negotiation if possible; but if not, we shall take them.”
(_EC-450_)
In January 1937, Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies,
impliedly threatened a breach of the peace unless Germany’s demands for
colonies were met. The conversation is related as follows in a report
under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of
State:
“He [Schacht] stated the following: that the present condition
of the Germany people was intolerable, desperate and
unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to
submit proposals to France and England which would (1) guarantee
European peace; (2) secure present European international
boundaries; (3) reduce armaments; (4) establish a new form of a
workable League of Nations; (5) abolish sanctions with new
machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial
cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population,
source for food stuffs, fats and raw material. * * *” (_L-111_)
The inference was clear: without a colonial cession, peace could not be
guaranteed. Equally clear was the inference that it would be Germany in
its search for “_Lebensraum_” that would disturb the peace.
On 21 December 1937, Schacht indicated to Ambassador Dodd that he
desired the annexation of neighboring countries, without war if
possible, but with war, if necessary. The pertinent portion of
Ambassador Dodd’s notes on this conversation are as follows:
“Schacht meant what the Army chiefs of 1914 meant when they
invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in six weeks; i.e.,
domination and annexation of neighboring little countries,
especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s
dictatorship, he, as most other eminent Germans, wishes
annexation—without war if possible, with war, if the United
States will keep hands off.” (_EC-461_)
(3) _Schacht knew of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war and wilfully
provided the means whereby such a war might successfully be waged._
Whether or not Schacht personally favored war, it is clear that he at
least knew that Hitler planned military aggression and that he was
providing Hitler with the instrument by which those plans could be
executed. Even before Hitler’s accession to power, Schacht knew from a
reading of _Mein Kampf_ that Hitler was bent upon expansion to the East
by force of arms (_3727-PS_).
In the course of his frequent contacts with Mr. Messersmith, United
States Consul General in Berlin from 1930 to 1934, Schacht emphasized
that the “Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war”
(_EC-451_).
In September of 1934, Ambassador Dodd recorded in his diary a
conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin,
wherein he stated that “Schacht had acknowledged to me the war purposes
of the Nazi Party” (_EC-461_).
Schacht has admitted that in the course of his numerous talks with
Hitler from 1933 to 1937, he formed the impression that “in order to
make his hold on the Government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must
present the German people with a military victory” (_EC-458_).
These admissions by Schacht are fortified by other evidence which shows
that Schacht knew that Hitler planned military aggression. After his
appointment as Minister of Economics, Schacht became a permanent member
of the secret Reich Defense Council. The function of that Council, as
shown in other connections, was secretly to mobilize all of the human
and material resources of Germany for war (_EC-177_).
Shortly after his appointment as the Plenipotentiary General for the War
Economy in May 1935, Schacht was entrusted by the Reich Defense Council
with the “preparation of economic mobilization” in connection with the
proposed re-occupation of the Rhineland. Schacht and those officials who
were charged with the purely military aspects of the re-occupation were
enjoined to proceed with the utmost secrecy because of assurances given
by Hitler to the French that no military action was contemplated in the
de-militarized zone of the Rhineland (_EC-405_).
At the 11th meeting of the Reich Defense Council, on 6 December 1935,
which was attended by a number of representatives from Schacht’s office
of Plenipotentiary of the War Economy, Keitel pointed out that
“According to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic leadership
puts the increase of our armed might knowingly ahead of other
requirements of the state. It is the task of all members of the
Reich Defense Council to utilize the national property, made
available, primarily for this purpose and economically in the
framework of the entire situation, and request only such funds
and raw materials which serve absolutely and exclusively the
Reich Defense. * * *”
The singleness of purpose with which Schacht and the other conspirators
were gearing the German economy for war is strikingly shown by the Top
Secret minutes of the meeting of ministers dated 30 May 1936. This, it
will be recalled, was little more than 10 weeks after German troops had
occupied the Rhineland. At this meeting, Schacht pointed out that “it
must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which
are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for
the case of mobilization”; and also that “certain raw materials for war
must be stocked.” Continuing the discussion, Goering emphasized that
“all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured
waging of war.” Thereafter, Schacht advocated the introduction of price
supervision and agreed that first priority should be given to the
“specially urgent petroleum question” (_1301-PS_).
By Top Secret letter dated 31 August 1936, Schacht was advised by
General von Blomberg that Hitler had ordered that “the setting up of all
air force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937”. This accelerated
program entailed the expenditure of large additional funds which Schacht
and the Minister of Finance were called upon to supply. The sense of
urgency with which Hitler pressed the completion of the German air force
patently signified that the waging of war was a certainty (_1301-PS_).
Shortly after the receipt of this letter, and on 4 September 1936,
Schacht attended a secret cabinet meeting where Goering stated:
“The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the
Col. General and the Reich War Minister which represents a
general instruction for the execution thereof.
“It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia
is inevitable.”
* * * * * *
“The Colonel General reads the memorandum of the Fuehrer.”
* * * * * *
“If war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to take
measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the
present moment. They are, therefore, to be taken.”
* * * * * *
“All measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in
the stage of imminent danger of war.” (_EC-416_).
There was no room for surmise in these utterances; Hitler was definitely
and irrevocably committed to waging aggressive war. If Schacht ever had
any doubts concerning Hitler’s firm resolve to carry out the program of
aggressive war outlined in _Mein Kampf_; if, contrary to his statements
to Mr. Messersmith and Ambassador Dodd, Schacht actually doubted in 1934
that the Nazis, whom he was faithfully serving, would inevitably plunge
Europe into war; and if, despite the pressing sense of immediacy that
had pervaded the Nazi war economy from the very outset, he had
entertained lingering doubts concerning Hitler’s plans for armed
aggression, all such doubts must have been removed by the clear and
unequivocal pronouncements in the above-mentioned eventful meetings of
1936 in which he participated.
Yet, despite his knowledge of Hitler’s plans to wage aggressive war,
despite the fact that he had grave technical doubts about the ability of
the Reichsbank to finance further armaments through additional short
term credits, and despite the fact that some directors of the Reichsbank
had opposed further “mefo” financing, Schacht pledged another 3 billion
Reichsmarks by the “mefo” bill method for further financing of armaments
in March 1937 (_EC-438_).
The Hossbach notes, dated 10 November 1937, on the important conference
of 5 November 1937 in the _Reichskanzlei_, reveal a further
crystallization of Hitler’s program of absorption and conquest in Europe
(_386-PS_). Definite plans were laid for the early acquisition of
Austria and Czechoslovakia, and for their exploitation in preparation
for further military operations. So far as appears, Schacht was not
present at this particular meeting. But his awareness of what occurred
at the meeting is shown by the fact that he told Ambassador Bullitt on
23 November 1937, that
“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to
Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of
Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned
about the Polish Corridor, and in his [Schacht’s] opinion it
might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were
permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a
bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and
East Prussia with Germany.” (_L-151_).
Although Schacht apparently sought to convey the impression to
Ambassador Bullitt that he desired to stay Hitler’s hand but was
powerless to do so, it is clear that he was actually in complete
sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Despite the mounting tension which
followed his conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, Schacht remained as
President of the Reichsbank, and in that capacity established, in
advance of the invasion of Austria, the rate of exchange between Marks
and Austrian Schillings which was to prevail after the absorption of
Austria (_EC-421_).
Moreover, under his direction, the Austrian National Bank was merged
into the Reichsbank (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, I, 254). His speech of
21 March 1938, to the employees of the former Austrian National Bank on
the occasion of its obliteration as an independent institution, betrayed
his true feelings. After inveighing against “the dictates of Versailles
and St. Germain”, Schacht stated:
“Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great
German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a
communion of German will and German thought, he bolstered it up
with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and he then finally gave
the external form to the inner union between Germany and
Austria.”
* * * * * *
“One person says he would have done it maybe in one way, but the
remarkable thing is that they did not do it (hilarity), that IT
WAS ONLY DONE BY OUR ADOLF HITLER (Long continued applause) and
if there is still something left to be improved, then those
grumblers should try to bring about those improvements from the
German Reich and within the German community, but not to disturb
it from without. (Lively agreement)”.
* * * * * *
“I ask you to raise your hands and to repeat after me:
I swear that: I will be faithful, and obedient to the Fuehrer of
the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, and will
perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience
takes the pledge with uplifted hands).
You have taken this pledge. A scoundrel he who breaks it. To our
Fuehrer a triple ‘Sieg heil’.” (_EC-297-A_)
Schacht was likewise enthusiastic about the acquisition of the
Sudetenland, and filled with pride over the contribution his credit
policy as head of the Reichsbank had made thereto (_EC-611_).
In January 1939, when Hitler was ruthlessly exploiting his successes in
Austria and the Sudetenland in preparation for his next aggressive move,
Schacht again referred, with pride, to the fact that the _Wehrmacht_
which he had helped create by his ingenious and risky methods had made
possible Hitler’s successes. Thus, he said:
“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact
that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the
reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the Reichsbank]
therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to
_finance_ the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the
currency. The justification thereof was the necessity—which
pushed all other considerations into the background—to carry
through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore
under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy
possible.” (_EC-369_)
The foregoing proof establishes, it seems clear, that Schacht knew of
Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, and wilfully created the means
whereby those plans could be executed. But apart from this direct proof,
it is submitted that to a man in Schacht’s position, the events of the
period clearly bespoke Hitler’s intentions. Schacht was a key figure in
the Nazi Government during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria,
the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the
conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of
force.
During this period, the Reich debt trebled under the stress of mounting
armaments (_EC-419_), and all the resources of Germany were being
strained to the very limit for armament. It was a period in which the
burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s
repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy
of expansion, was laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in
preparation for war.
Certainly in this setting, Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the
fact that he was assisting Hitler and Nazi Germany along the road
towards armed aggression.
E. _SCHACHT’S LOSS OF POWER DID NOT IMPLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE
CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF AGGRESSIVE WAR._
(1) _His resignation as Minister of Economics and General
Plenipotentiary for War Economy._ In November 1937, Schacht resigned his
offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War
Economy. At the same time, he accepted appointment as Minister without
Portfolio, and continued as President of the Reichsbank. It is submitted
that the evidence shows that Schacht’s resignations were merely the
outgrowth of a clash between two power-seeking individuals, Goering and
Schacht, over _methods_ of creating a war economy and over who should
have final authority to direct the completion of the task. So far as
appears, Schacht was in full accord with the other conspirators upon the
_desirability_ of providing Hitler with the means by which he eventually
could carry out his planned aggressions.
The basic differences between Schacht and Goering date from a period
shortly after Goering became head of the Four-Year Plan Office. The
latter office was created by Hitler in September 1936, and in connection
therewith, Goering was “given far reaching powers to issue directives to
all the highest offices of the State and Party”. Goering conceived of
his function as head of the Four-Year Plan Office “within four years to
put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war” (_EC-408_).
Schacht was in agreement with the “aim and idea” of the Four-Year Plan.
He promised Goering his complete support and cooperation, and urged that
Goering draw upon Schacht’s long experience in economic affairs. Thus,
in Schacht’s letter of 5 August 1937, to Goering, he said:
“The aim and the idea of the Four Year Plan were and remain
entirely correct and necessary! It stands, essentially, for the
application of increased energy to the efforts already
undertaken by my ministry since 1934 with the results shown in
the above statistics. As you will remember, I welcomed it when
your energy, my dear Prime Minister, was recruited by the
Fuehrer for these tasks, and from the very beginning I gave you
my most loyal support and cooperation, with the particular plea
that I be given a hearing from time to time, since I believed
that my more than thirty years of experience in economic life,
half of them in public service, could be of value to you.”
(_EC-497_)
Goering, however, failed to avail himself of Schacht’s offer of his
services. “I can only regret,” said Schacht in the aforementioned
letter, “that you have made so little use of my offer” (_EC-497_).
Instead, Goering began to encroach upon powers which had been delegated
to Schacht, and they became embroiled in a bitter jurisdictional
conflict. On 26 November 1936, Goering issued a directive regarding raw
and synthetic material production, whereby he undertook to assume
control over large economic areas previously within Schacht’s province
(_EC-243_).
Schacht did not supinely accept Goering’s intrusions upon his powers.
Goering’s directive was countered by an abrupt order from Schacht to all
supervisory offices to accept orders from him alone (_EC-376_).
The conflict reached such dimensions that it threatened to retard the
pace of the conspirators’ armament program. The military sided with
Schacht, who had provided the means for their rapid rearmament. They
submitted proposals which would have assured to Schacht as
Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy the responsibility for
“unified preparation of the war economy as heretofore” (_EC-408_;
_EC-420_).
In January 1937, the German Military Weekly Gazette published an article
warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. The timing of the
article indicates that it was a further attempt by the military to tip
the scales in Schacht’s favor. The article stated:
“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one
of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its
development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s skill
and great ability that, in defiance of all currency
difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to
its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.” (_EC-383_)
Shortly thereafter, Schacht attempted to force a showdown with Goering
by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary.
Schacht plainly was using his prime importance in the conspirators’
program of economic planning and preparation for war as a lever. In a
letter to Hitler dated 22 February 1937, General von Blomberg, the
Minister of War, suggested a settlement of the jurisdictional fight
under which Schacht would fully retain his powers as General
Plenipotentiary of War Economy, and concluded by stating:
“If you, my Fuehrer, agree with my view regarding these
jurisdictional questions, it may be possible to induce
Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, whose cooperation as
Plenipotentiary for preparation of war is of great significance,
to resume his former activity.” (_EC-244_)
As a further demonstration of the community of interest between Schacht
and the top German military authorities, Schacht attended the secret
“War Economy” games at Godesberg in the latter part of May 1937. The
purpose of the games was to demonstrate “how the action of the soldiers
in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy
is completely dependent on military operations”. Schacht’s attendance
was acclaimed at the games as
“renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us
soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to
strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your offices.”
(_EC-174_).
In June 1937, Keitel implored Hitler to accelerate a final agreement
between Schacht and Goering. Speaking of arrangements concerning
cooperation of these two key figures, Keitel said:
“I know that a necessary practical basis for it [the arrangement
for cooperation between Schacht and Goering] has already been
found, and only a formal agreement is needed in order to carry
on the common work.”
* * * * * *
“* * * to waste time in our situation would be the greatest
reproach that history could make upon us.
“May I beg, therefore, once more that the arrangement mentioned
be expedited, and that I be notified accordingly.” (_EC-248_)
Finally, on 7 July 1937, Schacht and Goering signed an agreement of
reconciliation in Berlin, wherein it was said that the tasks of Goering
and Schacht “are being solved in closest mutual cooperation,” and that
“no doubt exists about the fact that the Commissioner General for War
Economy has the position of a supreme authority of the Reich”
(_EC-384_).
Schacht resumed his duties as General Plenipotentiary with renewed
vigor. On the day following his formal agreement with Goering, he wrote
to General von Blomberg on “Measures for the preparation of the conduct
of war,” pledging continued cooperation in their mutual endeavors:
“* * * by the direction of the supreme authority for the conduct
of war, the coordination of the conduct of war will be assured
in its execution through mutual agreement between you and me,
which I look upon as a matter of course in the Central Authority
and without which I cannot envisage any conduct of war. The
direction of the economy by the plenipotentiary would in that
event never ‘take place entirely independent from the rest of
the war mechanism’ but would be aimed at the accomplishment of
the political war purpose with the mustering of all economic
forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this
way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to
the Reich Defense Act [_Reichsverteidigungsgesetz_].” (_EC-252_)
However, Schacht and Goering were soon again in disagreement. After a
sharp exchange of letters in which each sought to justify his particular
economic program as the best means of making possible the attainment of
Hitler’s objectives (_EC-497_; _EC-493_), Schacht suggested to Goering
in a curt letter dated 26 August 1937, that he (Goering) assume sole
charge of economic policies. In this letter, Schacht rationalized his
precipitate action as follows:
“To me it does not seem to be of decisive importance to raise
questions of competence and initiative, but it is of decisive
importance that the Fuehrer’s economic policy should be carried
out in a coherent manner, and with the least amount of
friction.” (_EC-283_)
Despite the uncompromising tenor of the latter communication, Schacht
was still amenable to an arrangement with Goering which would have
permitted him a measure of autonomy in economic planning and preparation
for war. On 1 November 1937, he attended a conference with Goering
“* * * which led in an entirely friendly manner to the working
out of a series of proposals, which * * * Goering promised to
have presented to me [Schacht] in writing on the following day *
* * so that, after having reached an agreement we could present
a mutually approved text to you, my Fuehrer.” (_EC-495_)
But the written agreement was not forthcoming as Goering had promised,
and Schacht repeated his request to be relieved from the Ministry of
Economics, “in the interest of a uniform government management”
(_EC-495_). Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of
Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister
Without Portfolio. Schacht’s resignation was also extended to his
position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_EC-494_).
In subsequent interrogations, both Schacht and Goering have confirmed
the fact that Schacht’s withdrawal was simply the result of a losing
struggle with Goering to retain personal power (_3730-PS_; _3728-PS_).
There is nothing to indicate that Schacht’s withdrawal from the Ministry
of Economics and the Office of Plenipotentiary for War Economy in any
sense represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated
military aggression. He consented to retain his position as President of
the Reichsbank, where he remained undisputed master, and accepted the
post of Minister of[without] Portfolio, in order to be Hitler’s
“personal adviser.” In the letter accepting Schacht’s resignation as
Minister of Economics, Hitler said:
“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest
gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy
consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorium,
you will make available for the German people and me for many
years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your
untiring working strength. Delighted at the fact that in the
future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I
appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.” (_L-104_).
As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht continued to carry out Hitler’s
policies. As previously shown, he participated in the planning of the
invasion of Austria by fixing the conversion rate of the Austrian
Schilling in advance of the invasion; and under his direction, the
Austrian National Bank was merged into the Reichsbank. He publicly
approved the absorption of Austria and the acquisition of the
Sudetenland. He continued to finance armaments by “mefo” bill credits
until April 1938, and thereafter, until his resignation in January 1939,
authorized an increase of approximately 2.6 billion Reichsmarks in bank
notes in order to discount commercial paper which was used in connection
with the armament program. (_EC-438_)
(2) _Schacht’s dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank._ Schacht
was dismissed from the Presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The
evidence indicates that Schacht engineered his dismissal in order to
escape personal responsibility for what he believed to be an impending
financial crisis; he was not dismissed because of disagreement with the
ultimate objectives of the conspiracy or common plan.
Schacht had always feared an inflation in Germany. As early as May 1936,
he emphatically stated that he would “never be party to an inflation”
(_1301-PS_). In January 1939, Schacht was convinced that ruinous
inflation was, in fact, imminent (_EC-369_). There was, it appears,
ample basis for his fear. The Finance Minister, von Krosigk, had already
recognized the situation in September 1938, and had written to Hitler
warning that
“* * * we are steering towards a serious financial crisis, the
forebodings of which have led already abroad to detailed
discussions of this weak side in our economic preparations and
to an apprehensive loss of confidence domestically.” (_EC-419_)
Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis; he was even more
fearful that he personally would be held responsible for it and his
prestige would suffer a crushing blow. One of his associates at the
Reichsbank has stated:
“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had
sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more anxious
to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a
long time the ‘leitmotif’ of Schacht’s conversations with the
directors of the bank.” (_EC-438_)
In the end, Schacht deliberately stimulated his dismissal from the
Presidency of the Reichsbank by arbitrarily refusing an end-of-the-month
loan in a relatively small amount to the Reich, contrary to well
established practice (_3730-PS_; _3731-PS_).
Despite differences of opinion concerning the limits to which the German
economy might be pushed without plunging the country into inflation,
Schacht continued to enjoy Hitler’s confidence. In his letter to Schacht
dated 19 January 1939, Hitler stated:
“On the occasion of your recall from Office as President of the
Reichsbank Directory, I take the opportunity to express to you
my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you
rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this
capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all,
will always be connected with the first epoch of the national
rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your
services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich
Minister.” (_EC-397_).
On his side, Schacht evidenced his abiding faith in Hitler and his
continued agreement with his aggressive policies, by remaining as
Minister without Portfolio until January 1943. As such he received a
large salary from the Nazi Government and enjoyed the emoluments of
public office (_3724-PS_).
(3) _Conclusion._ Schacht’s assistance in the earlier phase of the
conspiracy was an important factor in enabling the conspirators to seize
the German state and thus pave the way for their later crimes. His work
was indispensable to the rearmament of Germany and to the economic
planning and preparation required to launch the German wars of
aggression. As long as he remained in power, he worked as eagerly for
the preparation of aggressive war as any of his co-conspirators. He
personally was favorably disposed towards aggression, if “Lebensraum”
for Germany could not otherwise be attained. He knew that Hitler
intended to and would break the peace, and with this knowledge, he
willingly and purposely contributed his efforts. His withdrawal from
three of his four posts reflected no moral feeling against the use of
aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy; he withdrew for
reasons wholly unrelated to Hitler’s program of illegal aggression. By
the time of his withdrawal from these three positions, he had already
provided his co-conspirators with the physical means and economic
planning necessary to launch and maintain their wars of aggression; and
he continued in his lucrative fourth position (Minister without
Portfolio) until January 1943—until, in short, it became doubtful
whether the conspirators could maintain the successes which they had
gained in the wars they had illegally launched and were waging.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HJALMAR SCHACHT
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │
│the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │
│November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │
│adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │
│November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295
│ │ │
*1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler,│ │
│3 May 1935, concerning the financing │ │
│of the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827
│ │ │
*1301-PS │File relating to financing of │ │
│armament, including minutes of │ │
│conference with Goering at the Air │ │
│Ministry, 14 October 1938, concerning │ │
│acceleration of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to │ │
│the Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │
│Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83
│ │ │
*3021-PS │Statement of governmental positions │ │
│held by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. (USA 11) │ V │ 737
│ │ │
3700-PS │Letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal, │ │
│11 March, concerning conscription of │ │
│15-year-olds. (USA 780) │ VI │ 404
│ │ │
*3724-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 11 July │ │
│1945. (USA 776) │ VI │ 463
│ │ │
*3725-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 20 July │ │
│1945. (USA 615) │ VI │ 464
│ │ │
*3726-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 24 │ │
│August 1945. (USA 628) │ VI │ 465
│ │ │
*3727-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 13 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 633) │ VI │ 478
│ │ │
*3728-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 16 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 636) │ VI │ 485
│ │ │
*3729-PS │Testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 616) │ VI │ 501
│ │ │
*3730-PS │Testimony of Hermann Goering, 17 │ │
│October 1945. (USA 648) │ VI │ 530
│ │ │
*3731-PS │Testimony of von Krosigk, 24 September│ │
│1945. (USA 647) │ VI │ 535
│ │ │
*3901-PS │Letter written November 1932 by │ │
│Schacht, Krupp and others to the Reich│ │
│President. (USA 837) │ VI │ 796
│ │ │
*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of│ │
│industry before the election of March │ │
│1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080
│ │ │
*EC-128 │Report on state of preparations for │ │
│war economic mobilization as of 30 │ │
│September 1934. (USA 623) │ VII │ 306
│ │ │
*EC-174 │Summary “war economy” trip to │ │
│Godesberg undertaken by General Staff │ │
│between 25 May and 2 June 1937. (USA │ │
│761) │ VII │ 326
│ │ │
*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │
│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │
│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328
│ │ │
EC-243 │Memorandum, 26 November 1936, │ │
│containing Goering’s Order regarding │ │
│jurisdiction and development of raw │ │
│and synthetic materials. (USA 637) │ VII │ 338
│ │ │
*EC-244 │Letter from Blomberg to Hitler, 22 │ │
│February 1937. (USA 641) │ VII │ 342
│ │ │
EC-248 │Letter from Keitel to Koerner, 14 June│ │
│1937, concerning cooperation of │ │
│Plenipotentiary General and Four Year │ │
│Plan for War Economy. │ VII │ 343
│ │ │
EC-251 │Letter from Wohlthat to various │ │
│officials, 21 July 1937. │ VII │ 344
│ │ │
*EC-252 │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 │ │
│July 1937. (USA 762) │ VII │ 346
│ │ │
*EC-257 │Personal letter from Schacht to │ │
│Thomas, 29 December 1937. (USA 763) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
*EC-258 │Report on Preparation of the Economic │ │
│Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary │ │
│for War Economy as of 31 December │ │
│1937. (USA 625) │ VII │ 347
│ │ │
EC-283 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 26 │ │
│August 1937. │ VII │ 379
│ │ │
*EC-297-A │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank │ │
│President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938.│ │
│(USA 632) │ VII │ 394
│ │ │
*EC-369 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │
│Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631) │ VII │ 426
│ │ │
*EC-376 │Letter from Schacht to supervisory │ │
│officers, 11 December 1936. (USA 638) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
*EC-383 │Letter 16 January 1937 with │ │
│enclosure—article about Schacht │ │
│appearing in the Military weekly │ │
│Gazette. (USA 640) │ VII │ 436
│ │ │
EC-384 │Agreement between Schacht and Goering,│ │
│7 July 1937. (USA 771) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-397 │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 │ │
│January 1939. (USA 650) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-398 │Dismissal of Schacht as President of │ │
│the Reichsbank, 20 January 1939. (USA │ │
│649) │ VII │ 438
│ │ │
*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │
│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │
│26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450
│ │ │
*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │
│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │
│772) │ VII │ 455
│ │ │
*EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │
│Plan and preparation of the war │ │
│economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465
│ │ │
*EC-415 │Extracts from “Schacht in His │ │
│Statements”, Berlin, 1937. (USA 627) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*EC-416 │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 4 │ │
│September 1936. (USA 635) │ VII │ 471
│ │ │
*EC-419 │Letter from Schwerin-Krosigk to │ │
│Hitler, 1 September 1938. (USA 621) │ VII │ 474
│ │ │
*EC-420 │Draft of letter prepared by Military │ │
│Economic Staff, 19 December 1936. (USA│ │
│639) │ VII │ 479
│ │ │
*EC-421 │Minutes taken by member of General │ │
│Thomas’ staff of meeting held on 11 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 645) │ VII │ 481
│ │ │
EC-432 │Extracts from Annual Economic Review │ │
│for Germany, 1935, prepared by Douglas│ │
│Miller. │ VII │ 484
│ │ │
*EC-433 │Koenigsberg speech of Schacht at │ │
│German Eastern Fair. (USA 832) │ VII │ 486
│ │ │
*EC-436 │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 620) │ VII │ 494
│ │ │
EC-437 │Affidavit of Puhl, 7 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 624) │ VII │ 495
│ │ │
*EC-438 │Affidavit of Puhl, 8 November 1945. │ │
│(USA 646) │ VII │ 499
│ │ │
*EC-439 │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November │ │
│1945. (USA 618) │ VII │ 501
│ │ │
*EC-450 │Affidavit of S. R. Fuller, 18 October │ │
│1945. (USA 629) │ VII │ 502
│ │ │
*EC-451 │Affidavit of Messersmith, 15 November │ │
│1945. (USA 626) │ VII │ 509
│ │ │
*EC-456 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 12 │ │
│November 1932. (USA 773) │ VII │ 512
│ │ │
*EC-457 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 29 │ │
│August 1932. (USA 619) │ VII │ 513
│ │ │
*EC-458 │Affidavit of Major Tilley, 21 November│ │
│1945. (USA 634) │ VII │ 514
│ │ │
*EC-460 │Franz Reuter “Schacht”, from German │ │
│Publishing Establishment, 1937, pp. │ │
│113-114. (USA 617) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
*EC-461 │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary,│ │
│1933-38. (USA 58) │ VII │ 515
│ │ │
EC-492 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 17 │ │
│April 1937. │ VII │ 550
│ │ │
*EC-493 │Letter from Goering to Schacht, 22 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 642) │ VII │ 552
│ │ │
*EC-494 │Letter from Lammers to Goering, │ │
│presenting copy of letter from Lammers│ │
│to Schacht, 8 December 1937. (USA 643)│ VII │ 565
│ │ │
*EC-495 │Letter from Schacht to Hitler, 16 │ │
│November 1937, requesting release. │ │
│(USA 774) │ VII │ 566
│ │ │
*EC-497 │Letter from Schacht to Goering, 5 │ │
│August 1937. (USA 775) │ VII │ 567
│ │ │
EC-498 │“Schacht in Danzig”, excerpt of 16 │ │
│June 1935 from Frankfurter Zeitung. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-499 │Dr. Schacht 60 Years Old, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 21 January │ │
│1937. │ VII │ 576
│ │ │
EC-500 │A Proclamation by Dr. Schacht on │ │
│occasion of presentation of Golden │ │
│Party Badge, from Frankfurter Zeitung,│ │
│9 February 1937. │ VII │ 578
│ │ │
EC-501 │The Economic Development, and │ │
│Inaugural speech by Dr. Schacht, from │ │
│Berliner Tageblatt, 21 April 1937. │ VII │ 579
│ │ │
EC-502 │“In Germany There is only One Economic│ │
│Policy”, from Frankfurter Zeitung, 19 │ │
│January 1936. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
EC-503 │Schacht Speech at Leipzig Fair, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 March 1935. │ VII │ 583
│ │ │
*EC-611 │Speech by Schacht, 29 November 1938, │ │
│entitled “Miracle of Finance” and “The│ │
│New Plan”. (USA 622) │ VII │ 589
│ │ │
*L-104 │Report Ambassador Dodd to State │ │
│Department, 29 November 1937, │ │
│concerning Hitler’s letter to Schacht │ │
│accepting resignation as Minister of │ │
│Economics and Schacht’s circular │ │
│communication to officials of │ │
│Ministry. (USA 644) │ VII │ 879
│ │ │
*L-111 │Telegraphic report from Ambassador │ │
│Davies to State Department, 20 January│ │
│1937. (USA 630) │ VII │ 881
│ │ │
*L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │
│State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │
│regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │
│70) │ VII │ 894
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
13. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH[1]
A. _IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY, KRUPP CIRCUMVENTED THE
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ON THE REARMAMENT OF
GERMANY. AS THE RESPONSIBLE HEAD OF THE HUGE ARMAMENTS CONCERN, FRIED.
KRUPP A.G., HE CONCEALED ITS ARMAMENT ACTIVITY IN ORDER TO DECEIVE THE
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS, THEREFORE, IN A POSITION TO PROMOTE THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSPIRACY BY THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS OF WAR
ON A HUGE SCALE AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER._
-----
[1] Since the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was severed
from the Nurnberg trial which commenced on 20 November 1945, the trial
brief outlining the case against Krupp, which was prepared before his
severance, was not presented to the Tribunal. Despite his personal
absence from the prisoners’ dock, however, Krupp remained technically
still under indictment and liable to prosecution in subsequent
proceedings. Moreover, Krupp was still regarded by the prosecution as a
member of the Nazi conspiracy. The following summary of evidence,
adapted from the trial brief, is included here in order to show the role
played by Krupp as co-conspirator.
-----
In an article entitled “Manager and Armament Worker” written for the 1
March 1942 issue of the Krupp magazine, Krupp stated:
“* * * I knew German history well, and out of my experiences in
the rest of the world I believed to know the German kind;
therefore I never doubted that, although for the time being all
indications were against it, one day a change would come. How, I
never knew or asked, but I believed in it. But with this
knowledge—and today I may speak about these things and for the
first time I am doing this extensively and publicly—with this,
as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the
greatest importance had to be taken. If Germany should ever be
reborn, if it should shake off the chains of Versailles one day,
the Krupp concern had to be prepared again. * * *”
“* * * I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all
opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if
in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most
intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake
the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for
I had to expect that many people would not understand me. * * *”
“Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and
preparations were undertaken. Thus to the surprise of many
people Krupp began to manufacture goods which really appeared to
be far distant from the former work of an armament plant. Even
the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans,
cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and similar
‘small junk’ appeared really unsuspicious and even locomotives
and automobiles made an entirely ‘civilian’ impression.
“After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler I had the
satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupps
stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the
rearmament of the German people without any gaps of
experience,—the blood of the comrades of KAR. Saturday 1923 had
not been shed in vain. Since that time I was often permitted to
accompany the Fuehrer through the old and new workshops and to
experience how the workers of Krupp cheered him in gratitude. In
the years after 1933 we worked with an incredible intensity and
when the war did break out the speed and results were again
increased. We are all proud of having thus contributed to the
heretofore magnificent successes of our army.”
* * * * * *
“I have always considered it to be an honour as well as an
obligation to be the head of an arms factory and I know that the
employees of Krupp share these feelings. Thanks to the
educational work of the National Socialist Government this is
the case all over Germany. I know that the things I have said
here about the armament worker in particular hold true for every
German worker. With these men and women who work for the cause
with all their hearts, with cool heads and skilled hands we will
master every fate.” (_D-94_; see _D-64_).
In a memorandum of a conference held on 9 December 1942, concerning the
proposed publication of a book dealing with Krupp’s armament activities,
Von Bulow, confidential secretary to Krupp, wrote:
“For the period of transition from 1919 up to rearmament, A. K.
[Krupp] had undertaken various tasks in order to keep up the
Company’s activity in the field of artillery, in the sense of
observing activities in that field in the rest of the world
(relation: BOFORS) and then also for the production of artillery
material, within and to a certain extent also beyond, the
limitation established by the peace dictate.” (_D-249_).
B. _AFTER THE CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER, KRUPP LENT HIS
INFLUENCE, PRESTIGE, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR
CONTROL OVER THE GERMAN STATE._
(1) With knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Nazi conspiracy, he
sought to reorganize the Reich Association of German Industry, of which
he was Chairman, so as to bring it into line with the aims of the
conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of
their policies.
(_a_) Upon the invitation of Goering (_D-201_), Krupp attended a meeting
in Berlin on 20 February 1933, during which Hitler, in a speech to a
select group of industrialists, announced the conspirators’ aims to
seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary
system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of
the _Wehrmacht_. In the course of this speech, Hitler stated:
“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of
Democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound
idea of authority and personality. * * * Life always tears up
humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a Leader to find
ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people
apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to
search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them
in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of
reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of
individual personality. * * * If one rejects pacifism, one must
put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be
pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.”
“* * * We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must
be introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon
a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this,
however, courage, and iron will and perseverance are essential.”
“* * * With the very same courage with which we go to work to
make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we
have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way. We
have turned down the favour (benevolence) of the Catholic Centre
Party [_Zentrum_] to tolerate us. Hugemberg has too small a
movement. He has only considerably slowed down our development.
We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other
side completely. While still gaining power one should not start
the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one
has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further
possible upward development, shall one strike. * * *”
“Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the
outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election
does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the
election does not decide, the decision must be brought about
even by other means. I have intervened in order to give the
people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves.
This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly
happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany
won’t go to ruin. Today, as never before, everyone is under the
obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make
sacrifices has never been greater than now. For Economy I have
the one wish that it go parallel with the internal structure to
meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht
will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have
gained internal strength through internal peace. * * * There are
only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on
constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this
election or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons,
which may demand greater sacrifices. I would like to see them
avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness
of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably even
100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to
which I pledge myself with glowing energy.” (_D-203_).
At this same meeting, Goering declared that the impending election of 5
March 1933 would certainly be the last one for the next 10 years, and
probably even for the next 100 years (_D-203_).
In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933 describing this meeting, Krupp
wrote that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of approximately 25
industrialists present for the clear expression of his views and
emphasized, on behalf of all present, that it was time to clarify the
political situation in Germany (_D-204_).
(_b_) On 25 April 1933, Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of
German Industry (_Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie_) submitted to
Hitler his plan for the reorganization of German industry and in
connection therewith, undertook to bring the Association into line with
the aims of the conspirators and to make it an effective instrument for
the execution of their policies.
_1._ In the letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that his plan of
reorganization was characterized by the desire to coordinate
“economic measures and political necessity, adopting the
Fuehrer’s conception of the New German State” (_D-157_).
_2._ In the plan of reorganization itself Krupp stated:
“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes
which I myself and the Board of Directors have cherished
for a long time. I am convinced that, under the threat
of the impoverishment of our people, the machinery of
government must be simplified to the utmost. For the
same reason I did not fail to recognize a long time ago
the necessity of rationalizing our economic system.
“Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be
missed to obtain the best for our economic system, I am
employing the authority bestowed upon me by the
Presiding Council to carry out a double task:—
1. In the negotiations with the Reichschancellor and his
representatives I shall make it my goal to coordinate,
in the field of organization of industrial associations,
the economically reasonable with the politically
necessary.
2. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German
Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the
new organization into agreement with the political aims
of the Reich Government and at the same time to make it
so rational and forceful that it can be an effective
instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the
relative importance of the industry.” (_D-157_)
(_c_) In a speech delivered on 18 October 1933, on the occasion of the
first meeting of the Committee for Industrial and Social policy of the
Reich Association of German Industry, Krupp reaffirmed his aim to bring
the Association into complete accord with the political goals of the
Nazi government and stated, _inter alia_:
“* * * To have united the purposes of an entire Nation, is the
great historical achievement of the man in whose strong hands
our President has placed the fate of our people. When
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer Adolf Hitler called the General
Council of Economy together for the first time on the 20th of
September, I had the honor to thank him for the confidence which
he had put in the men of the practical business world by calling
them to the General Council. I pledged to him unrestrained
support in his Government in its exceedingly difficult task from
all branches and organizations of Economy.
“I may repeat now what I said then: ‘The unshakable faith of our
Reichschancellor and Fuehrer in the future of our people gives
also to the men of business the courage and the strength to put
everything in the reconstruction of a healthy National Economy
in a strong National State under National Socialist leadership’.
“You, too, gentlemen, if I am certain of your confidence, are
bound to this pledge. It holds in itself, for all of us, the
deeply felt obligation to be the guarantors for the
unconditional execution of the Fuehrer’s will in all links and
branches of Industry. May the spirit of devotion to duty which
inspires us always dominate this Committee’s conferences!
“I ask you, gentlemen, to rise and to join me in the toast: To
the venerable President of the German Reich, General
Fieldmarshal Von Hindenburg and the German People’s Chancellor
and Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler: ‘_Sieg Heil_’.” (_D-353_).
(2) Krupp organized, sponsored, and made substantial financial
contributions to the Hitler Fund (_Hitler Spende_), with knowledge that
the funds were to be used to further the objectives of the SA and SS.
(_a_) In a letter to Schacht dated 30 May 1933, Krupp wrote:
“As Dr. Hoettgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you
yesterday, it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most
far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture
and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the
Fuehrer of the NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’, which
would replace collections in many cases separately organized of
the various NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm. It has been
decided to appoint a management council for this central
collection; I have accepted the chairmanship of the management
council at the unanimous request of the principal federations,
inspired by the wish to collaborate with my full strength in
this task which is to be a symbol of gratitude to the Fuehrer of
the nation.” (_D-151_)
(_b_) A circular written by Hess in August 1933, which was found among
Krupp’s files, specifically states that one of the purposes of the
Hitler Fund is “to put at the disposal of the Reich leadership the funds
required for the unified execution of the tasks which fall to the lot of
the SA, SS, ST, HJ, political organizations etc.” (_D-151_).
In a letter dated 15 August 1934, from Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA,
which was found among Krupp’s papers, authority was granted, with the
approval of the Deputy Fuehrer, to Gauleiter Terboven to use a special
part of the year’s Hitler Fund in the interest of the SA in the Ruhr
district (_D-368_).
(_c_) From the inception of the Hitler Fund until the collapse of
Germany, the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen (main company in the
Krupp organization) alone contributed 4,738,446 marks to that fund
(_D-325_; the above figure is the total amount shown on the chart, not
here reproduced[2]). This assistance to the Hitler Fund was supplemented
by large contributions made by the other Krupp companies.
-----
[2] This and subsequent similar charts have been omitted from this
publication because of their length and complexity, and the relative
unimportance of the issue for which they have been cited.
-----
(3) Krupp, both privately and through the Krupp firm, made substantial
contributions to the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.
(_a_) For contributions by Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works in Essen, see
_D-325_.
(_b_) In June 1935, Krupp contributed 100,000 marks to the Nazi Party
out of his personal account (_D-332_; _D-373_).
(4) In numerous public addresses, Krupp supported the measures adopted
by the conspirators in the execution of their program.
(_a_) In a speech urging every German to approve Germany’s withdrawal
from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, Krupp said:
“* * * Just as the 5th of March brought about the change from
chaos to order, from disgrace to honor in domestic policy so, on
November 12, the unanimous “Yes” of the German people concerning
the foreign policy of the Reich Government, shall and must give
ample proof to the entire world that every citizen who is worthy
of the German name, stands unconditionally behind the Reich
Government as led by the Reich Chancellor, and its foreign
policy which is dictated by the commandment of self-respect.”
* * * * * *
“* * * When the radio broadcasts the results of the People’s
Election on the evening of November 12, the entire world must
know that: Germany stands in the camp of Adolf Hitler.”
(_D-393_).
(_b_) In a speech delivered on 26 January 1934, Krupp expressed approval
of the leadership principle in industrial relations, under which the
entrepreneur became the leader and the workers became his followers. In
the course of this speech he said:
“National-Socialism has liberated the German worker from the
clutches of a doctrine which was basically hostile both for
employer and employee. Adolf Hitler has returned the worker to
his nation; he has made of him a disciplined soldier of labor
and therefore our comrade. When, on the other hand, the new
State awards to the enterpriser the role of leader in economy
and labor, then we know that: Leadership has obligation!
“The enterpriser and his leading officers are the trustees for
the material welfare of our people.” (_D-392_).
(_c_) In a speech delivered on 10 August 1934, in connection with the
plebiscite to approve Hitler’s dual appointment as president and
chancellor after Hindenburg’s death, Krupp said:
“Let us all follow him now also, our Leader, our Reich—and
People’s Chancellor.
“In an exceptionally short time he has eliminated the quarrel
between parties, has guaranteed unity to the Reich and has
assured to every German pride to work, has brought the
opportunity for work to the near future. On 19 August all our
votes borne of deep trust and proven confidence shall go to the
man acclaimed by those hearts of many thousands and millions who
cannot, because of their age, go to the polls but who daily join
us, who are permitted to vote, in the Cry:
Heil Hitler!” (_D-386_).
(_d_) In a speech dated 27 October 1935, Krupp stated:
“* * * Our thoughts fly therefore by themselves in this festive
hour of our plant community, to the man whom we thank for the
resurrection of our Nation: Adolf Hitler, the patron of German
labour and German art. Unanimously we will confess and pledge
ourselves to stand behind the Fuehrer and his movement today and
forever and thereby to be of service to the idea of eternal
Germany.” (_D-385_)
(_e_) In a speech dated 1 May 1936, after the Nazis had reoccupied and
fortified the Rhineland, Krupp stated:
“No greater recognition, no greater incentive to further common
work accomplishment could have been given us than was done
through the visit of our Fuehrer on March 27th of this year to
our works and through his addresses from here. * * *”
“Never has a statesman fought for the soul of his people and for
its well-being with such faith, such ardor, such endurance. We
shall never forget how deeply we are indebted to him. * * * I
only mention here the abolition of the parties and the
unification of the people, the regaining of the sovereignty in
the Rhineland, the extensive abolition of unemployment, the
accomplishments of the labour service, the magnificent public
buildings, the roads, bridges and canals. * * *”
* * * * * *
“The world will have to get used to the fact that the voice of
the Fuehrer is the voice of the whole German people. * * *”
“Jubileers and co-workers! We shall be thankful to fate that we
were and are permitted to be eye and action witnesses of the
great turning point in our German history, and we shall thank
especially the divine destiny that it has presented us with a
man like Adolf Hitler. Let us then combine all that which moves
our hearts upon mention of this name into the cry: Our people
and fatherland and its great Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-291_).
C. _UNDER KRUPP’S DIRECTION, THE KRUPP FIRM, BY DEVELOPING NEW
INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND PRODUCING HUGE QUANTITIES OF WAR MATERIALS,
FURTHERED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM TO CREATE A POWERFUL MILITARY
POTENTIAL._
(1) In a speech prepared in January 1944, for delivery at the University
of Berlin, Krupp stated:
“* * * I don’t see why this thought still flutters in many a
head occasionally—that the production of war materials should
be a sinister trade! No: war material is life-saving for one’s
own people and whoever works and performs in these spheres can
be proud of it; here enterprise as a whole finds its highest
justification of existence. This justification—I may inject
this here—crystallized especially during that time of the
‘Interregnum’, between 1919 and 1933, when Germany was
lying-down disarmed. * * * It is the one great merit of the
entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during
those bad years, even though its activity could not be brought
to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work,
scientific and basic ground work was laid, in order to be ready
again to work the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour,
without loss of time or experience.”
* * * * * *
“Only through this secret activity of German enterprise,
together with the experience gained meanwhile through production
of peace time goods was it possible after 1933, to fall into
step with the new tasks arrived at restoring Germany’s military
power, (only through all that) could the entirely new and
various problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four Year’s Plan
for German enterprise, be mastered. * * *” (_D-317_)
(2) Krupp played a leading role in the design and production of new
weapons for the German armed forces.
(_a_) In a memorandum concerning a conference held at the Federal
Ministry for National Defense in Vienna on 25 September 1936, Pfirsch, a
Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * in spite of the obstacles put in our way by the Treaty of
Versailles, we had never been inactive throughout the postwar
period, but had drawn upon the experience of the war in the
creation of new types, and that we had won the prizes for almost
every type in the competitions organized by our War Ministry for
the construction of new artillery weapons, so much so that the
guns introduced into the German Army of to-day, such as the 8.8
cm. anti-aircraft, the 10.5 cm. field gun, the heavy field
howitzer and beyond them the larger calibres have been made
according to our pattern.” (_D-152_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 21 February 1944, Woelfert, a department
chief in the Krupp concern, wrote:
“First a few facts about the development of tanks by Krupp. We
are manufacturing tanks since 1928, which means before
rearmament. We started studying on heavy tractors. Krupp built
the first mass production tank, the Panzer I, which is also
known as LaS. It was shown in public in 1935, the year when
rearmament started, and made a great impression. We also
originated the Panzer IV, or better the BW, which was especially
at the beginning of the war one of the prime factors in our
rapid advances into enemy country, so that today we are fighting
on the Atlantic coast, in the South, and east and not on German
soil. Even today we use the BW-base for many self-propelled
guns, assault-guns, anti-aircraft guns etc.” (_D-96_).
(_c_) In a letter to Hitler dated 24 July 1942, Krupp wrote:
“My Fuehrer!
“The big weapon, whose manufacturing is to be thanked to your
command, has now proved its effectiveness. * * *”
“True to an example set by Alfred Krupp in 1870, my wife and
myself ask the favour that the Krupp works refrain from charging
for this first finished product.
“To express my thanks to you, my Fuehrer, for the confidence
shown in our plants and in us personally by entrusting such an
order with us, is a pleasant duty for my wife and myself.
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-375_).
(_d_) Krupp likewise made significant contributions to the production of
Navy weapons and U-Boats (_D-88_; _D-287_).
(3) The rapid and progressive expansion in armament production by Krupp
after the conspirators’ accession to power is plainly shown by a chart
prepared by Krupp officials concerning the production of war materials
at the _Krupp Gustahlfabrik_ in Essen (only one of the many companies in
the Krupp organization). This chart shows that the production of war
materials at that particular factory during the fiscal year, 1 October
1933 to 30 September 1934, was more than twice that of any previous year
since 1929; that such production during the fiscal year, 1 October 1934
to 30 September 1935, was almost twice as great as the previous year;
and that production of war materials continued thereafter at an
accelerated rate with the result that during the fiscal year, 1 October
1938 to 30 September 1939, it was more than 10 times as great as it was
during the period 1 October 1932 to 30 September 1933 (Chart entitled
“Fried. Krupp Gustahlfabrik Essen, Turnover in War Material,” not
reproduced here). It should be noted that this chart shows only direct
sales by the Essen factory of war materials to the German Armed Forces
Ordnance Supply Department and sales to foreign countries of war
materials easily recognizable as such. It does not cover indirect sales,
viz: the sale of products to other concerns which, in turn, used them to
produce materials of war. (The chart entitled “Fried. Krupp and Branch
Establishments, Inland Turnover,” not here reproduced, shows figures
which include “indirect” sales of war materials by certain Krupp
companies.)
D. _KRUPP GOVERNED THE EXPORTS OF HIS FIRM IN THE LIGHT OF THE MILITARY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS AND THE ACCEPTED AND DISCHARGED
IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE
CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR._
(1) In a “strictly confidential” memorandum dated 25 March 1941, the
following was reported:
“* * * The liberation of the Reich from the shackles of
Versailles enabled Krupp to recommence the export of armaments.
The German Government had, in fact, pressed for the matter.
Military-political and Military-economic reasons were the cause.
Krupp desired to come into the closest contact with the armament
exports, so as to further the development of arms * * *”
* * * * * *
“* * * By using all the forces at his [Krupp’s] disposal and
regardless of effort, costs and risk, considerable export
contracts were secured, which served to obtain foreign currency
or raw materials, and were, at the same time, politically
desirable. * * *” (_D-191_)
In a memorandum dated 23 June 1937, concerning a Bulgarian order for
armour plating which was discussed with German Army representatives,
Reiff, a Krupp official, wrote:
“Major Olbrich showed himself aware quite evidently of the
deeper reasons existing why Germany was anxious that this order
should be booked. * * *” (_D-154_)
(2) At the request of the Inspector of War Production, Krupp became a
Leader of War Production in 1937, and was charged with the
responsibility of preparing and carrying out the mobilization of the
armament industry and of directing it in time of war.
(_a_) In a “strictly confidential” letter dated 21 January 1937, the
Inspector of War Production wrote to Krupp:
“The Reich Minister for War and the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces has ordered that a Corps of Economic Leaders of War
Production be recruited with immediate effect.
“The Economic Leaders of War Production in collaboration with
the Armed Forces, are to be responsible for the preparing and
carrying out of the mobilization of the armament industry and
for directing it in time of war.”
* * * * * *
“A selected small circle of these persons is to act in an
advisory capacity to the Armed Forces in all important economic
questions both during peace and war.
“Subject to your approval, I intend to propose to the Reich
Minister for War that you should be nominated as Economic Leader
for War Production.” (_D-62_)
(_b_) In connection with his acceptance of the position of Leader of War
Production, Krupp submitted a “secret” document entitled, “Declaration
of Political Attitude,” dated 6 February 1937, in which he stated:
“I herewith declare that I stand by the National Socialist
conception of the State without reserve and that I have not been
active in any way against the interests of the people.”
* * * * * *
“I am aware that should I say or do anything which constitutes
an attack against the National Socialist conception of the
State, I must expect, in addition to legal proceedings, my
dismissal from the post of Economic Leader of War Production.”
(_D-63_).
E. _KRUPP SUPPORTED THE CONSPIRATORS’ PROPAGANDA PROGRAM; LENT HIS
ORGANIZATION TO THE DISSEMINATION OF NAZI PROPAGANDA ABROAD; AND USED
HIS EMPLOYEES IN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE AIMS AND
PURPOSES OF THE NAZI CONSPIRACY._
(1) In April 1933, Krupp contributed 20,000 marks to Rosenberg for the
purpose of counteracting anti-Nazi propaganda abroad. In a letter to
Krupp dated 26 April 1933, Rosenberg said:
“Once more my most cordial thanks for not having shunned the
inconvenience of the journey in order to participate at
yesterday’s intimate conference. I am glad to determine, on the
basis of our discussion, that you too welcome the organization
of an active counter-action abroad, in the interest of State and
Economy, and express to you the highest thanks for the support
of a monetary kind as well, which you have subscribed to our
work. Very shortly a quantity of material will be sent to you
promptly and will subsequently be distributed throughout the
world in a comprehensive compilation.” (_D-158_; see also
_D-208_ and _D-242_)
(2) In a memorandum dated 12 October 1939, entitled “Distribution of
Official Propaganda Literature Abroad with the Help of our Foreign
Connections,” concerning a visit by a Mr. Lackmann of Ribbentrop’s
private foreign office, Von Raussendorff, a Krupp official, wrote:
“I informed Mr. L. that our Firm had put itself years ago at the
disposal of official Bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda
and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the
utmost. * * * Only by personal handling can our connections
abroad be used and kept receptive to effective propaganda. With
the present lively activity of the ‘Secret Service’ it must be
avoided, not only in the interest of our Firm but also in the
interest of Germany as a whole, that our agents in neutral
foreign countries would come through improper handling to the
attention of the ‘Secret Service’ and economically ruined by it
within a short time.
“* * * If additional distributions of propaganda literature were
desired, a propaganda-leaflet should be sent to us, and after
examining it, we would advise the official Bureau what quantity
of such printed matter could be mailed abroad through us, at our
expense, as heretofore.” (_D-206_)
(3) In a memorandum dated 14 October 1937, concerning a visit by Menzel
of the Intelligence Office of the Combined Services Ministry,
Sonnenberg, a Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * Menzel asked for intelligence on foreign armaments (but
not including matters published in newspapers) received by Krupp
from their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed
on to Combined Services Intelligence [Abwehrabteilung des RKM.].
* * *”
“On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined
Ministry [RKM] as required.” (_D-167_)
The results of a later visit by Menzel, in the company of _Kapitaen zur
See_ Globig, of the Information Department, Naval Armaments Branch, are
reported in a memorandum dated 25 June 1939 by Dr. Conn, a Krupp
official. In the course of this memorandum, which is entitled
“Intelligence and Information,” Dr. Conn stated:
“1. _Kapitaen zur See_ Globig whom I had known for a long time,
spoke to me quite frankly and openly. It is therefore impossible
to embody parts of our discussion in this report.”
* * * * * *
“Similarly to Kapitaen zur See Globig he [Menzel] stressed the
point that in view of the progressive disappearance of public
and easily accessible sources of information, the information
obtained through our representatives abroad was of increasing
value. This method of obtaining intelligence would have to be
followed up much more drastically than in the past.”
* * * * * *
“His [Menzel’s] third point was a request to utilize foreign
visitors for obtaining intelligence. I replied that this was
being done already, but that it was necessary to proceed very
carefully, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the
visitors.”
“I gave him to understand that we were slightly disappointed
with the collaboration with Intelligence [_Abwehr Abteilung_]
since we had supplied information, but had received none in
return. Menzel explained that Intelligence was only a collating
centre and that they were merely passing on information, the
value of which they were unable to judge by themselves, to the
departments concerned; any information for us would therefore
have to come from those departments only. Exceptions were only
made in the case of intelligence of universal importance such as
e.g. the long range gun [_Ferngeschuetz_] some time ago.”
“This remark is important concerning the way in which we should
present our information at Berlin. The departments receiving the
information through Intelligence, must be able to see that it
originates from Krupp, so that they might feel themselves under
obligation to let us have some information in return.” (_D-167_)
In a memorandum marked “secret,” relating to foreign anti-aircraft guns,
Sonnenberg wrote on 8 May 1939:
“I have gained the impression that from no other side do the
respective Army departments get such far reaching support in
their investigation of foreign armaments as from Fr. Krupp.”
(_D-170_).
F. _KRUPP PUBLICLY APPROVED THE SUCCESSIVE CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE
PERPETRATED BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS._
(1) In a speech dated 6 April 1938, shortly after Schuschnigg had been
compelled to capitulate to the Nazi conspirators’ threat of force, Krupp
stated:
“At our family party, today as well, our first thought, our
first glass, is raised in deep appreciation to our Fuehrer. We
are still under the lasting impression of the mighty happenings
of the last four weeks; so are those of us who until a short
time ago were forced to wait impatiently for these developments
outside our State frontiers. To the fulfillment of century-old
dreams consciously arrived at, to the fulfillment of the
life-long wish of Adolf Hitler—thanks to his faith, thanks to
his determination, thanks to his heart, to him, our Fuehrer, a
threefold, deeply thankful,
_Sieg Heil_.” (_D-391_).
(2) In a speech dated 7 April 1938, Krupp, in urging all Germans in the
impending election of 10 April to approve Hitler’s invasion of Austria,
stated:
“Three more days separate us from the day of the Plebiscite to
which our Fuehrer calls us, from the Plebiscite concerning
Greater Germany, at the same time a Plebiscite in which the
proof of faith in our Fuehrer concerns every individual’s
conscience.
“Full with thanks for what Adolf Hitler has bestowed and secured
for the German people in little more than five years’ leadership
through internal and external peace he is worthy of the deepest
felt ‘Yes’ from everyone of us!
“To him, our Fuehrer and Chancellor a threefold
_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-387_)
(3) In a speech delivered on 13 October 1938, on the occasion of
Hitler’s visit to the Krupp works after the Nazi occupation of the
Sudetenland, Krupp said:
“My Fuehrer,
“To be able to greet you at the Krupp Works, in our home, in the
name of my wife and my own, as well as in the name of those
close to me and also in that of the greater plant family, so
shortly after the world-shaking events of the last weeks, is a
great honour and a heart-felt joy to me.
“Perhaps no plant and no home can feel more deeply and more
gratefully than ours the changes in the last decades; none can
be more proudly conscious to be allowed to participate in the
mighty tasks set by you.
“Before us stands now the basic and undeniable world-encircling
success, in its total extent perhaps not fully grasped, which
your faith and strong will, your nerves and your initiative have
achieved.
“May no German ever forget how deeply gratitude therefore put us
under obligation, how proud we may be to be recognized once more
in the world as a free, equal, great German People.
“With the thanks of my family, of our plants, of our entire Ruhr
District filled with the urge to work, I must express united
gratitude, springing from a full warm heart, from the Sudeten
District which is now a part of the German Reich.”
* * * * * *
“_Heil_ to Thee, my Fuehrer.” (_D-304_)
(4) Shortly after the conspirators launched their aggression against
Poland, Krupp stated to the workers in his plant:
“The Fuehrer has made his decision, not lightheartedly but in
the consciousness of responsibility to his people, to the entire
future of the German Nation—we have all heard that in his
Reichstag speech last Friday.”
* * * * * *
“A hard struggle, perhaps hardly appreciated to its fullest
extent, lies before us. The entire German Nation must face this
test of fire in unshakable unity, young or old, man or woman,
everyone must and will do his duty at his post, do more than
just what his duty demands and devote his entire strength to the
task assigned to him. Therefore let us also, as Krupp Members,
remain determined. May God protect our Fuehrer and our people!”
(_D-363_)
(5) In a speech dated 6 May 1941, commemorating the successes of the
Nazi aggression in the West, Krupp stated:
“The one who, like myself, had the chance to visit and
thoroughly inspect during the last weeks the fields where our
superb troops made the breakthrough in the West—
“who could hear on that occasion the roar of our Airforce
against England—
“who witnessed how our U-boats and speedboats distinguished
themselves against the remains of England’s sea-might—
“such a person is bound to be thankfully proud to be able to
contribute through his labours to assure to our fighters the
weapons which they need for their battle—
“such a person is and remains devotedly and respectfully
conscious that the nicest machines, the most effective
instruments mean little, no, nothing, without the complete
unselfish and trusting share of the individual, whose trust is
assured through his knowledge of, and his faith in, the genius
of his Fuehrer, who embodies the worth of the German people,
their honour and might. To him, our Fuehrer, we direct also in
this hour in the Spring month of May our thoughts, renew our
solemn oath, present our heartiest wishes and give thanks to
him.
“Adolf Hitler—_Sieg Heil!_” (_D-390_)
G. _KRUPP AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON
PLAN TO EXPLOIT THE PEOPLE OF OCCUPIED COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR,
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPELLING PERSONS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED
COUNTRIES AND PRISONERS OF WAR TO WORK AGAINST THEIR WILL AND WITHOUT
THEIR CONSENT IN THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS. THESE ACTS AND
PRACTICES WERE CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 6 AND 52 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS,
1907, TO ARTICLE 31 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929),
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND TO ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE
CHARTER._
(1) Charts marked “secret” have been found which show the number and
nationalities of prisoners of war and foreign workers employed in each
of the workshops in the Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works at Essen, for the
period from December 1940 to 1 February 1945. These charts, when read in
conjunction with an affidavit by a Krupp official concerning the
materials produced in the various Essen workshops, reveal that French
and Russian prisoners of war and slave laborers from virtually every
country occupied by Germany were used in the production of arms and
munitions. Thus, they were compelled to work in departments engaged in
the construction of turrets for tanks and carriages for heavy Army and
Navy guns; the assembling of marine gun turrets, 10.5 cm. marine guns,
and 15 cm. torpedo-boat guns; the manufacture of crankshafts for S-boats
and aeroplanes, etc. (Charts and affidavit relating to production in the
workshops of Fried. Krupp Cast Steel Works by prisoners of war and
foreign workers, not here reproduced.) Affidavits of workers in the
Krupp workshops afford added proof that prisoners of war and foreign
laborers were used by Krupp in the manufacture of arms and munitions
(see _D-253_, _D-265_, _D-279_).
(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories did
not voluntarily engage in the manufacture of arms and munitions; they
were forced to do so. This fact is clearly shown by the following:
(_a_) Workers were brought to Essen from Poland and Russia in grossly
overcrowded, unheated, and unsanitary cattle cars and upon debarking,
were beaten, kicked, and otherwise inhumanely treated. An employee of
the Reich Railway at Essen has described these conditions as follows:
“* * * In the middle of 1941 the first workers arrived from
Poland, Galicia and Polish Ukraine. They came to Essen in goods
wagons in which potatoes, building materials and also cattle
have been transported; they were brought to perform work at
Krupp. The cars were jammed full with people. * * * The people
were squashed closely together and they had no room for free
movement. The Krupp overseers laid special value on the speed
the slave workers got in and out of the train. * * * the people
were beaten and kicked and generally maltreated in a brutal
manner. * * * I could see with my own eyes that sick people who
could scarcely walk * * * were taken to work. One could see that
it was sometimes difficult for them to move themselves. The same
can be said for the Eastern workers and PWs who came to Essen in
the middle of 1942.” (_D-321_; _D-367_).
(_b_) Foreign workers were compelled to go to work under guard and were
closely watched. In a memorandum dated 7 April 1942, entitled
“employment of foreign workers”, from the Ignitor workshop of the Krupp
Essen plant, it is stated:
“In the course of last week, due to the fact that the foreign
workers, especially Poles, could not be relied upon to appear at
work, there was an extraordinary decrease in production; loss of
money and fines did not obtain the desired results.
“Especially during short (bank) holidays we were not able to
find a responsible person in the camp Seumannstrasse, to whom we
could have referred. We ourselves are short of guards to fetch
the Poles from their camp, and to guard them overnight.”
(_D-270_; re compulsion exerted by guards in marching foreign
workers to work, see also _D-253_).
(_c_) After working hours, foreign workers were confined in camps under
barbed wire enclosures and were carefully guarded. Dr. Jaeger, senior
camp doctor in Krupp’s workers’ camps, has stated in an affidavit:
“The eastern workers and Poles who laboured in the Krupp works
at Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Spenlestrasse,
Grieperstrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Kramerplatz. * * * All
these camps were surrounded by barbed wire and were closely
guarded.” (_D-288_)
H. _CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 4, 6, 7, AND 46 OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS, 1907,
ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (GENEVA 1929), THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, AND ARTICLES 6(b) AND 6(c) OF THE CHARTER,
KRUPP, AS HEAD OF THE KRUPP CONCERN, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DENYING
ADEQUATE FOOD, SHELTER, CLOTHING, AND MEDICAL CARE AND ATTENTION TO
PRISONERS OF WAR AND WORKERS FORCIBLY DEPORTED FROM OCCUPIED COUNTRIES,
FOR FORCING THEM TO WORK UNDER INHUMANE CONDITIONS, AND FOR TORTURING
THEM AND SUBJECTING THEM TO INDIGNITIES._
(1) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were
undernourished and forced to work on a virtual starvation diet.
(_a_) In a memorandum upon Krupp stationery to Mr. Hupe, Director of the
Krupp locomotive factory in Essen, dated 14 March 1942 and entitled
“Employment of Russians”, it was said:
“During the last few days we have established that the food for
the Russians employed here is so miserable, that the people are
getting weaker from day to day.
“Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to
place a piece of metal for turning into position for instance,
because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist
at all places of work where Russians are employed.” (_D-316_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 18 March 1942, the following was reported
from the Krupp armoured car repair shop:
“I got the food this evening after Mr. Balz telephoned, but I
had quite a struggle with the people responsible in the camp
before I got anything at all. They always told me that the
people had already received the day’s rations and there wasn’t
any more. What the gentlemen understand under a day’s ration is
a complete puzzle to me. The food as a whole was a puzzle too,
because they ladled me out the thinnest of any already watery
soup. It was literally water with a handful of turnips and it
looked as if it were washing up water.
“Please tell Mr. Balz again definitely so that the matter is
finally cleared up, that it cannot continue having people perish
here at work.” (_D-310_)
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 20 March 1942 to Mr. Ihn, one of the Krupp
Directors, Dinkelacker, a Krupp official, wrote:
“The Deputy Works Manager Mr. Mustin, who also employs a number
of such Russian workers and who is quite satisfied with their
performance, went to the camp in Kramerplatz on my inducement
and had a talk with Mr. Welberg, the Camp Commandant. Mr. Hassel
from the Works Police who was present at the time, butted in and
declared that one should not believe what the people said. Also
that one was dealing with Bolsheviks and they ought to have
beatings substituted for food.” (_D-318_)
(_d_) In a memorandum dated 26 March 1942, to Mr. Hupe concerning the
use of Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers, it was reported:
“The reason why the Russians are not capable of production is,
in my opinion, that the food which they are given will never
give them the strength for working which you hope for. The food
one day, for instance, consisted of a watery soup with cabbage
leaves and a few pieces of turnip. The punctual appearance of
the food leaves a good deal to be desired too.” (_D-297_)
(_e_) In a memorandum dated 8 December 1942, Haller, a Krupp official,
wrote:
“The complaints from our foreign workers about insufficient food
have increased lately. * * *”
“We experienced a very forcible confirmation of these complaints
the other day when we drew the food for the Eastern workers from
the kitchen in Kramerplatz. On 5.12.42 the midday meal contained
unpeeled, whole potatoes which were not even properly cooked; on
7.12.42, there was soup on which cabbage leaves floated, the
sight of which made me feel sick.” (_D-366_)
(_f_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupps’ workers’ camps, has
stated under oath that not only did the plan for food distribution to
foreign workers call for a very small quantity of meat every week, but
also that they received only contaminated meats rejected by the health
authorities, such as horse or tuberculin infested meat (_D-288_).
(2) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were
forced to live in grossly overcrowded hutted camps and otherwise were
denied adequate shelter.
(_a_) In a sworn statement, Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor of the Krupp
workers’ camps, has stated with respect to the Krupp camps at which the
eastern workers and Poles were kept:
“Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad. The camps
were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were over twice as
many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted.”
* * * * * *
“Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where
approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms
of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the
extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1,200
inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were
available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion
contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were
also very few facilities for washing.” (_D-288_)
(_b_) Statistics upon the Krupp camps compiled by Krupp officials in
1942 for the Essen health authorities show that in the Krupp
Seumannstrasse camp 1784 beds were compressed into a surface area of
7844 square meters; in the Krupp Bottroperstrasse camp 874 beds were
crowded into a surface area of 3585 square meters; and that in other
Krupp camps the congestion was even greater (_D-143_).
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 12 June 1944, Dr. Stinnesbeck, a doctor
retained by the Krupp works, reported, with respect to the Krupp
prisoner of war camp at Noggerathstrasse that:
“315 prisoners are still accommodated in the camp. 170 of these
are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in Grunerstrasse
under the Essen-Mulheim railway line. This tunnel is damp and is
not suitable for continued accommodation of human beings. The
rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 different factories
in Krupps works.” (_D-335_)
(_d_) In a special medical report marked “strictly confidential”, dated
2 September 1944, concerning the same prisoner of war camp, Dr. Jaeger
wrote:
“The P. O. W. camp in the Noggerathstrasse is in a frightful
condition. The people live in ash bins, dog kennels, old baking
ovens and in self-made huts.” (_D-339_).
(3) The prisoners of war and foreign workers at the Krupp factories were
denied adequate clothing.
(_a_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in Krupps’ workers’ camps, has
stated under oath:
“The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely
inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which
they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no
overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets
as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of
shoes, many workers were forced to go to work in their bare
feet, even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the
workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore
feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet
rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes.
Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued
to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue
work suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this
represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the
time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen.”
(_D-288_)
(_b_) In a memorandum to Mr. Ihn, a Krupp director, dated 20 October
1942, Dr. Wiehle, head of the Krupp hospital in Essen, wrote:
“It has already been pointed out several times at conferences
that the clothing for Eastern workers, men and women, is not
sufficient. With regard to the cold weather, the camp physician
today called our attention to the fact that the number of colds
is going up because of the question of insufficient clothing.
“Many of the men and women still have to go barefooted. They
have no underwear and it often happens that people who wear foot
bandages because of injuries walk barefooted on these bandages.”
(_D-271_; see also _D-355_, _D-312_)
(4) Prisoners of war and foreign laborers at the Krupp works were denied
adequate medical care and treatment, and as a consequence, suffered
severely from a multitude of diseases and ailments.
(_a_) In the above mentioned affidavit, Dr. Jaeger has stated:
“The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as
great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly
widespread among the eastern workers. The T.B. rate among them
was 4 times the normal rate (2% eastern workers, .5% Germans).
At Dechenschule approximately 2½% of the workers suffered from
open T.B. These were all active T.B. cases. The Tartars and
Kirghiz suffered most; as soon as they were overcome by this
disease they collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing,
the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork,
and insufficient rest.
“These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice,
the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, bugs
and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a
result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern
workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food
also caused many cases of Hunger-Odem, Nephritis and
Shighakruse.
“It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to
work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit
for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse,
Kapitan-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily
sick call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or
three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work
despite illnesses.”
* * * * * *
“At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944,—I am not
completely sure of the exact date—I obtained permission for the
first time to visit the prisoner of war camps. My inspection
revealed that conditions at these camps were even worse than
those I had found at the camps of the eastern workers in 1942.
Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In
an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the
_Wehrmacht_ authorities whose duty it was to provide medical
care for the prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to
nothing. After visiting and pressing them over a period of two
weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000
prisoners of war.” (_D-288_)
(_b_) In a memorandum dated 7 May 1943, prepared at the Krupp hospital,
entitled “Deaths of Eastern Workers,” report was made of the death of 54
“eastern workers.” Of this number, 38 died of tuberculosis, 2 of
undernourishment, and 2 of intestinal disease. (_D-283_)
(_c_) In his “strictly confidential” report concerning the prisoner of
war camp at Noggerathstrasse, Dr. Jaeger reported:
“The food is barely sufficient. Krupp is responsible for housing
and feeding. The supply of medicine and bandages is so extremely
bad that proper medical treatment was not possible in many
cases. This fact is detrimental to the P. W. camp. It is
astonishing that the number of sick is not higher than it is and
it moves between 9 and 10 percent.” (_D-339_; also _D-313_).
(_d_) In a special medical report dated 28 July 1944, Dr. Jaeger wrote:
“The sick barrack in Camp Rabenhorst is in such bad condition,
one cannot speak of a sick barrack anymore. The rain leaks
through in every corner. The housing of the ill is therefore
impossible. The necessary labour for production is in danger
because those persons who are ill cannot recover. * * *”
(_D-338_)
(5) Russian juveniles were compelled to work at the Krupp factories, and
prisoners of war and foreign workers were generally forced to work long
hours, to and beyond the point of exhaustion.
(_a_) In a memorandum marked “secret”, dated 14 August 1942, Reiff, a
Krupp official, wrote:
“* * * I am under the impression that the better Russian workers
are first of all chosen for the works in Central and Eastern
Germany. We really get the bad remainders only. Just now 600
Russians, consisting of 450 women and 150 juveniles, 14 years of
age, arrived.” (_D-348_; similar proof is contained in _D-281_).
(_b_) In a memorandum from the Chief of the Krupp Camp Catering
Department, it is stated:
“* * * It is to be considered that foreigners must work 12 hours
on principle out of which, 1 hour counts as a break and
consequently will not be paid.” (_D-233_; for evidence
concerning complete exhaustion of foreign workers and prisoners
of war, see _D-313_).
(6) The prisoners of war and foreign laborers used at the Krupp works
were beaten, tortured, and subjected to inhuman indignities.
(_a_) In a sworn statement, Heinrich Buschhauer has stated:
“* * * I admit that I hit Russians. The Russians were very
willing and attentive. The clothing of the Russians was very bad
and torn. Their feet were wrapped in rags. The appearance of the
people was bad, they were thin and pale. Their cheeks had fallen
in completely. In spite of this, I was forced to ill-treat the
people on the orders of works manager Theile. I have boxed the
people’s ears and beaten them with a ¾ rubber tube and a wooden
stick. * * * The more energetic I went against these people, the
more the Works Manager liked it. I * * * had to drive and beat
the Russians in order to get increased production from them. At
times, I had up to two thousand foreigners under me. The
Russians could not possibly work more than they did, because the
food was too bad and too little. The Works management, however,
wanted to get still higher performance from them. It often
happened that the Russians, so utterly weakened, collapsed. * *
*”
* * * * * *
“The conditions which I have described above continued the whole
of the years I was in the boiler making department. On 20th
February 1943, I was transferred from the boiler making shop to
Nidia.” (_D-305_).
(_b_) Walter Thoene, a Krupp employee, likewise admitted in a sworn
statement that he constantly beat foreign workers. He stated:
“I admit that I punched and beat Hungarian Jewesses who I had to
supervise in No. 3 Steel Moulding Shop. I did not do this of my
own free will but was ordered to do so by my works manager Reif,
who was a Party Member like I was. Almost every day this
unscrupulous man held me to it in no mistakable manner to
driving on these Jewesses and getting better performances from
them. He also always emphasized that I should not be trivial in
the choice of means, and if necessary, hit them like hitting a
piece of cold iron. As soon as I saw that these women were
standing near the ovens, I had to drive them back to their
work.” (_D-355_)
Comparable admission were made by August Kleinschmidt, another Krupp
employee. (_D-306_)
(_c_) Dr. Apolinary Gotowicki, a doctor in the Polish Army, who was
taken a prisoner of war and in that capacity attended some Russian,
Polish and French prisoners of war at the Krupp factories, has stated
under oath:
“* * * Every day, at least 10 people were brought to me whose
bodies were covered with bruises on account of the continual
beatings with rubber tubes, steel switches or sticks. The people
were often writhing with agony and it was impossible for me to
give them even a little medical aid. * * * I could notice people
daily who on account of hunger or ill-treatment, were slowly
dying. Dead people often lay for 2 or 3 days on the pailliases
until their bodies stank so badly that fellow prisoners took
them outside and buried them somewhere. * * * I have seen with
my own eyes the prisoners coming back from Krupps and how they
collapsed on the march and had to be wheeled back on barrows or
carried by their comrades. * * * The work which they had to
perform was very heavy and dangerous and many cases happened
where people had cut their fingers, hands or legs. These
accidents were very serious and the people came to me and asked
me for medical help. But it wasn’t even possible for me to keep
them from work for a day or two, although I had been to the
Krupp directorate and asked for permission to do so. At the end
of 1941, 2 people died daily and in 1942 the deaths increased to
3-4 per day.” (_D-313_)
(_d_) A particular form of torture which was inflicted upon Russian
workers was a steel cabinet specially manufactured by Krupp, into which
workers were thrown after beatings. The cabinets are shown in
photographs attached to a sworn statement wherein it is stated:
“Photograph ‘A’ shows an iron cupboard which was specially
manufactured by the Firm of Krupp to torture Russian civilian
workers to such an extent that it is impossible to describe. Men
and women were often locked in one compartment of the cupboard,
in which a man could scarcely stand, for long periods. The
measurements of this compartment are height 1.52 meters, breadth
and depth 40 to 50 cm. each. In fact, people were often kicked
and pressed into one compartment in pairs. At the top of the
cupboard, there were sieve-like air holes through which cold
water was poured on the unfortunate victims during the ice-cold
winter.” (_D-382_; for further evidence of constant beatings of
foreign workers, see _D-253_, _D-312_, _D-354_, and _D-267_).
(_e_) Records found in the Krupp files plainly indicate that the
practice of beating and torturing prisoners of war and foreign workers
was deliberately prescribed by Krupp officials. Steel switches which
were used to beat the workers were distributed pursuant to the
instructions of Kupke, head of the Krupp camps for foreign workers
(_D-230_). In a memorandum dated 19 March 1942, from the Krupp Works
Catering Department, it was said:
“* * * With regards to the times ahead it seems desirable to us,
to draw attention to the authorities concerned, with the
necessary pressure, to the fact that only severest treatment of
the French prisoners of war will ensure that they maintain their
performance even with the present food position, which is the
same for German workers.” (_D-278_).
As previously shown, Hassel, an official in the Krupp works police,
stated that the Russians “ought to have beatings substituted for food”
(_D-318_).
(7) The Krupp companies specifically requested and actively sought out
the employment of prisoners of war and foreign laborers.
(_a_) In a memorandum dated 13 July 1942 by Weinhold, a Krupp official,
complaint was registered over the fact that “the foreign laborers are
only available two to three months after they have been asked for by
us.” (_D-281_).
(_b_) In a letter to the Krupp firm dated 27 August 1942, Colonel
Zimmerman of the _Oberkommando des Heeres_, said:
“According to our estimate, there ought to be enough workers in
your ignitor workshops to reach the demanded production figure.
This especially, as the 105 Russians, demanded by your firm at
the Conference of the special committee M 111 on the 24.4.42,
were assigned to your works at the beginning of June re-letter
from Wa J Ru (Mun. 2). * * *
“Unfortunately, I found out at the sitting of the special
committee M 111 on the 26.8.42 that the firm of Krupp asks for
another 55 workers, including 25 skilled labourers, without
having a corresponding raise in the production figures. I cannot
judge from here, what the reasons for this are.” (_D-345_)
(_c_) In a memorandum dated 21 December 1942 concerning the possibility
of the Krupp works obtaining additional conscripted French workers, Dr.
Lehmann, a Krupp official, stated:
“* * * We discussed how far it would be possible for complete
shifts of workers conscripted from French factories to be
transferred to Essen. We are to collaborate as far as
practicable in the splitting up of our requirements amongst
individual military government offices and military police
posts. So far as possible one of our representatives is to
assist in the selection from amongst the conscripts.” (_D-196_;
see also _D-280_)
(8) Concentration camp laborers, who were brought to the Krupp works at
the request of Krupp officials, were subjected to persecution,
degradation, despoilment, and torture in a manner similar to that of
prisoners of war and slave laborers.
(_a_) Mr. Ihn, a director of the Krupp firm, has stated in a signed but
unsworn statement, that the Krupp firm first asked for concentration
camp labor on 22 September 1942, and that the first group of them
arrived “in the summer or autumn of 1944” (_D-274_).
(_b_) The fact that concentration camp labor was requested by the Krupp
works; that such persons were to be confined behind barbed wire
enclosures; and that they were to be closely guarded by SS personnel is
further shown in a memorandum entitled “Visit of the Director of
Distribution of Workers of the Weimar-Buchenwald Concentration Camp; SS
Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwarz on 26-7-44”, written by Trockel, a Krupp
official. In the course of this memorandum, Trockel stated:
“Herr Schwarz came on behalf of his Commandant SS
Standartenfuehrer Pister to talk over with us, the question of
employment of K1 detainees. He pointed out that the employment
of men could not be reckoned with for a considerable period. Our
last request was for 700 women.”
* * * * * *
“As not less than 500 women would be assigned, we agreed that
the figure should remain at 500 women in order that the
assignment should not be endangered. * * *”
* * * * * *
“* * * The main things are the erection of a barbed wire fence
in front of the hall which allows a small exit and the erection
of a small barracks for the Commander of the guard and his duty
office and for the German female guard personnel. * * *”
* * * * * *
“The SS are providing a guard consisting of guard commander and
10 men. For 520 women we have to name approx. 45 German women
who will be sworn in to the SS, given 3 weeks training in the
women’s camp at Ravensbrueck and then given full official
supervision duties by the SS. * * *” (_D-238_)
(_c_) Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in the Krupp camps, has described
conditions at the camp which the Krupp works maintained for
concentration camp labor as follows:
“Camp Humboldtstrasse had been inhabited by Italian prisoners of
war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians
were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald
Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp
factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldtstrasse, I found
these females suffering from open festering wounds and other
diseases.
“I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight.
There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were no
medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about
in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a
sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn.
The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS
guards.
“The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very
poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the
ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against
rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors
that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one
could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to
30 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the
camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this
camp with a Mr. Grono on two occasions and both times we left
the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of
the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this
attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and
the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to
undertake the necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put
an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite
this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary
conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.”
(_D-288_)
(_d_) The conditions under which the concentration camp workers existed
at the Krupp camps and factories and the indignities and barbarities to
which they were subjected are vividly described in affidavits by such
workers (_D-256_; _D-277_; _D-272_). In general, the affidavits disclose
that these concentration camp laborers slept on bare floors of damp,
windowless and lightless cellars; that they had no water for drinking or
cleansing purposes; that they were compelled to do work far beyond their
strength; that they were mercilessly beaten; that they were given one
wretched meal a day, consisting of a dirty watery soup with a thin slice
of black bread; and that many of them died from starvation, tuberculosis
and overexertion. A chart entitled “Fried. Krupp _Berthawerk,
Markstaedt_ Breslau, Number of Occupied Foreigners, Prisoners of War and
Concentration Camp Inmates” shows the use of concentration camp labor at
that factory, as well as at the above-mentioned Krupp company in Essen
(_D-298_).
(9) Charts prepared by Krupp officials show that in September 1943, the
Krupp concerns employed 39,245 foreign workers and 11,224 prisoners of
war, and that the number mounted steadily until September 1944, when
54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war were used (Chart
entitled “Foreigners and Prisoners of War of the Krupp Concern”; chart
entitled “Cast Steel Works, Number of Prisoners of War and Foreigners”,
not here reproduced.) The majority of the foreign laborers consisted of
Russians, French, Poles, and Dutch.
I. _AS REWARD FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ PROGRAM,
KRUPP REAPED LARGE PROFITS, WAS PERMITTED TO EXPAND HIS INDUSTRIAL
EMPIRE, AND RECEIVED HIGH HONORS AND SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM THE NAZI
GOVERNMENT._
(1) Although the Krupp companies operated at a substantial loss in the
years immediately preceding Hitler’s accession to power, the huge orders
from the Nazi state enabled them to derive vast profits thereafter. In
the fiscal year 1 October 1934 to 30 September 1935, the net profits of
Fried. Krupp and subsidiaries, after the deduction of taxes, gifts and
reserves recognized by the tax authorities, amounted to 57,216,392
marks. In the fiscal year 1937 to 1938 these net profits rose to
97,071,632 marks, and in the fiscal year 1941 they amounted to
111,555,216 marks (Chart entitled “Income and Loss of the Fried. Krupp
Combine”; Graph entitled “Profits or Losses of Fried. Krupp and
Subsidiaries as Reported to Tax Authorities,” not here reproduced.)
(2) Krupp was permitted, with the approval and at times connivance of
Nazi officials, to extend in great measure his participation in other
companies, both within and without Germany.
(_a_) On 1 October 1933 the participations of Fried. Krupp in other
concerns had a book value of 75,962,000 marks. By 30 September 1942 the
book value of the participations had grown to 132,944,000 marks. On 1
October 1942 the participation account was revalued and carried at a new
figure of 187,924,621 marks. In the following year new acquisitions were
made in the amount of 50,224,707 marks, so that the book value of the
participations as of 1 October 1943 was 237,316,093 marks. Even this
figure contains many going concerns in occupied countries which were
arbitrarily assigned a book value of only 1 mark. Leaving out of account
the revaluation of 1 October 1942, the participation account as of 1
October 1943 would have been 182,952,000 marks. The increment in the
participation account is shown in a chart entitled, “Fried. Krupp
Participations” (_D-341_). The expansion of the Krupp concern under the
Nazi regime is likewise revealed by a comparison of charts showing the
companies in the Krupp concern as of 30 September 1935 and 31 January
1944.
(_b_) Complete records of all acquisitions by Krupp have not been
obtained because, according to Krupp officials, many records were lost
or destroyed in air raids. Enough appears, however, to indicate that the
Krupp firm did in fact call upon the Nazi authorities to facilitate or
make possible the acquisition of property interests in occupied
countries. Thus, when Mr. Erhard, the French custodian of Jewish
property in France, resisted Krupp’s attempts to acquire a lease of a
plant at Liancourt, France, the Krupp concern enlisted the support of
the Army to gain its objective. Under threat of replacement by a German
official, the French custodian of Jewish property acceded to Krupp’s
demands. In a memorandum dated 29 July 1942, found in the Krupp files,
it is stated:
“* * * M. Erhard delayed the negotiations to such an extent that
finally the appropriate military authorities in Paris urged a
settlement. This authority declared that if Mr. Erhard could not
make up his mind to sell, at least he would have to give a three
years’ lease to Krupp.
“The custodianship would be taken away from Mr. Erhard and a
German Commissar would be appointed unless the lease were
granted in a very short time.” (_D-526_).
(3) In recognition of his services to the Nazi State, Krupp was awarded
the “Shield of the Eagle of the German Reich” with the inscription “To
the German leader of Industry” (_D-66_).
(4) Because of his unique service to the military power of the Nazi
State, Krupp was authorized by special decree of Hitler to transform
Fried. Krupp A.G. into a private family concern in order to perpetuate
control of the firm by a single member of the Krupp family.
(_a_) In a letter dated 11 November 1942 to Bormann, Krupp stated:
“* * * You have asked me to make proposals to you which would
secure the future of the unified existence of the Krupp works
more than this is feasible today. * * * On considering this
question we have ascertained that under the present laws the
principal solution of the question cannot be carried out. We had
to find an entirely new way, therefore, which, just as the law
regarding heritage of agricultural property, creates entirely
new legislation.” (_D-99_)
(_b_) In reply to the above letter, Bormann wrote to Krupp that:
“I have reported the contents of your letters of the 11/11 to
the Fuehrer today. He instructed me to inform you that he would
be readily prepared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for
the continued existence of the works as a family enterprise; it
would be the simplest to issue a ‘_Lex Krupp_’ to start with.”
(_D-101_).
(_c_) Krupp’s recognition of the unusual character of his proposal is
indicated in his letter of 24 February 1943 to Lammers, wherein he said:
“Without doubt, the matter, which is without precedent in
economic life, will have to be discussed with the Reichs
Minister of Justice and the Reichs Minister of Finance also. * *
*” (_D-106_).
(_d_) On 12 November 1943 Hitler signed the decree making possible the
preservation of the Krupp firm as a family enterprise in recognition of
the fact that
“for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise
has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed
strength of the German people.” (_D-120_)
In a letter dated 16 November 1943, Lammers wrote to Krupp:
“On 12 November the Fuehrer signed the decree regarding the
family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp. * * * May I express
my heartiest congratulations to you, your wife and the firm
Fried. Krupp on the great honor which has been conferred on the
merits of the firm Fried. Krupp with this recognition by the
Fuehrer.” (_D-124_).
(_e_) As the final step in the proceeding, Hitler approved “the statute
of the family enterprise Fried. Krupp” which gave effect to his decree
of 12 November 1943 (_D-131_).
(_f_) In a letter of gratitude to Hitler dated 29 December 1943, Krupp
stated:
“* * * By this, you have made a wish come true, which my wife
and I had had for years, and thus relieved our hearts of great
worry over the future of the Krupp works.”
* * * * * *
“My wife and I, as well as the whole family, are deeply grateful
to you for this proof of your confidence. * * *”
“Our special thanks go to you, Mein Fuehrer, also for the great
honour and recognition which you have awarded, in the
introduction to your decree, to 130 years of the work of Krupps,
the work of Krupps done by many generations of faithful
followers, and steered and directed by 4 generations of the
family Krupp.” (_D-135_)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH