At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for

Reich Defense on 22 May 1933, Colonel Keitel emphasized that the supreme

consideration guiding the work of the committee was to be secrecy. “No

document”, he said, “ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into

the hands of the enemy’s intelligence service. Orally transmitted

matters are not provable; they can be denied by us in Geneva.” He

requested that written documents not be sent through the mails, or, if

it was absolutely necessary to do so, that they be addressed, not to a

government agency or office (where they might be opened by the mail

clerks) but to the recipient personally. (_EC-177_)

The fact that Keitel was a member of the Nazi conspiracy in good

standing is apparent from his statement that he held the Golden Party

Badge, and that consequently the Party considered him a member as from

the autumn of 1944, when the law against military personnel being

members of the Party was changed (1944 RGBl. I, 317). His political

convictions were those of National Socialism, and he was a loyal

follower of Hitler. (_1954-PS_)

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councillors for

Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933, the chairman, Colonel Keitel,

pointed out the necessity and desirability for the creation of the Reich

Defense Council which had been determined on by a cabinet decision of 4

April 1933. He said that a general program for the creation of a war

economy had already been completed, but that it would take a long time

to carry out the program. He explained that it was the purpose and

objective of the Working Committee of the new Defense Council to

overcome these difficulties. (_EC-177_)

On 6 December 1935 General Major Keitel, chairman of the eleventh

meeting of the Reich Defense Council, pointed out that the mobilization

year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following

year. For the first time, a “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies”

was to be issued on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the

extent possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared

that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of

the country should put the enhancement of military capacity above all

other national tasks. Keitel emphasized that it was the function of all

members of the Reich Defense Council to use all available resources

economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials as were

absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich.

In the presence of Keitel, Colonel Jodl said that the “Mobilization Book

for the Civilian Agencies” constituted the unified basis for the

carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army. (_EC-406_)

The twelfth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense

Council, held on 14 May 1936, was opened by Field Marshal von Blomberg,

War Minister and Supreme Army Commander. He stressed the necessity for a

total mobilization, including the drafting of the necessary laws,

preparations in the re-militarized Rhineland zone, financing and

rearmament. Lt. General Keitel, in his capacity as chairman of the

Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council, again stressed the

necessity for secrecy. Ministerial Director Wohlthat pointed out that,

in order to guarantee rearmament and an adequate food supply, an

increase in production and utmost economy were necessary, a postulate

that had led to the special mandate given by the Fuehrer to Minister

President Goering. (_EC-407_)

Keitel participated also in the activities of the conspirators to

re-militarize the Rhineland. At that time he was Chief of the

_Wehrmachtsamt_ under von Blomberg and signed, on the latter’s behalf,

the order for naval participation in the operation. (_C-194_)

Keitel also took part in the war-planning activities of the Reich

Cabinet, of which he was a member. The cabinet consulted by meetings,

and by the circulation of decrees among its members for their approval

or disapproval. (See generally Section 3 of Chapter XV on the Reich

Cabinet.) Keitel was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council, which has

been described as “a select committee” of the cabinet for deliberation

on foreign affairs. (_1774-PS_)

A Reich Defense Council was established by the ordinary cabinet in 1933.

It was a war-planning group, and Keitel took part in the meetings of its

working committee. (_EC-177_; _EC-406_; _EC-407_)

On 4 December 1938 a Secret Defense Law was passed, which defined the

duties of the Reich Defense Council. As Chief of OKW, Keitel was a

member of the council, and he also presided over the Council’s Working

Committee (_Reichsverteidigungsausschuss_). (_2194-PS_)

The Secret Defense Law of 1938 provided for a Plenipotentiary for

Economy, whose task was to “put all economic forces into the service of

the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of the German

nation”, and for a Plenipotentiary for Administration, whose duties were

to take over “the uniform leadership of the non-military administration

with exception of the economic administration” upon the declaration of a

“state of defense”. Certain ministries were, in peace-time, bound by the

directives of the plenipotentiaries. The latter were bound, in turn,

under certain conditions, together with the ministries subordinate to

them, to take directions from the Chief of OKW. Keitel could also, in a

state of defense, issue orders to the Minister of Transport and the

Minister of Posts. In addition, he presided over the Council’s Working

Committee, which prepared the Council’s decisions, saw that they were

executed, and obtained collaboration between the armed forces, the chief

Reich offices, and the Party. Keitel regulated the activities of this

committee and issued directions to the plenipotentiaries and certain

Reich ministries to assure uniform execution of the council’s decisions.

(_2194-PS_)

The two plenipotentiaries and the OKW formed what was known as a “Three

Man College” (_2608-PS_). This system of a three man college functioned

as follows, from a legislative point of view: The Plenipotentiary for

Economy was empowered by paragraph 4 of the Secret Defense Law of 4

September 1938 to issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the

OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Administration, which differed from

existing laws. Similarly, the Plenipotentiary for Administration was

empowered by paragraph 3 of the same law to issue laws within his

sphere, with the consent of the OKW and the Plenipotentiary for Economy,

which differed from existing laws.

In the spheres of the Reich Minister of Posts, the Reich Minister of

Transport and of the General Inspector for German roads

(_Generalinspektor fuer die Strassenwesen_), the Chief of the OKW had

the right, under paragraph 5 of the same law, to issue laws, in

agreement with the Plenipotentiaries for Administration and Economy,

which differed from existing laws. (_2194-PS_)

The legislative function of the three man college, prior to 9 September

1939 was one of drafting decrees to be used in time of war.

The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was established by

a decree of Hitler on 30 August 1939. It was formed out of the Reich

Defense Council, and included among its members the two

plenipotentiaries of the council and the Chief of OKW. (_2018-PS_)

The Council had the power to pass decrees with the force of law, and to

legislate for the occupied Eastern Territories (1939 RGBl, I, 2077).

Decrees of the council were circulated, before enactment, among all the

members by written communication from Dr. Lammers, who was also on the

Council. (_2231-PS_)

Frick has referred to the Council of Ministers as “the highest permanent

organ of the Reich with comprehensive jurisdiction, responsible only to

the Fuehrer”. “The composition of the Ministerial Council for the

Defense of the Reich”, he added, “shows the real concentration of power

in it”. He said also that Keitel was liaison between the council and the

armed forces, it being primarily his duty to coordinate the measures for

civilian defense in the area of administration and economy with the

genuine military measures for the defense of the Reich. (_2608-PS_)

Keitel also took an active part in collaborating with and in instigating

the Japanese to enter the war. Nazi policy with regard to Japan was

expressed in an order signed by Keitel on 5 March 1941. This order was

distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKL, and also to Jodl. It stated that

Japan must be drawn actively into the war, and that the taking of

Singapore would mean a decisive success for the three powers. (_C-75_)

At about the time this order was issued, a meeting was held with Hitler,

in which Raeder urged that Japan be induced to attack Singapore. Keitel

and Jodl were both present at this meeting. (_C-152_)

Keitel may have known of a report from the Military Attache in Tokyo

that preparations were continuing for a sudden attack on Singapore and

Manila. (_1538-PS_)

D. _KEITEL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._

(_See “F” 1 through 7, infra, where the joint responsibility of Keitel

and Jodl for these activities is discussed._)

E. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES

AGAINST HUMANITY._

(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian populations in occupied

territory and on the high seas._ Keitel committed many crimes of this

nature, by ordering such criminal activities.

On 13 May 1941 Keitel, as Chief of OKW, signed an order from the

Fuehrer’s Headquarters providing that Russian civilians suspected of

offenses against German troops should be shot or ruthlessly punished

without a military trial, and that prosecution of German soldiers for

offenses against Russian civilians was not required (_C-50_). On 27 July

1941 he ordered that all copies of this decree should be destroyed, but

without affecting its validity. (_C-51_)

On 23 July 1941 Keitel signed an order concerning the administration of

occupied Russia. This order provided that legal punishments were

inadequate in so great an area, and that troops should use terrorism in

crushing the population’s will to resist. (_C-52_)

Keitel signed one of the so-called _Nacht und Nebel_ decrees on 7

December 1941. It provided that in occupied territories of the west

civilians would be tried for offenses against the German state only if

the death sentence was likely to be carried out within a few days of

arrest. Otherwise the accused would be taken to Germany, and no

information would be given about them in reply to any inquiries.

(_666-PS_)

By a first ordinance of 7 December 1941 Keitel made the provisions of

the foregoing directive applicable to the following offenses; attacks

against life or bodily health, espionage, sabotage, communistic

conspiracy, offenses likely to create disturbances, assistance to the

enemy, and illicit possession of arms. His ordinance also provided that

the offenses mentioned were to be tried in the occupied countries only

if it were likely that the death sentence would be pronounced, and if it

were possible to complete trial and execution within a very short time,

as a rule within a week after arrest. In case of trial in Germany, it

was provided that alien witnesses could be heard only with the consent

of the High Command of the Armed Forces and that the public would not be

admitted to the proceedings. (_L-90_)

In a communication issued by him in his capacity as Chief of the High

Command of the Armed Forces Keitel on 12 December 1941 stated with

respect to the aforementioned directive and ordinance:

“Efficient and enduring terrorization can be achieved only

either by capital punishment or by measures to keep the

relatives of the criminal and the population in the dark as to

the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved by transferring

the criminal to Germany.” (_L-90_)

In pursuance of Keitel’s _Nacht und Nebel_ decree, Admiral Canaris on 2

February 1942 issued instructions to the _Abwehr_ to punish crimes

against the _Wehrmacht_ accordingly. At first the order was to apply

only to Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. (_833-PS_)

The Chief of the SIPO and SD reported to OKW on 24 June 1942 that a

Frenchman had died while awaiting trial in Germany, and that, in order

to create anxiety in accordance with the decree, his family had not been

notified. Keitel’s OKW approved of this procedure, which had been

established for such cases by an OKW order of 16 April 1942. (_668-PS_)

When, on 20 April 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg “Deputy for a

Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories,”

Keitel was asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with

Rosenberg. Keitel designated Jodl as his representative and Warlimont as

deputy. (_865-PS_)

Thus Keitel and Jodl share the responsibility for crimes committed by

Rosenberg’s administration. In this connection reference is made to

section 7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.

Among the decrees issued by the Council of Ministers, of which Keitel

was a member, are two which connect him with harsh treatment of

inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories. (_2746-PS_; _2039-PS_)

(2) _Deportation of civilian populations in occupied territories for

slave labor and other purposes._ Keitel’s connection with the forced

labor program began at a meeting with Hitler on 23 May 1939, when it was

announced that Poland would be invaded, and also that non-German

populations would be available as a source of labor. (_L-79_)

Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use Russian prisoners

of war in German war industries, and stated that OKW (AWA) would furnish

to the Secretary of Labor information on the use of such labor, and

provide the labor force. (_EC-194_)

Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Manpower by a decree

of 21 March 1942, signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. (_1666-PS_)

On 8 September 1942 Keitel initialled a Hitler order requiring citizens

of France, Holland, and Belgium to work on the “Atlantic Wall”. The

order was to be enforced by the withdrawal of food and clothing ration

cards (_556-2-PS_). Keitel was informed of the quotas of foreign

laborers which Sauckel and his agents were to fill. Sauckel requested

the assistance of the Army, and asked that pressure be used to obtain

the quotas, if necessary. (_3012-PS_)

At a conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, at which Keitel was

present, it was determined that Sauckel should obtain 4,000,000 new

workers from occupied territories. (_1292-PS_)

(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members

of the armed forces of the countries with which Germany was at war, and

of persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that

commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in

battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender (_498-PS_). An

order regulating the treatment of paratroopers had been issued by Keitel

about a month earlier. It provided that captured paratroopers were to be

turned over to the SD. (_553-PS_)

A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was

distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum

dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are

known in which the order was carried out (_508-PS_; _509-PS_). Three

specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C-in-C, Norway,

where captured members of sabotage units were executed after

interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred

at Glomfjord, Drontheim, and Stavanger. (_512-PS_)

On 23 June 1944 the Supreme Command West requested instructions

redefining the scope of the commando order. In view of the extensive

landings in Normandy, it had become difficult to decide which paratroops

should be considered sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and

which should be considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The

question was answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was

signed by Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order

(_531-PS_; _551-PS_). Keitel extended the application of the commando

order to members of Anglo-American and Russian “military missions” taken

in the fighting against the partisans in the southeast and southwest.

(_537-PS_)

When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes

killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect

the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was

considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen

who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror”.

Whether or not the order was ever issued is immaterial, for it is

certain that Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to

prevent them, and in fact considered giving them official justification.

(_See also “F”, 8, infra, in which the joint responsibility of Keitel

and Jodl for the lynching of Allied airmen is discussed._)

Keitel’s criminal activities against Soviet prisoners of war are shown

by the following. On 8 September 1941 Keitel’s OKW issued a regulation

for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. It stated that Russian

soldiers would fight by any methods for the idea of Bolshevism and that

consequently they had lost any claim to treatment in accordance with the

Geneva Convention. Stern measures were to be employed against them,

including the free use of weapons. The politically undesirable prisoners

were to be segregated from the others and turned over to “special

purpose units” of the Security Police and the Security Service. There

was to be the closest cooperation between the military commanders and

these police units. (_1519-PS_)

Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr considered this order in such direct

violation of the general principles of International Law that he

addressed a memorandum of protest to Keitel on 15 September 1941. He

pointed out that, while the Geneva Convention was not binding between

Germany and the USSR, the usual rules of International Law should be

observed; that such instructions, particularly those concerning the use

of weapons, would result in arbitrary killings; and that the disposition

of politically undesirable prisoners would be decided by the SIPO and

the SD according to principles of which the _Wehrmacht_ was ignorant.

(As to this argument, Keitel wrote in the margin “Very efficient” and

“Not at all.”) Keitel received and considered this memorandum, for on

its first page there is the following comment in his handwriting, dated

23 September and initialled “K”:

“The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous

warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I

approve and back the measures.” (_EC-338_)

The regulations which Canaris had protested were restated on 24 March

1942, but their essential provisions were unchanged. (_695-PS_)

An order of Keitel’s OKW dated 29 January 1943, signed by Reinecke,

contains a broad interpretation of the guards’ right of self-defense

against prisoners. For example, self-defense includes not only the

guard’s person, but his honor and property, and third parties, such as

the State. (_656-PS_)

That Keitel knew of the appalling treatment of Russian prisoners of war,

and the high death rate among them, appears from the statements in a

letter sent to him by Rosenberg on 28 February 1942. The letter stressed

the need for better treatment of the Russians, so that they would be

well impressed by the Germans. (_081-PS_)

An order of Keitel’s OKW provided that escaped officers and non-working

non-commissioned officers other than Americans and British were to be

turned over to the SIPO and SD upon recapture. The SIPO and SD, upon

instructions from their chief, would then transport the men to the

Mauthausen concentration camp under operation “Kugel” (_L-158_). Such

prisoners were executed at Mauthausen upon arrival (_2285-PS_).

Americans and British who were recaptured might be turned over to the

SIPO and SD, upon decision of the “W.Kdos” from the OKW/o.i.c. (_L-158_)

(4) _Killing of Hostages._ Keitel’s criminal activities are shown by the

following two documents. On 16 December 1941 he signed an order stating

that uprisings among German troops in occupied territories must be

considered as inspired by a communist conspiracy, and that the death of

one German soldier must mean death for fifty or one hundred communists.

(_829-PS_)

Keitel also signed an order (received by the OKH on 1 October 1941)

specifying that hostages should be well known, and that they should come

from Nationalist, Democrat, or Communist political factions. After each

act of sabotage hostages belonging to the saboteur’s group should be

shot. (_1590-PS_)

(5) _Plunder of public and private property._ The looting of cultural

property was carried on chiefly under Rosenberg by the _Einsatzstab

Rosenberg_, an organization established for that purpose. In the West he

was to act in his capacity as Reichsleiter, and in the East in his

capacity as Reichsminister. Keitel’s OKW cooperated with Rosenberg, and

directions for carrying out the order were to be issued by the Chief of

the OKW in agreement with Rosenberg (_149-PS_). Keitel ordered the

military authorities to cooperate in this program (_137-PS_; _138-PS_).

A memorandum of 17 May 1944 in the Rosenberg Ministry states that the

_Wehrmacht_ was one of the principal agencies engaged in removing

treasures from Russia. (_1107-PS_)

Keitel was also responsible for the removal of machine tools,

foodstuffs, and other materials from occupied territories. (_1161-PS_;

_743-PS_)

(6) _The exaction of collective penalties._ Collective penalties were

exacted from the population for acts of individuals for which it could

not be held responsible. Keitel advocated such measures. This appears

from correspondence on acts of sabotage in the shipbuilding yards.

(_C-48_; _870-PS_; _871-PS_)

(7) _Germanization of Occupied Territories._ On 16 July 1941 Keitel was

present at a meeting with Hitler where the policy was announced of

exploiting occupied Russian territory and making it part of the Reich.

(_L-221_)

In order to promote a racially valuable German heritage an order signed

by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel provides for payment of subsidies to

Norwegian or Dutch women who had borne children of German soldiers. The

Chief of OKW was authorized to extend its application to other occupied

territories. (_2926-PS_)

(8) _Persecution of minorities._ Keitel’s responsibility for the

persecution of minorities in Germany appears from the fact that, with

Hitler, Goering, and Lammers, he signed a decree on 7 October 1939 which

provided that the harmful influence of foreigners must be eliminated

from Germany; that Germans could be resettled by the Reichsfuehrer SS;

and that the Reichsfuehrer SS could perform “all necessary general and

administrative measures” to discharge this duty. (_686-PS_)

Keitel’s responsibility for the criminal treatment of Jews is apparent

from his own statement that the struggle against Bolshevism necessitated

a ruthless proceeding against the Jews; the _Wehrmacht_ was not to use

them for any service, but they could be placed in labor columns under

German supervision. (_878-PS_)

F. _JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF KEITEL AND JODL FOR PLANNING AND LAUNCHING

WARS OF AGGRESSION, AND FOR THE LYNCHING OF ALLIED AIRMEN._

(1) _Aggression against Austria._ In June of 1937 von Blomberg ordered

preparations for “Case Otto”—armed intervention in Austria in event of

a Hapsburg restoration (_C-175_). New plans were made in 1938 under the

same name. German policy in 1938 was to eliminate Austria and

Czechoslovakia, and there was a campaign to undermine Austria’s will to

resist, by pressure on the government, by propaganda, and by fifth

column activity. (_1780-PS_)

Keitel was present at Berchtesgaden when Schuschnigg visited Hitler

there in February 1938. Schuschnigg was subjected to political and

military pressure, which resulted in such concessions to the Nazis as

the reorganization of the Austrian cabinet (_1780-PS_). Keitel and Jodl

and Canaris were instructed to keep up the military pressure against

Austria by simulating military measures until 15 February. (_1780-PS_)

The OKW submitted proposals to Hitler regarding the Austrian campaign;

these included suggestions of false rumors and broadcasts. A note in

Jodl’s handwriting states that Hitler approved the memorandum by

telephone and that Canaris was informed. (_1775-PS_)

Hitler ordered preparation of “Case Otto”—mobilization of army units

and air forces (_1780-PS_). Hitler’s directive for “Case Otto” was

initialled by Keitel and Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions

(_C-102_; _C-103_). Jodl initialled Hitler’s order for the invasion of

Austria. (_C-182_)

(2) _The Execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia._ On 21 April

1938 Hitler and Keitel met and discussed plans for the taking of

Czechoslovakia. They considered a military attack after a period of

diplomatic friction, or as the result of a created incident, such as the

assassination of the German ambassador at Prague. (_388-PS_)

After the invasion of Austria, _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted to “Case

Green,” the operation against Czechoslovakia (_1780-PS_). Case Green was

first drafted in 1937, when it was thought that a “probable warlike

eventuality” would be “war on two fronts with the center of gravity in

the southeast.” A surprise attack on Czechoslovakia was considered

possible (_C-175_). Through the late spring and summer of 1938 Case

Green was revised and modified. The memoranda and correspondence are

frequently signed or initialled by Keitel, and it is clear that he knew

of Hitler’s intention to use force against Czechoslovakia and made the

plans to carry out that intention. (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _2353-PS_)

There were many meetings on Case Green in September 1938, some with

Hitler, some with Keitel and Jodl. The timing of troop movements was

discussed; the question of advance notice to OKH; preparations of

railroads and fortifications; even propaganda to counteract the

anticipated violations of International Law which the invasion would

entail (_388-PS_; _1780-PS_; _C-2_). Assistance was given by OKH to the

Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization which

operated under Henlein to create disorder in Czechoslovakia. (_1780-PS_;

_388-PS_)

In October 1938 Hitler addressed to the OKW four specific questions

about the time and the forces that would be required to break Czech

resistance in Bohemia and Moravia, and Keitel submitted the answers

prepared by the OKH and Luftwaffe (_388-PS_). On 21 October 1938 Hitler

signed an order (and Keitel initialled it) requiring the _Wehrmacht_ to

make preparations to take the remainder of Czechoslovakia. (_C-136_)

Two months later Keitel issued a supplement to this order, stating that

on the order of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of

Czechoslovakia were to continue, and stressing the importance of having

the attack well camouflaged and unwarlike in appearance. (_C-138_)

Keitel was present at the interview between Hitler and Hacha at the

Reich Chancellery on 15 March 1939, when the Czech representatives

delivered their country to Hitler, after hours of duress, which included

the threat of immediate bombing of Prague. (_2798-PS_; _2943-PS_)

(3) _Aggression against Poland._ On 25 March 1939—four days after

Ribbentrop pressed new demands for Danzig on the Polish

Ambassador—Hitler told von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-chief of the Army,

that he did not intend to solve the Polish question by force for the

time being but requested that plans for that operation be developed.

(_R-100_)

On 3 April 1939 Keitel, as Chief of the High Command of the Armed

Forces, reissued over his signature the directive for the Uniform

Preparation for War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40. The directive,

noting that the basic principles for the sections on “Frontier Defense”

and “Danzig” remained unaltered, stated that Hitler had added the

following directives to “Fall Weiss”:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation

can be carried out at any time from _1.9.39_ onwards.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to

draw up a precise timetable for “Fall Weiss” and to arrange by

conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches

of the Armed Forces.

“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the

details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by

1.5.39.” (_C-120_)

It is noteworthy that, even in April of 1939, the tentative timetable

called for the invasion of Poland to be carried out at any time from 1

September 1939 onwards.

About a week later, an order signed by Hitler was circulated to the

highest commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This confirmed

Keitel’s directive to prepare for three eventualities: “Frontier

Defense”, “Fall Weiss”, and the Annexation of Danzig. Annex II contained

further instructions for “Fall Weiss”. In the first paragraph, headed

“Political Hypotheses and Aims”, it was stated that should Poland adopt

a threatening attitude toward Germany, a “final settlement” would be

necessary _notwithstanding the pact with Poland_. “The aim is then to

destroy Polish military strength . . .”

It was further stated that the Free State of Danzig would be

incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict, at the

latest. The directive continued: “Policy aims at limiting the war to

Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis

in France and British restraint as a result of this.”

The general political background against which the Armed Forces were to

work having thus been set down, the later paragraphs outlined the tasks

and operational objectives of the three branches of the Armed Forces. It

was also decreed that a “camouflaged or open (‘general’ added in ink)

mobilization will not be ordered before D-Day 1 at the latest possible

moment”, and further that the “preparations for the opening of

operations are to be made in such a way that—without waiting for the

planned assembly of mobilized units—positions can be taken up

immediately by the first available troops.” (_C-120_)

On 10 May an order signed by Hitler promulgated his instructions for the

seizure of economic installations in Poland and directed the

commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces to report

by 1 August 1939 on the measures taken in consequence of these

instructions. (_C-120_)

On 23 May 1939 Hitler called a meeting of his military leaders at the

Reich Chancellery. Keitel was at the meeting; Jodl was not, but

Warlimont (also from the Planning Department of OKW) was. Hitler

announced the necessity of a war against Poland, not over Danzig, but in

order to acquire living space in the East. He recognized the possibility

that this would provoke a war against France and England, but the

_Wehrmacht_ was instructed to prepare detailed plans. (_L-79_)

A directive dated 22 June 1939, signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW,

indicates an advanced stage of preparation. On the basis of particulars

already available from the Navy, Army, and Air Force, he stated, he had

submitted to Hitler a “preliminary timetable” for “Fall Weiss.” The

Fuehrer was reported to be in substantial agreement with the intentions

submitted by the three branches; he had also made suggestions with

regard to the need to camouflage the scheduled maneuvers “in order not

to disquiet the population,” and had commented on the disposition of an

SS Artillery Regiment. (_C-126_)

Two days later, Keitel issued instructions for further study on two

specific problems: the capture, in undamaged condition, of bridges over

the Vistula; and the possible adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig

Bay on the element of surprise in the Army’s attack against the bridge

at Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (_C-120_)

On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg the Supreme

Commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the

lower ranking Commanding Generals (_Oberbefehlshaber_), and announced

his decision to attack Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this

meeting. (_L-3_; _798-PS_; _1014-PS_)

Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered: the text of

one, _L-3_, overlaps the contents of the other two, _798-PS_ and

_1014-PS_; the latter two appear to be complementary, _798-PS_ being a

record of a morning speech, and _1014-PS_ of an afternoon speech.

Violent and abusive language appears in both _L-3_ and _798-PS_. That

Hitler made, at a minimum, the following points, appears from all of

them:

1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (_L-3_; _798-PS_)

2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish armed forces,

rather than to reach a fixed line. (_L-3_; _1014-PS_)

3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August (_L-3_;

_1014-PS_)

4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by German

propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it is plausible or

not. The world will not question the victor (_L-3_; _1014-PS_). The text

in _L-3_ further describes the pretext to be used to start the war:

“I’ll let a couple of companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an

assault in Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”

A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief of the

Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the time for the attack

on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26 August 1939. (_1780-PS_)

(4) _Aggression against Norway and Denmark._ On or about 12 September

1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations for the occupation of

Norwegian bases early in 1940. (_1546-PS_)

The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler on 12

December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl were

present. Hitler agreed with Raeder’s suggestion that, if he was

favorably impressed with Quisling, the OKW should be authorized to

prepare for the occupation either with Quisling’s assistance, or by

force. (_C-64_)

In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate barges for the

invasion, and further preparations were to be conducted under the code

name “_Weserubung_” (_C-63_). The general directive for the invasion was

issued by Hitler on 1 March 1940. (_C-174_; _1809-PS_)

(5) _Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ At a

conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it was determined that the

occupation of the Low Countries was necessary to the successful conduct

of the war against England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW

with responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and complete

secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (_L-79_)

On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for the conduct

of the war in the West that the invasion should be started soon, in

order to protect the Ruhr and to provide air bases for use against

England. A copy of this directive was distributed to OKW. (_L-52_)

In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders was issued

concerning the invasion of the Low Countries—“Fall Gelb”. Questions of

how far the troops should advance under the plan were clarified (_C-62_;

_440-PS_). Instructions were issued concerning the deployment of troops,

communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the administration

and pacification of the countries to be taken (_2329-PS_). Provisions

were made for special operations by the 7th Flieger Division near the

Belgian-French border. (_C-10_)

Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were issued

setting and postponing the day for starting operations. These delays

were caused by the weather. One of the orders, dated 11 January 1940,

shows that all the others were concerned with the action against the Low

Countries, and that the 7th Flieger Division (see _C-10_) was involved.

All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (_C-72_)

The development of the plans, and the various questions which came up

for consideration are shown in the entries in Jodl’s diary. At one point

the Foreign Office did not regard the prepared justification for the

attack as satisfactory, but Jodl thought it was sufficient. His diary

shows the existence of the plan against the Low Countries and the steps

taken to put it into execution. (_1809-PS_)

(6) _Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia._ On 12 November 1940

Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the occupation of the

Greek mainland (_444-PS_). On 13 December 1940 a Hitler order stated

that the invasion of Greece was planned and would start as soon as the

weather became favorable. The composition of combat teams and their

routes of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded, the

mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a new task. This

order was distributed to the OKW, as well as to the three armed

services. (_1541-PS_)

On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed intervention in

Albania, to assist the Italians against Greece. The order was initialled

by Keitel and Jodl (_448-PS_). On 20 January 1941 Jodl reported, in

notes of a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated that

one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for

use in his plan for the operation against Greece. This was four months

prior to the attack. (_C-134_)

On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave decisions for

carrying out the Greek campaign, providing that pontoon building would

commence on 26 February, and that the Danube would be crossed on 2

March. (_C-59_)

On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, asked for

confirmation that the whole of Greece would have to be occupied even in

the event of a peaceful settlement, and Hitler replied that complete

occupation was a prerequisite to any settlement. (_C-167_)

At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and Jodl, Hitler

outlined the proposed operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. The

actual plan for military operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the

same day. (_1746-PS_)

(7) _Aggression against the U.S.S.R._ On 12 November 1940 Hitler issued

a directive in which, among other things, it was stated that

preparations for the East already verbally ordered should be continued,

regardless of the outcome of current political discussions for the

clarification of Russia’s attitude. The directive was initialled by

Jodl. (_444-PS_)

The original directive for preparation of the attack on Russia—case

“Barbarossa”—was signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940 and initialled by

Keitel and Jodl (_446-PS_). On 3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to

discuss the intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present

(_872-PS_). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the intended

division of occupied Russian territory. The distribution list shows that

Keitel and Jodl received copies. (_1642-PS_)

In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give him

detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming invasion. The letter

was initialled by Jodl. (_874-PS_)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to Hitler’s

Barbarossa order (_446-PS_). This order defined the area of operations

and established the relationship between political and military officers

in those areas (_447-PS_). On 1 June 1941 there was issued, with

Hitler’s approval, a timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition

and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was signed by

Keitel (_C-39_). On 14 June 1941 an order was issued for final reports

on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders.

(_C-78_)

While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning for the

production of armaments and supplies was being conducted by one of

Keitel’s subordinates, General Thomas, Chief of the _Wirtschaft

Ruestungsamt_ in OKW. (_2353-PS_)

By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was appointed “Deputy

for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern

Territories”. Jodl and Warlimont were appointed Keitel’s representatives

with the Rosenberg office (_865-PS_). A preliminary report by Rosenberg

on his work up to the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as

having consulted and worked with him in those preparations. (_1039-PS_)

A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June 1941 states that

Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s policy on raw materials—that it

took less manpower to seize territories containing raw materials, than

it did to make synthetic substitutes. (_1456-PS_)

(8) _War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;—Crimes against Military

Personnel—Lynching of Allied Airmen._ On 21 May 1944 Keitel received a

note from WFSt to the effect that Hitler had decided that enemy fliers

who had been forced down should be shot without court-martial, if they

had engaged in “acts of terror”. Keitel wrote on the note “Please

arrange for order to be drafted. K”. (_731-PS_)

By 4 June 1944 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead with

formulating the plans. Goering was to be asked what actions of enemy

fliers should be punishable by death; the Airmen’s Reception Camp at

Oberursel was to be told which fliers should be delivered to the SD; and

the Foreign Office was to be kept advised. (_737-PS_)

At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised questions about the

difficulty of establishing general rules in such a matter. The “Acts of

Terror” were:

1. Low level attacks on civilians.

2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.

3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.

4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (_735-PS_)

On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask their approval

of the proposed measure and the agreed definition of “Acts of Terror”

(_730-PS_). On the same day Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his

approval of the definitions of “Acts of Terror”, and also to ask that he

give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at Oberursel to

hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD. Both Keitel and Jodl

initialled this letter (_729-PS_). Goering replied that fliers not

guilty of acts of terror must be protected, and suggested that such

matters be handled by the courts. (_732-PS_)

A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944 expresses

misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and concern about the publicity

that would be involved. (_728-PS_)

On 26 June 1944 Goering’s adjutant telephoned the WFSt to say that

Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (_733-PS_)

On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had approved the

Foreign Office draft (_728-PS_), but wished to obtain Hitler’s approval

before communicating his own final written approval to Keitel.

(_740-PS_)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WILHELM KEITEL

│ │ │

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page

│ │ │

│Charter of the International Military │ │

│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5

│International Military Tribunal, │ │

│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │

│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66

│ ———— │ │

│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │

│document indicates that the document │ │

│was received in evidence at the │ │

│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │

│before a document number indicates │ │

│that the document was referred to │ │

│during the trial but was not formally │ │

│received in evidence, for the reason │ │

│given in parentheses following the │ │

│description of the document. The USA │ │

│series number, given in parentheses │ │

│following the description of the │ │

│document, is the official exhibit │ │

│number assigned by the court. │ │

│ ———— │ │

081-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Keitel, 28 │ │

│February 1942, concerning mistreatment│ │

│of Soviet prisoners of war. │ III │ 126

│ │ │

*137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │

│Commanding General of Netherlands, 5 │ │

│July 1940, to cooperate with the │ │

│Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 379) │ III │ 185

│ │ │

138-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to │ │

│Commanding General of France, 17 │ │

│September 1940, to cooperate with the │ │

│Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 186

│ │ │

*149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, │ │

│establishing authority of Einsatzstab │ │

│Rosenberg. (USA 369) │ III │ 190

│ │ │

*375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │

│report of Intelligence Division, │ │

│Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │

│1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280

│ │ │

*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │

│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │

│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │

│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305

│ │ │

440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │

│November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │

│war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397

│ │ │

*444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │

│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │

│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │

│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │

│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │

│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │

│116) │ III │ 403

│ │ │

*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │

│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │

│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │

│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │

│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407

│ │ │

*447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │

│No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │

│1941, concerning Directives for │ │

│special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409

│ │ │

*448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │

│Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │

│concerning participation of German │ │

│Forces in the Fighting in the │ │

│Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │

│(GB 118) │ III │ 413

│ │ │

*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │

│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │

│501) │ III │ 416

│ │ │

*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │

│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │

│of his commando order of the day │ │

│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426

│ │ │

*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │

│about shooting of British glider │ │

│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430

│ │ │

509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │

│reporting “special treatment” for │ │

│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │

│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │

│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │

│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │

│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

*531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │

│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │

│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │

│550) │ III │ 435

│ │ │

*537-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of members of │ │

│foreign “Military Missions”, captured │ │

│together with partisans. (USA 553) │ III │ 439

│ │ │

*551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of Commando │ │

│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440

│ │ │

*553-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942,│ │

│regulating treatment of paratroops. │ │

│(USA 500) │ III │ 441

│ │ │

*556-2-PS │Order initialled by Keitel, 8 │ │

│September 1942, for civilians to work │ │

│on “West Wall”. (USA 194) │ III │ 443

│ │ │

*656-PS │Letter, undated, from Bormann to │ │

│Political leaders, enclosing Order of │ │

│Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 29 │ │

│January 1943, relating to self-defense│ │

│against prisoners of war. (USA 339) │ III │ 470

│ │ │

666-PS │Directives issued by the Fuehrer and │ │

│Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces │ │

│signed by Keitel, 7 December 1941, for│ │

│prosecution of offenses against the │ │

│Reich. │ III │ 474

│ │ │

668-PS │Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD │ │

│and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, │ │

│concerning prosecution of punishable │ │

│offenses against the Reich or │ │

│occupation forces in occupied │ │

│territories. (USA 504) │ III │ 476

│ │ │

*686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │

│Chancellor to strengthen German │ │

│Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │

│Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │

│(USA 305) │ III │ 496

│ │ │

695-PS │OKW Order signed by Reinecke, 24 March│ │

│1942, concerning treatment of Soviet │ │

│prisoners of war. │ III │ 498

│ │ │

*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │

│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │

│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │

│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526

│ │ │

729-PS │Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14│ │

│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │

│enemy terror aviators. │ III │ 529

│ │ │

730-PS │Draft of letter to Foreign Office, │ │

│attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June │ │

│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 530

│ │ │

731-PS │Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May,│ │

│concerning measures to be taken │ │

│against Anglo-American air crews in │ │

│special instances. │ III │ 531

│ │ │

732-PS │Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June │ │

│1944, concerning treatment of enemy │ │

│terror aviators. │ III │ 532

│ │ │

733-PS │Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of terror │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 533

│ │ │

735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │

│fix the cases in which the application│ │

│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │

│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533

│ │ │

737-PS │Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │

│aviators. │ III │ 536

│ │ │

*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │

│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537

│ │ │

743-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 8 September │ │

│1944, instructing the Armed Forces to │ │

│support Koch in the exploitation and │ │

│evacuation of Baltic territories. │ III │ 539

│ │ │

*795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │

│concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │

│Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580

│ │ │

*798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │

│Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │

│22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581

│ │ │

829-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 16 December │ │

│1941, for ruthless suppression of │ │

│uprisings in occupied territories. │ III │ 597

│ │ │

833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head │ │

│of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, │ │

│concerning prosecution of crimes │ │

│against the Reich or occupying forces │ │

│in the occupied territories. │ III │ 600

│ │ │

*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │

│Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │

│concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │

│Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │

│Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621

│ │ │

870-PS │Report of December 1944 from Terboven │ │

│to Hitler concerning sabotage in Oslo,│ │

│with marginal comment by Keitel │ │

│approving suggestion to shoot │ │

│relatives of saboteurs. │ III │ 623

│ │ │

*871-PS │Teletype from Keitel to Lammers, 6 │ │

│December 1944, agreeing that reprisals│ │

│must be ruthless. (GB 322) │ III │ 626

│ │ │

*872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │

│Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │

│“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” │ │

│(African operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626

│ │ │

874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │

│and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │

│Deception measures. │ III │ 634

│ │ │

878-PS │Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12 │ │

│September 1941, providing that Jews │ │

│may be put in labor-columns. │ III │ 636

│ │ │

*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │

│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │

│(USA 30) │ III │ 665

│ │ │

*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │

│regarding problems in Eastern │ │

│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │

│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695

│ │ │

1107-PS │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in │ │

│Rosenberg Ministry concerning the │ │

│Wehrmacht’s function in removing │ │

│treasures from the USSR. │ III │ 789

│ │ │

1161-PS │OKW, 31 May 1940, setting up economic │ │

│reconnaissance teams to procure all │ │

│important stocks of raw materials, │ │

│machinery, etc. in Belgium, Holland │ │

│and Northern France. │ III │ 816

│ │ │

1292-PS │Memorandum of conference with Hitler, │ │

│4 January 1944, concerning allocation │ │

│of labor, 1944. (USA 225) │ III │ 866

│ │ │

*1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel│ │

│consulted about resources of USSR. │ │

│(USA 148) │ IV │ 21

│ │ │

*1519-PS │Circular from Bormann, 30 September │ │

│1941, containing text of OKW of 8 │ │

│September 1941 on treatment of Soviet │ │

│prisoners of war. (GB 525) │ IV │ 58

│ │ │

*1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in│ │

│Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, │ │

│24 May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100

│ │ │

*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │

│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101

│ │ │

1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │

│concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104

│ │ │

1590-PS │Order received by OKH signed by │ │

│Keitel, 1 October 1941, containing │ │

│regulations for the shooting of │ │

│hostages. │ IV │ 127

│ │ │

1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │

│secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154

│ │ │

*1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │

│Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │

│1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │

│certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │

│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │

│pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182

│ │ │

*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │

│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │

│speech by Hitler to German High │ │

│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │

│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │

│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272

│ │ │

1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │

│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │

│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349

│ │ │

*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │

│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357

│ │ │

*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │

│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │

│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360

│ │ │

*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │

│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377

│ │ │

1915-PS │Decree concerning leadership of Armed │ │

│Forces, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │

│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ IV │ 552

│ │ │

1954-PS │Deposition of Keitel, 3 August 1945, │ │

│on his official functions and relation│ │

│to Nazi Party. │ IV │ 592

│ │ │

*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │

│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │

│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │

│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │

│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650

│ │ │

*2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │

│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │

│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │

│217) │ IV │ 654

│ │ │

2039-PS │Decree concerning the conditions of │ │

│employment of Eastern workers, 30 June│ │

│1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │

│p. 419. │ IV │ 655

│ │ │

*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │

│Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │

│Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │

│enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │

│Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843

│ │ │

2231-PS │Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die │ │

│Reichskanzlei” (1940), pp. 19-34. │ IV │ 873

│ │ │

*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │

│officers, about shooting of prisoners │ │

│at Mauthausen, (USA 490) │ IV │ 991

│ │ │

*2329-PS │Order by Commander in Chief of the │ │

│Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105) │ IV │ 1037

│ │ │

*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │

│Facts for History of German War and │ │

│Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071

│ │ │

*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │

│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327

│ │ │

2746-PS │Decree concerning organization of │ │

│Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles │ │

│and Jews in Incorporated Territories, │ │

│4 December 1941. 1941 │ │

│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │

│759-761. │ V │ 386

│ │ │

*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │

│meeting between Hitler and President │ │

│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │

│1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433

│ │ │

2926-PS │Decree concerning the care of children│ │

│begotten by members of the Wehrmacht │ │

│Personnel in Occupied Territories, 28 │ │

│July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │

│Part I, p. 488. │ V │ 592

│ │ │

*2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │

│73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow │ │

│Book. Excerpts from eight dispatches │ │

│from M. Coulondre, the French │ │

│Ambassador in Berlin, to the French │ │

│Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 │ │

│March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608

│ │ │

3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │

│1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │

│Service, and record of telephone │ │

│conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │

│1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731

│ │ │

3019-PS │Announcement of Keitel as Chief of │ │

│Wehrmacht, published in The Archives, │ │

│Vol. 18, p. 860. │ V │ 737

│ │ │

3020-PS │Fuehrer’s speech in Reichstag on 19 │ │

│July 1940, published in The Archives, │ │

│Vol. 76, p. 386. │ V │ 737

│ │ │

**3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │

│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │

│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │

│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │

│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │

│in evidence.) │ V │ 766

│ │ │

*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411

│ │ │

*3704-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von │ │

│Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536) │ VI │ 414

│ │ │

*3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │

│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │

│535) │ VI │ 415

│ │ │

*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419

│ │ │

*3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │

│in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │

│January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655

│ │ │

*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │

│International Law and proposed counter│ │

│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │

│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799

│ │ │

C-6 │Order by Keitel for intensified sea │ │

│and air measures in connection with │ │

│Fall “Gelb”, 30 December 1939. │ VI │ 816

│ │ │

*C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, │ │

│signed by Keitel, subject: Employment │ │

│of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817

│ │ │

*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │

│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857

│ │ │

C-48 │Order signed by Keitel, 30 November │ │

│1944, concerning sabotage in Norway │ │

│and Denmark. │ VI │ 870

│ │ │

*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │

│1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │

│treatment of civilians in the USSR for│ │

│offenses committed by them. (USA 554; │ │

│GB 162) │ VI │ 871

│ │ │

C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │

│for destruction of all copies of Order│ │

│of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without│ │

│effecting its validity. │ VI │ 875

│ │ │

*C-52 │Order signed by Keitel, 23 July 1941, │ │

│to abandon legal prosecution and │ │

│punishment in USSR and use terrorism │ │

│instead. (GB 485) │ VI │ 876

│ │ │

*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │

│execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │

│February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879

│ │ │

*C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,│ │

│signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │

│directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 │ │

│on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880

│ │ │

*C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │

│“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │

│87) │ VI │ 883

│ │ │

C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │

│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │

│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884

│ │ │

*C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │

│November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893

│ │ │

*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │

│signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │

│concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │

│(USA 151) │ VI │ 906

│ │ │

*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │

│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │

│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909

│ │ │

*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │

│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │

│74) │ VI │ 911

│ │ │

*C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │

│1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │

│Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913

│ │ │

*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │

│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │

│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916

│ │ │

*C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │

│Weiss” and directions for secret │ │

│mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932

│ │ │

*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │

│on conference between German and │ │

│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │

│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │

│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939

│ │ │

*C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │

│October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │

│initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947

│ │ │

*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │

│to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │

│(GB 33) │ VI │ 949

│ │ │

C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed│ │

│by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │

│OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950

│ │ │

*C-148 │Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, │ │

│subject: Communist Insurrection in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (USA 555) │ VI │ 961

│ │ │

*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │

│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │

│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │

│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966

│ │ │

*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │

│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977

│ │ │

*C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │

│“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003

│ │ │

*C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │

│for War 1937-1938, with covering │ │

│letter from von Blomberg, 24 June │ │

│1937. (USA 69) │ VI │ 1006

│ │ │

*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │

│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │

│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017

│ │ │

*C-194 │Orders by Keitel and │ │

│Commander-in-Chief of Navy, 6 March │ │

│1936, for Navy cooperation in │ │

│Rhineland occupation. (USA 55) │ VI │ 1019

│ │ │

*D-39 │Telegrams relating to activities │ │

│against partisans in Italy. (GB 275) │ VI │ 1023

│ │ │

*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer │ │

│SS, the OKW, Inspector of │ │

│Concentration Camps, Chief of Security│ │

│Police and SD, dating from 29 October │ │

│1941 through 22 February 1944, │ │

│relative to procedure in cases of │ │

│unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │

│execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74

│ │ │

D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │

│December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177

│ │ │

*D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │

│December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183

│ │ │

*D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │

│German Foreign Minister and Count │ │

│Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │

│Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │

│(GB 295) │ VII │ 190

│ │ │

*D-763 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │

│regarding penal jurisdiction of │ │

│non-German civilians in Occupied │ │

│Territories. (GB 300) │ VII │ 222

│ │ │

*D-764 │Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, │ │

│concerning combatting of “terrorists” │ │

│and “saboteurs” in Occupied │ │

│Territories and jurisdiction relative │ │

│thereto. (GB 299) │ VII │ 223

│ │ │

*D-765 │Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, │ │

│regarding offenses by non-German │ │

│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │

│302) │ VII │ 225

│ │ │

*D-766 │Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, │ │

│regarding offenses by non-German │ │

│civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB│ │

│301) │ VII │ 226

│ │ │

*D-767 │Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on │ │

│offenses by non-German civilians in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (GB 303) │ VII │ 228

│ │ │

*D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │

│21 September 1940, relative to │ │

│application of capital punishment in │ │

│connection with Railway strike in │ │

│Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229

│ │ │

D-770 │Circular, 24 September 1944, on │ │

│offenses of non-German civilians in │ │

│Occupied Territories. (GB 305) │ VII │ 229

│ │ │

*D-774 │Directive of Chief of OKW to German │ │

│Foreign Office at Salzburg, on │ │

│treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers│ │

│14 June 1944. (GB 307) │ VII │ 231

│ │ │

*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │

│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232

│ │ │

*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │

│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │

│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233

│ │ │

*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │

│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234

│ │ │

*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │

│OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235

│ │ │

*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │

│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │

│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236

│ │ │

*D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239

│ │ │

*D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │

│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │

│315) │ VII │ 239

│ │ │

D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │

│June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │

│“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240

│ │ │

*D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │

│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240

│ │ │

*D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │

│“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241

│ │ │

*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │

│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242

│ │ │

*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │

│Committee of the Reich Defense held on│ │

│26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328

│ │ │

*EC-194 │Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning│ │

│use of prisoners of war in the war │ │

│industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214) │ VII │ 336

│ │ │

*EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │

│Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │

│price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380

│ │ │

EC-338 │Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from │ │

│Canaris to Keitel concerning an OKW │ │

│Order regulating the treatment of │ │

│Soviet prisoners of war. │ VII │ 411

│ │ │

*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │

│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │

│772) │ VII │ 455

│ │ │

*EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │

│Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247)│ VII │ 462

│ │ │

L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │

│Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │

│Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)│ │

│(Referred to but not offered in │ │

│evidence.) │ VII │ 752

│ │ │

*L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct │ │

│of war in the West, 9 October 1939. │ │

│(USA 540) │ VII │ 800

│ │ │

*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │

│“Indoctrination on the political │ │

│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847

│ │ │

*L-90 │Fuehrer decree, February 1942, │ │

│concerning prosecution of offenses in │ │

│Occupied Territory; “First Ordinance” │ │

│signed by Keitel for execution of the │ │

│directive; memorandum of 12 December │ │

│1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503) │ VII │ 871

│ │ │

*L-158 │Circular letter from SIPO and SD │ │

│Commander of Radom District, 28 March │ │

│1944, concerning measures to be taken │ │

│against escaped officers and │ │

│non-commissioned officer PWs. (USA │ │

│514) │ VII │ 906

│ │ │

L-179 │Letter from RSHA to police officials, │ │

│5 November 1942, concerning criminal │ │

│procedure against Poles and members of│ │

│Eastern people. │ VII │ 976

│ │ │

*L-211 │OKW circular entitled Direction of War│ │

│as Problem of Organization, 19 April │ │

│1938. (GB 161) │ VII │ 1043

│ │ │

*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │

│July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │

│Eastern populations and territories. │ │

│(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086

│ │ │

*R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by │ │

│Hitler to General von Brauchitsch on │ │

│25 March 1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83

│ │ │

UK-20 │Keitel Order on treatment of │ │

│supporters of De Gaulle who fight for │ │

│Russians, 26 May 1943. (GB 163) │ VIII │ 538

│ │ │

*UK-57 │Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and │ │

│21 April 1944, concerning │ │

│counteraction to Kharkov show trial. │ │

│(GB 164) │ VIII │ 539

│ │ │

*UK-66 │Report of British War Crimes Section │ │

│of Allied Force Headquarters on German│ │

│reprisals for partisan activity in │ │

│Italy. (GB 274) │ VIII │ 572

│ │ │

Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │

│January 1946, substantially the same │ │

│as his testimony on direct examination│ │

│before the International Military │ │

│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │

│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587

│ │ │

Affidavit I │Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 │ │

│January 1946. │ VIII │ 647

│ │ │

Statement III │The Origin of the Directives of the │ │

│Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, │ │

│by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 │ │

│September 1945. │ VIII │ 669

│ │ │

Statement IV │The Position and Powers of the Chief │ │

│of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, │ │

│Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. │ VIII │ 672

│ │ │

Statement V │Notes Concerning Actions of German │ │

│Armed Forces During the War and in │ │

│Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel,│ │

│Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. │ VIII │ 678

│ │ │

Statement VI │The Relationship Between Canaris and │ │

│Keitel, by Erwin Lahousen, Nurnberg, │ │

│23 October 1945. │ VIII │ 682

│ │ │

Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │

│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │

│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

│ │ │

**Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │

│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │

│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776

5. ALFRED JODL

A. _POSITIONS HELD BY JODL._

Operations Department of the Army (_Heer_), 1932-35.

Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the

Armed Forces (_Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW_), 1935-Oct.

1938.

Artillery Commander (“_Artillerie Kommandeur_”) of the 44th

Division. Vienna and Brno, Oct 1938-27 Aug. 1939.

Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces

(_Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der

Wehrmacht_), August 1939-1945.

Dates of Promotion:

1932—Major and Oberstleutnant

1936—Oberst

1939—Generalmajor

1940—General der Artillerie

1944—Generaloberst (2865-PS).

B. _FUNCTIONS OF JODL’S POSITIONS._

Jodl’s most important office was that of Chief of the Operations Staff

(_Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab_) in OKW. In this capacity he was directly

subordinate to Keitel and equal in status to other departmental chiefs

in OKW. However, insofar as the planning and conduct of military affairs

are concerned, Jodl and his staff were more influential than the other

departments.

The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the

most important was the “National Defense” section, of which Warlimont

was chief. He was primarily concerned with the development of strategic

questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same

duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

(_3707-PS_)

Jodl drafted many directives for Hitler to sign, for the preparation of

military operations and plans of deployment, and for the possible

initiation and commencement of military measures relating to matters of

organization, operations, or “war-economics.” While in a theater of

operations, Jodl would report twice daily to Hitler about operations,

and then prepare the Fuehrer directives. There was direct contact

between Hitler and Jodl, though Keitel was kept informed of what passed

between them.

In addition to certain ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s

military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic

and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations

Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the Commanders and

Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had

approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the appropriate

military authorities (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).

C. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._

Jodl’s loyalty to the Nazi party doctrine is evident in a speech he

delivered on 7 November 1943. He spoke of the National Socialist

Movement and its struggle for internal power as the preparation for

liberation from the Treaty of Versailles. (_L-172) _ He also stated, in

a speech on the occasion of the attempted assassination of Hitler, that

his aims had been in general agreement with the aims of the party.

(_1808-PS_)

At the sixth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense

Council on 7 February 1934 Jodl pointed out that the practical execution

of the preparations for mobilization, which had been ordered by the Army

and the highest Reich authorities, were making a considerable

enlargement of personnel necessary. He suggested, however, that this

enlargement of personnel ought not to result in “the disquieting of

foreign countries through conspicuous mobilization measures.” (_EC-405_)

In the presence of Jodl, Generalmajor Keitel pointed out at the eleventh

meeting that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on

31 March of the following year. A “Mobilization Book for Civilian

Agencies” was to be issued for the first time on 1 April 1936. Keitel

said that this day, to the extent possible, should find the nation ready

and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer,

the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of

military capacity deliberately above all other national tasks. It was

the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council, he emphasized,

to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such

funds and raw materials that were absolutely and exclusively needed for

the defense of the Reich. Colonel Jodl said that the Mobilization Book

for the Civilian Departments constituted the unified basis for the

carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army (_EC-406_).

D. _JODL’S PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION._

(_See “F,” 1 through 7, in Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where

the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for these activities is

discussed._)

E. _JODL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES

AGAINST HUMANITY._

(1) _Murder and ill treatment of civilian population in occupied,

territories and on the high seas._ Jodl ordered the forcible evacuation

of all persons in a northern district of Norway, and the burning of all

their dwellings. This was to be done so that the inhabitants of that

area could not help the Russians (_754-PS_). Shortly thereafter an

evacuation took place in Finnmark County in northern Norway, in the

course of which 30,000 houses were damaged. (_1800-PS_)

Jodl was aware that in 1942 there were continual arrests in Belgrade,

and that from fifteen to thirty followers of Mihalovic were shot every

day. (_1383-PS_)

Jodl initialled an order signed for Hitler by Keitel, which provided

that enemy civilians guilty of offenses against German troops should be

killed without a military trial, and that punishment could be waived in

the case of German soldiers who committed offenses against enemy

civilians. (_886-PS_)

Rosenberg was appointed by Hitler on 20 April 1941 “Deputy for a

Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories.”

The highest Reich authorities were to cooperate fully, and Keitel was

asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with Rosenberg. Jodl

was appointed as Keitel’s representative with Warlimont as his deputy,

and Keitel wrote to Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 that Jodl and Warlimont

would be the OKW representatives. (_865-PS_)

Responsibility for crimes committed under Rosenberg’s authority thus

attach to Jodl as well. In this connection reference is made to Section

7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.

(2) _Deportation of civilian populations of and in Occupied Territories

for slave labor and for other purposes._ Jodl knew of the deportation of

workers, for he once told Hitler that the military commander of France

had reported that over 220,000 workers had been deported into the Reich

in the past six months. (_1383-PS_)

(3) _Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members

of the Armed Forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war and of

persons on the high seas._ On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that

commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in

battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender. This order was

issued by Jodl’s department. (_498-PS_)

A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was

distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum

dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (_503-PS_). Several cases are

known in which the order was carried out. (_508-PS_; _509-PS_)

Three specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C in C,

Norway, where captured members of sabotage units were executed after

interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred

at Gloafjord, Drontheim, and at Stavanger. (_512-PS_)

On 23 June 1944 C in C West requested instructions re-defining the scope

of the commando order. In view of the extensive landings in Normandy, it

had become difficult to decide which paratroops should be considered

sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and which should be

considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The question was

answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was signed by

Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order. (_531-PS_;

_551-PS_)

When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes

killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect

the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was

considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen

who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror.”

It is not certain that the order was ever issued, but it is certain that

Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to prevent them and

in fact considered giving them official justification.

(_See also “F” at the end of Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where

the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for the lynching of Allied

airmen is discussed._)

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ALFRED JODL

│ │ │

Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page

│ │ │

│Charter of the International Military │ │

│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5

│International Military Tribunal, │ │

│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │

│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 66

│ ———— │ │

│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │

│document indicates that the document │ │

│was received in evidence at the │ │

│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │

│before a document number indicates │ │

│that the document was referred to │ │

│during the trial but was not formally │ │

│received in evidence, for the reason │ │

│given in parentheses following the │ │

│description of the document. The USA │ │

│series number, given in parentheses │ │

│following the description of the │ │

│document, is the official exhibit │ │

│number assigned by the court. │ │

│ ———— │ │

*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │

│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │

│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │

│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305

│ │ │

444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from │ │

│Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by │ │

│Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 │ │

│November 1940, concerning plans for │ │

│prosecution of war in Mediterranean │ │

│Area and occupation of Greece. (GB │ │

│116) │ III │ 403

│ │ │

*446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed│ │

│by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │

│Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December │ │

│1940, concerning the Invasion of │ │

│Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407

│ │ │

*448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │

│Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │

│concerning participation of German │ │

│Forces in the Fighting in the │ │

│Mediterranean Theater of Operations. │ │

│(GB 118) │ III │ 413

│ │ │

*498-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing │ │

│of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA │ │

│501) │ III │ 416

│ │ │

*503-PS │Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October │ │

│1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation │ │

│of his commando order of the day │ │

│before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542) │ III │ 426

│ │ │

*508-PS │OKW correspondence, November 1942, │ │

│about shooting of British glider │ │

│troops in Norway. (USA 545) │ III │ 430

│ │ │

*509-PS │Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, │ │

│reporting “special treatment” for │ │

│three British commandos. (USA 547) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

*512-PS │Teletype from Army Commander in │ │

│Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning │ │

│interrogation of saboteurs before │ │

│shooting; and memorandum in reply from│ │

│OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546) │ III │ 433

│ │ │

531-PS │OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing │ │

│inquiry from Supreme Command West │ │

│about treatment of paratroopers. (USA │ │

│550) │ III │ 435

│ │ │

*551-PS │Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, │ │

│concerning treatment of Commando │ │

│participants. (USA 551) │ III │ 440

│ │ │

*754-PS │Teletype Order signed by Jodl, 28 │ │

│October 1944, for evacuation of │ │

│Norwegians and burning of houses. (GB │ │

│490) │ III │ 544

│ │ │

*789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │

│23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │

│Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572

│ │ │

*865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, │ │

│Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, │ │

│concerning appointment of Jodl and │ │

│Warlimont as OKW representatives with │ │

│Rosenberg. (USA 143) │ III │ 621

│ │ │

874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J,│ │

│and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │

│Deception measures. │ III │ 634

│ │ │

886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │

│courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │

│civilians in the district │ │

│“Barbarossa”, signed by Keitel for │ │

│Hitler, and initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637

│ │ │

*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │

│regarding problems in Eastern │ │

│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │

│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695

│ │ │

1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German │ │

│Intelligence Service in the East, │ │

│signed by Jodl, 6 September 1940. (USA│ │

│130) │ III │ 849

│ │ │

*1383-PS │Extract from transcription of │ │

│stenographic report on discussion of │ │

│current military situation, 12 │ │

│December 1942. (GB 489) │ III │ 958

│ │ │

*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13│ │

│December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101

│ │ │

1642-PS │Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for │ │

│secret map of Soviet Union. │ IV │ 154

│ │ │

*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │

│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │

│speech by Hitler to German High │ │

│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │

│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │

│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272

│ │ │

*1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │

│February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357

│ │ │

*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │

│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │

│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360

│ │ │

1800-PS │Preliminary report on Germany’s crimes│ │

│against Norway, prepared by the Royal │ │

│Norwegian Government. │ IV │ 375

│ │ │

*1808-PS │Excerpt of speech by Jodl to Officers │ │

│and officials of Armed Forces │ │

│Operations Staff, 24 July 1944. (GB │ │

│493) │ IV │ 377

│ │ │

*1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │

│1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377

│ │ │

*2865-PS │Statement by Jodl, showing positions │ │

│held by him. (USA 16) │ V │ 526

│ │ │

*3702-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531) │ VI │ 411

│ │ │

3705-PS │Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von │ │

│Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA │ │

│535) │ VI │ 415

│ │ │

*3707-PS │Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz │ │

│Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533) │ VI │ 419

│ │ │

*3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │

│in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │

│January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655

│ │ │

*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │

│International Law and proposed counter│ │

│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │

│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799

│ │ │

*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │

│Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857

│ │ │

*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │

│execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │

│February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879

│ │ │

*C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │

│meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. │ │

│(GB 86) │ VI │ 884

│ │ │

*C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │

│November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893

│ │ │

*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │

│signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │

│concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │

│(USA 151) │ VI │ 906

│ │ │

*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │

│convening conference on Barbarossa on │ │

│14 June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909

│ │ │

*C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │

│operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │

│74) │ VI │ 911

│ │ │

*C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March │ │

│1938, on conduct towards Czech or │ │

│Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913

│ │ │

C-123 │Jodl Order on capitulation of │ │

│Leningrad, 7 October 1941. │ VI │ 929

│ │ │

*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │

│on conference between German and │ │

│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │

│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │

│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939

│ │ │

*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18│ │

│March 1941, concerning audience of │ │

│C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March│ │

│1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966

│ │ │

*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │

│Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977

│ │ │

*C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander│ │

│Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 │ │

│March 1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017

│ │ │

*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │

│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │

│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │

│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234

│ │ │

*D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │

│OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │

│treatment of Allied │ │

│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235

│ │ │

*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │

│Committee of Reichs Defense Council, │ │

│26 June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450

│ │ │

*EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │

│Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA│ │

│772) │ VII │ 455

│ │ │

*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │

│“Indoctrination on the political │ │

│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847

│ │ │

L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the │ │

│Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a │ │

│lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 │ │

│November 1943 at Munich to Reich and │ │

│Gauleiters. (USA 34) │ VII │ 920

│ │ │

Statement II │A Short Historical Consideration of │ │

│German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, │ │

│Nurnberg, 6 September 1945. │ VIII │ 662

│ │ │

Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │

│the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │

│fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707

│ │ │

**Chart No. 7 │Organization of the Wehrmacht │ │

│1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to │ │

│Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 776

6. ERNST KALTENBRUNNER

A. _KALTENBRUNNER ENTERED THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN ITS EARLY

STAGES, AND SUPPORTED IT, AND WAS A LEADER IN IT UNTIL THE END._

Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born on 4 October 1903 at Ried on Inn (near

Braunau) Austria. He spent his youth in Hitler’s native district. Later

he moved to Linz, where he attended the State _Realgymnasium_. He

studied law and obtained a law degree in 1926. He spent the first year

as apprentice lawyer at Linze-on-Danube and then worked as a

lawyer-candidate, first at Salzburg and after 1928 at Linz (_2938-PS_).

Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932. Prior

to 1933 he was the District speaker (_Gauredner_) and legal counsellor

(_Rechtsberater_) of the SS division (_Abschnitt_) VIII. After 1933 he

was the fuehrer of regiment (_Standarte_) 37 and later of the SS

division VIII (_2892-PS_).

In January 1934 Kaltenbrunner was jailed by the Dollfuss government on

account of his Nazi views, and sent with other leading National

Socialists into the concentration camp Kaisersteinbruch. He is said to

have started and led a hunger strike of the prisoners and thereby to

have forced the government to dismiss 490 National Socialist prisoners.

In the following year he was jailed again because of suspicion of High

Treason and committed to the military court at Wels (Upper Danube).

After an investigation of many months the accusation of High Treason was

dropped, but he was condemned to six months’ imprisonment for

conspiracy. His right to practice law was suspended because of his Nazi

activities (_2938-PS_).

After the Spring of 1935 Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian

SS. In the magazine of the SIPO and SD, issue of 15 May 1943, it is

stated:

“It redounds to his credit that in this important position he

succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity

of the Austrian SS, which he had built up, in spite of all

persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the

right moment. After the annexation, in which the SS was a

decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security

Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National-Socialist cabinet

of Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to

Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the

Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a. m., as the first National

Socialist leader, that the Movement had achieved a complete

victory and that ‘The SS is in formation and awaiting further

orders.’” (_2938-PS_)

Hitler promoted Kaltenbrunner on the date of the Anschluss to the rank

of SS Brigadefuehrer and leader of the SS _Oberabschnitt_ Donau. On 11

September 1938 he was promoted to the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer. During

the liquidation of the Austrian national government and the

reorganization of Austria into Alps and Danube Districts, he was

appointed Higher SS and Police Leader to the governors of Vienna, Lower

Danube, and Upper Danube, in Corps Area (_Wehrkreis_) XVII, and in April

1941 was promoted to Major General of the Police (_2938-PS_).

On 30 January 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the Security

Police and SD (RSHA), succeeding Heydrich, who had been assassinated in

Prague in June 1942. Kaltenbrunner held this position until the end of

the war (_2644-PS_).

On 4 October 1943 at Pozen, Poland, in a speech delivered to

Gruppenfuehrers of the SS, Himmler made special reference to “our

comrade Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, who has succeeded our fallen

friend Heydrich” (_1919-PS_).

On 9 December 1944 the decoration known as the Knight’s Cross of the War

Merit, Cross with Swords, was given to SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General

of the Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security Police and

the SD (_2770-PS_).

In addition he held the Golden insignia of Honor and the _Blutorden_. He

was a member of the Reichstag after the 9th election period 1938

(_2892-PS_).

Toward the end of the war, Kaltenbrunner’s power increased greatly,

especially after the attack on Hitler of 20 July 1944. He gained direct

access to Hitler. He was very friendly with Fegelein and his wife, who

was the sister of Eva Braun. So powerful had Kaltenbrunner become toward

the end that even Himmler feared him. On 13 April 1945 the chief of the

German foreign intelligence service, Schellenberg, asked Himmler to

receive the representative of the Jewish World Congress, Mr. Storsch,

from Stockholm, and Himmler said,

“But how am I going to do that in regard to Kaltenbrunner? I

shall then be completely at his mercy!” (_2990-PS_).

B. _DURING KALTENBRUNNER’S TERM IN OFFICE AS CHIEF OF THE SECURITY

POLICE AND SD, NUMEROUS AND VAST CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY THE SIPO AND

SD IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES._

As Chief of the Security Police after 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner was

the head of the RSHA and the regional offices of the Gestapo, SD, and

Kripo. Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the Chiefs of the main offices

of the RSHA, including Amt III (the SD), Amt IV (the Gestapo), Amt V

(the Kripo), and Amt VI (the SD in foreign intelligence) (_L-219_).

Kaltenbrunner had direct responsibility over the offices of the RSHA.

All important matters had to be referred to him or had to be handled

under general or special authority granted by him to office chiefs.

“All decisions of principal character are signed by the Chief of

the Security Police personally. An office chief has only the

authority to sign ‘acting for’ and a chairman ‘by order of’ if

the subjects treated in the respective decrees fit into the

general laid-down principles according to the plan of

distribution of authority. In case of doubt it was the duty to

get the question cleared up by reporting it to the Chief of

Security Police and SD.” (_L-34_)

“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of

the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign in any

principal affairs of particular political significance without

consent of the Chief of the Security Police—not even during his

temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore

declare that the chief of Amt IV, Mueller, particularly was very

hesitant in signing documents concerning questions of general

nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put

aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the

Chief of the Security Police, whereby often much time was lost.”

(_L-50_).

Schellenberg, the Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, has stated:

“I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as

Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered

upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the

office and control over the Amts * * * He made it very clear in

his official relations with all of us who were his _Amt_ Chiefs

that he was the head of the office exercising full executive

powers and deciding all matters of policy. He permitted us to

issue directives within the organization in our own names

pursuant to fixed policies established by him, but all important

matters had to be submitted to him whether he signed them or we

signed them. He was constantly informed of all matters of

importance which went on in the entire organization. (_2939-PS_)

During Kaltenbrunner’s term in office as Chief of the Security Police

and SD, the following crimes were committed by the SIPO and SD pursuant

to policy established by the RSHA or orders issued out of the RSHA for

all of which he was responsible by virtue of his office.

(1) _Mass murders of civilians of occupied countries by Einsatz Groups._

A general discussion of this and the following twelve crimes of the

_Gestapo_ and SD appears in Section 6 of Chapter XV. That this crime

continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:

_3012-PS_; _2752-PS_; _2890-PS_.

(2) _Screenings of prisoner of war camps and executing racial and

political undesirables._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is

shown by the following document: _2622-PS_.

(3) _The taking of recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps,

where in some cases they were executed._ That this crime continued after

January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1650-PS_; _L-158_;

_1514-PS_.

(4) _Establishing concentration camps and committing racial and

political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave

labor and mass murder._ That this crime continued after January of 1943

is shown by the following documents: _D-50_; _D-46_; _L-41_; _701-PS_.

(5) _Deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and

disciplining of forced labor._ That this crime continued after January

1943 is shown by the following documents: _3012-PS_; _1063-B-PS_.

(6) _The execution of captured commandos and paratroopers and protection

of civilians who lynched Allied fliers._ That this crime continued after

January 1943 is shown by the following documents: _1276-PS_; _532-PS_;

_526-PS_; _R-110_; _745-PS_.

(7) _The taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret

trial and punishment._ That this crime continued after January 1943 is

shown by the following document: _835-PS_.

(8) _Punishment of citizens of occupied territories under special

criminal procedure and by summary methods._ That this crime continued

after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-5_.

(9) _The execution and confinement of persons in concentration camps for

crimes allegedly committed by their relatives._ That this crime

continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-37_.

(10) _Seizure and spoliation of public and private property._ That this

crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:

_2620-PS_; _L-18_.

(11) _Murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons._ That this crime

continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document: _L-53_.

(12) _Persecution of Jews._ That this crime continued after January 1943

is shown by the following documents: _L-18_; _1061-PS_; _2375-PS_;

_2605-PS_.

(13) _Persecution of the churches._ That this crime continued after

January 1943 is shown by the following document: _1815-PS_.

C. _KALTENBRUNNER HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE

COMMISSION OF MANY SPECIFIC CRIMES._

(1) _Kaltenbrunner was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration

camps and of the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor

and mass murder._ Mauthausen concentration camp was established in

Austria while Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for

Austria, and was frequently visited by Kaltenbrunner before he was

appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (_L-51_). On the occasion

of one such visit in 1942, Kaltenbrunner personally observed the gas

chamber in operation (_2753-PS_). After he became Chief of the Security

Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen concentration camp but

with less frequency (_L-51_). On one occasion he made an inspection of

the camp grounds with Himmler and had his photograph taken during the

course of the inspection (_2641-PS_). After a visit to Mauthausen in

1944 Kaltenbrunner reported to his _Amt_ Chiefs with pride that he had

helped to build up Mauthausen when he was Higher SS and Police Leader in

Austria and that the camp was engaged in valuable armament work

(_2990-PS_). Mauthausen concentration camp was classified by Heydrich in

January 1941 in category III, a camp for the most heavily accused

prisoners and for asocial prisoners who were considered incapable of

being reformed (_1063-A-PS_).

There were frequent conferences between the RSHA and executives of the

SS _Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ who had charge of the internal

administration of concentration camps. The affidavit of Rudolf Mildner

states with respect to these conferences:

“SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner attended personally

conferences with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, Chief of the SS

_Wirtschaft_ and _Verwaltungshauptamt_ and Chief of the

concentration camps. Due to these conferences and through talks

with the Chief of Office Gruppenfuehrer Mueller of _Amt_ IV and

Gruppenfuehrer Nebe of _Amt_ V, the Chief of the Security Police

and SD, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, must have known

the state of affairs in the concentration camps.” (_L-35_)

(2) _With full knowledge of conditions in and the purpose of

concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or permitted to be ordered in

his name the commitment of persons to concentration camps._ All orders

for protective custody other than short-term confinements were issued in

the name of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD and

bore the facsimile stamp of his signature (_2477-PS_).

The commandant of Buchenwald concentration camp in his affidavit states:

“With the exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the

concentration camps of occupied territories, all prisoners were

sent to the concentration camp Buchenwald on orders of the

_Reichssicherheitschauptamt_, Berlin. These preventive arrest

orders (red blanks) were in most cases signed with the name

Kaltenbrunner. The few other preventive arrest orders were

signed with ‘Foerster.’” (_L-38_)

On 7 July 1943 an order for protective custody was issued by the Gestapo

(_Amt_ IV C 2, RSHA) bearing the facsimile signature of Kaltenbrunner,

to be sent in the form of a telegram to the Gestapo office in Koeslin in

the case of a woman whose offense was stated to be failure to work, work

sabotage, and asocial conduct. She was ordered to be confined in the

concentration camp at Ravensbrueck (_2745-PS_).

On 19 January 1944 a warrant for protective custody was issued by the

Gestapo (_Amt_ IV C 2 of the RSHA) certified as signed by Kaltenbrunner,

to a British subject, C. S. James, on the grounds that he had been

proven guilty of activities to the detriment of the German Reich, and

that there was reason to expect that he would, if released, commit acts

prejudicial to the Reich (_1574-PS_).

Other instances of commitments to various concentration camps on orders,

signed by Kaltenbrunner, are contained in the dossiers of 25

Luxembourgers committed to concentration camps by the _Einsatzkommando_

of the Sipo and SD in Luxembourg during the year 1944. The concentration

camps to which the persons were committed included Dachau, Natzweiler,

Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald. Among the grounds were: “strongly

suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich;” “spiteful

statements inimical to Germany as well as aspersions and threats against

persons active in the National Socialist movement;” “strongly suspected

of aiding desertion;” “as relative of a deserter expected to take

advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich.” (_L-215_).

Further orders for commitments to concentration camps are contained in

file of 42 telegrams, all issued by the RSHA, _Amt_ IV A 6, Prague, to

the Gestapo Office at Darmstadt, and all signed by Kaltenbrunner, during

the period from 20 September 1944 to 2 February 1945. The concentration

camps to which people were sent included Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrueck,

Buchenwald, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenburg, and Theresienstadt.

Nationalities included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican,

Lithuanian, Greek, and Jew. Grounds included “refusal to work;”

“religious propaganda;” “sex relations with PWs;” “communist

statements;” “loafing on job;” “working against the Reich;” “spreading

of rumors detrimental to morale;” “_Aktion Gitter_;” “breach of work

contracts;” “statements against Germany;” “assault of foreman;”

“defeatist statements;” “theft and escape from jail.” (_2239-PS_).

(3) _Kaltenbrunner authorized executions in concentration camps._ Adolf

Zutter, the adjutant of Mauthausen concentration camp, avers that, until

the assassination of Heydrich, orders for executions at Mauthausen were

signed by Heydrich or his substitute, and that after Kaltenbrunner

became Chief of the Security Police and SD they were signed either by

Kaltenbrunner or by his substitute, Mueller. Zutter mentions a specific

instance in which Kaltenbrunner ordered the execution of a group of 12

to 15 uniformed members of an American military mission (_L-51_).

(4) _Kaltenbrunner had knowledge of the commitment of thousands of

Warsaw Poles to concentration camps and refused to release them._ During

the suppression of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, about 50,000 to 60,000

inhabitants of Warsaw were sent to concentration camps. As a result of

entreaties by Hans Frank to Himmler the deportation was stopped. Frank

and Buehler, his State Secretary, requested Kaltenbrunner to release the

persons who had been committed. Kaltenbrunner refused to release them on

the grounds they were employed in making secret weapons for the Reich

and declared that the number transported into concentration camps in the

Reich was small. Buehler verified the fact that the number of persons so

placed in concentration camps for forced labor was 50,000 to 69,999

(_2476-PS_).

(5) _Kaltenbrunner controlled the deportation of Poles, Jews, and other

non-Germans from Poland._ Otto Hofmann, former Chief of the SS Main

Office for Race and Settlement Matters, stated:

“The execution of all so-called resettlement actions, that is,

the sending away of Polish, Jewish, and people of non-German

blood, inhabitants of a territory in Poland destined for

Germanization was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA,

Heydrich, and, since the end of 1942, Kaltenbrunner.” (_L-49_).

(6) _Kaltenbrunner ordered the deportation of Jews from Denmark._ In

September 1943 Himmler ordered the Danish Jews arrested and shipped to

Stettin and from there to Theresienstadt concentration camp. Mildner,

the Chief of the Sipo and SD, telegraphed the RSHA to request that the

Jewish persecutions be stopped. In reply he received an order from

Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish action.

Shortly thereafter Mildner flew to Berlin to speak to Kaltenbrunner

personally about the matter. In Kaltenbrunner’s absence he spoke to

Mueller. After his return to Copenhagen, Mildner received a direct order

from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to carry out the anti-Jewish actions

immediately (_2375-PS_).

(7) _Kaltenbrunner personally exercised punitive authority over foreign

workers._ By order of Kaltenbrunner Labor Reformatory Camps were

established under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Police

(_1063-B-PS_).

In addition to sending workers to Labor Reformatory Camps,

Kaltenbrunner, through orders for protective custody signed by him or by

facsimile of his signature, committed workers to concentration camps. On

9 February 1945 a French citizen was sent to Buchenwald by order of

Kaltenbrunner for shirking work and insubordinate behavior. On 18 June

1943 a Pole was sent to Natzweiler “to be used as a skilled worker” by

order of Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a citizen of the Netherlands

was taken into protective custody “for work sabotage” by order of

Kaltenbrunner. On 2 December 1944 a French citizen was taken into

protective custody for “work sabotage and insubmissive” (_2582-PS_;

_2580-PS_).

(8) _Kaltenbrunner personally attended to matters against Jews and

political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate._ A

memorandum found among Kaltenbrunner’s personal effects states in part:

“Radio message to Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein Hq. of the Fuehrer

through Sturmbannfuehrer Sansoni, Berlin.

“Please report to RF SS and to the Fuehrer that all arrangements

against Jews, political and concentration camp internees in the

Protectorate have been taken care of by me personally today”

(_2519-PS_).

(9) _Kaltenbrunner personally ordered the Sipo and SD to encourage the

populace to lynch American and English flyers._ In 1944 at a conference

of _Amt_ Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:

“All offices of the SD and the security police are to be

informed that pogroms of the populace against English and

American terror-fliers were not to be interfered with; on the

contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered” (_2990-PS_).

(10) _Kaltenbrunner personally worked out the form of justification to

be submitted to cover up the execution of prisoners of war._ In

connection with the shooting of some 50 recaptured prisoners of war who

had escaped from a prisoner of war camp near Breslau, Kaltenbrunner

worked out with Mueller and Nebe the false reasons which were to be

given to the Red Cross, that is, that they had been killed by bomb

attacks, or shot while escaping or resisting arrest (_2990-PS_).

D. _CONCLUSION._

Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the

SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a leading role in the

betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As Higher SS

and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss he supervised and had

knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. He had

much to do with developing Mauthausen concentration camp and visited it

frequently. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in

action. With this knowledge and background he accepted in January 1943

appointment as chief of the very agencies which sent such victims to

their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to high prominence

in the conspiracy, receiving honors from Hitler and gaining Hitler’s

personal confidence.

* * * * *

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERNST KALTENBRUNNER