│ │ │

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page

│ │ │

│Charter of the International Military │ │

│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5

│International Military Tribunal, │ │

│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │

│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 64

│ ———— │ │

│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │

│document indicates that the document │ │

│was received in evidence at the │ │

│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │

│before a document number indicates │ │

│that the document was referred to │ │

│during the trial but was not formally │ │

│received in evidence, for the reason │ │

│given in parentheses following the │ │

│description of the document. The USA │ │

│series number, given in parentheses │ │

│following the description of the │ │

│document, is the official exhibit │ │

│number assigned by the court. │ │

│ ———— │ │

*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │

│picture composed of captured German │ │

│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801

│ │ │

D-62 │Letter from Inspector of War │ │

│Production to Krupp, 21 January 1937. │ VI │ 1028

│ │ │

D-63 │Declaration of political attitude by │ │

│Krupp, 6 February 1937. │ VI │ 1029

│ │ │

D-64 │Letter to Krupp, 3 December 1941, │ │

│enclosing extracts from draft of │ │

│article entitled “Works Leader and │ │

│Armaments Works”, 5 April 1941. │ VI │ 1030

│ │ │

D-66 │Presentation certificate, 7 August │ │

│1940, concerning granting to Krupp of │ │

│Shield of the Eagle of German Reich. │ VI │ 1034

│ │ │

D-88 │Correspondence between Krupp and │ │

│Raeder, 7 and 10 August 1935. │ VI │ 1042

│ │ │

D-94 │Article by Krupp, Manager and Armament│ │

│Worker, from 1 March 1942 issue of │ │

│Krupp magazine. │ VI │ 1043

│ │ │

D-96 │Memorandum on establishment of an │ │

│experimental Tank Factory by the │ │

│Grusonwerk, 21 February 1944. │ VI │ 1047

│ │ │

D-99 │Letter from Krupp to Bormann, 11 │ │

│November 1942. │ VI │ 1048

│ │ │

D-101 │Letter from Bormann to Krupp, 21 │ │

│November 1942. │ VI │ 1050

│ │ │

D-106 │Letter from Krupp to Lammers, 24 │ │

│February 1943. │ VI │ 1050

│ │ │

D-120 │Fuehrer decree on family enterprise of│ │

│the firm Friedrich Krupp. │ VI │ 1051

│ │ │

D-124 │Letter from Lammers to Krupp, 16 │ │

│November 1943. │ VI │ 1053

│ │ │

D-131 │Hitler decree of 21 December 1943, │ │

│approving family enterprise of Krupp. │ VI │ 1054

│ │ │

D-135 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 29 │ │

│December 1943. │ VI │ 1054

│ │ │

D-143 │List of barracks and beds in workers │ │

│Hostels and PW camps of Friedrich │ │

│Krupp A.G., and covering letter of 30 │ │

│June 1942. │ VI │ 1058

│ │ │

*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │

│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │

│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060

│ │ │

D-152 │Memorandum by Pfirsrch on the │ │

│conference at Federal Ministry for │ │

│National Defense in Vienna, 28 │ │

│September 1936. │ VI │ 1062

│ │ │

D-154 │Memorandum, 23 June 1937, in files of │ │

│Friedrich Krupp A.G. concerning order │ │

│for armor plating from Bulgaria. │ VI │ 1062

│ │ │

*D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │

│1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063

│ │ │

D-158 │Letter from Rosenberg to Krupp, 26 │ │

│April 1933. │ VI │ 1066

│ │ │

*D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │

│concerning exchange of intelligence │ │

│involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069

│ │ │

D-170 │Notes of 8 May 1939 by Sonnenberg on │ │

│conference in Berlin concerning │ │

│foreign anti-aircraft guns. │ VI │ 1072

│ │ │

D-191 │Memorandum on reconstruction of │ │

│Krupp’s after war 1914-1918 with │ │

│special reference to armaments │ │

│exports, 25 March 1941. │ VI │ 1076

│ │ │

D-196 │Memoranda by Dr. Lehman concerning │ │

│recruiting of French workers. │ VI │ 1078

│ │ │

D-201 │Telegram from Goering to Krupp. │ VI │ 1080

│ │ │

*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │

│industry before the election of March │ │

│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080

│ │ │

*D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning │ │

│political organization of state and │ │

│economy, 22 February 1933. (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085

│ │ │

*D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │

│distribution of propaganda abroad │ │

│through foreign connections of Krupp │ │

│firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085

│ │ │

D-208 │Letter from Krupp to Springorum, 26 │ │

│April 1933. │ VI │ 1087

│ │ │

*D-230 │Instruction for issuing steel switches│ │

│to Krupp camps, 3 January 1945. (USA │ │

│898) │ VI │ 1094

│ │ │

D-233 │Memorandum, 17 October 1944, │ │

│concerning working hours for foreign │ │

│workers. │ VI │ 1095

│ │ │

D-238 │Memorandum by Trockel, 28 July 1944, │ │

│concerning assignation of detainees. │ VI │ 1095

│ │ │

D-242 │Letter from Springorum to Krupp │ │

│concerning contribution of 20,000 │ │

│marks to Rosenberg. │ VI │ 1097

│ │ │

D-249 │Von Bulow memorandum on notes of │ │

│conference with Grassmann, Fuss and │ │

│Kraft, held 9 December 1942, │ │

│concerning History of War Economy. │ VI │ 1098

│ │ │

D-253 │Affidavit of Peter Gutersohn, 3 │ │

│October 1945. │ VI │ 1105

│ │ │

D-256 │Affidavit of Rene Koenigsberg and │ │

│Agnes Koenigsberg, 20 September 1945. │ VI │ 1107

│ │ │

D-265 │Affidavit of Heinrich Ruhnau, 3 │ │

│October 1945. │ VI │ 1108

│ │ │

D-267 │Affidavit of Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl │ │

│Hanke, Johann Berek, 27 September │ │

│1945. │ VI │ 1109

│ │ │

D-270 │Memorandum, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │

│employment of foreign workers. │ VI │ 1110

│ │ │

D-271 │Memorandum from Wiele to Ihn, 20 │ │

│October 1942. │ VI │ 1110

│ │ │

D-272 │Affidavit of Elizabeth and Ernestin │ │

│Roth, 21 September 1945. │ VI │ 1111

│ │ │

D-274 │Statement by Ihn, 1 October 1945. │ VI │ 1112

│ │ │

D-277 │Affidavit of Rosa Katz, 21 September │ │

│1945. │ VI │ 1115

│ │ │

D-278 │Memorandum from Works Catering │ │

│Department to Dr. Lehmann, Employment │ │

│Office, 19 March 1942. │ VI │ 1116

│ │ │

D-279 │Affidavit of Alexander Haverkarte, 1 │ │

│October 1945. │ VI │ 1116

│ │ │

D-280 │Secret memorandum, 17 June 1942, │ │

│concerning need for and obtaining of │ │

│workers for cast steel works. │ VI │ 1117

│ │ │

D-281 │Memorandum by Winhold, 13 July 1942, │ │

│concerning urgent production A.Z. 23 │ │

│(Pr). │ VI │ 1119

│ │ │

*D-283 │Report by Krupp hospitals, 7 May 1943,│ │

│concerning deaths of Eastern Workers. │ │

│(USA 899) │ VII │ 1

│ │ │

D-287 │Letter from Krupp to Raeder, 30 │ │

│October 1942. │ VII │ 1

│ │ │

*D-288 │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 │ │

│October 1945. (USA 202) │ VII │ 2

│ │ │

D-291 │Speech by Krupp, 1 May 1936. │ VII │ 7

│ │ │

D-297 │Memorandum from Theile to Hupe, 26 │ │

│March 1942, concerning employment of │ │

│Russian PWs and civilians. │ VII │ 9

│ │ │

D-298 │Affidavit by Dr. Georg Wolff and │ │

│chart, “Fried. Krupp Berthawerk, │ │

│Markstaedt Breslau, Number of Occupied│ │

│Foreigners, Prisoners of War and │ │

│Concentration Camp Inmates”. │ VII │ 10

│ │ │

D-304 │Krupp speech, 13 October 1938. │ VII │ 12

│ │ │

D-305 │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 │ │

│October 1945. │ VII │ 13

│ │ │

D-306 │Affidavit of August Kleinschmidt, 11 │ │

│October 1945. │ VII │ 14

│ │ │

D-310 │Memorandum from Grollius to Kolsch, 18│ │

│March 1942. │ VII │ 15

│ │ │

D-312 │Affidavit of Karl Sehnbruch, 11 │ │

│October 1945. │ VII │ 16

│ │ │

*D-313 │Affidavit by Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, │ │

│October 1945. (USA 901) │ VII │ 18

│ │ │

D-316 │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│ │

│concerning employment of Russians. │ │

│(USA 201) │ VII │ 20

│ │ │

*D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │

│Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944.│ │

│(USA 770) │ VII │ 21

│ │ │

D-318 │Memorandum from Diwkelaker to Ihn, 20 │ │

│March 1942. │ VII │ 24

│ │ │

*D-321 │Affidavit of Adam Schmidt, 12 October │ │

│1945. (USA 895) │ VII │ 25

│ │ │

D-325 │Affidavit of 17 October 1945 │ │

│concerning payments of Fried. Krupp │ │

│Cast Steel Works to Party and Party │ │

│Organizations. │ VII │ 26

│ │ │

D-332 │Letter from Janssen to NSDAP, 27 June │ │

│1935. │ VII │ 26

│ │ │

*D-335 │Memorandum from Stinnesbeck to Jaeger,│ │

│12 June 1944. (USA 900) │ VII │ 27

│ │ │

D-338 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │

│28 July 1944. │ VII │ 27

│ │ │

D-339 │Special medical report by Dr. Jaeger, │ │

│2 September 1944. │ VII │ 28

│ │ │

D-341 │Affidavit of Johannes Schroeder │ │

│concerning Fried. Krupp │ │

│Participations. │ VII │ 29

│ │ │

D-345 │Letter from Col. Zimmermann to Krupp │ │

│firm, 27 August 1942. │ VII │ 30

│ │ │

D-348 │Secret memo by Reiff concerning │ │

│conference in Berlin, 14 August 1942. │ VII │ 31

│ │ │

D-353 │Speech by Krupp, 18 October 1933, at │ │

│first meeting of Committee for │ │

│Industrial and Social Policy of Reich │ │

│Association of German Industry. │ VII │ 32

│ │ │

D-354 │Affidavit of Paul Lenz, Wilhelm Sill, │ │

│Hermann Rosskothen, Fritz Schink, Karl│ │

│Fortkamp, Wilhelm Piegeler, 5 October │ │

│1945. │ VII │ 34

│ │ │

D-355 │Affidavit of Walter Thoene, 8 October │ │

│1945. │ VII │ 36

│ │ │

D-363 │Krupp speech, 4 September 1939. │ VII │ 37

│ │ │

D-366 │Memorandum from Haller to Schuermeyer,│ │

│8 December 1942. │ VII │ 37

│ │ │

D-367 │Affidavit of Heinrich Frauenrath, 12 │ │

│October 1945. │ VII │ 38

│ │ │

D-368 │Letter from Lutze, 15 August 1934, │ │

│concerning use of Hitler Fund. │ VII │ 39

│ │ │

D-373 │Letter from Terboven to Krupp, 24 June│ │

│1935, thanking Krupp for │ │

│contributions. │ VII │ 40

│ │ │

D-375 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 24 July │ │

│1942. │ VII │ 40

│ │ │

*D-382 │Affidavit of Raimund Becker, Aloys │ │

│Hoefer, Josef Dahm, 4 October 1945. │ │

│(USA 897) │ VII │ 41

│ │ │

D-385 │Speech by Krupp at first showing of │ │

│Krupp film on 27 October 1935. │ VII │ 42

│ │ │

D-386 │Speech by Krupp on election after │ │

│death of Hindenburg, on 10 August │ │

│1934. │ VII │ 43

│ │ │

D-387 │Speech by Krupp, 7 April 1938. │ VII │ 43

│ │ │

D-390 │Krupp speech to jubilees of plant on 6│ │

│May 1941. │ VII │ 43

│ │ │

D-391 │Speech by Krupp, 6 April 1938. │ VII │ 44

│ │ │

D-392 │Speech by Krupp, 26 January 1934. │ VII │ 45

│ │ │

D-393 │Speech by Krupp, “The Day of Fate of │ │

│the German People”. │ VII │ 47

│ │ │

D-526 │File memorandum, 29 July 1942, │ │

│concerning acquisition of Liancourt │ │

│lease. │ VII │ 71

14. KARL DOENITZ

A. _NAVAL AND POLITICAL CAREER._

After his appointment in 1935 as commander of the Weddigen U-boat

flotilla—the first flotilla to be formed after the World War in

1918—Doenitz, who thus became in effect commander of U-boats, rose

steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded until he became an admiral.

On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Grand Admiral and succeeded Raeder

as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the

U-boat arm. Then, on 1 May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as leader of

Germany (_2887-PS_).

Doenitz was awarded the following decorations: On 18 September 1939 he

received the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat

successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was

followed on 21 April 1940 by the high award of the Knight’s Cross to the

Iron Cross, while on 7 April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the

Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd

recipient.

Doenitz’s services in building up the German Navy, and in particular the

offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, were outstanding. An extract

from the official publication “_Das Archiv_” on the occasion of

Doenitz’s promotion to vice-admiral, dated 27 September 1940, reads as

follows:

“* * * In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the

word uninterrupted work of training, he [Doenitz] succeeds in

developing the young U-boat arm, personnel, and material till it

is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts.

More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in

only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than

words of the services of this man.” (_D-436_)

An extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition (_1463-PS_)

emphasizes Doenitz’s contribution. It describes in detail Doenitz’s work

in building up the U-boat arm; his ceaseless work in training night and

day to close the gap of seventeen years, during which no training had

taken place; his responsibility for new improvements and for devising

the “pack” tactics which were later to become famous. His position is

summarized further as follows:

“* * * In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable

proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction

program, the chief was what he always was and always will be,

leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. * * * In

spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men and he

showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the

changing fortunes of war.” (_1463-PS_)

It was not only, however, his ability as a naval officer which won

Doenitz these high honors: his promotion to succeed Raeder as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the personal position he acquired as one

of Hitler’s principal advisers; and finally, earlier candidates such as

Goering having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding the position less

attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honour of becoming

Hitler’s successor. These he owed, to his fanatical adherence to Hitler

and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he

sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his

“masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of

war” (_1463-PS_), which may be regarded as synonymous with a capacity

for utter ruthlessness.

B. _INDOCTRINATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITH NAZI POLITICAL IDEOLOGY._

Doenitz’s attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his

public utterances. In a speech—subsequently circulated by Doenitz as a

Top Secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers

only—at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on 17 December

1943, Doenitz stated (_D-443_):

“* * * I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological

education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a

matter of course for the soldier. But the whole importance, the

whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and

spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of

duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only

carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is

therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of

his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for

this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is

therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly,

comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our

Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or

every divergence, or unpreparedness, imply a weakness in all

circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is

superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the

whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also

nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no

politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives; he

is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He

must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.

“We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The

Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this

war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our

fanaticism.

“Not I alone can do this, but it can only be done with the aid

of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with

Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the

Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It

does not matter to me who builds them.” (_D-443_)

In a speech on the same subject by Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy to the Commanders in Chief on 15 February 1944, he had this to say:

“From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so

indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the

National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the

exponent of the state; the idle chatter that the officer is

non-political is sheer nonsense.” (_D-640_)

Doenitz’s position was made unmistakably clear in a speech which he made

to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944:

“German men and women!

“* * * What would have become of our country today, if the

Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism! Split into

parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable

to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising

world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens

of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our

adversaries. * * *” (_2878-PS_) A speech by Doenitz to the Navy

on 21 July 1944 shows his fanaticism:

“Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts

because of the criminal attempt which was intended to have cost

the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it

otherwise—watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not

abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.”

(_2878-PS_)

And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to

the traitors.

The abolition of the German military salute and the adoption of the Nazi

salute in the German forces was due to Doenitz along with Goering and

Keitel (_2878-PS_).

When Adolf Hitler was reported dead, Doenitz spoke over the German radio

announcing the Fuehrer’s death and his own succession. The German

announcer made this statement:

“It has been reported from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters that our

Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle

headquarters at the Reichschancellery fighting to the last

breath for Germany against Bolshevism.

“On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz

to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer’s successor

will speak to the German nation.” (_D-444_)

Whereupon Doenitz spoke as follows:

“German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our

Fuehrer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest

sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger

of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against

it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the

capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably

straight and steady life.” (_D-444_)

Doenitz proceeded to issue an order of the day, to the same effect

(_D-444_).

C. _PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AGGRESSIVE WARS._

Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample

evidence that Doenitz, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the

planning and execution of the aggressive wars against Poland, Norway,

and Denmark.

(1) _Poland._ The distribution list on a memorandum by Raeder, dated 16

May 1939, shows that the sixth copy went to the _Fuehrer der

Unterseeboote_, who was Doenitz. This document was a directive for the

invasion of Poland (_Fall Weiss_) (_C-126_). Another memorandum from

Raeder’s headquarters, dated 2 August 1939, is addressed to the fleet,

and The Flag Officer, U-boats—this is, Doenitz (_C-126_). This was

merely a covering letter on operational directions for the precautionary

employment of U-boats in the Atlantic in the event that the intention to

carry out _Fall Weiss_ remained unchanged. The second sentence is

significant:

“Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to

SKL [_Seekriegsleitung_, the German Admiralty] by 12 August. A

decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will

probably be made at the middle of August.” (_C-126_)

Doenitz proceeded to give operational instructions to his U-boats for

the operation _Fall Weiss_. These instructions, signed by him, are not

dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that the date must have

been before 16 July 1939 (_C-172_). These operational instructions gave

effect to Raeder’s directive (_C-126_).

(2) _Norway and Denmark._ An extract from the War Diary of the Naval War

Staff of the German Admiralty, dated 3 October 1939, records the fact

that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the

possibility of taking operational bases in Norway (_C-122_). It states

Doenitz’s views as follows:

“* * * Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors

extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases for Atlantic

U-boats to call at temporarily.” (_C-122_)

A communication from Doenitz as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the

Supreme Command of the Navy (the Naval War Staff) dated 9 October 1939,

sets out Doenitz’s views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as

bases. Doenitz proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with

Narvik as an alternative (_C-5_).

Doenitz then gave operation orders to his U-boats for the occupation of

Denmark and Norway. This Top Secret order, dated 30 March 1940, under

the code name “_Hartmut_,” provided:

“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British

flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.”

(_C-151_)

(3) _England._ The preparations for war against England are perhaps best

shown by the disposition of the U-boats under Doenitz’s command on 3

September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western

Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including

that of the _Athenia_, provide corroboration. These matters are

contained in two charts prepared by the British Admiralty. The first

chart sets out the disposition of German submarines on 3 September 1939.

The certificate attached to this chart reads:

“This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders

issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939,

and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate

disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939,

and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file

of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the

submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or

about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The

documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the

British Admiralty in London.”

It will be apparent that U-boats which were in the positions indicated

on this chart on 3 September 1939 had left Kiel a considerable time

before. The location of the U-boat U-30 is particularly significant.

The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war.

The attached certificate reads:

“This chart has been constructed from the official records of

the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and

sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in

the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939.”

The location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ is significant.

D. _PARTICIPATION IN CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF

WARFARE._

The course of the war waged against neutral and allied merchant shipping

by German U-boats followed, under Doenitz’s direction, a course of

consistently increasing ruthlessness.

(1) _Attacks on Merchant Shipping._ Doenitz displayed “his masterly

understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war”

(_1463-PS_). From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and

neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones

had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to

take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in

the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the

crews or passengers of sunken merchant ships, and the announcement

claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm

the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted

without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the

requirements of humanity.

The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is

summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who

compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which

have since come to hand. An official report of the British Foreign

Office summarizes German attacks on merchant shipping during the period

3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of

the war (_D-641-A_). This report, made shortly after September 1940,

states in part as follows:

“* * * During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons

of Allied shipping, comprising 508 ships, have been lost by

enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping

comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these

merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or

surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged

on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen

have lost their lives in these ships.

“In the last war the practice of the Central Powers was so

remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought

necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in

particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty

of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The

rules laid down:

“(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must

conform to the rules of International Law to which surface

vessels are subjected.

“(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to

stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and

search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not

sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without

having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a

place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not

regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the

passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather

conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another

vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

“At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize

Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of

her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the

submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however,

provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it

seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article

73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral

vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for

forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy.

These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the

traditional British view but the important point is that, even

in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the

merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the

Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize

Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with

them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the

broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event,

however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of

the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war

with steadily increasing disregard for International Law, and

for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the

protection of human life and property from arbitrary and

ruthless attacks.” (_D-641-A_)

Two instances are then set out:

“On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a

neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of

life. This was the Danish ship ‘_Vendia_’ bound for the Clyde in

ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after

torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had

already signalled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders

and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By

November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels

without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the

Norwegian ‘_Arne Kjode_’ was torpedoed in the North Sea without

any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral

port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their

lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open

boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the

nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an

increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.” (_D-641-A_)

And then, dealing with attacks on allied merchant vessels, certain

figures are given:

“Ships sunk 241

“Recorded attacks 221

“Illegal attacks 112

“At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.”

(_D-641-A_)

The report continues:

“By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant

vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four

months later the Germans were still officially claiming that

they were acting in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. Their

own semi-official commentators however, had made the position

clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in

February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily

or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including

contraband control harbours—thereby loses its neutrality and

must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was

let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which

obtained a navicert from a British Consul in order to avoid

putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be

sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral

port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of

November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of

British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had

been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines,

and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels

were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not

only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but

also that neither before nor after this German threat did the

German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed

vessels.” (_D-641-A_)

A similar report covering the next six months (_D-641-B_) makes these

statements:

“On the 30th January 1941, Hitler proclaimed that ‘every ship,

with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes

is going to be torpedoed.’ On the face of it, this announcement

appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification

provided by the context is that the threats immediately

preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the

American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently

tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring

only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the

German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force.

“From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly

was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be

reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant

shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by

the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but

solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any

given time.”

* * * * * *

“The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral

ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain

(the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from

the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon

pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews

killed. As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships,

exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by

enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade’.”

* * * * * *

“Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details

are available to prove that, during the period under review, at

least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in

convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the

‘total blockade’ area.

“That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the

area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships

referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits

of the war-zone.”

* * * * * *

“The sinking of the ‘_City of Benares_’ on the 17th September

1940 is a good example of this. The ‘_City of Benares_’ was an

11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly

100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the

‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children.

It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very

rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the

darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at

least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others

were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In

one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from

exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third

21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality

of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when

a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans

have done and are doing.”

“There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for

days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water

clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by

one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their

boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to

pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know

that such things are the inevitable result of the type of

warfare he has chosen to employ.” (_D-641-B_)

The total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) amounted to

2,775 British, Allied, and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons

(_D-641-C_).

Another example of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by

Doenitz’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German

versions of the sinking are available, is the sinking of “_S. S. Sheaf

Mead_.” The British report, which includes the German account in the

shape of a complete extract from the U-boat’s log, states:

“The British ‘_S. S. Sheaf Mead_’ was torpedoed without warning

on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of

the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an

exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to

upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man

was Kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U-37. The following extract from

his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and

speaks for itself as to his behaviour.” (_D-644_)

The relevant extract from the log, at 1554 hours, reads:

“Surface. Stern [referring to the ship which has been torpedoed]

is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water.

Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some

distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from

somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush

with great bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern

disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men

fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing.

Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We

approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves

on wreckage. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on

the raft. He says, hardly turning his head—‘Nix Name.’ A young

boy in the water calls ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are very

composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of

cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After

washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light:

Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons.” (_D-644_)

“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.

The report of the Chief Engineer of the “_S. S. Sheaf Mead_” contains

this description of the situation:

“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side,

that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five

yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of

the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our

lifebuoys, but this had the name ‘_Gretaston_’ on it, as this

was the name of our ship before it was changed to ‘_Sheaf Mead_’

last January.”

* * * * * *

“She had cutaway bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two

men stood at the side with boat hooks to keep us off.

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us

in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing.

Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any

assistance whatever.” (_D-644_)

The U-boats log at 1444 hours contains a description of the sighting of

the ship, the difficulty in identification, and then the sinking:

“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in

quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern

yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also

prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square,

dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope

a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or

something similar. Fire! I cannot miss.” (_D-644_)

The actual documents by which Doenitz and his fellow conspirators issued

their orders in disregard of International Law indicate that the

compiler of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover

not only the period referred to in the above reports, but also the

subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the

steps by which the conspirators progressed. At first they were content

with breaching the rules of International Law to the extent of sinking

merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was

a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The

facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were

defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in

practice immaterial.

A memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939,

(_C-191_) provides:

“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to

sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights. * * *

In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as

the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way

that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political

situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out,

U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters

where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be

situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English

units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats

can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be

given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken

approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be

informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship

must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion

with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile,

U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to

attack all vessels sailing without lights.” (_C-191_)

The War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty contains

the following report by Ia (Staff Operations Officer on the Naval War

Staff) on directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December

1939:

“According to this the Fuehrer, on report of the Commander in

Chief, Navy, has decided:

“(_a_) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels

in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

“(_b_) In the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without

warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given

out as hits by mines.

“Both measures may be taken with immediate effect.” (_C-21_)

Another report by Ia, refers to intensified measures in naval and air

warfare in connection with “_Fall Gelb_”.

“In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize,

simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the

sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those

waters near the enemy coasts in which _mines can be employed_.

In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made

that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons

by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.” (_C-21_)

A third extract from the Naval War Diary, dated 6 January 1940, states:

“* * * the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of

report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing

without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in

certain parts of the American blockaded zone.” (_C-21_)

Whereupon, the order is given to Flag Officer, Submarines, carrying out

that decision (_C-21_).

The report for 18 January 1940 states:

“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following

Directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order

concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.

“The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking

without warning by U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the

enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended. U-Boats

must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the

pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the

hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy,

Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks.” (_C-21_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary (Doenitz’s War Diary) dated 18 July

1941, reveals a further extension of the above order so as to cut down

the protected categories:

“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being,

attacks on U. S. warships and merchant vessels in the

operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered

the following:

“1. Attack on U. S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U. S.

convoys or independently is authorized in the original

operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.

S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U. S.

to Iceland.” (_C-118_)

As these orders show, at one date the ships of a particular neutral

under certain conditions could be sunk, while those of another could

not. The attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals

changed at various times, for Doenitz conducted the U-Boat war against

neutrals with cynical opportunism. It all depended on the political

relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time

whether her ships were sunk or not.

(2) _The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors._ A series of orders

led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U-Boat commanders not

merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance, but

deliberately to annihilate them.

Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order

Number 154, signed by Doenitz:

“Paragraph (_e_). Do not pick up survivors and take them with

you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship’s boats. Weather

conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only

for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as

soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began

the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.”

(_D-642_)

In 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous

ship-building capacity, the change thus brought about necessitated a

further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats. Doenitz

accordingly issued an order, which intended not merely the sinking of

merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but

their deliberate extermination.

The course of events is shown by the record of a conversation between

Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, (_D-423_) in the presence of

Ribbentrop, on 3 January 1942:

“The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador

the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic,

emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get

the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being

reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in

the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted

outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown

and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”

* * * * * *

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer

pointed out that, however many ships the United States built,

one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For

that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning

with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible.

Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the

sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in

enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes

a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our

attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason

he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be

taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats

were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer’s comments,

and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these

methods.” (_D-423_)

An extract from the BDU War Diary of 16 September 1942 is part of the

story in the sense that it was on the following day that the

annihilation order was issued. It records an attack on a U-boat, which

was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied

liner “_Laconia_,” when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft (_D-446_).

A Top Secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from

Doenitz’s headquarters, dated 17 September 1942, provided:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of

ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water

and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and

handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the

rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy

ships and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still

apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of

importance for your boat.

“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of

women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”

(_D-630_)

The intentions of this carefully worded order are made clear by an

extract from Doenitz’s War Diary which is personally signed by Doenitz.

The War Diary entry for 17 September 1942 reads:

“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the

fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships

which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for

the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their

crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and

Chief Engineers still stand.” (_D-630_).

In this connection, a telegram from the Commander of the U-boat

“_Schacht_” to Doenitz’s headquarters, and the reply, are significant.

“_Schacht_” had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the

“_Laconia_.” The telegram from “_Schacht_,” dated 18 September 1942,

reads:

“163 Italians handed over to ‘_Annamite_.’ Navigating Officer of

‘_Laconia_’ and another English Officer on board.” (_D-630_)

The telegram goes on to set out the position of English and Polish

survivors in boats.

The reply from Doenitz’s headquarters was sent on the 20th:

“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was

wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for

the rescue of English and Poles.” (_D-630_)

Such were Doenitz’s plans before the bombing incident ever occurred.

“Operation Order Atlantic No. 56,” dated 7 October 1943, contains the

sailing orders of a U-boat (_D-663_). Although the date of this order is

7 October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued

earlier, in the autumn of 1942. The following is an extract from this

order:

“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to

every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered

tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after

U-boat attacks. These ships are, for the most part, equipped

with a shipborne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly

armed with depth-charge throwers, and very manoeuverable, so

that they are often called U-Boat Traps by the commander. In

view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking

is of great value.” (_D-663_)

The Prosecution does not complain against attacks on rescue ships. They

are not entitled to protection. But the point of the foregoing order to

U-boats was that priority in attack should be given to rescue ships.

This order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of 17 September

1942 (_D-630_): in view of the Allied shipbuilding program the German

Navy had resolved to take all means to prevent Allied ships from being

manned.

To summarize, it would appear from the War Diary entry of 17 September

that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in

fact, issued. They have not, however, been captured. It may be that they

were issued orally, and that Doenitz awaited a suitable opportunity

before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats

detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the “_Laconia_” afforded

the opportunity, and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent

is clear when it is considered in the light of the War Diary entry. The

wording is, of course, extremely careful, but to any officer of

experience its intention was obvious: he would know that deliberate

action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.

It may be contended that this order, although perhaps unfortunately

phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his

ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous as

a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and

that the notorious action of U-Boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek

steamer “_Peleus_” and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in

the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a

copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as Eck

himself swore, on his own initiative.

In reply it may be said that if the intention of this order was to stop

rescue attempts, in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, it

would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154.

Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the

order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced

staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible

capture by the enemy. Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks

attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there

would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except

possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be

apprehended. Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would

have read very differently. And fifthly, if in fact—and the Prosecution

does not accept it—Doenitz did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was

so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to

such a document.

The instructions given by Admiral Doenitz with regard to the murder of

shipwrecked Allied seamen are described in an affidavit by _Oberleutnant

Zur See_ Peter Josef Heisig (_D-566_). (Heisig was called as a

prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct

examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his

affidavit.) In September 1942 Heisig was a Midshipman in a training

course for U-boat officers of the watch. On the last day of the course

Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief, U-boats, held an

inspection tour and made a speech to the officers in training. Heisig

describes the content of Doenitz’s speech as follows:

“* * * According to news received from America we were bound to

reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more

than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping

space would be brought into service monthly. This was more

shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat

successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem

of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was

too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought

aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the

U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we

should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew.

That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was

to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the

British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long

run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant

shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the

opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no

more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a

ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew,

through the destruction of every means of saving life.

“I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz’s with the

others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them

to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of

escape, whether in boats, on rafts, or by any other means, must

be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be

attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for

most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz’s

authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely

accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any

doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the

bombing.” (_D-566_)

Further light on the real meaning of the Top Secret radio message sent

by the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to all U-boat and operational

flotillas in September 1942 (_D-630_) is contained in the statement of

_Korvettenkapitaen_ Karl Heinz Moehle (_382-PS_). (Moehle was called as

a Prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on

direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements

in his affidavit.) Concerning this order which was couched in terms of a

prohibition against the rescue of survivors, Moehle states as follows:

“This W/T message was without any doubt, sent out at the

instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e.

Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in

which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider

it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have

been given without his knowledge.”

* * * * * *

“So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and

in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander

in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High

Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also

their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that

they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was

continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant

ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this

order in that way.

“Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the

order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words.

It would then only have stated that for reasons of security

rescue measures were to cease and this order would have passed

as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the

intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and

the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes

international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order

which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in

commanding officers.”

* * * * * *

“To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942

appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total

disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had

however to carry out the command to pass on this order to

commanding officers for their instruction.

“During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla

no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not

reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that

he was therefore unable to carry it out.” (_382-PS_)

Moehle graphically describes Doenitz’s incitement of his men to the

murder of survivors:

“A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when

outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay

of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to

take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a

complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The

boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the

survivors.

“This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the

Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. It was stated that she would

have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was

highly probably that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the

enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a

German U-boat.

“This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief

U-boats clear to me.” (_382-PS_)

As senior officer of the Fifth U-boat Flotilla, it was Moehle’s duty to

transmit orders from the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to commanding

officers of U-boats. In this connection, Doenitz’s ambiguous order

against the rescue of survivors caused difficulties.

“I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with

more or less the following words:—‘I have now to inform you of

a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is

a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September

1942 gave the following order in an ‘officers only’ signal (* *

* the exact words of the order were then read out).’

“Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement

with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding

officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any

further discussion on this point.

“Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer

somewhat as follows:—

“‘I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave

this order, by reference to the following event:’ I then

mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay

together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by

Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. I then went on to say,

‘Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with

your own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always

remain your prime consideration.’”

* * * * * *

“I also remember that many commanding officers after the order

of September 1942 had been read said, ‘That is quite clear and

unequivocal however hard it may be.’ Had this order been given

to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in

silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear

conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger

my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at

lift-boats).” (_382-PS_)

Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the

notation of any actions in violation of International Law:

“There was an order—I do not remember whether it was in the

form of a written or verbal instruction—that no events during a

war patrol which contravened established international

agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the

reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war

logs and were available to many authorities; there was always

the danger therefore that events of this nature would become

known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of

propaganda that this should be so.

“Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for

when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were

invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats

or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.” (_382-PS_)

Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (_D-630_)

was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam

trawler, the “_Noreen Mary_,” which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944.

The log of the U-Boat shows that at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired,

which missed (_D-645_).

At 2055 hours the log reads:

“Surfaced.

“Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].

“Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes.” (_D-645_)

There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and

then, the final entry:

“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.”

(_D-645_)

The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:

“Recognized success: Fishing vessel ‘_Noreen Mary_’ sunk by

flak.” (_D-645_)

An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the

“_Noreen Mary_” at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks

which missed the trawler, and continues as follows:

“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine

surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast

of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the

ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath,

on a north-westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine

and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with

light airs.”

* * * * * *

“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the

conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the

submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately

slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased

to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased

us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two

or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had

not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a

heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which

burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping

the ship.

“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but

four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round

ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both

guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the

time but did not catch fire.

“The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was

aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the

attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the

water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to

port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and

the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea.

I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during

this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the

water.

“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our

lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top

of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately

steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired

directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their

intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained

there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after

which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine

had been firing her guns for a full hour.” (_D-645_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer

and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later

picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues:

“Whilst on board the ‘_Lady Madeleine_’ the Second Engineer and

I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second

Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½

inches long embedded in his body. * * * I had 14 shrapnel

wounds.”

* * * * * *

“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the

whalers ‘_Sylvester_’ (mined) and ‘_New Seville_’ (torpedoed),

and the Trawler ‘_Ocean Tide_’, which ran ashore.

“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six

killed, two missing, two injured.” (_D-645_).

The next case is that of the ship “_Antonico_”, which was torpedoed, set

afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana.

The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the

order (_D-630_). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the

attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (_D-647_):

“* * * That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the

‘_Antonico_’ as he and his crew tried to swing out their

lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20

minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to

get away from the side of the ‘_Antonico_’ in order to avoid

being dragged down by the same ‘_Antonico_’ and also because she

was the aggressor’s target; that the night was dark, and it was

thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard

the ‘_Antonico_’ lit up the locality in which she was

submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats

trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned

the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness

found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de

Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave

orders to his company to throw themselves’ overboard to save

themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected

and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled

with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At

that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in

distance from the submarine.” (_D-647_)

The U-boat’s log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised,

in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in

entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of

the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda

service from Friesland, (_D-646-A_) in English, on 11 March 1943,

stated:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for

romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these

waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the

colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a

U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer.

Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of

the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a

decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards,

when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder

of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank.

There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and

sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth

in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for

Britain and America.” (_D-646-A_)

This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to

terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships

and with the order on the destruction of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he

presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the

Reich, which Raeder had held (_2098-PS_).

An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty

sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those

present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his

representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until

the end (_D-648_). The certificate states:

“* * * I have compiled from them [captured documents] the

attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended

conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list of other senior

officials who attended the same conferences is added when this

information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I

certify that the list is a true extract from the collective

documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession

of the British Admiralty, London.”

Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at

each of the numerous meetings listed. Among those who were also

constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and

Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is

clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of

the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all major decisions

of policy.

(3) _The Order to Kill Commandos._ An internal memorandum of the Naval

War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to

another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to

the shooting of Commandos (_C-178_).

Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the

understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the

memorandum it is suggested:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether

or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference

with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments

concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the

treatment of members of commando units.” (_C-178_)

Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is

dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder.

But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British

Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order,

for shooting. An affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as

judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the

order states (_D-649_):

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that

they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in

violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the

killing of * * *” [there follow the names of six personnel of

the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist

of the British Navy, prisoners of war.].

* * * * * *

“There was evidence before the Court, which was not challenged

by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from

Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of

making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian

coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The

persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo

Boat.

“The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was

wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant

evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that

they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.

“On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo

off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day

the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a

German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von

Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to

the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July.

The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a

Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of

Korvettenkapitaen Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval

Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon

the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut.

Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence

Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew

were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that

officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea

Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west

coast.

“The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was

concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost

immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the

immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to

Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was

at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen.

This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von

Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th

October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the

classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection

of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners

of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD.

Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo

Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer

order, to the SD.” (_D-649_)

The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the

SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence

officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.

Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad

composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows:

“It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an

order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was

transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance

of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who

fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as

ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to

the Fuehrer order referred to above.” (_D-649_)

The date mentioned is important; it was time “in March or April, 1945,”

for these men to put their affairs in order.

(4) _Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention._ The minutes of

conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read

as follows:

“The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should

renounce the Geneva Convention * * *” [the 1929 Prisoners of War

Convention].

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to

consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his

opinion as soon as possible.” (_C-158_)

Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a

representative of Ribbentrop:

“* * * On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the

convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry

out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at

all costs to save face with the outer world.” (_C-158_)

An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and

Hitler, on 1 July 1944,—the extract is signed by Doenitz—states:

“* * * Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer

says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court

martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names

of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is silence

with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in

similar circumstances without court martial proceedings.”

(_C-171_)

(5) _Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards._ In a memorandum

signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to

Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force,

Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes:

“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties

by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special

measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths,

especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert

coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to

shipbuilding.” (_C-195_)

In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say:

“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against

whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have

proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in

France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for

the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”

(_C-195_)

Item 2 of the summing-up reads:

“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the

shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to

this)” (_C-195_).

It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his

Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.

They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is

clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps

and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he

must bear his full share of that responsibility.

(6) _Doenitz’s Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men._ The orders

issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (_D-650_) show his fanatical adherence

to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a

hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of

increased destruction and misery to his country:

“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That

they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty,

whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out

ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger

the following of this path.

“I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as

ruthless action against any commander who does not do his

military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral

strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he

must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier

in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not

burdened with any tasks as a leader.” (_D-650_)

In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an

example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted:

“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser

‘_Cormorau_’, in Austria, a petty officer acting as camp senior

officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among

the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a

way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure

of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After

his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown

that he is fitted to be a leader.” (_D-650_)

E. _CONCLUSION._

Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer,

loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He was an

extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German

people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he—not

Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler—who was chosen to

succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet,

one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and

execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation

of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would

not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality,

where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready

to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken

ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

There can be few countries which do not mourn for men of the merchant

navies whose destruction was due to the callow brutality with which, at

the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO KARL DOENITZ

│ │ │

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page

│ │ │

│Charter of the International Military │ │

│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5

│International Military Tribunal, │ │

│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │

│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 67

│ ———— │ │

│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │

│document indicates that the document │ │

│was received in evidence at the │ │

│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │

│before a document number indicates │ │

│that the document was referred to │ │

│during the trial but was not formally │ │

│received in evidence, for the reason │ │

│given in parentheses following the │ │

│description of the document. The USA │ │

│series number, given in parentheses │ │

│following the description of the │ │

│document, is the official exhibit │ │

│number assigned by the court. │ │

│ ———— │ │

*382-PS │Affidavit of Korvettenkapitaen Moehle,│ │

│England, 19 July 1945, concerning the │ │

│interpretation of Doenitz’s order of │ │

│September 1942. (GB 202) │ III │ 290

│ │ │

*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │

│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │

│501) │ III │ 416

│ │ │

503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │

│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │

│of his commando order of the day │ │

│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426

│ │ │

*526-PS │Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, │ │

│concerning saboteurs captured and shot│ │

│in Norway. (USA 502) │ III │ 434

│ │ │

*1463-PS │Diary of the Navy, 1944, by Admiral │ │

│Doenitz. (GB 184) │ IV │ 45

│ │ │

*2098-PS │Decree relating to Status of Supreme │ │

│Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 │ │

│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │

│Part I, p. 215. (GB 206) │ IV │ 725

│ │ │

*2878-PS │Extracts from The Archive. (GB 187) │ V │ 540

│ │ │

*2887-PS │Certificate of positions held by │ │

│Doenitz, 8 November 1945. (USA 12) │ V │ 552

│ │ │

2988-PS │Affidavit of Gerhard Wagner, Nurnberg,│ │

│19 November 1945, who identified │ │

│document C-158 as expressing opinion │ │

│of Doenitz and initialled by him. │ V │ 693

│ │ │

3150-PS │Interrogation of Doenitz, 3 November │ │

│1945. │ V │ 911

│ │ │

3151-PS │Interrogation of Falkenhorst, 24 │ │

│October 1945. │ V │ 912

│ │ │

*3260-PS │“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, │ │

│published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │

│23 October 1939. (GB 218) │ V │ 1008

│ │ │

*C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │

│Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │

│concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815

│ │ │

*C-21 │Extracts from file on Intensification │ │

│of U-boat warfare. (GB 194) │ VI │ 825

│ │ │

*C-105 │Extract from German Naval War Diary, │ │

│21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455) │ VI │ 913

│ │ │

C-118 │Extract from German Naval file, 18 │ │

│July 1941, concerning authorization of│ │

│attacks on U. S. Merchantmen. (GB 195)│ VI │ 916

│ │ │

*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │

│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │

│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916

│ │ │

*C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │

│Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 │ │

│October 1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928

│ │ │

*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │

│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │

│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932

│ │ │

*C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │

│“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by│ │

│Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965

│ │ │

*C-158 │Minutes of conference of C-in-C of │ │

│Navy with Hitler, 19 and 20 February │ │

│1945. (GB 209) │ VI │ 971

│ │ │

*C-171 │Minutes of conference between Hitler │ │

│and C-in-C of Navy regarding │ │

│Copenhagen General Strike, 1 July │ │

│1944. (GB 210) │ VI │ 1002

│ │ │

*C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by│ │

│Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002

│ │ │

*C-178 │Order of Navy concerning treatment of │ │

│saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)│ VI │ 1012

│ │ │

*C-179 │Hitler’s second decree, 18 October │ │

│1942, regarding annihilation of terror│ │

│and sabotage units. (USA 543) │ VI │ 1014

│ │ │

*C-191 │Demands by defendant Doenitz on │ │

│sinking of merchant ships, 22 │ │

│September 1939. (GB 193) │ VI │ 1018

│ │ │

*C-195 │Report signed by Doenitz, 1944, giving│ │

│support to Navy and Merchant Marine. │ │

│(GB 211) │ VI │ 1022

│ │ │

D-423 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │

│Hitler and Oshima, 3 January 1942. (GB│ │

│197) │ VII │ 53

│ │ │

*D-436 │Citation on promotion of Doenitz to │ │

│Vice Admiral, published in The │ │

│Archive, 27 September 1940. p. 550. │ │

│(GB 183) │ VII │ 54

│ │ │

*D-443 │Speech by Doenitz to Naval officers at│ │

│Weimar, 17 December 1943. (GB 185) │ VII │ 54

│ │ │

*D-444 │Order of day and speech of Doenitz on │ │

│death of Hitler, 1 May 1945. (GB 188) │ VII │ 55

│ │ │

*D-446 │Extract from B.d.U. War Diary, 16 │ │

│September 1942. (GB 198) │ VII │ 57

│ │ │

*D-566 │Affidavit by Peter-Joseph Heisig, 27 │ │

│November 1945. (GB 201) │ VII │ 72

│ │ │

*D-630 │Extracts from B.d.U. War Diary and │ │

│Order to all U-boat commanders; │ │

│telegram from Schacht and in reply to │ │

│Schacht. (GB 199) │ VII │ 100

│ │ │

*D-638 │Affidavit of Doenitz concerning │ │

│sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. │ │

│(GB 220) │ VII │ 114

│ │ │

*D-640 │Speech by C-in-C of Navy to Commanders│ │

│in Chief, 15 February 1944. (GB 186) │ VII │ 116

│ │ │

*D-641-A │Extracts from official reports │ │

│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │

│shipping, 3 September 1939 to │ │

│September 1940. (GB 191) │ VII │ 116

│ │ │

*D-641-B │Extracts from official reports │ │

│concerning German attacks on merchant │ │

│shipping, 1 September 1940 to 28 │ │

│February 1941. (GB 191) │ VII │ 120

│ │ │

*D-641-C │Sinkings by U-boats during the war, │ │

│1939-1945. (GB 191) │ VII │ 124

│ │ │

*D-642 │Extract from Befehlshaber der │ │

│U-bootes; Secret Standing Order No. │ │

│154 signed by Doenitz. (GB 196) │ VII │ 124

│ │ │

D-644 │Report of sinking of “Sheaf Mead”. (GB│ │

│192) │ VII │ 124

│ │ │

*D-645 │Report on sinking of “Noreen Mary”; │ │

│affidavit by survivor. (GB 203) │ VII │ 128

│ │ │

*D-646-A │Wireless talk by German naval reporter│ │

│concerning Windjammer sunk by U-boat. │ │

│(GB 205) │ VII │ 133

│ │ │

D-646-B │Extract from War Diary of U-105, 12 │ │

│January 1943. │ VII │ 133

│ │ │

*D-647 │Statement on sinking of SS “Antonico”,│ │

│which was torpedoed, set afire and │ │

│sunk, 28 September 1942. (GB 204) │ VII │ 134

│ │ │

*D-648 │List of Hitler-Doenitz meetings. (GB │ │

│207) │ VII │ 136

│ │ │

*D-649 │Affidavit by Judge Advocate, 28 │ │

│December 1945. (GB 208) │ VII │ 145

│ │ │

*D-650 │Orders issued by Doenitz, 11 April │ │

│1945. (GB 212) │ VII │ 148

│ │ │

*D-663 │Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for │ │

│U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. │ │

│(GB 200) │ VII │ 170

│ │ │

Statement I │The Laconia Case and German Submarine │ │

│Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 │ │

│and 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 657

│ │ │

Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │

│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │

│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

15. ERICH RAEDER

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RAEDER._

Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By

1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser _Koeln_. In 1928 he became

an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935

he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General

Admiral, a creation of Hitler’s, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937

he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he

became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In 1939 he was made Grand

Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s

baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was

a kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943 Doenitz was

the effective commander of the German Navy. (_2888-PS_)

B. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO PLAN AND WAGE WARS OF

AGGRESSION._

During the years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy, from 1928 to

1943, he played a vital role in building up the Navy as an instrument of

war, to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.

(1) _Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles._ In

successive and secret steps, the small Navy permitted to Germany under

the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of

Raeder.

The story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of

Versailles is told in a history of the fight of the German Navy against

Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German

Admiralty in 1937 (_C-156_). This history shows that before the Nazis

came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the

governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage

its own government, regarding the secret measures of rearmament ranging

from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret

intelligence and finance organizations. Raeder’s role in these

developments are described as follows:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had

received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and

development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the

previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in

consideration of the Versailles Treaty.” (_C-156_)

An illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament is contained in

his statement that:

“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament

conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-boat

Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of

torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these

E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed

them.” (_C-141_)

It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland

was already current in German military circles. An extract from the

History of War Organization and of the Scheme for Mobilization (_C-135_)

which is headed “All 850/38”, suggesting that the document was written

in 1938, reads:

“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for

mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a

very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a

theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an

‘Establishment Order’ and ‘Instructions for Establishment,’ the

forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.

“An ‘establishment organization’ and ‘adaptable instructions for

establishment’ were drawn up for each A-year, the cover name for

a mobilization year.

“As stated, the ‘Establishment Organizations’ of that time were

to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive

basis in the form of men and materials. They provided,

nevertheless, a valuable foundation for the establishment of a

War Organization as our ultimate aim.”

* * * * * *

“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming

increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical

preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a

purely German-Polish conflict.

“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of

Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on active service was to

be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be

indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential

coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and

Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the

Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” (_C-135_)

The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear political request

to build up for him in five years, that is, by April 1938, armed forces

which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.

(_C-135_)

The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full

speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told Hitler that the

German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore

from 1936 on, the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the

British “_King George_” class of battleship. Raeder also went along with

Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept

completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite (_C-189_).

In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing

of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case

of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 RM.

from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (_C-190_)

Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up the German

Navy is the fact that the true displacement of certain German

battleships exceeded by twenty percent the displacement which the Nazis

had reported to the British (_C-23_). In similar vein, it was ordered

that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should

be referred to as “transport ships O.” (_C-166_)

The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry

illustrates Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and

of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs, and

German armament manufacturers. (_C-29_)

A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a letter from

Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. This letter was given

extensive distribution; in fact there is provision in the distribution

list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s, which is marked with both

self-justification and apology, reads:

“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in

the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem

whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged

the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or

whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the

first, on the construction of U-boats.

“If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire

naval building program has been wrongly directed, and that, from

the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon

and, after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must

emphasize the following matters:

“The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the

political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The

Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the

threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time

the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat

superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength

in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for

warfare on the high seas.

“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the

expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to

accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The

result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis

should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the

U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far

this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel,

training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in

any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German

Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and

necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the

desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I

indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the

political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic,

far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the

immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards

equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the

assumption of power.” (_C-155_)

This letter shows no trace of reluctance in cooperating with the Nazi

program. On the contrary, it is evident that Raeder welcomed and became

one of the pillars of the Nazi power.

(2) _Conversion of the Navy into a tool of the Nazi conspiracy._ Raeder,

more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned

allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement—an allegiance which

Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on 2 August

1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when Raeder and all the men under

him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to

Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland (_D-481_). The new oath ran

as follows:

“I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the

Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme

Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I

will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.”

(_D-481_)

For his fatherland, Raeder substituted the Fuehrer.

There is no need to elaborate upon the step by which the German Navy was

progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. The

facts of history—such as the incorporation of the swastika into the

ensign under which the German Fleet sailed, and the wearing of the

swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men—these facts speak for

themselves.

The Nazis, for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance

and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were

widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his

66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,”

published a special article about him, which summed up Raeder’s

contribution to Nazi development:

“It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by that time

a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet,

despite the fetters of Versailles.

“With the assumption of power through National Socialism began,

too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the

German Fleet.

“The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s

faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him

General Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936”.

* * * * * *

“As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved

himself to be the Fuehrer’s first and foremost naval

collaborator.” (_D-448_)

(3) _Raeder’s political activities and responsibilities._ Raeder’s

personal part in the Nazi conspiracy arises from the fact that, from the

time of the Nazi seizure of power, he became increasingly involved in

responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a

member of the secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was

founded, on 4 April 1933. Thus, at an early date, he was involved, both

militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. These facts are

contained in a document which contains the classic Nazi directive:

“Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be

denied by us in Geneva.” (_EC-177_)

On 4 February 1938, Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly

formed Secret Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (_2031-PS_). Three

weeks later, a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in

rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the

sessions of the Cabinet (_2098-PS_). It is thus clear that Raeder’s

responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was

steadily developed from 1933 to 1938, and that in the course of time he

had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was a

member of the inner councils of the conspirators.

As an illustration, Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at

which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring

countries. The first of these was Hitler’s conference at the Reichs

Chancellery on 5 November 1937, concerning matters which were said to be

too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The

minutes of this meeting establish conclusively that the Nazis

premeditated their crimes against peace (_386-PS_). The second meeting

which Raeder attended was Hitler’s conference on 23 May 1939 (_L-79_).

This was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make

a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing

that this must cause widespread war in Europe.

In addition to those two key conferences, Raeder was also present at

many others, where he placed his knowledge and professional skill at the

service of the Nazi war machine. Raeder’s promotion of the military

planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is discussed in Section

8 of Chapter IX.

(4) _The “Athenia Case”._ Once the war was underway, Raeder also showed

himself to be a master of one of the conspirators’ favorite

techniques—deceit on the grand scale. His handling of the case of the

“_Athenia_” is a case in point.

The “_Athenia_” was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of 3

September 1939, when she was outward bound to America. About one hundred

lives were lost.

On 23 October 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the “_Voelkischer

Beobachter_,” published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill

sank the Athenia” (_3260-PS_). The scale on which this deliberate lie

was perpetrated is indicated by the rest of the “_Voelkischer

Beobachter_” for that day; on the front page, with large red

underlining, were the words: “Now we indict Churchill” (_3260-PS_). An

extract from the third page of this issue of the “_Voelkischer

Beobachter_” refers to photograph of the ship and reads as follows:

“Churchill sank the ‘_Athenia_’. The above picture shows the

proud ‘_Athenia_’, the ocean giant, which was sunk by

Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment

on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship.

Why was the ‘_Athenia_’ silent? Because her captain was not

allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained

from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink

the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew

it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred

people would have lost their lives if Churchill’s original plan

had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped

that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find

death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who

were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany as the

presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority

escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on

the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the

freighter, ‘_City of Flint_’, and as can be seen here, turned

over to the American coast guard boat ‘_Gibb_’ for further

medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the

criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost

their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask

the British people, ‘How long will the office, one of the

richest in tradition known to Britain’s history, be held by a

murderer?’” (_3260-PS_)

Contrary to these Nazi allegations, the “_Athenia_” made repeated

wireless distress signals, which were in fact intercepted and answered

by His Majesty’s ships “_Electra_” and “_Escort_,” as well as by the

Norwegian steamship “_Knute Nelson_” and the Swedish yacht “_Southern

Cross_.” In fact, the “_Athenia_” was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So

unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the “_Athenia_,” however, that the

German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and

on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding the guilty secret.

Meanwhile, the Nazi propagandists sought to shift the responsibility to

the British. The Captain of U-boat 30, _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, was later

killed in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have

survived to tell the tale as prisoners of war. An affidavit by a member

of the crew of the U-30 establishes the truth of this episode and

reveals the Nazis’ attempt to conceal the true facts (_D-654_). The

affidavit reads:

“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T,

“Do solemnly declare that:

“I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

“That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of

approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the

evening by the U-30.

“That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again,

approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant

called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

“That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not

think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account

of the position of the moon.

“That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to

the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

“That apart from myself, _Oberleutnant_ Hinsch was in the tower

when I saw the steamer after the attack.

“That I observed that the ship was listing.

“That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

“That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed

ship.

“That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

“That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were

fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the

explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp waited until darkness before

surfacing.

“That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in

Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the

Petty Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then had the Petty Officers’ quarters

cleared in order to be alone with me.

“That _Oberleutnant_ Lemp then showed me a declaration under

oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing

concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.

“That this declaration under oath had approximately the

following wording: ‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I

shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on

board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I

shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.’

“That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn

up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand

very illegibly.

“That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the

‘_Athenia_,’ the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3

September 1939 might have sunk the ‘_Athenia_,’ especially since

the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

“That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these

events.

“That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed

from my oaths.” (_D-654_)

Doenitz’s part in the “_Athenia_” episode is described in an affidavit

which he has sworn, in English (_D-638_). At the end of the affidavit

four words are added in Doenitz’s handwriting, the significance of which

will be adverted to shortly. Doenitz states:

“U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain,

_Oberleutnant_ Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the

boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me

in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very

unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was

responsible for the sinking of the ‘_Athenia_’ in the North

Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions, he

had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant

cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had

torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the ‘_Athenia_’

from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an

armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my

instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant

cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at

once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I

ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the

same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal

order from _Kapitaen zur See_ Fricke [head of the Operations

Division of the Naval War Staff] that:

“1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.

“2. The OKM considered that a court martial was not necessary as

they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.

“3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which

the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the ‘_Athenia_.’

“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I

interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the

impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had

still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the

identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given

very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were

to be treated according to naval prize law, before the

occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under

cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only

acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity” [whereat

Doenitz has added the words, “and too much time”]. (_D-638_)

Doenitz’s suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the “_Athenia_”

in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of

Doenitz’s order of 22 September 1939, that

“the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War

Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an

auxiliary cruiser.” (_C-191_)

The U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. On that date

another fraudulent entry was made in the War Diary of the Chief of

U-boats:

“U-30 comes in. She had sunk: ‘S.S. _Blairlogie_’; ‘S.S. _Fanad

Head_’.” (_D-659_)

There is no reference at all to the sinking of the “_Athenia_.”

Perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was

made on the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the

“_Athenia_” (_D-662_). The Prosecution submits that the first page of

that log book is a forgery which shows a curiously un-German

carelessness about detail. It is clear on the original document that the

first page of the text is a substitute for pages that have been removed:

The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On

the second and more authentic-looking page, and throughout the other

pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. (_D-662_)

Furthermore, all reference to the sinking of the “_Athenia_” on 3

September is omitted. The log book shows that at 1400 hours on 3

September 1939 the position of the U-30 is given as AL 0278, which is

one of the few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was

some 200 miles west of the position where the “_Athenia_” was sunk. The

recorded course (due south) and the recorded speed (10 knots)—those

entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear

of the “_Athenia’s_” position on 3 September. (_D-662_)

Finally, the original shows Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing

with 3 September differs from his other signature in the text. The

difference appears in the final letter of his name. The signature in

question shows a Roman “p”, whereas on the other signatures there is a

script “p.” The inference is that either the signature is a forgery or

it was made by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later,

date. (_D-662_)

The story of the “_Athenia_” establishes that the German Navy under

Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s

reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that

a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed

the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the

“_Athenia_” (discussed in Section 14 on Doenitz) have shown the

dishonesty of these announcements. The conclusion to be drawn is this:

Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and

information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as

head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in

the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_,” which was an attempt by the Nazi

conspirators to save face with their own people and to uphold the myth

of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine.

(5) _The Attack on Norway and Denmark._ Truth mattered little in Nazi

propaganda, and Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his

ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking

Norway or Denmark. Raeder’s proud comment upon the invasions of Denmark

and Norway, in which he played a leading part, (see Section 9 of Chapter

IX on aggression against Norway and Denmark), is contained in a letter

of Raeder’s to the Navy, which stated in part:

“The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for

all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war.”

(_C-155_)

(6) _The Attack on the U.S.S.R._ With the occupation of Norway and much

of Western Europe safely completed, Hitler turned his eyes towards

Russia. Raeder was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to

dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. Raeder approached the problem

with cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because

of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to

it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going

further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against

Russia is told in extracts from a German compilation of official naval

notes by the German Naval War Staff (_C-170_). The first entry, dated 26

September 1940, shows that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive

Mediterranean policy, in which the Navy would play a paramount role, as

opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme

Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez

Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance

through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The

Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia

is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable

whether action against Russia from the North will then be still

necessary.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 14 November reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is still

inclined to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme

Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the

victory over England since there is heavy strain on German

forces and the end of warfare is not in sight. According to the

opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander, Russia will not press

for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process

of building up her Navy with Germany’s help—38 cm. turrets for

battleships, etc.:—thus, during these years she continues to be

dependent upon German assistance.” (_C-170_)

And again, the entry for 27 December states:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme

Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our

entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most

urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained

strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the

eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On

the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a

strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking

effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force

construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must

work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy

and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and

endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices

serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of

England.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 18 February 1941 reads as follows:

“Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of

Malta even before ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The 23 February entry reads:

“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that

seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the

execution of ‘_Barbarossa_’.” (_C-170_)

The entry for 19 March 1941 shows that by March 1941 Raeder had begun to

consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to

offer. The entry states:

“In case of ‘_Barbarossa_’, Supreme Naval Commander describes

the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the

Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces, considers

compliance very difficult.” (_C-170_).

In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying out for a

more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry for 30 May reads:

“[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall

1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; ‘This stroke would be

more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’;

Chief Naval Operations agrees completely.” (_C-170_)

Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views of Raeder

and the German Navy at that stage:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the

Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the strategic situation

in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the

occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.”

* * * * * *

“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive

aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved

into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and

the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the

present favorable situation must take place with the greatest

acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened

her position in the Near East with help from the United States

of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that

the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly;

demands, however, that the undertaking ‘_Barbarossa_’, which

because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the

foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces

leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment,

diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern

Mediterranean.” (_C-170_)

Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his Navy in the

Nazi war plans.

Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for the

Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval operational plan against

Russia was characteristically Nazi. The entry for 15 June 1941 in the

notes of the German Naval War Staff reads:

“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against

Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland

warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is

to be aimed at.” (_C-170_)

Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this action in his

letter dated 15 June 1941 (_C-38_):

“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the

Baltic Sea.

“To:

“High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL)

“Offensive action against submarine south of the line

Memel—southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot

be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by

German naval forces.

“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces

believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”

(_C-38_).

This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi attack on Russia

did not take place until 22 June 1941.

(7) _Instigation of Japanese aggression._ In the meantime, Raeder was

urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the

world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. Raeder’s views at his

audience with Hitler on 18 March were as follows:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,

since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole

English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war

against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the

Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,

but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she

will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.

Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring

Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East

Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby

solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do

so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”

(_C-152_)

By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder’s proposition to induce

the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. The entry in

the notes of the German Naval War Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme

Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit, and evaluation

of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, ‘that

Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to

the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’

Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany,

and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and

to cause her to attack Singapore.” (_C-170_).

The real purpose of Hitler’s words to Matsuoka is revealed in another

description of their conversation:

“* * * At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a

surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian

attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was

frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed

entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”

(_C-66_)

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This is typical

of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

C. _RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES._

(1) _Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare._ Raeder

throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international

rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying

through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his

attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval

War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war

started (_UK-65_). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of

the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against

Great Britain.

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means

at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success

can be most confidently expected if we attack British

sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the

greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut

off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to

consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military

measures taken on existing International Law; however measures

which are considered necessary from a military point of view,

provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have

to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing

International Law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare

which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used

on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a

new code of naval warfare.

“The supreme War Council will have to decide what measures of

military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been

decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form,

in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be

adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances

may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic

warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under

political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in

the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral

powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries,

including the U. S. coming into the war, which can be expected

with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to

a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.

The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will

it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The

economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy

must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate

re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the

respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong

political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.”

(_UK-65_)

Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member

of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share

responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and

underlings in the course of their wars.

(2) _The Navy’s Crimes at Sea._ Apart from this over-all responsibility

of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered

through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

(_a_) _Attacks on neutral shipping._ The minutes of a meeting between

Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:

“The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given

to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to

the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally

agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the

American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can

be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (_C-27_)

At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another

demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive

effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the

OKW, and signed by Jodl (_C-12_). This directive reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M.,

the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided

that:

“(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by

U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked

without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can

be created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.”

(_C-12_)

A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

“Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The

denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected

protests are made must be possible.” (_C-12_)

Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral

shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 16 June 1942

(_1807-PS_). This extract reads as follows:

“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May

for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The

SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and

merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense

measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the

possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to

all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.” (_1807-PS_).

This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,” although war did

not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August

1942.