPECIFIED
-------------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----
| Men |Women|Total
-------------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----
Died within one year of admission to Ingleside | 31 | 16 | 47
Died within three years of admission to Ingleside| 33 | 11 | 44
Went to work or to friends or relatives | 83 | 25 | 108
Now in charitable institutions | 124 | 70 | 194
No information available | 154 | 38 | 192
-------------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----
Total | 425 | 160 | 585
-------------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----
It is highly suggestive that a very large proportion of those who went
to work or to friends or relatives left in January, 1908, when Ingleside
was about to be closed and all the inmates removed to the Relief Home.
When the final alternative was presented to go permanently to an
institution or to find some other home, they were able to make the
latter choice. Most of them belonged to the wandering labor classes
which find no hardship so great as the monotonous, comfortable life of
an orderly institution where thorough discipline is maintained. The
Relief Home was, fortunately, located beyond the city a mile from any
car line. It was far removed from the bustle and the sensational
diversions which were so pleasantly accessible to the lazy and the
semi-vicious at Ingleside. The mere limitation of the right to go in and
out freely was so irksome that many chose to take their chance in the
world again rather than go where they must ask for a pass.
(c) APPLICANTS WHO HAD NEVER BEEN AT INGLESIDE
Mention has already been made, page 325, of the fact that between 100
and 200 persons left the almshouse shortly after the fire, most of them
presumably going to the camps and posing as refugees. Besides these
there were 27 applicants for relief who, although not in the almshouse
at the time of the fire, had been there one or more times, one of them
16 times, in the eight years previous. In most instances the
Rehabilitation Committee had no means of knowing that these people were
former almshouse inmates, and the grants were made merely on the ground
of old age. The more important details concerning this group of 27, none
of whom were at Ingleside, are as follows:
To 13 persons relief was granted in sums ranging from $15 to $125, and
six of these were believed to be non-dependent in 1909, while seven were
in the Relief Home. Grants were refused to nine applicants; eight of
these required such care and supervision as that provided in the Relief
Home, and the ninth, who was an opium taker, was aided by a sister.
Checks were canceled in three cases: one, because other relief was
given; another, because the applicant was found to be a drunkard; and
the third, because the money had been paid to the wrong person. In the
two remaining cases of the 27 no action was taken.
It is surprising to find that the 13 cases in which relief was granted
average ten years younger than the Ingleside cases. They were either
persons who had gone in former years to the almshouse to convalesce
after illness, as was customary with those discharged from the City and
County hospital, or persons who had some physical or mental disability
that made it difficult to keep employment. Most of the others who were
not in the Relief Home in April, 1909, if they live will probably come
back there. Of the 14 applicants who did not receive aid, nine were in
the Relief Home three years after the disaster or had died there.
One last group of the aged and handicapped remains to be mentioned,--35
applicants who had been neither in the almshouse nor at Ingleside, but
who arrived at the Relief Home between April, 1908, and April, 1909.
These had been able to hold out until then against the ravages of age,
disease, incapacity, and misfortune. A few, a very few, were again
independent of relief three years after the grant was made, but of the
remainder, 21 were still in the Relief Home or other charitable
institutions, and nine had either left the city or had died.
III
RESULTS
The final important question to be considered in this study of relief of
the aged and infirm is: What proportion of the aged and infirm persons
in the Relief Home in April, 1909, were there solely because of the
earthquake and fire of April 18, 1906? To answer this question one must
know the proportion between the total population of San Francisco and
the aged and infirm in the almshouse for some time previous to 1906.
TABLE 123.--PROPORTION OF ALMSHOUSE INMATES AND OF ALMSHOUSE ADMISSIONS
TO TOTAL POPULATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1890, 1900, 1905, AND 1909
====+=============+=========+===========+============+============
Year| Population | Average | Almshouse | Admission | Admissions
| of city and |number of|inmates per|to almshouse|to almshouse
|county of San|almshouse| 1,000 of | during |per 1,000 of
| Francisco | inmates |population | year | population
----+-------------+---------+-----------+------------+------------
1890| 298,997 | 736 | 2.5 | 560 | 1.9
1900| 342,782 | 947 | 2.8 | 670 | 2.0
1905| 379,847[278]| 890 | 2.3 | 773 | 2.0
1909| 409,499[278]| 1,295 | 3.2 | 816 | 2.0
----+-------------+---------+-----------+------------+------------
[278] Estimated.
It seems fair to assume that the disaster was responsible, at least in
part, for the increase of the proportion of almshouse inmates in the
population from 2.3 per 1,000 in 1905 to 3.2 per 1,000 in 1909. The fact
that in 1909 the number of admissions was not higher indicates that
already as regards this class the abnormal conditions resulting from the
fire were passing away. The high death rate would shortly reduce the
Relief Home population almost to its normal proportion.[279]
[279] Between 1900 and 1905 the inmates of the almshouse went in and
out much more freely than they do now at the Relief Home, but the
effect on the average number present is impossible to calculate.
The increase, from 1904-05 to 1909, in the relative number of almshouse
inmates in the population must not be attributed wholly to the disaster.
The condemnation of the unsanitary City and County Hospital threw a part
of the burden of its chronic cases on the Relief Home. The shock of the
disaster to highly nervous and ill-balanced persons doubtless produced
insanity in a number of cases. As the state insane hospitals were
already overcrowded, the least troublesome found refuge in the Relief
Home. But perhaps the most important factor in producing this charitable
burden was the general disorganization of industry in the years 1907-08,
due to a street-car strike in San Francisco and to the financial panic.
The slow recovery of certain industries caused by the exorbitant cost of
building was perceptibly checked. The result was that only young and
able-bodied men could get work. Old and semi-able men who would in
normal times have continued for several years to make a bare living,
could find no work after the brick cleaning was done. This economic
stagnation accounts for the failure of some who were given tools, or
small grants to set up little shops or buy stock to peddle. The buying
capacity of the laboring class, their prospective patrons, was greatly
diminished.
Finally, the number of the aged and the infirm in the Relief Home was
increased by those sent from a number of the private charities whose
buildings were burned or whose funds were lessened. The private
charitable agencies were the more inclined to disburden themselves as
the new institution was so attractive. As one of the employes put it:
“If the city furnishes clean steam-heated rooms, three hot meals a day,
electric lights, and every convenience, the place will always be full.
Lots of people in the Relief Home never had so much before.” The new
institution at its dedication was advertised to set a high standard of
care. The maintenance of this standard by the superintendent drew to it,
undoubtedly, some who formerly would not have applied for admission.
Since the variations in the numbers of the old almshouse inmates
registered the increase due to the industrial stagnation following the
labor agitation and the panic of 1893, it is reasonable to conclude that
the several circumstances described above had increased the number of
the inmates in the Relief Home as much as had the disaster of April 18,
1906.
An interesting question, growing out of the coalescence in the Relief
Home of the Ingleside refugee group with the old almshouse population,
is the comparative social standing of the two groups. Were the Ingleside
inmates potential almshouse inmates or were they such as would not have
arrived there but for a great and wholly impersonal misfortune? The
“refugees” maintained in the Relief Home a class identity and were
particular to insist that they were not like “the old almshouse people.”
It has been pointed out[280] that there was a group at Ingleside whose
occupations and general history marked them as belonging to a somewhat
more skilful and resourceful class than the rest. Such of these as went
to the Relief Home continued to be superior and exceptional, but far the
larger number were precisely of the same human stuff as the interminable
procession that had for forty years been entering the almshouse. On this
point the testimony of employes who were in charge at Ingleside and
later at the Relief Home was nearly unanimous and quite conclusive. They
agreed that three-fourths of these refugees were “almshouse types” and
would have reached an almshouse in a few years; and that some of the
others, of rather better education and character, would have been cared
for in private charitable institutions, or by children and relatives who
because of the fire were too poor to take them. It is pointed out that
these last if they shared the poverty of their kindred would have been
far less comfortable than in the Home.
[280] See Part VI, p. 333.
One clear distinction between the almshouse people and the refugees is a
difference of temper. During the relief period the refugees got the idea
that there were “millions for relief,” in which they had a “just and
equal share,” and that as the Relief Home was built for them they had
exceptional rights in it as victims of misfortune. They were,
therefore,--the women especially,--more exacting, lazy, and termagant
than the old-time inmates. Ingleside has been described as “one long
vacation picnic” where they had varied and abundant food, very little
work and, to satisfy their gregarious instincts, continuous gossip.
Those who had become accustomed to the freedom of the camps were
consequently more incorrigible as well as more able-bodied than the
almshouse inmates, and were never bound by such necessary rules of labor
and discipline as existed there.
It has already been demonstrated[281] that so far as age, proportion of
the sexes, marital condition, and nativity are concerned, at least
four-fifths of the refugees at Ingleside did not differ essentially from
the inmates of the San Francisco almshouse. Collateral information
corroborates this conclusion. The rents they had paid and the wages they
had received before the fire were rarely above those common to the
unskilled laboring classes, while the streets they had lived in were in
the districts familiar to charity visitor and settlement worker. It may
be concluded upon these facts that not more than one-sixth of the
Ingleside refugees, at most 200 persons, were of the more fortunate and
resourceful sort who but for some extraordinary disaster would never
have become dependent.
[281] See Tables 114-116, pp. 329-331.
Before undertaking to estimate the work of the Rehabilitation Committee
in relation to the aged and infirm it is imperative to make clear the
characteristics of the different classes with which they had to deal.
The problems of the helpless, the very old, and the very young, stand
apart. But the destiny of old people cannot, like that of children, be
determined solely by the will of others, for self-will increases rather
than diminishes with the approach of senility. So long as the old are on
their feet in the world, whatever plans are made, whatever relief is
proposed, may be set at naught. They cannot be imprisoned unless
positively vicious, nor be refused relief, because the humane standard
requires that age, however unlovely, shall be kindly treated.
There were at Ingleside 70[282] unruly, immoral, drunken people, who had
to be ejected but who returned again and again by way of the jail and
the hospital to ask assistance. To such as these only food and shelter
could safely be given. In the Relief Home they were relegated to “The
Last Chance,” the name given by the residents to the building for senile
incorrigibles. Some were in their second infancy and behaved like filthy
animals, others had senile dementia and “imagined violence like
children,” accusing the nurses of stealing from them and of starving
them, yet it would have been impossible to get them committed for
insanity. Still others who came and went from Ingleside and who went in
and out of the Relief Home as often as permitted, became insane with
rage whenever they were crossed. Angry at some trifle, they would rave
by the hour; but if locked up or deprived of some privilege they would
gradually recover self-control and be quiet for weeks until crossed
again. It would have been impossible for them to live in a family even
of their own relatives. It was all but impossible to care for them in
the institution until their vigor was depleted enough to make them
stationary.
[282] See Part VI, p. 325.
Another class is the wanderers, in all stages of senile dementia. Some
were intelligent enough to apply for relief but wandered from Ingleside,
could not be found by the visitors, and turned up later in the Relief
Home. A few were promised grants but never claimed the checks. Those in
the Relief Home got lost, could not remember where their rooms were, or
now and then climbed the barbed-wire fence and ran away. Although for
their proper care the same precautions were needed as at a prison,
neither Ingleside Model Camp nor the Relief Home could be so organized.
Every person had the legal right to come and go from the Relief Home at
will. Some of the relatively able-bodied would go out to visit
acquaintances or relatives, to beg a little, to work a little, or even
to pawn their clothes, and after drinking up the money obtained, return
exhausted or filthy to recuperate in the Home. The same may be said of
the one-third of the inmates who were entered in the records as drinking
or drunkards. Many of them combined with intemperance some other
infirmity. For our purpose, however, it is immaterial whether they began
to drink as a result of physical debility or whether they were sick
because of drunkenness. In either case, it was very nearly hopeless to
give them money for rehabilitation. A number are known to have wasted
their grants in drink.
[Illustration: _See Frontispiece_
“PORTALS OF THE PAST”
This beautiful arch was found practically uninjured in the midst of the
ruins at the summit of Nob Hill. Mr. James D. Phelan had it removed to
the banks of a little lake in Golden Gate Park, where it stands as a
memorial to the devastated city.]
The Ingleside population affords a painful study in isolation. Among a
thousand refugees over fifty years of age, a majority would be expected
to have children or relatives and the hasty inference would be that
family care should be given to a number that were in the Relief Home.
Filial obligation is, indeed, too little emphasized; but frequent
migration weakens the family tie. An examination of these cases does not
show many in which the refugees were dependent because of wilful neglect
by relatives. The superintendent of the Relief Home in the year 1909
carefully investigated all cases about which there was rumor of property
concealed or relatives able to give support. The result was that only a
very few of either were discovered. In the case of those who had hidden
savings, or an inheritance, the city compelled the payment of $15 a
month for board and lodging or the leaving of the institution. In the
case of most children who had been well-to-do, a payment was agreed on
rather than the return to relatives.
A cursory glance at the Ingleside records would give the impression that
all the mutilated, semi-blind, deaf, rheumatic, and disabled old people
in the countryside; the one-legged and one-armed men and the men with no
legs at all; the partly paralyzed and otherwise crippled, had been
gathered there,--a forlorn company more than half of whom added to other
defects the slowness of old age. The problem was not merely the relief
of the aged, but the relief of the handicapped. The crippled had been
for the most part self-supporting before the fire; some were elevator
men, some were watchmen, many had sold notions or papers on the streets
or peddled goods in the country roundabout. The peddlers on the whole
did very well with their grants, perhaps because a physical mutilation
is an asset to a peddler, or because no definite patronage had to be
regained. A person with a physical defect but accustomed to unusual or
skilled occupation, as for instance, the printing and distributing of
bill-heads or the repairing of musical instruments, is not debarred from
self-support as is the man who belongs in the ranks of common labor.
The restoration to self-support of even the able-bodied elderly women
was quite as difficult as the rehabilitation of the handicapped. There
was after the fire, as always, a considerable demand for cheap general
houseworkers. To the casual observer, these sturdy old women at
Ingleside ought to have been able at least to earn their lodging and
food. But if the observer had attempted to employ one in her own
household she would have found it all but impossible to endure her
personal peculiarities. More than half were born and had lived in
foreign countries, and although to a degree Americanized, were relapsing
into the peasant habits of childhood. In cleanliness and decorum a
rising standard had left them far behind. To uncleanly and vulgar habits
and lack of skill were added a tendency to misrepresent, even when
truth-telling would be advantageous, and to be voluble on the subject of
chronic grievances or ailments. Women of another type who were both
cleanly and competent could not keep in work because they lacked
initiative. Someone had to do their thinking for them. In the Relief
Home where they had kindly supervision they became excellent helpers
capable of earning small wages.
The chief elements in the failure of these old people, men and women, to
recover their independence, were lack of adaptability, lack of speed,
and poor judgment in business matters. Those who had maintained
themselves for years, could not get back into their narrow familiar
groove nor find another into which to fit themselves. An old man who was
probably as good a cabinet maker as any other in the city, could do
barely half the work in a day expected by employers, because of
over-conscientiousness and slowness. In a thousand ways the inefficiency
due to ignorance, lack of skill, and poor judgment, predestined the
refugees of Ingleside to failure, whether they received grants or not,
and whether the aid given was great or small.
In some cases the grants seem pitifully inadequate and it may be
questioned whether the individuals had a fair chance to re-establish
themselves. Remembering the high rents, the cost of materials, the cost
of transportation, the dearth of employment, and the lessened
consumption, larger sums than those given would seem to have been
necessary to afford a prospect of permanent rehabilitation. But the
Corporation could not anticipate panic nor exceptional lack of
employment. A large proportion of these cases, moreover, had to be
decided in August, 1906,[283] when the grants were discontinued or made
in small amounts. In the cases of those who received $150 or more, there
was no higher proportion of success than where smaller amounts were
given. It is impossible to determine from the information we have
whether the later dependence of one-third to one-half of the Ingleside
refugees was due to the industrial situation or to the deficiencies of
the individuals themselves or to inadequate relief. One conclusion we
may safely set down: no case of failure was due to any one of these
causes alone.
[283] See Part I, p. 99 ff.
Turning from the discussion of these qualifying circumstances to
estimate the results of the relief of the aged, the infirm, and the
handicapped at Ingleside and in the Relief Home, certain things emerge
very definitely. For convenience and clearness they may be set down
categorically.
1. _The speculative character_ of relief after disaster, especially in
the case of persons over fifty years of age, should be recognized and
too much must not be expected from the issue. The recuperative power of
aged persons is relatively small under ordinary conditions of life, but
when they are thrown out of the groove of years, subjected to shock and
hardship, and made to begin over again, it is infinitely smaller. For
this reason the element of uncertainty should be reduced to a minimum by
the use of records, by the employment of trained investigators, and by
the consultation with camp commanders or others who have observed the
applicants for some time. During the earlier part of the relief work in
San Francisco grants were made after investigation, in lump sums which
in a considerable number of cases were squandered or used unwisely.
After the Model Camp at Ingleside had been in operation for some months
and the camp commander had had time to observe the inmates, the
recommendations of visitors were often modified at his suggestion; in
some cases the money was placed in the hands of a visitor to be expended
for the applicant, and in many others it was given in care of the
Associated Charities. These later grants lasted longer and were of more
avail in relieving the recipient than those made on less information and
with fewer precautions.
2. _The value of charity records_ as a basis for determining the kind
and amount of relief that should be given in an emergency cannot be
over-emphasized. The case records of the Associated Charities, of the
several benevolent societies of the different nationalities, and of the
Catholics and the Hebrews, and the records of the almshouse, all should
have afforded a quick means of learning the former dependent or
independent position of many applicants. Unfortunately in San Francisco,
before the fire, most of these agencies did not sufficiently understand
the value of permanent detailed records. The result was that a number of
people who previously had been more or less dependent were assisted on
the assumption that they were as likely to become self-supporting as
those who had never applied for aid. Elderly indigents rarely resort to
an alias and they might have been easily identified if the records had
been reasonably complete and had been available in one central bureau.
Since the disaster, the exchange of case information among the principal
charitable agencies is proving invaluable in preventing duplication of
relief and in developing unity of plans for constructive charity.
3. _The value of trained investigators_ is distinctly apparent in a
comparison of their recommendations with those of amateurs in the
Ingleside cases. The inexperienced visitor, “taken in” by some plausible
old person, would recommend a grant of several hundred dollars; the
committee, mindful of many applicants yet to come and suspicious of the
excessive enthusiasm of the visitor, would give half as much carefully
guarded. The trained visitor, on the other hand, seized upon the hopeful
points as well as the limitations of capacity and formed a balanced
judgment which the committee usually accepted in substance and which was
generally justified by the subsequent history of the applicant. The
business of an investigator is not to harden his sympathies and expose
imposture, but to become a trained and sympathetic expert in human
nature. Especially in emergency relief, therefore, his judgment should
be of the highest value.
4. _The pension and the direct grant_ were both used in providing for
two quite different classes of the aged and infirm. A number of feeble
persons who had been decent and hardworking before the fire but who,
very evidently, could never again be self-supporting, were given grants
outright “till they should be able to work again”--as the committee
kindly phrased it--or because they were “too nice to go to the
almshouse.” A larger number of cases, where it was impossible to
determine whether the applicants were still capable of self-support or
in need of institutional care, were given the benefit of the doubt. This
was, indeed, almost compulsory because institutional facilities were so
meager. The intention of these grants must be wholly commended, but the
history of the cases treated by the two methods indicates clearly that
the money given in instalments in care of a visitor or of the Associated
Charities had been much more effectively spent than that given to the
applicant in a lump sum. If it be assumed--as it should be--that no
decent person of this borderland class should be prematurely relegated
to an institution, the results in San Francisco prove that a limited
pension in the care of a friendly visitor is both wise and humane. It
is, moreover, economical.
5. _The age of possible rehabilitation_ is approximately defined by the
results of these cases. The natural period of self-support is between
sixteen and sixty; but the capacity of the unskilled laboring classes to
keep the pace of modern industry often begins to decline at middle age.
As regards health and ability to be self-supporting the decade between
fifty and sixty is critical; and the number of those between sixty and
seventy who, after such a disruption of their lives as that produced by
the earthquake and fire, are able to re-establish themselves even with
assistance, will be very small. To conserve the common self-respect and
society’s humane instincts, as many as possible should be encouraged to
try.
6. _The lack of provision for certain classes_ in San Francisco was well
known to charity workers before the fire, but it became a far more
serious matter owing to the sudden increase and shifting of these
classes of dependents. There were many people set down as
“convalescents” at Ingleside who remained permanently in need of
institutional care. The hospitals continued to discharge, at the
earliest possible moment because of overcrowding, numbers of half-well
people who had no homes and little or no resources. Even those who went
back to poor homes frequently did not recover fully for want of proper
care during the convalescent period. Those without homes must go to the
Relief Home, and the increase of this class of inmates became a serious
tax on the institution. The medical attention that must be given to the
inmates of the Relief Home is greater than had to be given in the old
almshouse. The increase in the number of the incurables, due in some
measure to the shock and hardships of 1906, makes great demands upon
the nursing staff. Although the number of admissions per thousand of the
population is now no greater than before the disaster, the permanent
burden of refugees will remain proportionately great for some years to
come. Certain special classes--the convalescent, the incurable, the
advanced tubercular, the chronic alcoholic, have never been adequately
provided for in San Francisco. The transition from emergency to
permanent provision affords the opportunity for developing the best
methods and differentiating the kinds of charitable care.
SOME LESSONS OF THE RELIEF
SURVEY
SOME LESSONS OF THE SURVEY
PAGE
PART I. ORGANIZATION AND THE EMERGENCY PERIOD 369
PART II. REHABILITATION 370
PART III. BUSINESS REHABILITATION 371
PART IV. HOUSING REHABILITATION 371
PART V. AFTER-CARE 372
PART VI. THE AGED AND INFIRM 372
SOME LESSONS OF THE RELIEF SURVEY
What then are some of the lessons to be learned from this review of the
San Francisco relief work that may be applied in other great disasters?
PART I. ORGANIZATION AND THE EMERGENCY PERIOD
We see among other things:
1. The importance of postponing the appointment of sub-committees until
a strong central committee has been able to determine general policies
and methods of procedure.
2. The wisdom of reducing the bread line and the camp population as
quickly as possible after the disaster so that the relief resources may
be conserved to meet the primary need of rehabilitation.
3. The value of utilizing for emergency administration a body so highly
organized and so efficient as the United States Army, to take charge of
camps, and to bring to points of distribution the supplies required for
those in need of food and clothing.
4. The necessity of utilizing the centers of emergency distribution for
the later rehabilitation work of district committees and corps of
visitors.
5. The need of establishing a central bureau of information to serve
from the beginning of the relief work as a clearing house, to prevent
confusion and waste through duplication of effort.
6. The importance of legal incorporation for any relief organization
that has to deal with so large a disaster.
7. The importance of a strict audit of all relief in cash sent to a
relief organization. The impossibility of an equally strict accounting
for relief in kind, because of the many leaks and the difficulties
attendant upon hurried distribution.
8. The desirability that contributions, especially those in kind, shall
be sent without restrictions, as only the local organization is able to
measure relative needs at different periods of the work.
9. The recognition of the American National Red Cross, with its
permanent organization, its governmental status, and its direct
accountability to Congress for all expenditures, as the proper national
agency through which relief funds for great disasters should be
collected and administered; thus securing unity of effort, certainty of
policy, and a center about which all local relief agencies may rally.
PART II. REHABILITATION
We have to recognize:
1. The need, in at least the early stages of rehabilitation, of the
district system, in order to facilitate application and investigation
and to insure prompt committee action upon calls for assistance.
2. The need of a bureau of special relief from beginning to end of the
rehabilitation work in order to meet the emergent and minor requirements
of families and individuals without having to use the necessarily
complicated slow-moving machinery of the rehabilitation organization
itself.
3. The fact that even in a community where the residences of over half
of the population have changed and the business section has been
completely destroyed, it is possible to make individual investigations
of family wants such as will generally mean the adding of the judgment
of one outsider at least to that of the family.
We have to recognize further:
4. That the period of time elapsing between applications and grants will
not be greatly altered if, after the early stages of rehabilitation, a
centralized system is substituted for a district system.
5. That a flexible scheme of rehabilitation is furthered when no rigid
limit is fixed for an individual grant and deliberation is required in
each case where a grant of large amount is made.
6. That though rehabilitation may proceed generally along the line of
fortifying each family in one particular direction, as for instance, in
its business relations or housing accommodations, it will always be
necessary to provide a considerable proportion of the families with
subsidiary grants for other purposes.
7. That any centralized system which attempts to fix arbitrarily the
different types of cases with which different committees shall deal will
create a certain amount of confusion. If a centralized system seem
desirable, the question is whether the committees in the central office
should not have authority to consider cases according to geographical
divisions rather than according to typical classes of applicants.
PART III. BUSINESS REHABILITATION
We learn, and the fact deserves to stand apart:
That when grants are made for the re-establishment in business of
persons of little ability or experience, close supervision of plans and
expenditures by agents of the relief committee is necessary to secure
the best results.
PART IV. HOUSING REHABILITATION
We have to recognize:
1. That to provide but one form of housing rehabilitation is far from
satisfactory.
2. That in a general way the three forms provided in San Francisco met
the needs of the three general classes to be reached.
(a) With reference to the camp cottages it is too soon to say how
successful the experiment will ultimately be of giving cottages for
removal to other sites to those who may be classed as comparatively weak
in resourcefulness and character. It is certain, however, that the
permanent close grouping of the cottages in great numbers on open lots
is a danger to be guarded against.
(b) With reference to the grant and loan houses, though it seems that in
general the houses built by applicants were better than those built by
the housing committee for the applicants, it by no means follows that
direct grants of money if commonly adopted would always bring good
results. Individual capabilities must be one determining factor. As to
grants and loans, it may be said that a double standard is not
practicable. A grant on one house and a loan on its neighbor lead to
dissatisfaction and often failure on the part of the borrower to meet
his debt.
3. That because of the highly specialized business ability required, a
separate department of the relief organization should have charge of all
building and details of building.
4. That decisions upon housing applications and dealings with housing
applicants should be centered in a rehabilitation department.
PART V. AFTER-CARE
We are brought to see that:
1. The applications made to an emergency relief organization will not
include all who, as a result of the disaster, will eventually be obliged
to seek succor. It is demonstrated that some permanent agency must be
prepared to help those who, fighting heroically to the very end of their
resources, give up after the temporary relief organization has
discontinued active work.
2. The number of sufferers who need after-care may be increased by
families who have been attracted to the city by illusive expectations of
work.
3. The problems of family relief after a great disaster are essentially
those requiring the personal care and attention which are characteristic
of the work of an associated charities under normal conditions. The
number of families that have come to the San Francisco Associated
Charities in the years since the Corporation turned over the relief work
to it, has been far larger than before the fire. It follows that for
some years after so tremendous a disaster there should be an increase in
the force of trained workers proportionate to the increase in the
applications for rehabilitation. The community must be prepared to pay
the additional cost.
4. Grants of relief, when they must be given regularly and for a
considerable period (in the form that is often described as pensions),
should be sufficiently large to assure reasonable standards of living.
PART VI. THE AGED AND INFIRM
We see finally that:
1. A great disaster increases especially the number of the aged and
infirm who become public charges.
2. One of the tasks of delicate readjustment is to remove from the
almshouse the aged men and women who, merely through the rough chance
of a great catastrophe, are thrown with those whose lifelong habits and
disabilities lead to the almshouse.
3. A critical test of the quality of a community is how far the
responsibility for the aged, infirm, and handicapped who, save for the
disaster, would never have become dependent upon public relief, is
resumed by relatives, friends, or others who in the ordinary course of
events would have cared for them; how completely the standard of private
and family care for them shall be as though the disaster had never
occurred.
APPENDIX I
DOCUMENTS AND ORDERS
APPENDIX I
DOCUMENTS AND ORDERS
PAGE
1. List of Members Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross
Funds and Its Permanent Committees 377
2. General Orders No. 18 379
3. Extracts from The Army in the San Francisco Disaster. By
Brigadier General C. A. Devol 383
4. Letter from General Greely to James D. Phelan 387
5. Plan of the Executive Commission 391
6. Original Housing Plan 394
7. The Incorporation of the Funds 398
8. Appointment of Board of Trustees Relief and Red Cross Funds,
February, 1909 401
9. List of Official Camps 404
10. Grants to Charitable Organizations 405
A. By Denominations and Nature of Work 405
B. By Denominations 405
11. Rehabilitation Committee: Details of Administration 406
I. Directions given by the Associated Charities 406
II. Monthly budgets 408
III. Method of work beginning July 7, 1906, in connection
with the district [section] organization 408
IV. The centralized system 412
V. Consideration of cases out of turn 412
VI. A lesson learned regarding records 413
VII. Loose ends 415
VIII. Bookkeeping and registration notes 415
12. General Plan of Housing Committee 417
13. Statistics from Associated Charities 419
A. Receipts of San Francisco Associated Charities from all
sources, by months, from June, 1907, to September, 1912,
inclusive 419
B. Disbursements of San Francisco Associated Charities for
relief and for administration, by months, from June, 1907,
to September, 1912, inclusive 419
APPENDIX I
1
LIST OF MEMBERS FINANCE COMMITTEE OF RELIEF AND RED CROSS FUNDS AND ITS
PERMANENT COMMITTEES
FINANCE COMMITTEE
James D. Phelan, Chairman
J. Downey Harvey, Secretary
Rufus P. Jennings (elected Secretary in the beginning but resigned)
James L. Flood (resigned July 16)
Thomas Magee
M. H. de Young
W. F. Herrin
Herbert E. Law
William Babcock (resigned June 29)
I. W. Hellman, Jr. (appointed in place of I. W. Hellman)
Rudolph Spreckels (appointed in place of Claus Spreckels)
Charles Sutro, Jr.
Allan Pollok (appointed April 21)
Garret W. McEnerney, elected to membership April 24th
Frank G. Drum, elected to membership April 24th
Joseph S. Tobin, elected to membership April 24th in place of
R. J. Tobin
Elected April 24 to represent the California Branch of the Red Cross:
W. W. Morrow
John F. Merrill
Horace Davis
Appointed later:
F. S. Stratton, appointed April 30
F. W. Dohrmann, appointed June 29 on nomination of California Red
Cross to succeed John F. Merrill, resigned.
Charles S. Wheeler, appointed July 13 to succeed William Babcock,
resigned.
NOTE: At the meeting of April 30 Dr. E. E. Baker of Oakland was
appointed to Finance Committee to represent Governor Pardee, at the
latter’s request. Later in the same meeting it was arranged that, since
Dr. Baker’s duties prevented him from attending meetings, he should be
represented on the Finance Committee by F. S. Stratton. Mr. Stratton was
from that date on a member of the Finance Committee, representing both
the Governor and the Oakland Relief Committee.
SUB-COMMITTEES OF FINANCE COMMITTEE
_Committee of Supervision_ (appointed April 22)
Allan Pollok, Chairman
F. W. Van Sicklen
A. Haas
Wm. Cluff
J. Solomon
Nathan Bibo
R. B. Hale
L. P. Lowe
W. L. Harvey
D. Samuels
R. D. McElroy
Edward Heller
W. F. Williamson
_Purchasing Committee_ (also called Purchasing Agents, appointed April
26)
Allan Pollok
Edward T. Devine
_Auditing Committee_ (appointed May 7)
M. H. de Young, Chairman
Joseph S. Tobin
Frank G. Drum
_Committee on Hospitals_ (appointed May 9)
Edward T. Devine, Chairman
J. Downey Harvey
Allan Pollok
_Rehabilitation Committee_ (authorized May 5, appointed June 29)
Edward T. Devine, Chairman (succeeded Aug. 6 by Mr. Dohrmann).
Rev. D. O. Crowley, representing Archbishop Riordan
Rev. J. A. Emery, representing Bishop Nichols
Rabbi Jacob Voorsanger
O. K. Cushing (Treasurer)
F. W. Dohrmann (Chairman from Aug. 6 on)
Dr. John Gallwey
Later appointments made by the Executive Committee were
Ernest P. Bicknell, appointed July 31 to succeed Dr. Devine
C. F. Leege, appointed July 31 alternate for Mr. Dohrmann and on Nov.
2, member, to succeed Mr. Bicknell
Abraham Haas, appointed Nov. 2 to succeed Rabbi Voorsanger
Frank Miller, appointed Nov. 9 to serve during Mr. Dohrmann’s absence.
On Nov. 2 Mr. Dohrmann was granted leave of absence for 90 days and
Mr. Cushing was appointed Acting Chairman in his place
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION (OFFICIAL TERM OF OFFICE JULY 1 TO AUGUST 1, 1906)
Edward T. Devine, Chairman (appointed by the American National Red
Cross)
Edward F. Moran (appointed by the mayor)
George H. Pippy (appointed by the Finance Committee)
2
GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 18
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC DIVISION,
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., _April 29, 1906_.
I. In order to economically and efficiently perform the non-military
duties of distributing relief supplies, the City of San Francisco is
hereby divided into seven civil sections, as described in Paragraph XIV.
II. The following named officers are charged, generally, with
administrative duties, as follows:
1. Major Lea Febiger, Inspector General; in general charge of the
organization of relief stations, of their personnel, methods of
administration and requisitions. Headquarters: Hamilton School Building,
on Geary Street near Scott Street.
2. Major C. A. Devol, Depot Quartermaster; with all questions of
transportation, storage, and allied duties. Headquarters: Presidio
Wharf.
3. Major C. R. Krauthoff, Depot Commissary, with the commissary duties
in connection with providing food supplies and the filling of
requisitions approved by Major Febiger, Dr. Edward T. Devine, Special
Representative of the National Red Cross, or other duly authorized
agents or officials. Headquarters: Folsom Street Wharf.
4. An officer of the Army, not yet selected; with supplies other than
food, and the filling of requisitions for such supplies after approval
by Major Febiger, Dr. Devine, or other duly authorized official. Pending
his selection these duties will be performed by Major Devol.
Headquarters: Presidio Wharf.
5. Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Torney, M. D., U. S. A., has been placed in
charge of all sanitary work. He is charged with the proper organization
of sanitation, the formulation of regulations to carry out the proper
measures of safety against any danger from unsanitary conditions,
co-operating with the Health Commission of San Francisco.
6. Colonel W. H. Heuer, Corps of Engineers, is charged with all duties
relating to engineering problems connected with the work in hand and in
this connection will consult freely with the civil authorities in regard
to the water supply, sanitation and all other matters in which
engineering skill is required.
III. As far as practicable, all applications for relief, (whether for
food, clothing, tentage or bedding) will be made direct to, and the
administrative business connected therewith transacted directly with,
the officers above named. This will facilitate relief and centralize
data and action relative thereto. The officers named will, as far as
possible, transact their business with each other and with outside
applicants direct, that is, without reference to Division Headquarters,
the object being to insure an economical, efficient and prompt service
for the distressed and destitute.
IV. 1. As soon as practicable an officer of the Army, with assistants,
will be assigned to each of the seven sections enumerated, with the
view of co-ordinating the work, and introducing at the earliest moment
such methods as will prevent dishonesty or wastage, eliminate the
unworthy and impostors, and insure economical administration.
2. Wherever an officer of the Army is not available a responsible
civilian of the locality, designated by Dr. Devine, will be placed in
immediate charge of each relief station, and assisted in organizing a
proper personnel to carry on the work.
3. As soon as possible, rigid daily inspections will be made of every
relief station, and local regulations introduced with the view of
correcting abuses, neglects or mistakes. Relief stations will be reduced
in number and personnel limited to the smallest possible number
consistent with pressing demands.
4. The officer or person placed in immediate charge of each relief
station will be carefully instructed by the officer in charge of the
civil section to make his requests in duplicate, and those for food
supplies must be separate and distinct from those for clothing, bedding,
tentage, etc., because they must be filled from different supply
departments. All requests must be in duplicate, and submitted through
the officer in charge of the civil section to Major Febiger, at the
Hamilton School Building, on Geary Street near Scott. In case of
immediate need the requisition may be taken direct to Major Febiger.
V. It is expected and desired that commanders of military districts in
San Francisco, charged with guarding of public buildings and other
military duties, shall extend advice and, as far as practicable, needful
assistance in the interests of the non-military duties of relief.
VI. Charges of wastage, deception, theft and improper appropriation of
relief supplies have been freely made, and it is claimed that the food
supply in some cases is too lavish in quantity, and is being issued
without suitable discrimination. The period of extreme distress for food
has passed, and at the earliest possible moment the issue of rations
must be confined to helpless women and children, and refused to adult
males, unless they are sick or in feeble condition.
VII. For the information of Division Headquarters, a system of
inspection will be established through the Inspector General’s
Department, in order that the inspectors may be facilitated as much as
possible in gaining information giving a clear idea as to how the work
is going on. All officers connected with the distribution of supplies
will keep such memorandum records, aside from their regular records, as
will enable them to give to the inspectors a summary of the work being
done, the method pursued, and in general such information and
recommendation as they may have for improvements and economy.
VIII. The following permanent relief ration is fixed, the amount being
stated in allowance per ration or per 100 rations:
MEAT COMPONENTS.
10 oz. canned meat or salt meat or canned fish, or
14 oz. fresh meat to the ration.
BREAD COMPONENTS.
14 oz. fresh bread or 10 oz. hard bread, or crackers or
12 oz. flour to the ration.
COFFEE AND TEA.
1 lb. coffee to 15 rations or
1¹⁄₂ lbs. tea to 100 rations.
VEGETABLE COMPONENTS.
1¹⁄₂ oz. beans, peas, rice or hominy, to the ration.
³⁄₄ lb. fresh vegetables (80 per cent. potatoes, 20 per cent. onions)
to the ration.
DRIED FRUIT COMPONENT.
1 oz. dried fruit to the ration.
MISCELLANEOUS.
15 lbs. sugar to 100 rations.
3 quarts vinegar (or pickles) to 100 rations.
2 lbs. salt to 100 rations.
4 oz. pepper to 100 rations.
4 lbs. soap to 100 rations.
1¹⁄₂ lbs. candles to 100 rations.
It is recognized that exact conformity to articles herein mentioned is
at present impracticable. However, the ration, commencing at noon,
Tuesday, May 1, 1906, will be confined to the articles herein named, or
proper substitutes equivalent thereto.
IX. After May 1, 1906, no rations beyond the articles above named, or
their substitutes, will be issued from any relief station or district
under military control, except on the prescription or order of a
reputable physician or other competent authority. Issues of luxuries, or
articles of special diet must be confined to infants or invalids. Any
other course will speedily exhaust the very limited means of subsistence
now at the disposal of the Army and of the Finance Committee of Relief
and Red Cross Funds.
X. At the earliest practicable moment, each of the four officers charged
with the supervision of the work of distribution of supplies will report
approximate data from which the Division Commander can determine.
A. The amount of United States supplies actually received to date by
the Army and the amount in transit.
B. The total amount of all kinds of supplies (army relief and other
relief) actually received to date by the Army.
C. The total amounts issued daily to stations distributing food,
clothing, tentage, etc., under Army control.
D. Same for those not under army control in San Francisco.
E. Amounts issued to towns outside of San Francisco.
While present reports through lack of sufficient force and supervision,
cannot be exact, it is expected that they will as soon as possible be
reduced to the methods generally in vogue in the Army.
XI. Officers in charge of departments will submit a report as soon as
conditions permit, of the disbursements made, or indebtedness contracted
in carrying out the relief work by the Army. They will immediately
submit requisitions for necessary funds, giving the period which they
are expected to cover, such requisitions to be accompanied by notes
explaining the reason and necessity for such funds.
XII. Officers charged with these duties will be expected to make such
daily record as to enable them to make weekly, or when otherwise called
upon, a brief report of the work done, and when the civil authorities
resume the work to present a complete report covering their entire
operations.
XIII. Rigid economy is enjoined on every officer of the army engaged in
relief work. No indebtedness will be contracted without the authority of
one of the officers named in this order or the department or division
commanders. It is desired and directed that any unusual and abnormal
expense be reported verbally or in writing to the Division Commander so
that authority covering expenditures, apart from the necessary ones of
the employees, material and ordinary routine, may be specifically
authorized.
XIV. RELIEF SECTIONS[284]
[284] In General Circular, No. 1, May 1, 1906, Section 1 is defined as
the section in which relief stations are numbered between 1 and 100;
Section 2, between 200 and 300, and so on. This numbering was used
instead of that of General Orders No. 18.
1st Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between 1
and 100, is bounded as follows: On the south by Fulton street, on the
east by Devisadero street, on the north and west by San Francisco Bay,
and Pacific Ocean, including Presidio Reservation, but not including
Fort Miley reservation.
2nd Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
101 and 200 is bounded as follows: On the north by Fulton street, on the
east by Devisadero street and Castro street, on the south by 18th and L
streets, on the west by the Pacific Ocean.
3rd Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
201 and 300, is bounded as follows: On the north and east by San
Francisco Bay, on the south by Union street, on the west by Devisadero
street.
4th Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
301 and 400, is bounded as follows: On the north by Union street on the
east by the Bay, on the south by Market street, on the west by
Devisadero and Castro streets.
5th Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
401 and 500, is bounded as follows: On the north by Market street, on
the east by the Bay, on the south by 18th street, on the west by Castro
street.
6th Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
501 and 600, is bounded as follows: On the north by 18th street, on the
east by the Bay, on the south by the County Line, on the west by the
Southern Pacific Railroad.
7th Section wherein all official relief stations are numbered between
601 and 700, is bounded as follows: On the north by L and 18th street,
on the east by the Southern Pacific Railroad, on the south by the County
Line, on the west by the ocean.
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL GREELY:
S. P. JOCELYN,
_Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff_.
OFFICIAL:
W. G. HAAN,
_Captain, General Staff, Military Secretary_.
3
THE ARMY IN THE SAN FRANCISCO DISASTER[285]
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL C. A. DEVOL
[285] Extracts from article printed in the Journal of the United
States Infantry Association, Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 59-87.
At 7:45 on the morning of the disaster Companies C and D, Engineer
Corps, arrived from Fort Mason and were reported to the Mayor and Chief
of Police. They were directed by the former to guard the banking
district and send patrols along Market Street to prevent looting. At
8:00 a.m., the Presidio garrison, consisting of the 10th, 29th, 38th,
66th, 67th, 70th, and 105th Companies of Coast Artillery; Troops I and
K, 14th Cavalry; and the 1st, 9th and 24th Batteries of Field Artillery,
began to arrive.
The Headquarters and 1st Battalion 22d Infantry, were brought from Fort
McDowell by boat, arriving at 10:00 a.m., and were held for a time in
reserve at O’Farrell Street. They were later utilized as patrols and as
an assistance to the fire department. The Fort Miley troops, the 25th
and 64th Companies Coast Artillery, had a longer march and did not
arrive until 11:30 a.m.
Troops subsequently arrived in the city as follows:
April 19. Companies E and G, 22d Infantry, from Alcatraz Island;
Companies K and M, 22d Infantry, from the depot of recruits and casuals,
and the 32d, 61st and 68th Companies Coast Artillery, from Fort Baker;
April 21. Headquarters and two battalions 20th Infantry, from Presidio
of Monterey;
April 22. Headquarters and ten companies 14th Infantry, from Vancouver
Barracks;
April 23. The 17th and 18th Batteries Field Artillery from Vancouver
Barracks.
These troops were all stationed in the Pacific Division and were ordered
to San Francisco by the Division Commander. Troops arriving later by
orders from the War Department will be enumerated later. It is believed
the prompt appearance of the United States troops on the streets of the
city was an object lesson to the minds of the evil-disposed, reminding
them that the law of the land still existed with ready and powerful
means at hand to enforce it, and was of incalculable moral and material
benefit to the city.
General Funston moved into the Commanding General’s quarters at Fort
Mason, establishing both Division and Department Headquarters at that
point, and the Signal Corps immediately began to stretch wires for
telegraph communication to various points of importance in the city.
The entire force in the city finally consisted of 1 Major-General, 1
Brigadier-General, the 1st and 14th Regiments of Cavalry, the 10th,
25th, 27th, 29th, 32d, 38th, 60th, 61st, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th,
70th, and 105th Companies Coast Artillery; the 1st, 9th and 24th
Batteries Field Artillery; the 11th Battalion Field Artillery,
consisting of the 17th and 18th Mountain Batteries; the 10th, 11th,
14th, 20th and 22d Regiments of Infantry; Companies C and D, Corps of
Engineers; Companies A and B, Hospital Corps; Companies A, E and H,
Signal Corps, and 168 staff, detailed and retired officers, a grand
total of 6000 men and officers. To these men were added during the
earlier days a large force of the navy, a battalion of marines, and a
force of naval apprentices, also the force of the National Guard, State
of California.
Officers of the Quartermaster’s Department were stationed at Oakland
Pier, Point Richmond, the Santa Fe freight yard, Entries Nos. 1, 2, 3,
and 4, Quartermaster Depots Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Officers of the
Subsistence Department were stationed at the Food Depots, Nos. 1, 2, and
3. The various Quartermaster and Commissary Depots were connected by
wire with the office of the Depot Quartermaster, which had been
established in the Quartermaster Warehouse at the Presidio, and the
Commissary Depots connected with the office of the Depot Commissary,
which was established at Folsom street dock. Every arriving car was
checked up across the bay, either at Oakland Pier or Point Richmond.
Every lighter leaving for any of the entries was reported by wire to the
Depot Quartermaster with the car numbers and what entry consigned to.
The Depot Quartermaster could thus control the supply and balance the
arrivals at the different entries, wiring orders to deliver more or less
at the different points as occasion demanded. A dispatch boat was put in
service, making two trips daily to Oakland Pier. At each trip, yard car
slips giving complete list of cars with numbers and contents were
forwarded to the main office. These were abstracted as fast as they came
in and from this abstract acknowledgment of arrival was made to all
donating parties in the different parts of the country. This branch of
the work was most important, as Relief Committees in the various cities
and towns were always desirous of obtaining information which would
enable them to inform the people of their community that the stores had
arrived in San Francisco and had reached the suffering people. The
record also enabled satisfactory answers to be given to the hundreds of
inquiries by wire and mail from all over the country on this subject.
Every car load was finally accounted for and inquiries answered locating
stores, except in some cases of individual packages.
The Quartermaster-General had been asked by wire to have the number of
every car of military supplies reported to San Francisco by wire as soon
as it was dispatched. These instructions were promptly given, and this
advance information aided very greatly in preventing confusion.
The stores for the Presidio were delivered by river steamers acting as
lighters from cars at Oakland Pier. At Entry No. 2, or the three docks
above described, deliveries were from river steamers acting as lighters
and also from cars delivered alongside of the docks by floats. Entry No.
3 was by cars sent across the bay on floats and delivered at the 3d and
Townsend Railroad yard, which fortunately was not destroyed by fire. The
small amount of freight that arrived from the south also came into this
depot. Entry No. 4 was from the Santa Fe Railroad by float to the Spear
and Harrison freight depot. The steamships delivered at the three docks,
8, 10, and 12. It will thus be seen that there were four avenues through
which supplies could reach the city simultaneously, and by night as well
as by day.
Forty-five officers were detailed on arrival to take charge of various
stations throughout the city. Fifteen were ultimately detailed as
assistants to the Depot Quartermaster, and placed in charge of the
various entries and depots, as above stated. As the various stations
were established in all administrative departments, the Signal Corps
connected up the stations by wire with the main offices and Department
Headquarters. Operators were placed at all instruments and
communications by day and night established. During the first three days
issues were made from the quarter-master supplies in store at the four
depot warehouses at the Presidio, which amounted to 3,000 tents, 13,000
ponchos, 58,000 shoes, 24,000 shirts and other articles necessary to
relieve immediate suffering. This issue was made in the face of
necessity without any authority, but when reported was promptly approved
by the Secretary of War.
The Finance Committee asked that the army take over all transportation
in the city for all purposes for betterment of management in
systematizing under one head. The Division Commander directed the Depot
Quartermaster to take it over, and Captain Peter Murray, Quartermaster,
8th Infantry, was directed to report to him for that purpose. An office
for this part of the transportation was established at Hamilton School,
and in two days the number of hired teams for this part of the work was
cut down from 557 to 109.
The population of San Francisco had spread over the surrounding country,
refugees in large numbers going to San Jose, Oakland, Berkeley, Alameda
and Sausalito, and naturally the people in these outlying towns demanded
their proportionate share of relief. Officers were sent to the various
interested sections and remained in charge, the system being similar to
San Francisco. The distribution, however, of supplies over this enlarged
territory added considerably to the burden which relief workers were
already carrying.
The gradual evolution of a completed camp system had kept pace from day
to day with the growth of other relief work. As before stated, there
were on hand at the Depot Quartermaster’s storehouse for immediate issue
some 3,000 tents (common), and 12,000 shelter tents. This canvas placed
indiscriminately wherever ground was available initiated what grew into
a very complete system of camps. By the prompt action of the War
Department, tentage had been shipped by express from different depots in
the United States and soon became available, there being finally issued
some 25,000 tents, many of which were conical, and wall tents of large
capacity.
As fast as camps were established the outlying and scattered tents in
that vicinity were called in and placed systematically as a part of the
camp. Each camp was known by number and each tent was known by number.
On May 29, General Orders were issued, defining the camps, the total at
that time being twenty-one, eighteen of which were in San Francisco and
the other three in outlying cities. The sanitary arrangements varied in
regard to the different conditions. Eighteen camps were variously
scattered through Golden Gate Park, the Presidio Military Reservation,
what is known as Harbor View Flat, Fort Mason Military Reservation, and
the various other parts of the city. No restrictions were placed on the
inmates of these camps save those required by decency, order, and
cleanliness. If the occupants persistently refused to obey the rules to
meet the above requirements they were obliged to forego the benefits of
government canvas and relief stores.
4
LETTER FROM GENERAL GREELY TO JAMES D. PHELAN
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC DIVISION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
June 15, 1906.
Mr. James D. Phelan, Chairman,
Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross Funds,
Hamilton School, City.
Sir:--
1. I understand from the morning papers that a telegram signed by you
and Mayor Schmitz, has asked the retention of the Army on duty in San
Francisco for ninety days from July 1st.
2. I have seen Mayor Schmitz this morning and he concurs with me in
the belief that the relief of the Army on July 1st is in the public
interests, and after consideration of the opinions expressed by me in
this letter, I trust that the Finance Committee will agree in the
wisdom of withdrawing their request.
3. The spirit of American institutions is obviously adverse to the
quartering of troops in times of peace in large cities, which is in
this case supplemented by reasons of a practical and economic
character. From all sources, there is a consensus of opinion that the
service of the Army for relief purposes in San Francisco was of great
benefit to the city of San Francisco and the State of California. That
July 1st marks the date on which federal troops should cease to guard
stores, control camps, administer order and provide sanitation for
civilians quartered on city grounds or private property, is my
conviction.
4. Your attention is called to the fact that there are classes of
worthy citizens who in considerable numbers are now deprived of their
ordinary means of gaining a livelihood, either by lack of public funds
or from destruction of private business. Among these may be mentioned
firemen, policemen, school teachers and physicians.
5. Your attention is particularly called to the fact that a certain
number of such persons could be given temporary employment by the Red
Cross organization if the present guards and camp administrations of
the Army were withdrawn. In short, the officers and men of the Army
are now performing duties and rendering services which should be
performed and rendered by the destitute men in San Francisco. I submit
to your Committee whether it is advisable to favor a policy which thus
discriminates against civilian labor because the work of the Army is
done without expense to the Red Cross Funds.
6. If the Red Cross was not amply supplied with funds, there might
exist a necessity for free army labor but such is not the case. The
morning paper reports that Mr. Bartnett is favoring the immediate
distribution of the greater part of six million dollars now in the
possession of the Committee.
7. Of all the methods of relief that which most commends itself to me
from a careful consideration of this question, is that advanced by
Dr. E. T. Devine, and known under the general term of rehabilitation.
There is no better way of rehabilitating a man than by allowing him to
earn a living salary. In this case it can be conjoined with the care
and relief of the destitutes who are rapidly being reduced in number.
8. It has been unofficially advanced that the withdrawal of the Army
would involve conditions of disorder and that sanitary conditions
would not be as carefully observed as under strict military methods.
It is believed that the rigidly enforced methods of the Army cannot be
equalled by ordinary civilian control and it is also acknowledged that
the suggestion of a soldier with a gun is more potent in enforcing
order that the directions of a policeman with a club.
9. On the question of order and sanitation, experience has shown that
the people of San Francisco are self-respecting and desirous of
conforming to proper methods of life as regards the three important
points of order, decency and cleanliness. That this is a fact and not
an opinion, is shown by the conditions attending the 43,000 people now
under canvas in the City of San Francisco. Of this number 18,000 are
under military supervision, while 25,000 are scattered elsewhere
throughout the city. About 10,000 of these people have been
continually under military supervision and 8,000 more have lately been
taken in charge. It might be thought the 25,000 other people
supplemented by the 8,000 lately transferred, would in the past two
months have become centers of infectious diseases or the centers of
disorder and violence, which has not been the case as infectious
diseases have been sporadic and the conditions of order have been such
that as far as I know no murder has been committed and only one or two
assaults have been made.
10. It appears to me that the time has arrived when some definite plan
of organization should be formulated. At present no one connected with
the Red Cross has any power to act, not even Dr. Devine, save as to
certain expenditures for rehabilitation which in limited amounts have
been appropriated.
11. To illustrate a practical method of handling this question, a
definite line of organization is herewith suggested. It is worse than
useless to expect that the interests of the tens of thousands of
people and sums of money running into the millions can be economically
and efficiently administered by men giving such part of their time as
remains after transacting their own business, to the questions of
relief. There must be not only a paid personnel but to obtain men of
character, efficiency and skill, they must be well compensated.
12. The Finance Committee should allow no money to be spent except on
estimates which should be submitted monthly in advance so that they
may be properly discussed by the Finance Committee before paying the
money. Emergencies can be met by allowing a small sum for each
particular department for contingent expenses. It is believed that the
duties of the Finance Committee should be confined to questions of
policy and considering of estimates and authorizing them formally.
13. The executive work should be done by three men who should receive
a salary of not less than $5,000 per year. One member should be a
special representative of the Red Cross and as Dr. Devine would
probably not remain many months and his services are needed as an
advisory to the Finance Committee, it is suggested that some one be
named by Dr. Devine if he will not serve himself. The second member
should be named by the Mayor of San Francisco and the third should be
selected by the Finance Committee from individuals familiar with the
industrial, commercial and business interests of San Francisco. This
committee should divide the duties between themselves.
14. Supplies should be centralized and should be in charge of a
carefully selected man to receive $10.00 per day, with an assistant
who should receive $5.00 per day. This official should under no
circumstances have anything to do with the purchase of supplies but
only be responsible for their receipt, care, and issue.
15. Each camp should be placed under a very carefully selected officer
of the Fire or Police Department who is on furlough; preferably to be
Captains and Lieutenants of the Fire Department and Captains,
Lieutenants and Sergeants of the Police Department, and should be paid
according to the size and importance of the camp. The familiarity of
these men with the people of San Francisco and their habits of
authority should enable them to properly supervise these camps, which
naturally would be under the general direction of one of the three
executive members of the committee. The present surgeons should be
replaced by doctors of executive ability and standing of which it is
understood that there are many without practice. There should be about
one doctor to each seven hundred persons and their pay should be from
$3.50 to $5.00 per day.
16. At places where guards are necessary, civilian watchmen, drawn
largely from furloughed policemen and firemen and male school
teachers, should be placed in charge. It might be added that wherever
opportunity for women’s work offers, it should be given to school
teachers of standing now on furlough.
17. All expenses of sanitation and policing of these camps should be
at the expense of the Red Cross. While they would be naturally
subjected to inspection from time to time by the sanitary officers of
the city yet such officers would, it is believed, not interfere unduly
with the arrangements in these camps. There should be special police
officers on duty at night at the larger camps, these also to be paid
employees.
18. In short, an organized, well selected and properly paid personnel
is indispensable to the successful handling of the relief work.
19. Supplementary to the executive committee, there should be an agent
charged with the rehabilitation work, acting under the special
direction of Dr. Devine or his successor. The policy regarding
rehabilitation should be liberal and a very considerable sum should be
set aside therefor subject to distribution as Dr. Devine or his
successor might direct.
20. Briefly this letter looks to action and organization, which cannot
progress satisfactorily while the Army is conducting independently a
part of this work. There are large sums of money on hand and the
public naturally has a right to demand results.
21. Valuable time is being lost as regards questions of shelter and
rehabilitation through lack of suitable organization.
22. The Committee will think perhaps that I have expressed myself
very forcibly in this matter, but my great interest in the adoption of
the best and speediest means of restoring normal conditions in San
Francisco and in the relief of its destitute, will, I hope, be viewed
as excuses for my speaking freely and fully, and offering definite
advice relative to the work in hand.
23. In view of the great importance of the interest the municipality
has in this work, I have furnished a copy of this letter to his Honor,
Mayor E. E. Schmitz.
24. May I then express the hope that the Finance Committee will agree
with me that the Army will be withdrawn on July 1st.
25. I may add that should the services of say half a dozen officers be
needed in the way of advice and aid during July, I should be glad to
take steps looking to their detail provided the Secretary of War
approves which I believe he will.
Very respectfully,
A. W. Greely,
Major General, Commanding
5
PLAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION[286]
Submitted to the Finance Committee, Relief and Red Cross Funds, June 26,
1906
[286] See Part I, p. 20.
The work to be undertaken will naturally fall into eight main
departments.
I. MANAGEMENT AND SANITATION OF CAMPS. The camps are of four classes:
1. Military Camps on military reservations. These will continue under
the supervision of the military authorities and our only relation to
them will be to furnish any necessary food, clothing or other relief,
and to arrange for the eventual removal of any who are not able to make
their own arrangements.
2. Military camps in public parks and squares. The problem in these
camps is to provide superintendence, sanitation, policing and labor,
which are now supplied by the Army. The present organization should be
continued, the pay-roll being transferred but the personnel so far as
possible being retained from the commanding officer of camps down.
Estimates for the expense of conducting these camps for the month of
July have been supplied to the Finance Committee by General Greely and
appropriations in accordance therewith are recommended.
3. Camps in public squares or on other city property not under military
control. These camps should be immediately incorporated into the system
which now prevails in the military camps. The co-operation of the Park
Department, the Health Department, and the Police Department will be
essential, but we are informed by the Mayor that the expense of
sanitation and policing which has heretofore been borne by the Army will
have to be met from the Relief Fund and probably the same is true of the
non-military camps which will become a part of the same system.
4. Camps and straggling shacks and tents on private property. The
Commission will have no authority to interfere with persons living
either in tents or in temporary dwellings on private ground, but the
giving of any relief to such persons may be made subject to any
conditions which are considered necessary, and the intervention of the
Health Board may be asked whenever there are insanitary conditions.
II. WAREHOUSES. After July 1st, there will be only two warehouses, one
in the Moulder School, for provisions and the other, now in the Crocker
School, and about to be removed to the new warehouse, Geary and Gough
Sts., construction of which has been authorized by the Finance
Committee, for clothing and other relief supplies. It is expected that
the present management of these two warehouses can be continued, the
military officers now in charge being given leave for this purpose and
engaged by the Commission. In this event the officers, as
superintendents of the warehouses, will probably be made purchasing
agents of the Commission for the kind of goods of which they
respectively have charge.
III. HOT MEAL RESTAURANTS. There are now some 27 hot meal restaurants,
on which 10 cent and 15 cent tickets are issued by the Red Cross in the
several sections, to be redeemed by the Finance Committee. As these
restaurants are located in camps any necessary supervision of their
management and sanitation so long as they are continued may safely be
entrusted to the superintendent of camps and to those who are in charge
of the several camps under his direction. The Commission should assume
responsibility for the issuing of tickets and certifying the bills of
the contractors to the Finance Committee.
IV. SECTION ORGANIZATION. The civilian chairmen of the seven sections,
in addition to their duties in the distribution of food and clothing in
the relief stations have succeeded to the duties of the military chiefs
of sections, and they should be responsible to the Commission until
relieved, which cannot probably be earlier than the end of July. These
chairmen have given their entire time to this work since May 1st and
they should be paid for their services. They should be held responsible
in the immediate future for the distribution of clothing, meal tickets
and other relief and for the second registration which is now in
progress and which will bring to the Commission a large number of cases
in which gifts of money or its equivalent are required.
V. HOSPITALS. The care of the indigent sick has thus far been in part in
emergency hospitals maintained as a part of the camp system, and in part
in private hospitals on a per capita basis--payment being made to the
hospitals for each patient who is accepted as a proper charge on the
relief fund. It is desirable that the present plan be continued, under
the supervision of the Commission, the medical executor who has been
engaged by the Hospital Committee remaining in charge and supervising
the emergency hospitals in camps as well as the care in private
hospitals, of which the expense is met from the Relief Fund.
VI. SPECIAL RELIEF. This is now one of the most important parts of the
work to be done by the Commission. It includes all aid given to
individuals or families other than food or ordinary clothing. Its
key-note is rehabilitation. Its object is to enable those who are now
dependent on the relief stations, or whose means of livelihood have been
destroyed, to become self-supporting. The means employed are the
furnishing of tools, furniture, sewing machines or other things,
transportation to other places, or loan, as may be indicated by the
investigation in each instance. The Finance Committee has thus far
advanced $15,000.00 for experimental work in this direction. About 500
applications have been passed upon, and checks have already been drawn
and await signature, for over $3,000.00 in excess of the amount
appropriated. It is recommended that an additional appropriation for
this purpose be made at once. An advisory committee of 5 or 7 members
will be appointed in connection with this work.
VII. LOANS. The Commission has under consideration the advisability of
opening a department of loans on
1. Pledges, such as are ordinarily deposited in pawn-shops.
2. Real estate mortgage for the erection of homes.
3. Chattel mortgage on furniture, etc., and
4. Personal endorsement.
Such a department or departments would be of great service to persons
who do not wish to accept charity and who are still not in position
unaided to build, furnish their homes or get started in business.
Especially is this true on account of the delay and uncertainty in the
payment of insurance claims. The Commission is not yet prepared to make
a definite recommendation on this subject, and it is named only as one
of the departments of work which it may be desirable to undertake in the
near future.
VIII. HOUSING. The question of shelter appears to the Commission to be
the one of paramount importance--so important indeed as to require not
only further consideration by the Commission itself and by the Finance
Committee, but also the co-operation of a strong board of consulting
architects and builders who would doubtless be willing to assist the
Commission in this capacity without compensation. Estimates are before
the Commission for the construction of temporary dwellings of from
$200.00 to $400.00 each. His Honor, Mayor Schmitz, has expressed the
opinion to the Commission that instead of constructing such temporary
buildings efforts should be made to provide before the winter season a
sufficient number of permanent homes of an attractive character for all
who need to be housed. The Commission is inclined to accept this view
although it is admitted that some additional temporary barracks may be
found necessary if by September 1st, it appears that there will be a
shortage of permanent housing accommodations.
If the Finance Committee decides that it will be advisable that
$1,000,000.00 or some such amount be invested in acquiring land and
erecting homes to be rented and sold on reasonable terms of monthly
payment, it is probable that this sum can be greatly augmented by
investment from private parties, if for any reason the Government
deposits are not found to be available for this purpose. The business
can be so conducted as to pay a reasonable return on such investment and
still make the dwellings of moderate cost to the renter and purchaser.
FINANCES. It is understood by the Commission that complete financial
control remains with the Finance Committee as was suggested by General
Greely in his letter of June 15 to the Finance Committee. All work
undertaken by the Commission will be on estimates and plans submitted in
advance to the Finance Committee. All bills will be audited and paid by
the Finance Committee. The Commission will make only such purchases and
contracts and engage such employees as have been authorized by the
Finance Committee, and the certificate of the duly authorized officers
and agents of the Commission would become a warrant for payment when
found to be in accordance with the action of the Finance Committee.
Certified copies of resolutions authorizing given lines of work should
be supplied by the Finance Committee to the Commission. On the other
hand, to fix responsibility and prevent confusion, all executive work,
both for relief and for rehabilitation, should devolve upon the
Commission, which should be held responsible for initiating relief
measures, presenting them to the Finance Committee and subsequently
carrying them into effect.
6
ORIGINAL HOUSING PLAN
Recommendations Submitted to Finance Committee, July, 1906
San Francisco, Cal., July 10, 1906.
James D. Phelan, Esq.,
Chairman Finance Committee.
Sir:--
The Finance Committee at its last meeting referred to the Rehabilitation
Committee for consideration and report a proposition made in the Finance
Committee by Mr. M. H. de Young that a donation be made to any
workingman owning a lot in the burnt district of one-third of the value
of the dwelling to be erected on it, this donation however, not to
exceed in any case the sum of five hundred dollars, and to be paid, not
to the lot owner, but to the contractor who builds the house when it is
completed and clear of liens.
The Executive Commission has had under consideration various plans for
acquiring tracts of land and building homes for sale or rental, one such
plan having been referred to the Commission by the Finance Committee at
its last meeting. The Executive Commission has also appointed, with the
knowledge and approval of the Finance Committee, a consulting board of
architects and builders who have placed their services at our disposal
without compensation, both for expert counsel on general plans and for
the making of suitable designs for dwellings which might be built by the
Commission, or by individual lot owners.
Under these circumstances, both the Executive Commission and the
Rehabilitation Committee have given careful consideration to this
subject, and have held informal joint sessions in order that any
recommendations made by this Committee might have the endorsement of
both bodies, and might, if possible, be such as to secure the immediate
favorable consideration of the Finance Committee. It is agreed on all
sides that no time is to be lost if houses are to be made available
before the winter season, and before the tents which are now in use are
so dilapidated as to be uninhabitable.
The Rehabilitation Committee recommends the acceptance of the principle
that workingmen and others of moderate means whose homes were destroyed
by fire, who own lots in the burnt district, and who cannot obtain from
banks, building and loan associations or other societies enough to
rebuild without assistance, should be aided in rebuilding by a donation
or loan from the relief fund. This policy involves no new action by the
Finance Committee except the appropriation from time to time of such
sums as may be required by the Rehabilitation Committee to carry it into
effect. It is exactly in line with the work which that Committee was
created to undertake. This Committee is therefore already endeavoring to
ascertain how many applications are likely to be made for such donations
or loans, and devising such safeguards as will protect the operation of
the plan from the obvious abuses to which it might be subjected. If
there are any conditions of such grants which the Finance Committee, or
its members, would consider it desirable to call to our attention, it is
suggested that this be done at the earliest possible moment; and if the
Finance Committee disapproves the plan, that of course, should be
indicated before any further steps are taken. As soon as the information
is available, an estimate will be presented to the Finance Committee as
to the amount of money which is required to carry this policy into
effect. We consider it doubtful whether this plan, of itself, will go
very far towards providing shelter for the families now in tents, but
the time which has elapsed since the plan was proposed has not been
sufficient to enable us to secure accurate information on this subject.
The Executive Commission on July 9th held a conference with the
consulting Board of Architects and Builders, at which the Chairman of
the Finance Committee, the Mayor, and some of the members of the
Rehabilitation Committee were present, and the whole subject was
exhaustively considered. The conclusion reached was that no one plan had
been suggested which would completely solve the problem of housing the
homeless families, but that immediate action is desirable in the
following directions:
I. The first necessity is the shelter of those who are entirely
dependent. We recommend for this purpose the erection on city property
of an attractive permanent building or buildings on the cottage pavilion
plan for the care of aged and infirm persons, chronic invalids and other
adult dependent persons for whom it is not so much a question of
rehabilitation as of permanent maintenance. We recommend that such
building or buildings to be erected from the relief fund be large enough
to accommodate one thousand men and women, and that the maintenance of
the institution after it is erected be left to the municipality.
Alternative plans would be to care for these aged and infirm persons in
existing private institutions, on a per capita weekly basis similar to
that on which patients are now cared for in private hospitals, or to
make an allowance in the nature of a pension for their care, in private
families. We believe that the erection of a special pavilion would be
more economical and that it has the indirect advantage of enabling the
city to secure an attractive modern public home for aged and infirm
persons. The plan suggested, supplemented by the policy now in force of
caring for the indigent sick in hospitals and the ordinary operation of
the established charitable agencies of the city, will, it is believed,
adequately and humanely shelter those who are actually destitute, and
who, from lack of any earning capacity, must remain entirely dependent
upon public relief.
II. The next and more serious problem is the supply of dwellings for
families who ordinarily pay a moderate rental, who do not own land and
have no considerable savings, but who are in receipt of ordinary wages.
There are probably five thousand families now in tents or other
temporary shelter who are in this position. Possibly, if those who are
temporarily out of the city and who desire to return are included, this
number may be ten thousand. No accurate estimate is possible for the
reason that there is no information available as to what number have
already permanently removed to suburban towns, what number has been
absorbed in existing homes by the doubling up process, and what number
will build for themselves. What is certain, however, is that no real
beginning has yet been made by private enterprise or otherwise in the
erection of dwellings for the five thousand families of which we do have
knowledge, although nearly half of the long summer season, which,
fortunately, lay between the disaster of April and the winter season,
has already elapsed. It was, therefore, the unanimous conclusion of the
conference, and it is the official recommendation of the Relief
Commission that in addition to all that is done for individuals through
the Rehabilitation Committee some considerable contribution to the
supply of homes should be made directly from the Relief and Red Cross
Funds, either by financial assistance to private individuals or
corporations in building on a large scale, suitable dwellings, on
satisfactory terms; or by the creation for this particular purpose of an
incorporated body, which can make contracts and enforce legal
obligations. It is, therefore, recommended: that unless the alternative
suggested can be made immediately effective, eleven or more persons,
including the Mayor, the Chairman of the Finance Committee and suitable
representation of the National Red Cross, the Executive Commission and
the Rehabilitation Committee, be designated by the Finance Committee to
form a corporation under the laws of this State relating to corporations
not for profit, that not less than one million dollars be subscribed by
the Finance Committee as capital or as a permanent loan to this
corporation; that the homes thus provided be sold on a monthly
installment plan to families who were living in San Francisco on April
17th, and rented to those who are unable to purchase; that all income
from rentals and sales after meeting necessary expenses be invested in
the building of other houses, or for such other public philanthropic
objects as may be decided upon by the corporation with the consent of
the Finance Committee. After one year it might be found practicable and
desirable for the corporation thus formed to sell its remaining property
and interests to Savings Banks or otherwise, and to dispose of the
entire sum thus obtained for the relief of those who were still at that
time in any way in distress through the disaster, or if there were no
such distress, then for some public purpose which might be decided upon.
The essential thing at this time is that, at the earliest possible
moment some of the funds which are now lying idle in the treasury of the
Finance Committee, shall be put at work providing homes for the working
people of the community. The plan which we have recommended is proposed,
first, as a relief measure because the tents will not provide proper
shelter after October; second, as a measure of public policy, because,
in the interests of the community it is not desirable that San Francisco
shall lose her present population of working people merely because there
are not dwellings to be rented or bought; third, also as a measure of
public policy, because it is desirable that workingmen shall have the
opportunity to own their homes, and this opportunity is now afforded,
not on a charitable, but on a reasonable and just business basis; and,
finally, because the intelligent and efficient carrying out of the plan
proposed will enable the community to set a standard of attractive,
sanitary, safe, and yet comparatively inexpensive dwellings which will
have a beneficial effect not only in the immediate future, but for the
coming generation. The co-operation of the municipal administration in
enforcing suitable conditions as to sanitation, light, ventilation, fire
protection, etc., of the architects in making plans for convenient and
attractive homes at moderate cost, of the building trades in getting
these homes built, and of the Finance Committee in advancing capital and
creating a corporation which will ensure the purchasers against fraud or
injustice, will solve the housing problem and nothing less than this
co-operation will solve it.
In closing this report, however, the Rehabilitation Committee and the
Relief Commission alike wish to emphasize the fact that there is no
intention that the relief fund shall become a providence of the
refugees, solving all their difficulties and relieving them of all
individual responsibility. On the contrary, it is confidently expected
that each family will to the greatest possible extent solve its own
problems, find its own capital, decide on the plans for its own home,
discharge its obligations for any money advanced as soon as practicable,
and that if these recommendations are adopted the entire business will
be so conducted by the Rehabilitation Committee, the Executive
Commission and the corporation formed for the purpose of acquiring land
and building homes, as to preserve in full integrity the fundamental
traits of American character, individual initiative and personal
responsibility.
Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Executive Commission and the
Rehabilitation Committee.
Edward T. Devine,
Chairman.
7
THE INCORPORATION OF THE FUNDS
SAN FRANCISCO RELIEF AND RED CROSS FUNDS, A CORPORATION
(Incorporated July 20, 1906)
MEMBERS AND DIRECTORS
James D. Phelan, President
F. W. Dohrmann, First Vice President
W. F. Herrin, Second Vice President
J. Downey Harvey, Secretary
Horace Davis
Frank G. Drum (resigned Aug. 21, 1906, resignation accepted Feb. 26,
1907)
I. W. Hellman, Jr.
W. F. Herrin
Rufus P. Jennings
Herbert E. Law
Thomas Magee
Garret W. McEnerney
Judge W. W. Morrow
Allan Pollok
Rudolph Spreckels
F. S. Stratton
Charles Sutro, Jr.
Joseph S. Tobin
Charles S. Wheeler
Ex Officio, the Governor of California
Ex Officio, the Mayor of San Francisco
Changes made later:
O. K. Cushing, elected member and director April 16, 1907, to succeed
Mr. Drum.
Edward T. Devine, elected member July 27, 1906.
The plan of organization adopted by the Executive Committee of the
Corporation for conducting the five departments into which it divided
its work was as follows:
DEPARTMENT A. FINANCE AND PUBLICITY
This department shall be in charge of the President or Acting President
of the Corporation. It shall comprise all matters pertaining to
Finances of the Corporation.
The donations made or promised to the Corporation.
The custody of funds on hand.
The General Office.
The Bureau of History.
All publications issued or made by this Corporation.
All Information to be given to the Press shall emanate from this
Department or shall be submitted for approval to this Department before
being printed except that each Chairman of the Department may transmit
information concerning the work contemplated or done in his Department
to the Press.
All automobiles except when assigned to their Departments, shall be in
the custody and under the direction of this Department.
The Staff of this Department shall consist of the Secretaries and
stenographers at large.
Accountants and Employees of the General Office.
The Janitors, door-keepers and messengers of the Office Building.
The Chauffeurs of the automobiles not assigned to other Departments.
The Committee and employees connected with the History Committee.
Any other employees for general work except those of the other
Departments.
DEPARTMENT B. BILLS AND DEMANDS
This Department shall be in charge of Chairman, M. H. de Young. It shall
comprise all matters pertaining to bills and demands against this
Corporation.
Staff of this Department shall be the employees required for the
examination of all bills and demands to be passed upon by this
Department.
DEPARTMENT C. CAMPS AND WAREHOUSES
This department shall be in charge of Chairman Rudolph Spreckels. It
shall comprise all matters pertaining to:
Camp and camp supplies.
Sanitary matters connected with camps.
Outside warehouses and contents of same.
The staff of this department shall be employees of the office of this
department, the Superintendent, officers and assistants and employees in
charge of or connected with camps; Officers and employees in charge of
or connected with Warehouses.
DEPARTMENT D. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
This Department shall be in charge of Chairman F. W. Dohrmann. It shall
comprise all matters pertaining to the business of the Special
Rehabilitation Committee appointed by this Corporation.
Of all applications for donations, relief and assistance not regularly
referred to the Special Rehabilitation Committee.
Of all matters connected with patients placed in hospitals on account of
this Corporation.
The Staff of this Department shall be:
The office employees required in addition to the staff of the Special
Rehabilitation Committee.
DEPARTMENT E. LANDS AND BUILDINGS
This Department shall be in charge of Chairman Thomas Magee. It shall
comprise all matters pertaining to the erecting of a municipal home for
the indigent and aged.
The erecting of temporary buildings for housing the refugees.
The granting of bonus for the building of individual homes.
The buying of land and erecting buildings on same to be rented or sold
on installments.
The collection of rent or payments for buildings rented or sold.
Any other provisions or plans for acquiring land, erection of buildings
and the providing of homes for families.
The Staff of this Department shall be: