address the fundamental aim of this organization: to unite every person
of German “racial stock” under the control of the Nazi conspirators.
“* * * the new Germany has recognized that its attention and
devotion to the welfare of the millions of Germans who have not
the fortune to owe political allegiance to Germany, but who are
condemned to live abroad, are not merely a matter of natural
sympathy and solidarity but are in a higher degree dictated by
the strong political and economic interests of the Reich.”
(_3258-PS_).
It is noteworthy that the DAI was closely affiliated with the
German-American Bund, a subversive Nazi organization in the United
States. The DAI’s official periodical, “Germandom Abroad” (_Deutschtum
im Ausland_), was edited during the war by Walter Kappe, former press
chief of the Bund (_3258-PS_). Walter Kappe and Fritz Gissibl, another
former leader in the Bund, established on the premises of the DAI in
Stuttgart an organization called “Comradeship U. S. A.” The purpose of
this “Comradeship U. S. A.” was to maintain during the war an
organization for all Nazi Party members who had been active in the Bund
in the United States (_3258-PS_). Even before the outbreak of the war,
in the spring of 1939, Walter Kappe had undertaken to collect a complete
archive of Nazi activities in the U. S. on behalf of the DAI and the
Nazi Party (_3258-PS_).
The success of this world-wide fifth column directed by Hess is now a
matter of historical record. Hess himself guided the subversive foreign
groups which he had created until the day when the conspirators were
ready to annex the countries which they had undermined.
Thus, the annexation of Austria was principally due to the efforts of
the Nazi Party’s work within that country under the orders of Hess. As
early as 1934 Hess had appointed Reinthaler leader of the Nazi peasants
in Austria, and thus placed him in a position to take over the
leadership of the Nazi Fifth Column in Austria (_812-PS_). Hess took a
major part in the negotiations carried on by Seyss-Inquart and other
members of the conspiracy in preparation of the Anschluss (_3254-PS_;
_3425-PS_). When on 12 March 1938 Germany invaded Austria, Hess,
accompanied by Himmler, was the first member of the conspiracy to arrive
in Vienna at noon on the same day (_L-292_). The next day Hess signed
the decree by which the conspirators destroyed the independence of
Austria (_2307-PS_; _3075-PS_).
Once the conspirators had achieved their aim, Hess did not hesitate to
admit publicly that he had approved of the steps which led to the final
subjection of Austria. On 24 July 1938 he addressed a meeting held on
the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Austrian Chancellor
Dollfuss by members of the 89th SS Regiment. He devoted the larger part
of his speech to a justification of that assassination (_L-273_).
When the conspirators turned their attention to their next victim,
Czechoslovakia, Hess was again in the forefront directing the German
fifth-column in the Sudetenland. In his speech at the annual meeting of
the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP on 28 August 1938, Hess declared
that Nazi Germany was giving full backing to the demands of the Sudeten
German agitators. What such support meant in fact became very clear when
Hess pointed to the success of the Nazi policy in Austria (_3258-PS_).
All through the summer of 1938 Hess was engaged in consultations with
Karl H. Frank and Konrad Henlein, leaders of the Nazi Sudeten German
Party (_3061-PS_).
A few months later Hess could mark up another success for his
fifth-column. When the Munich Agreement forced Czechoslovakia to
surrender the Sudeten territory to Germany, Hess went to Reichenberg,
the capital of that district, as Hitler’s representative in order to
accept the official incorporation of the Sudeten German Party into the
Nazi Party on 5 November 1938. In his address on that occasion he
emphasized repeatedly that the Nazi conspirators had been ready to go to
war for the possession of the Sudetenland (_3204-PS_).
Hess also put his signature to the Act of 14 April 1939 setting up the
government of the Sudetenland as an integral part of the Reich
(_3076-PS_).
Later during the same year, after the conspirators had loosed their
first aggressive war, Hess signed the laws incorporating first Danzig
and then a large portion of Poland into the Reich (_3077-PS_; see also
Decree 8 October 1939 (RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2042); Decree of 12 October
1939, Part I, p. 2077).
When in July 1941 the Nazi conspirators occupied Greece, the members of
the local Nazi Party were ready to take over as an auxiliary Army
service (_3258-PS_).
Thus, wherever the conspirators sent their invading armies Hess’
fifth-column had prepared the soil.
E. _PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
Hess, as Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party, had the task of realizing its
“ideological” program (_3200-PS_).
One of the demands of this conspiratorial program was the destruction of
so-called inferior racial stock. Persons who suffered from hereditary
insanity or other hereditary diseases were considered useless to the
Nazi community. They were therefore to be killed or at least to be
prevented from procreating their kind.
In order to carry out this plan Hess established a special Racial Policy
Division on his Staff under Dr. Walter Gross, by his order of 17
November 1933. This Division was to “participate with the competent
government agencies in all race and population measures” (_3322-PS_;
_3163-PS_). In addition, other agencies of the Nazi Party, under Hess,
actively cooperated in the administration of this criminal program
(_D-181_; _842-PS_; _1969-PS_).
In 1937 Hess publicly claimed credit for having used his Party
organization in order to gain the nation’s approval for compulsory
sterilization (_3124-PS_; _3067-PS_).
More important still in the Nazi program were the persecution and
extermination of religious and racial minorities. Hess vigorously
propagated the doctrine of the superiority of the German race with which
the conspirators sought to justify these persecutions (_3124-PS_).
The Nurnberg Laws, which constituted the legal basis of this campaign,
were the work of the Party. This was solemnly announced by Hitler in the
peroration of the address in which he announced these laws to the
Reichstag in Nurnberg 15 September 1935:
“I now propose to the Reichstag the acceptance of those laws
which Party member Goering will read to you.
“The first and second laws fulfill the program of the National
Socialist Party in one important respect, and thereby pay a debt
of gratitude to the Movement under whose symbol Germany has
regained her freedom.
“The second law constitutes an attempt to solve by legislation a
problem, the final solution of which, if it should again fail,
will then have to be referred by law to the National Socialist
Party. All three laws are backed by the National Socialist Party
and with it and behind it by the German Nation.
“I ask you to accept these laws.” (_3419-PS_).
Hess, along with Frick, was placed in charge of the administration of
the Nurnberg Laws and of the issuance of ordnances and regulations
thereunder (_1416-PS_; _3179-PS_; _1417-PS_; _2124-PS_).
With the launching of their aggressive wars, the Nazi conspirators
embarked on the execution of their plan to exterminate the non-German
populations which fell into their hands. This plan, especially insofar
as it concerned the Jews, had been bluntly revealed by Hitler well in
advance in his address to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939:
“If inter-national finance-Jewry inside and outside Europe
should succeed in throwing the nations into another _World War_,
the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thus
the victory of Jewry, but the _destruction of the Jewish race in
Europe_!” (_3418-PS_).
In support of this campaign, which was continued by his co-conspirators
after his flight to Scotland, Hess issued an order through his Party
Chancery on behalf of the SS, which had been put in charge of the
extermination program. In this order, Hess demanded the support of all
Party members for the recruiting drive of the SS Army Corps (Waffen SS).
Hess added that these SS formations were scheduled for service in the
Eastern occupied areas, where their “special training in race matters”
could be used to best advantage (_3245-PS_).
By a series of further legislative and administrative measures, Hess
participated in the establishment of a special regime in Poland which
deprived the inhabitants of that country of their legal protection, and
thus initiated their wholesale extermination (_R-139_; _R-96_; _R-141_).
In pursuance of the same policy Hess signed the decree which forced
certain groups of Polish citizens to surrender their original national
allegiance and to accept German citizenship (Decree of 24 October 1939,
RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2077).
Hess also signed the decree establishing the German Racial Register,
under which Allied nationals of German stock were registered and then
compelled to accept German nationality and to remove to German territory
(_2917-PS_).
Hess also used Party channels in order to incite the German people to
violations of the rules of war. Thus, he ordered that the population be
instructed to seize Allied parachutists or to “liquidate them”
(_062-PS_).
Hess also issued instructions to enforce Hitler’s orders prohibiting the
reconstruction of the city of Warsaw or of any of Poland’s destroyed
industries (_EC-411_).
On 10 May 1941, Hess flew to Scotland for the purpose of seeking an end
to the war with England, and support for Germany’s demands against
Russia. Upon his arrival, he was incarcerated and thus forcibly
eliminated from further participation in the crimes of the conspiracy
(_D-614_).
F. _CONCLUSION._
Of all the members of the Nazi conspiracy, Hess was closest to Hitler
from the first. As Hitler’s secretary and A. d. C., as his Deputy, and
finally as his Second Successor Designate, Hess was at all times his
direct representative in all Party matters. Thus, the conspiracy’s most
powerful instrument of political action rested in his hands.
Hess used this power to penetrate and dominate the German government
administration with National Socialist functionaries; to control
legislation and education; and to persecute all independent groups,
especially the churches and the Jews.
Being responsible for the political direction and control of the German
people, through the Party, Hess played a decisive role in preparing the
nation for war. He furthered the secret rearmament of the Party’s
military formations; he signed the Conscription Law of 1935; he sat on
the Reichs Defense Council, the inner Cabinet in which the heads of the
conspiracy blue-printed the administrative, economic, and political
preparation of their aggressive wars.
Hess, above, all, was responsible for the creation and direction of the
Nazi fifth-column, in which foreign citizens of German extraction joined
under the Nazi banner to weaken and undermine those countries which the
Nazi conspirators had determined to subjugate.
All through the years from 1920 to 1941 Hess remained the most faithful
and relentless executor of Hitler’s aims and designs. This complete
devotion to the success of the conspiracy was climaxed by his flight to
Scotland in an attempt to end the war with England and to receive
English support for Germany’s demands against Russia, which he had
helped to prepare.
The share of Hess’ participation in the Nazi conspiracy is as great as
that of the Party which he directed. The Party’s crimes are his.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RUDOLF HESS
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 58
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │
│1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │
│landings of enemy planes or │ │
│parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107
│ │ │
070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │
│25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │
│National Socialist mottos for morning │ │
│prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118
│ │ │
*089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │
│March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │
│issue further newsprint to │ │
│confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147
│ │ │
*098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │
│February 1940, urging creation of │ │
│National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │
│provide moral foundation for NS │ │
│religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152
│ │ │
*101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │
│concerning undesirability of religious│ │
│literature for members of the │ │
│Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160
│ │ │
*107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │
│June 1938, enclosing directions │ │
│prohibiting participation of │ │
│Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │
│celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162
│ │ │
*113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │
│signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │
│clergymen ineligible for Party │ │
│offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
675-PS │Letter from Hess’ office to Minister │ │
│of Interior, signed Bormann, 25 August│ │
│1938, agreeing to invalidation of │ │
│Concordat between Austria and Holy │ │
│See. │ III │ 482
│ │ │
784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to │ │
│Hess and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June │ │
│1935, concerning penal proceedings │ │
│against merchant and SA leader and 22 │ │
│companions because of inflicting │ │
│bodily injury on duty. (USA 732) │ III │ 559
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
*837-PS │Secret circular by Hess, 3 February │ │
│1939, concerning National League of │ │
│Germans abroad and the German Eastern │ │
│League. (GB 265) │ III │ 603
│ │ │
*838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │
│Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │
│Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │
│precluded Christian Scientists from │ │
│joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605
│ │ │
*840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │
│clergy and theology students │ │
│ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │
│355) │ III │ 606
│ │ │
842-PS │Correspondence between Party │ │
│officials, 30 December 1940, │ │
│concerning killing of the insane. │ III │ 609
│ │ │
*1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg,│ │
│20 October 1932, for personal │ │
│transmission to Hess concerning │ │
│organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806
│ │ │
1377-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │
│Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ III │ 931
│ │ │
1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │
│1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 993. │ III │ 972
│ │ │
1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │
│State and Party, and for the │ │
│Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │
│December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 1146. │ IV │ 7
│ │ │
*1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │
│Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │
│1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8
│ │ │
**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │
│universal military conscription. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │
│(Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ IV │ 163
│ │ │
*1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │
│Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │
│process, published in Legal │ │
│Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │
│Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584
│ │ │
1969-PS │Correspondence of party officials, │ │
│concerning killing of insane. │ IV │ 602
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │
│1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 49. │ IV │ 643
│ │ │
*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │
│Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │
│30 August 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │
│(GB 250) │ IV │ 650
│ │ │
*2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial│ │
│Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB│ │
│259) │ IV │ 755
│ │ │
*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │
│Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │
│Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │
│copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │
│1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │
│Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │
│for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │
│August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23
│ │ │
*2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │
│253) │ V │ 90
│ │ │
*2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │
│Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327
│ │ │
2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on │ │
│20 February 1938, published in The │ │
│Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. │ │
│1441-1442. (USA 331) │ V │ 376
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
2917-PS │Decree concerning German people’s list│ │
│and German nationality in the │ │
│incorporated Eastern Territories of 4 │ │
│March 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 118. │ V │ 587
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
3067-PS │Law for the prevention of offspring │ │
│with Hereditary diseases, 14 July │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 529. │ V │ 880
│ │ │
3075-PS │Law for the building up of │ │
│administration in Ostmark, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 777. │ V │ 884
│ │ │
3076-PS │Law for building up of administrations│ │
│in Reich Gau Sudetenland, 14 April │ │
│1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 780. │ V │ 889
│ │ │
3077-PS │Law regarding reunion of Free City of │ │
│Danzig with German Reich of 1 │ │
│September 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1547. │ V │ 891
│ │ │
3124-PS │Extracts from Rudolf Hess—Speeches. │ │
│(GB 253) │ V │ 902
│ │ │
3132-PS │Extracts from Dates of the History of │ │
│the NSDAP, 1939. │ V │ 906
│ │ │
3163-PS │The Deputy of the Fuehrer—Rudolf Hess,│ │
│published in National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1941, pp. 219-22. │ V │ 914
│ │ │
*3178-PS │Law to Secure the Unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 248) │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3179-PS │Law for the Protection of German Blood│ │
│and Honor of 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146. │ V │ 916
│ │ │
3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │
│of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │
│of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3182-PS │Decree concerning participation of │ │
│Deputy Fuehrer in the appointment of │ │
│Labor Service Leaders and Heads of │ │
│departments of Reich, 3 April 1936. │ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│373. │ V │ 918
│ │ │
3183-PS │Reich Regulations for enlistment, │ │
│employment and promotion of Reich and │ │
│Provincial officials, 14 October 1936.│ │
│1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, p. 893. │ V │ 919
│ │ │
3184-PS │Order of Fuehrer and Reichchancellor │ │
│concerning appointment of Civil │ │
│Servants and termination of employment│ │
│as Civil Servants of 10 July 1937. │ │
│1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│769. │ V │ 921
│ │ │
3189-PS │Greater Germany, published in │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI,│ │
│Part 1, pp. 4-5. (GB 249) │ V │ 922
│ │ │
3190-PS │The Development of the Reich, │ │
│published in Documents of German │ │
│Politics, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 264. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3191-PS │Extracts from German Fuehrer │ │
│Dictionary, 1934-1935, p. 25, │ │
│concerning Hess. │ V │ 923
│ │ │
3192-PS │Extract concerning Hess from The │ │
│German Reichstag, p. 180. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3196-PS │Hitler decree of 21 April 1933, │ │
│published in National Socialist Party │ │
│Correspondence, 27 April 1933, p. 1. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3197-PS │First decree for execution of Sudeten │ │
│Gau Law of 10 June 1939. 1939 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 997. │ V │ 924
│ │ │
3198-PS │Official Party News, 26 September │ │
│1933, published in National Socialist │ │
│Party Correspondence. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3200-PS │Extract concerning Hess as Deputy │ │
│Fuehrer from National Socialist │ │
│Yearbook, 1939, pp. 188-189. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3203-PS │Hess decree of 3 June 1936 │ │
│establishing the NS Aid Fund for the │ │
│Struggle in the Universities, reported│ │
│in The Third Reich, 1937, Vol. IV, p. │ │
│360. │ V │ 927
│ │ │
3204-PS │Ceremonial Initiation of Sudeten │ │
│German Party into NSDAP by Rudolf │ │
│Hess, published in Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 7 November 1938, p. 5. │ V │ 928
│ │ │
*3245-PS │Order of 21 February 1940, concerning │ │
│recruiting for Waffen SS, published in│ │
│Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, │ │
│Vol. III, p. 354. (GB 267) │ V │ 946
│ │ │
3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │
│704) │ V │ 961
│ │ │
*3258-PS │Extracts from National Socialism Basic│ │
│Principles, Their Application by the │ │
│Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and│ │
│the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi │ │
│Aims, by U. S. Government Printing │ │
│Office, Washington, 1943. (GB 262) │ V │ 997
│ │ │
3322-PS │Office for Racial Policies of NSDAP, │ │
│from Organization Book of NSDAP, 1940,│ │
│p. 330. │ VI │ 38
│ │ │
3347-PS │Seniority List of the SS, of NSDAP, as│ │
│of 1 December 1936. │ VI │ 78
│ │ │
*3385-PS │Hess Order of 14 December 1938 │ │
│concerning position of the SD within │ │
│the Party, from Decrees, Regulations, │ │
│Announcements, Vol. IV, Part I, p. │ │
│231. (GB 257) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3401-PS │National Socialism and German │ │
│Nationalism Abroad, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, 24 May 1934, p. 2. (GB │ │
│263) │ VI │ 120
│ │ │
3418-PS │Destruction of the Jewish race, from │ │
│The Archive, January 1939, p. 1605. │ VI │ 121
│ │ │
3419-PS │Extract from The Party Congress of │ │
│Freedom, 1936, pp. 258-259. │ VI │ 122
│ │ │
*3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │
│Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, │ │
│10 December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124
│ │ │
*3796-PS │Letter of Canaris enclosing a report, │ │
│25 October 1939, concerning the │ │
│activities of Auslands organization. │ │
│(GB 286) │ VI │ 732
│ │ │
3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │
│participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │
│the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │
│403) │ VI │ 1055
│ │ │
*D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │
│October 1934, concerning participation│ │
│in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056
│ │ │
*D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │
│Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057
│ │ │
*D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │
│in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │
│256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060
│ │ │
*D-181 │Circular from Gauleiter of South │ │
│Westphalia, 21 January 1937, │ │
│concerning Hereditary Health Law. (GB │ │
│528) │ VI │ 1073
│ │ │
D-614 │Statement of British Secretary of │ │
│State for Foreign Affairs in │ │
│Parliament on 22 September 1943. │ VII │ 94
│ │ │
*EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │
│reconstruction of certain industrial │ │
│enterprises in Poland, 20 November │ │
│1939. (USA 299) │ VII │ 469
│ │ │
*L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │
│1938, concerning anniversary of │ │
│assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │
│(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094
│ │ │
*L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in│ │
│Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March│ │
│1938, concerning propaganda dropped │ │
│over Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098
│ │ │
M-102 │Extract from National Zeitung, 27 │ │
│April 1942, concerning Hess. (GB 254) │ VIII │ 32
│ │ │
M-103 │Speech by Hess to representatives of │ │
│Foreign Chamber of Commerce, from │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 30 June 1934. │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-104 │Speech by Hess at inauguration of new │ │
│Adolf Hitler Hall at Hof, from │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 October 1936. │ │
│(GB 260) │ VIII │ 33
│ │ │
*M-105 │Speech by Hess at meeting of Reich │ │
│Chamber of Labour at Messerschmitt │ │
│Works, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 2 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 261) │ VIII │ 34
│ │ │
*M-107 │Speech by Hess at 7th Annual Meeting │ │
│of Foreign Organization of NSDAP, from│ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, 28 August │ │
│1939. (GB 266) │ VIII │ 35
│ │ │
M-108 │Speech by Hess broadcast on Fuehrer’s │ │
│birthday, 20 April 1941. │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-116 │Report of interview with Hess by Wing │ │
│Commander the Duke of Hamilton, 11 May│ │
│1941. (GB 269) │ VIII │ 37
│ │ │
*M-117 │Record of interview with Hess, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 270) │ VIII │ 40
│ │ │
*M-118 │Record of interview with Hess, 14 May │ │
│1941. (GB 271) │ VIII │ 43
│ │ │
*M-119 │Record of conversation with Hess, 15 │ │
│May 1941. (GB 272) │ VIII │ 45
│ │ │
M-120 │“The VDA and the Nazi Party”, │ │
│extracted from German Basic Handbook, │ │
│Part III, Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 46
│ │ │
M-121 │“German Foreign Institute”, extracted │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 47
│ │ │
*M-122 │“The Problem of German Minorities”, │ │
│from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │
│Chap. IV. (GB 264) │ VIII │ 48
│ │ │
R-96 │Correspondence of Minister of Justice │ │
│in preparation of the discriminatory │ │
│decree of 4 December 1941 regarding │ │
│criminal justice against Poles and │ │
│Jews in annexed Eastern Territories. │ │
│(GB 268) │ VIII │ 72
│ │ │
R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │
│and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │
│civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209
│ │ │
R-141 │Minutes of conference directed by │ │
│Hess’ assistants, 20 February 1941, │ │
│concerning racial problems in Armed │ │
│Forces. │ VIII │ 236
│ │ │
Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │
│November 1945. │ VIII │ 631
│ │ │
*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
│ │ │
*Chart No. 15 │Staff of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │
│(3201-PS; GB 251) │ End of VIII
3. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY RIBBENTROP._
According to Ribbentrop’s own certified statement (_2829-PS_), he became
a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but according to the semi-official
statement in “_Das Archiv_,” he had gone to work for the Party before
that time by extending his business connections to political circles.
Having joined the service of the Party in 1930 at the time of the final
struggle for power in the Reich, “Ribbentrop played an important if not
strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings
between the representatives of the President of the Reich and the heads
of the NSDAP, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on
30-1-1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler and von Papen
took place in Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin Dahlen.” (_D-472_).
Ribbentrop was therefore present and active at the inception of the Nazi
seizure of power. In that first period he was advisor to the Party on
questions of foreign affairs. His title was first, “Collaborator to the
Fuehrer on matters of Foreign Policy.” He later became Representative in
Matters of Foreign Policy on the Staff of the Deputy.
This was followed by membership in the Nazi Reichstag in November 1933.
On 24 April 1934 after Germany had left the disarmament conference, he
was appointed Delegate of the Reich Government in matters of
Disarmament. In this capacity he visited London and other foreign
capitals. He was then given a more important and imposing title, the
German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, and it was in that capacity
that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.
In March 1936, after the Nazi Government had reoccupied the Rhineland
zone, which had been demilitarized in accordance with the terms of the
Versailles and Locarno Treaties, and the matter was brought before the
Council of the League of Nations, Ribbentrop addressed the Council in
defense of Germany’s action.
On 11 August 1936 he was appointed Ambassador in London, and occupied
that position for a period of some eighteen months. His activities while
holding that position are not highly relevant to the issues, but during
that period, in his capacity which he still had as German Minister
Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with
Japan in November 1936, and also the additional pact by which Italy
joined it in 1937.
Finally, on 24 February 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Foreign Minister
in place of von Neurath, and simultaneously was made a member of the
Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer Kabinettsrat_) established by decree
of Hitler of the same date (_1337-PS_).
Ribbentrop became an _Oberfuehrer_ in the SS, was subsequently promoted
to SS _Gruppenfuehrer_ in 1938, and later became _Obergruppenfuehrer_.
There is no question of any honorary rank. The SS went into his ancestry
in detail in order to deal with the law relating to that subject.
Ribbentrop was also permitted to adopt “von” as a prefix before his last
name (_D-636_).
These activities of Ribbentrop in the earlier part of his career show in
themselves that he assisted willing and deliberately in bringing the
Nazis into power, and in the earlier stage of their obtaining control of
the German State.
B. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO LAUNCH AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION._
(1) _The Austrian Anschluss._ Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at
Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and von Papen met the
Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg and his foreign minister, Guido
Schmidt. The official German account of that interview is contained in
_2461-PS_. What appears to be the truthful account of that interview is
contained in Jodl’s diary, the entries for 11 and 12 February 1938
(_1780-PS_).
On 11 February Jodl wrote:
“In the evening, and on 12 February, General Keitel with General
von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg. Schuschnigg, together
with R. G. Schmidt, are again being put under the heaviest
political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs
protocol.” (_1780-PS_)
The 13 February entry reads:
“In the afternoon, General Keitel asks Admiral Canaris and
myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s
order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming
military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for
these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the
Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
“14 February:
“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrived. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and
initiates the different measures.
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.” (_1780-PS_)
The next step was the telephone conversation which took place between
Goering and Ribbentrop on 13 March 1938, when Ribbentrop was still in
London. Goering was passing on the false statement that there was no
ultimatum to Austria. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the
earlier telephone conversations between Goering and Vienna. But Goering
then passed the falsehood on to Ribbentrop in London in order that he
might placate and reassure political circles in London (_2949-PS_).
The third step was taken by Ribbentrop after his return from London.
Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone
back to London to clear up his business at the embassy. Although he was
still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, his
name appears as a signatory of the law making Austria a province of the
German Reich (_2307-PS_).
(2) _Czechoslovakia._ Czechoslovakia furnishes a typical example of
aggression in its various aspects. To summarize the outstanding features
briefly: First, there was the necessity of stirring up trouble inside
the country against which aggression was planned.
Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, helped in the stirring up of the
Sudeten Germans under Henlein, who was in frequent contact with the
German Foreign Office (_3060-PS_; _2789-PS_; _3059-PS_). These documents
demonstrate how the Foreign Office stirred up the Sudeten-German
movement so that it would act in accordance with the Government of the
Reich.
Later on, Ribbentrop was present on 28 May 1938 at the conference at
which Hitler gave instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia
(_388-PS_; _2360-PS_). In a speech in January 1939 Hitler proclaimed
that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia (_2360-PS_):
“On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still
further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve
the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner.”
* * * * * *
“On 28 May I gave the order for the preparation of military
steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.”
(_2360-PS_)
The important point is that 28 May was the date when the _Fall Gruen_
for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders, and that it was thereafter
put into effect, to come to fruition at the beginning of October.
That was the second stage: To lay well in advance the plans of
aggression.
The third stage was to see that neighboring states were not likely to
cause trouble. Hence, on 18 July 1938, Ribbentrop had a conversation
with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, at which the attack on
Czechoslovakia was discussed (_2800-PS_). Further discussions along the
same lines followed (_2791-PS_; _2792-PS_). The effect of these
documents is, that it was made clear to the Italian Government that the
German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia.
The other interested country was Hungary, for Hungary had certain
territorial desires with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian
Republic. Accordingly on 23 and 25 August Ribbentrop was present at the
discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians
Imredi and Kanya (_2796-PS_; _2797-PS_). These documents indicate that
Ribbentrop endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and that the
Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to
action, although it was ready enough with sympathy.
Contacts had been established with the Sudeten Germans, for theirs was
the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was
to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the
fountainhead. Therefore, between 16 and 24 September, the German Foreign
Office, of which Ribbentrop was the head, was engaged in stirring up
trouble in Prague (_2858-PS_; _2855-PS_; _2854-PS_; _2853-PS_; and
_2856-PS_). An example of the type of these activities is the
communication of 19 September from the Foreign Office to the German
Embassy in Prague (_2858-PS_):
“Please inform Deputy Kundt at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
_their_ demands _for_ autonomy tomorrow.” (_2858-PS_)
Another of these documents deals with questions of arrest and the action
to be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position
more difficult (_2855-PS_).
That was the contribution which Ribbentrop made to the pre-Munich
crisis, which culminated in the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938
(_TC-23_).
A significant aspect of Nazi plotting with regard to Czechoslovakia,
which shows the sort of action and advice which the _Wehrmacht_ expected
from the Foreign Office, is contained in a long document putting forward
an almost infinite variety of breaches of International Law, which were
likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to
Czechoslovakia (_C-2_). On all these points the opinion of the Foreign
Office was sought, with a view to explanation and justification. That,
of course, remained a hypothetical question because at that time no war
resulted.
The second stage of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia occurred when,
having obtained the Sudetenland, the Nazis arranged a crisis in
Czechoslovakia which would be an excuse for taking the rest. This action
is important as constituting the first time that the German Government
disregarded its own commitment that its desires did not go beyond the
return of German blood to the Reich. On that point, again, Ribbentrop
was active. On 13 March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a
telegram to the German Minister in Prague, his subordinate, telling him
to
“make a point of not being available if the Czech Government
wants to get in touch with you in the next few days.”
(_2815-PS_).
At the same time Ribbentrop attended a conference in Berlin with Hitler
and a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks. Tiso, one of the heads of the
pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State in
order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia (_2802-PS_). A
previous meeting along the same lines had been held a month before
(_2790-PS_). Thus, Ribbentrop was assisting in the task, again, of
fomenting internal trouble.
On 14 March 1939, the following day, Hacha, the President of
Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. Ribbentrop was at this meeting, at
which pressure and threats were used to obtain the aged President’s
consent to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler (_2798-PS_;
_3061-PS_).
That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week
Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, Article II of which granted
the German Government the right to construct military posts and
installations, and to keep them garrisoned within Slovakia (_1439-PS_).
Thus, after swallowing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state,
Ribbentrop obtained military control over Slovakia.
(3) _Lithuania._ An interesting point concerning the Northern Baltic
shows how difficult it was for Ribbentrop to keep his hands out of the
internal affairs of other countries, even when it did not seem a very
important matter. On 3 April 1939 Germany had occupied the Memeland
(_TC-53-A_). It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were
concerned, that the position was satisfactory to the Nazis but in fact
Ribbentrop was acting in close concert with Heydrich, in stirring up
trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the
Woldemaras Supporters (_2953-PS_; _2952-PS_). Heydrich was passing to
Ribbentrop a request for financial support for this group:
“Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop,
“Enclosed please find a further report about the ‘Woldemaras
Supporters.’ As already mentioned in the previous report, the
‘_Woldemaras Supporters’ are still asking for help from the
Reich._ I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial
support, brought up again by the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ set
forth on page 4, para 2 of the enclosed report and to make a
definite decision.
“_The request of the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ for financial
support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms
should not, however, be made, under any circumstances._”
(_2953-PS_)
At the end of a fuller report on the same matter (2952-PS) there is
added in handwriting,
“I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks
quarterly.” (_2952-PS_).
It is signed “W”, who was the Secretary of State. Such was the
extraordinary interference, even with comparatively unimportant
countries.
(4) _Poland._ In the aggression against Poland, there were several
periods. The first was what might be called the Munich period, up to the
end of September 1938, and at that time no language the Nazis could use
was too good for Poland. Examples of German assurances and reassurances
to Poland during this period are Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 20
February 1938 (_2357-PS_), the secret Foreign Office memorandum of 26
August 1938 (_TC-76_), and the conversation between M. Lipski, the
Polish ambassador, and Ribbentrop (_TC-73, No. 40_). A final
illustration of this technique is Hitler’s speech at the Sportzpalast on
26 September 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his
territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection
for the Poles (_TC-73, No. 42_).
The next stage occupied the period between Munich and the rape of
Prague. With part of the German plan for Czechoslovakia having been
accomplished and parts still remaining to be done, there was a slight
change towards Poland but still a friendly atmosphere. In a conversation
with M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, on 24 October 1938,
Ribbentrop put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of
the Danzig issue (_TC-73, No. 44_). The Polish reply, of 31 October
1938, stated that it was unacceptable that Danzig should return to the
Reich, but made suggestions of a bilateral agreement (_TC-73, No. 45_).
Between these dates the German Government had made its preparations to
occupy Danzig by surprise (_C-137_).
But although these preparations were made, still some two months later,
on 5 January 1939, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign
Minister, a new solution (_TC-73, No. 48_).
Ribbentrop saw M. Beck on the next day and said that there was to be no
violent solution of the Danzig issue, but a further building up of
friendly relations (_TC-73, No. 49_). Not content with that, Ribbentrop
went to Warsaw on 25 January to talk of the continued progress and
consolidation of friendly relations (_2530-PS_). That was capped by
Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939, in the same tone (_TC-73,
No. 57_). That was the second stage—the mention of Danzig in honeyed
words, because the rape of Prague had not yet been attained.
Then, in the meeting at the Reichschancellery on 23 May 1939, Hitler
made it quite clear, and so stated, that Danzig had nothing to do with
the real Polish question (_L-79_). “I have to deal with Poland because I
want _lebensraum_ in the East”—that is the effect of Hitler’s words at
that time: that Danzig was merely an excuse.
The extent to which Ribbentrop had adopted this attitude of mind of
Hitler at this time is shown in the introduction to Count Ciano’s Diary
(_2987-PS_):
“In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against
Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had
several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any
intentions of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite
these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for
myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his
residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were
waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the
fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most
unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. ‘Well,
Ribbentrop,’ I asked him, while we were walking in the garden,
‘What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?’ ‘Not any more’, and
he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, ‘We want
war.’” (_2987-PS_).
That extraordinary declaration closely corroborates Hitler’s statement
at his Chancellery conference on 23 May—that it was no longer a
question of Danzig or the Corridor, but a question of war to achieve
_lebensraum_ in the East (_L-79_).
It should be recalled in this connection that “_Fall Weiss_”, the plan
for operations against Poland, is dated 3 and 11 April 1939, thus
showing that preparations were already in hand (_C-120_). Another entry
in Count Ciano’s Diary during the summer of 1939 makes this point quite
clear:
“I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts
of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only
note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive
every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German
action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times
about German intentions toward Poland not to feel embarrassment
now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.
“The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which
might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain
that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded,
they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by
the demon of destruction.
“Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not
hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this
doesn’t shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this
view carries in German opinion.
“The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is
reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a
word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear
conscience. He has not.” (_2987-PS_)
The next stage in the German plan consisted of sharp pressure over the
claim for Danzig, commencing immediately after Czechoslovakia had been
formally dealt with on 15 March 1939. The first sharp raising of the
claim was on 21 March (_TC-73, No. 61_).
An interesting sidelight during the last days before the war concerns
the return of Herr von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of
St. James, to Berlin on 18 August 1939. When interrogated (after
capture) regarding the significance of this event, Ribbentrop expressed
a complete absence of recollection of ever having seen the German
Ambassador to England after his return. Ribbentrop thought he would have
remembered him if he had seen him, and therefore he accepted the
probability that he did not see him (_D-490_). Thus when it was well
known that war with Poland would involve England and France, either
Ribbentrop was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take
the trouble to see his ambassador, or else, as he rather suggests, he
had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his
opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In
either case, Ribbentrop was completely uninterested in anything which
his Ambassador might have to tell him as to opinion in London or the
possibility of war. It is putting the matter with great moderation to
say that in the last days before 1 September 1939, Ribbentrop did
whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which
might hinder the encouraging of the war which he and the Nazis wanted.
He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great
Britain and France. (See also Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression
Against Poland.)
M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador at Berlin, summarized all these events
leading up to the war in his report of 10 October 1939 (_TC-73, No.
147_).
(5) _Norway and Denmark._ On 31 May 1939, Ribbentrop, on behalf of
Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that:
“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no
circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind
against one another.” (_TC-24_)
And on 7 April 1940 the German armed forces invaded Denmark at the same
time they invaded Norway.
Ribbentrop was fully involved in the earlier preparations for the
aggression against Norway. Along with Rosenberg, Ribbentrop assisted
Quisling in his early activities. A letter from Rosenberg to Ribbentrop
on 24 February states:
“Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:
“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed
report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr who will address you
on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would
be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns
out that Privy Councillor Gruendherr states that the second
instalment can be made available only after eight days. But as
it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request
you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to
him at once. With a longer absence of _Reichsamtsleiter_ P. M.
Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be
broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be
very unfavorable.
“Therefore I trust that it is in everybody’s interest, if P. M.
Scheidt goes back immediately.” (_957-PS_)
In a report to Hitler on the Quisling activities, Rosenberg outlined
Ribbentrop’s part in the preparation of the Norwegian operation:
“* * * Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from
the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a
shipment of material for immediate use in Norway, such as coal
and sugar. Additional help was promised. These shipments were to
be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be
established in Germany or through especially selected existing
firms, while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin
had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the
Nygaardsvold Government, as for instance, the Minister of Supply
and Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of
coal. At the same time, the coal transports were to serve
possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch
Quisling’s political action in Oslo with German help. It was
Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, particularly
reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in
a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as
area and language specialists to German Special Troops, who were
to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political
action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading
opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all
military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately
following this political action and upon official request of
Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military
occupation of Norway was to take place. All military
preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan
contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a
great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure.
For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at
the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians
were concerned.
“In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the
Office of the Four Year Plan, only of the intention to prepare
coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further
details were discussed in a conference between Secretary
Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz, and Hagelin. Since
Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field
Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop—after a consultation
with Reichsleiter Rosenberg—consented to expedite these
shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged to pay Quisling
ten thousand English pounds per month for three months,
commencing on the 15 of March, to support his work”. (_004-PS_)
This sum was paid through Scheidt.
In a letter to Ribbentrop dated 3 April 1940, Keitel wrote:
“Dear Herr von Ribbentrop:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by
command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the _Wehrmacht_. The High Command of the _Wehrmacht_ has
therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions
connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at
your disposal for the political preparation of this operation,
is on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself
therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in
transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the
_Wehrmacht_ which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments
in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons,
but also if I include a series of requests which certainly
concern the _Wehrmacht_ only indirectly but which are, however,
of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task * *
*.” (_D-629_)
Keitel then proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with
certain commanders. The important point is Keitel’s clear admission to
Ribbentrop that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been
long in preparation. It is interesting to connect this letter with the
official Biography of Ribbentrop, in the Archives, which makes a point
of mentioning the invasion of Norway and Denmark (_D-472_):
“With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9 of April
1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in
these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.”
(_D-472_)
It is clear that whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was
ignorant, Ribbentrop had been thoroughly involved in the Quisling
plottings and knew at least a week before the invasion started that the
_Wehrmacht_ and Keitel had been long in preparation for this act of
aggression. (See also Section 9 of Chapter IX on Aggression against
Norway and Denmark.)
(6) _The Low Countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg._ The
facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period
when Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister, are discussed in Section 10 of
Chapter IX. Special attention should be called, however, to the
statement made by Ribbentrop 10 May 1940 to representatives of the
foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the
Low Countries. These reasons demonstrated to be false in Section 10 of
Chapter IX on Aggression Against The Low Countries.
(7) _Greece and Yugoslavia._ At a meeting in Salzburg in August 1939, at
which von Ribbentrop participated, Hitler announced that the Axis had
decided to liquidate certain neutrals (_1871-PS_):
“* * * Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done,
if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just
finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa.
Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the
visit of Prince Regent Paul he [the Fuehrer] suggested,
particularly in consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify
his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had
thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia’s
leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter.
Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance
from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that
happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable
during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the
aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that
he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the
Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria,
which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. * * *
At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for
Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side
openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the
disadvantage of the Axis.” (_1871-PS_)
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 Ribbentrop reviewed the war situation
with Mussolini. Ribbentrop emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in
England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed
between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece
and Yugoslavia, and that Italy could count on German support. Ribbentrop
went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack
on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein. He added that he was
expecting to sign the Protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country
into the war, on his return to Berlin (_1842-PS_). Ribbentrop then gave
Mussolini a free hand with Greece and Yugoslavia:
“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister
stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian
interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone,
and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic
assistance.
“But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems
for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of
England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was
concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts
(Norway, etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.”
(_1842-PS_)
Several months later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and
Mussolini in which Ribbentrop participated, the Greek operation was
discussed. Hitler stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use
in the planned campaign against Greece (_C-134_). Count Ciano, who
attended that meeting as Italian Foreign Minister, recalls his
impression of that meeting in his diary entry for 20/21 January:
“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am
less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so
boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how
long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its
ending before 1942.” (_2987-PS_)
Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, three weeks
later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese to enter the
war, Ribbentrop took a more optimistic line. On 13 February 1941 he saw
Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador. In the course of their conversation
Ribbentrop gave an optimistic account of the military situation and the
position of Bulgaria and Turkey (_1834-PS_).
In the course of his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis,
Ribbentrop addressed a note, (_2450-PS_) on 25 March 1941, to Prime
Minister Cvetkovitch, which contained this assurance:
“The Axis-Power Governments during this war will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.” (_2450-PS_)
Shortly thereafter, there occurred the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia, when
General Simovitch took over the Government. Two days after Ribbentrop’s
assurance (_2450-PS_), at a meeting on 27 March 1941 at which Ribbentrop
was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia
and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of
Belgrade by the German Air Force (_1746-PS_).
After the invasion of Yugoslavia Ribbentrop was one of the persons
directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries for the partition
and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that action
provided:
“* * * If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in
the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office
[Ribbentrop], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
[Goering], and the Reich Minister of the Interior [Frick].”
(_1195-PS_)
(8) _The U.S.S.R._ On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet
non-aggression Pact (_TC-25_). The first point at which Ribbentrop seems
to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet
Union was just after 20 April 1941, when Rosenberg and Ribbentrop met or
communicated to consider problems expected to arise in the Eastern
occupied territory. Ribbentrop appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to
be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General,
Braeutigam, who had many years experience in the USSR, as a collaborator
with Rosenberg (_1039-PS_).
The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared
a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean and
the Baltic and Black Seas to be used by the German Navy and Air Force in
the coming invasion of the Soviet Union:
“The Foreign Office has prepared for use in _Barbarossa_ the
attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The
Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the
date when the declaration will be issued, as well as discussion
of particulars.” (_C-77_)
Thus, it is clear that Ribbentrop was again fully involved in the
preparation for this act of aggression. Finally, on 22 June 1941,
Ribbentrop announced to the world that the German armies were invading
the USSR (_3054-PS_).
How untrue were the reasons given by Ribbentrop is shown by the report
of his own Ambassador in Moscow on 7 June 1941, who said that everything
was being done by the Russians to avoid a conflict.
(9) _Instigation of Japanese Aggression._ On 25 November 1936, as a
result of negotiations of Ribbentrop as Ambassador at Large, Germany and
Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (_2508-PS_). The recital states the
purpose of the agreement as follows:
“The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist
Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and
subdue existing States by all the means at its command;
convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist
Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only
endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is
also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating
in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having
agreed as follows * * *.” (_2508-PS_)
There then follow the effective terms of the agreement under which
Germany and Japan are to act together for five years. It is signed on
behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop (_2508-PS_).
On 27 September 1940 Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, signed the
Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a
full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new
order in Europe and East Asia (_2643-PS_).
On 13 February 1941—some four months later—Ribbentrop was urging the
Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East (_1834-PS_).
Then, in April 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka,
representing Japan, at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler promised
that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war
occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese
aggression in the Pacific (_1881-PS_).
The development of Ribbentrop’s views is indicated by the minutes of
another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister (_1882-PS_):
“* * * Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in
Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere
among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works.
He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as
yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the
intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.
“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which
had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of
intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation,
however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give
them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had
already started their pernicious activities when National
Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the
cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with
certainty * * *.” (_1882-PS_)
That was on 5 April 1941.
Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union on 22
June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his ambassador in Tokyo, to do his
utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia
(_2896-PS_; _2897-PS_).
A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in
Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the attack on the United
States at Pearl Harbor, reports the coaxings of Ribbentrop:
“Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had
received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States
negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been
and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under
the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this
time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New
Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States
will be concentrated against Japan.
“‘As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental
differences in the very right to exist between Germany and
Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the
effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United
States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the
fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.
“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and
herself.’” (_D-656_).
Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:
“‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any
concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that
a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and
the United States?’
“Ribbentrop: ‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell
what he would do.’” (_D-656_).
The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:
“Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has
said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to
avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s
recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that
German attitude toward the United States is being considerably
stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would
not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.” (_D-656_).
Part 3 of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows:
“In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering
into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all
British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this
war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international
affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her
other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided
three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa,
Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were
formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share
of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to
control European Russia.” (_D-656_)
In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:
“‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is
progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose
that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only
Great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those
areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which
have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such
circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion,
of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under
such an eventuality?’
“Ribbentrop: ‘We would like to end this war during next year
[1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible
that it will have to be continued on to the following year.
‘Should Japan become engaged in war against the United States,
Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is
absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate
peace with the United States under such circumstances. The
Fuehrer is determined on that point.’” (_D-656_)
Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way, with the
aggression by Japan against the United States.
Another intercepted diplomatic message from the Japanese Ambassador in
Berlin states (_D-657_):
“At 1 p. m. today [8 December 1941] I called on Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy
issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop
replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at
general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring
war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of
the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.
“It goes without saying that this is only for your secret
information.” (_D-657_)
Thus, Hitler ordered attacks on American ships before the German
declaration of war.
Then on 11 December 1941 Ribbentrop, in the name of the German
Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United
States.
Ribbentrop also made attempts to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union.
In his conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942
and in March and April 1943, Ribbentrop continued to urge Japanese
participation and aggression against the Soviet Union (_2911-PS_;
_2954-PS_). The report of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Ambassador
Oshima reads:
“Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from
Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:
“The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was
the object of a common conference between the Japanese
Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely
recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely
understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part
will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not
possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present
war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the
conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start
the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese
Government would never disregard the Russian question.”
(_2954-PS_)
Whereupon Ribbentrop returned to the attack:
“However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the
Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England
and America, but also Russia, together. It is not good when one
part must fight alone.” (_2954-PS_)
Ribbentrop’s pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown in another
report of Japanese-German discussions on 18 April 1943 (_2929-PS_):
“The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the
moment * * *.” (_2929-PS_)
C. _RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY._
(The following discussion concerns only the planning of these crimes.
The execution of the crimes was left to the French and Soviet
prosecuting staffs for proof.)
(1) _The Killing of Allied Aviators._ With the increasing air raids on
German cities in 1944 by the Allied Air Forces, the German Government
proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further
raids on Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite
policy was to be established, there is stated the point of view that
Ribbentrop had been urging (_735-PS_). The meeting took place at the
Fuehrer’s headquarters on 6 June 1944, and proceeded in part as follows:
“_Obergruppenfuehrer_ Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of
WFSt in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a
conference on this question had been held shortly before between
the Reich Marshal [Goering], the Reich Foreign Minister
[Ribbentrop], and the Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler]. Contrary to
the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who
wished to include every type of terror attack on the German
civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it
was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks
carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the
civilian population and their property, should be taken as the
standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense.
Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has
been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to
the police.” (_735-PS_)
That is, Ribbentrop was pressing that even where there was an attack on
a German city, the airmen who crash-landed should be handed over to be
lynched by the crowd.
The minutes of the conference report further as follows:
“Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that apart from lynch law, a
procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy
aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until
they are received into the reception camp for aviators at
Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed
over to the SD for special treatment.” (_735-PS_)
The sense of this seems to be that if they were not lynched under the
first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of
war, where they would be subject to the protecting power’s intervention.
And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD
to be killed.
The conference reached a decision on what would be regarded as
justifying lynch law:
“At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the
C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the
following actions were to be regarded as terror actions
justifying lynch law:
“Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian
population, single persons as well as crowds.
“Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out.
“Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the
public service.
“Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals,
hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with
the Red Cross.” (_735-PS_)
These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as Ribbentrop had
suggested, the case of the bombing of a city.
In the latter part of this report there occurs a somewhat curious
comment from Keitel:
“If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is
difficult to enforce rules!
“Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on
the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work out.”
(_735-PS_)
That is signed by Keitel.
The remarks of Jodl then appear:
“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be
decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:
“1. What do we consider as murder?
“Is RR in agreement with point 3_b_?
“2. How should the procedure be carried out?
“_a._ By the people?
“_b._ By the authorities?
“3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out
against other enemy aviators?
“4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
“(Signed) Jodl” (_735-PS_).
It is important to note that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office were
fully involved in these breaches of the laws and usages of war. The
clarity with which the Foreign Office perceived that there were such
violations is indicated by a document from the Foreign Office, approved
of by Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials, Ritter
(_728-PS_). The approval of Ribbentrop is specifically stated in a
memorandum of 30 June 1944 (_740-PS_). The Foreign Office document
reads:
“In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international
law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in
agreement with the proposed measures.
“In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must
be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special
treatment by the Security Service, SD.
“1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the
circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of
the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the
German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had
occurred before a German official became concerned with the
case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such
that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an
appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of
lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle
the individual case upon publication.
“2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D.,
including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if
Germany, on this occasion, simultaneously would openly repudiate
the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and
still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by
the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces
(P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very
fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.
“The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite
rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War,
and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in
Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months
after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in
Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same
courts and under the same procedure as members of the German
Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be
futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever
wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the
other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion
a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.
“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from
ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that
immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not
considered Prisoners of War but criminals; that they would not
be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over
Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but
that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the
prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a
summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal
that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular
case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status
of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.)
Reception Camp Oberursel.
“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility
that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing
treaties, and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon
German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable
us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the
necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or
of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would
believe, upon the publication of each individual case.”
* * * * * *
“It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action
will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be
carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit ‘the
deterrence of enemy aviators’, is actually achieved, which goal
is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by
enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a
completely different propagandist manner than heretofore.”
(_728-PS_).
Those words show clearly Ribbentrop’s point of view:
“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that
the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft.”
(_740-PS_)
Thus, on the treatment of aviators, Ribbentrop furthered the deliberate
adoption of a procedure evading International Law.
(2) _The Destruction of the Peoples in Europe._ With regard to Poland,
the affidavit of Lahousen reports Ribbentrop participation in a
discussion on 12 September 1939 on the Fuehrer’s train concerning the
extermination of Poles and Jews (_Affidavit A_).
With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, on 16 March 1939 there was
promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by
Ribbentrop, establishing the protectorate (_TC-51_). The effect of that
decree was to place the Reich Protector in a position of supreme power
over Bohemia and Moravia, subordinate only to the Fuehrer. Article 5 of
that decree provides:
“* * * 2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer
and Chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and
Chancellor of the Reich.
“3. The members of the government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.
“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the government of the Protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich,
and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common
interest.” (_TC-51_)
It is further provided that the promulgation of laws and the execution
of certain judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an
objection (_TC-51_).
In part as a result of the sweeping terms of this law, the two Reich
Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were able
to commit numerous violations of the laws of war, and crimes against
humanity. (Discussion of these matters was assumed as the responsibility
of the Soviet prosecuting staff.)
Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands, on 18 May 1940 a decree of
the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the
Netherlands was signed by Ribbentrop. Section 1 of that decree provided
(_D-639_):
“The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by
the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands territories
* * * the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the
Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.
“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.” (_D-639_)
On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart,
promulgated such orders as that of 4 July 1940, confiscating the
property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile
to the German Reich (_2921-PS_). Tentative arrangements were also made
for the resettlement of the Dutch population (_1520-PS_). (This part of
the proof was assumed as the responsibility of the French prosecuting
staff.)
With regard to Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against
Ribbentrop is laying the basis and erecting the governmental structure
under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed and
facilitated.
(3) _Persecution of the Jews._ In December 1938 Ribbentrop, in a
conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France,
expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United
States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department as follows
(_L-205_):
“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office
in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been
raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The
result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to
Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were
pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed
had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore
decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the
population. The property which they had acquired illegally would
be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts
frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police
observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report
to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German
Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped
to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was
not, however, willing for them to take the property which had
resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in
fact nothing that it could or would do.” (_L-205_)
That succinct statement of Ribbentrop’s views on Jews is elaborated in a
long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office (_3358-PS_).
This document, entitled “The Jewish Question As A Factor In German
Foreign Policy in the year 1938” contains the following:
“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question
simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater
Germany’, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and
consequence of the events of the year 1938.”
* * * * * *
“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all
Jews living in Reich territory.”
* * * * * *
“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if
desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the
expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews
from German _lebensraum_, which were misunderstood in many
countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and
would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw
with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to
them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant
Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will
react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of
German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the
future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated
not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish
minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the
danger which it represents to the racial composition of the
nations.” (_3358-PS_)
This document was widely circulated by Ribbentrop’s ministry, to all
senior Reich authorities and to numerous other people on 25 January
1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently Ribbentrop’s
anti-Semitic incitements grew stronger, for in June 1944 Rosenberg made
arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in
Krakow on 11 July 1944. The honorary members were to be Ribbentrop,
Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the
mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary,
Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc. in order to give an international
aspect to the Congress. However, the military events of June 1944
prompted Hitler to call off the Congress, which had lost its
significance by virtue of the Allied landing in Normandy (_1752-PS_).
It is clear that Ribbentrop supported and encouraged the Nazi program
against the Jews, which resulted in their transportation to
concentration camps, where things went on which he, as a minister in
special touch with the head of the government must have known about. As
one who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority,
Ribbentrop cannot suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was
carried out.
D. _CONCLUSION_
Hitler summed up Ribbentrop’s contribution to the Nazi conspiracy for
aggression, as follows:
“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von
Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and
audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all
problems of foreign policy.”
During the course of the war, Ribbentrop was in close liaison with the
other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them,
through his foreign embassies and legations abroad, information which
was required. He at times participated in the planning of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. His guilt is clear.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to │ │
│Deputy of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, │ │
│on the Political Preparation of the │ │
│Norway Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19
│ │ │
*388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │
│for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │
│kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │
│April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305
│ │ │
*728-PS │Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of │ │
│Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 │ │
│June 1944, concerning treatment of │ │
│enemy terror aviators. (GB 152) │ III │ 526
│ │ │
*735-PS │Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to │ │
│fix the cases in which the application│ │
│of Lynch Law against Allied airmen │ │
│would be justified. (GB 151) │ III │ 533
│ │ │
*740-PS │Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of enemy terror │ │
│aviators. (GB 153) │ III │ 537
│ │ │
*957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │
│February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641
│ │ │
*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │
│Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │
│(USA 30) │ III │ 665
│ │ │
1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │
│regarding problems in Eastern │ │
│Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │
│Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695
│ │ │
*1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │
│provisional directions for partition │ │
│of Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838
│ │ │
*1337-PS │Hitler’s decree electing Ribbentrop │ │
│member of Secret Cabinet Council, 4 │ │
│February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 112. (GB 129) │ III │ 913
│ │ │
*1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │
│and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 │ │
│March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. │ │
│1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│606. (GB 135) │ IV │ 18
│ │ │
*1520-PS │Memorandum of conference, 8 May 1942 │ │
│between Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, │ │
│Bormann. (GB 156) │ IV │ 65
│ │ │
*1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │
│Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │
│speech by Hitler to German High │ │
│Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │
│March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │
│Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272
│ │ │
*1752-PS │Preparation for International │ │
│Anti-Jewish Congress, 15 June 1944. │ │
│(GB 159) │ IV │ 280
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
*1834-PS │Report on conference between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February │ │
│1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469
│ │ │
1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in│ │
│Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477
│ │ │
*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │
│1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499
│ │ │
*1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12│ │
│August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508
│ │ │
*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and│ │
│Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │
│Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522
│ │ │
*1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop│ │
│and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │
│(USA 153) │ IV │ 526
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
*2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │
│February 1938, published in Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. │ │
│50-52. (GB 30) │ IV │ 1099
│ │ │
*2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │
│January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │
│Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January│ │
│1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101
│ │ │
*2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │
│Minister of Yugoslavia, as published │ │
│in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │
│Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │
│Communist International, 25 November │ │
│1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242
│ │ │
*2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │
│January 1939, published in Voelkischer│ │
│Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267
│ │ │
*2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power │ │
│Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,│ │
│27 September 1940, signed by │ │
│Ribbentrop for Germany. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 41, p.│ │
│279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355
│ │ │
*2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419
│ │ │
*2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │
│Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │
│Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │
│program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │
│March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422
│ │ │
*2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │
│Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424
│ │ │
*2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop,│ │
│Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │
│(USA 110) │ V │ 425
│ │ │
*2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │
│August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │
│conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │
│Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426
│ │ │
*2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │
│conversations between Hitler, │ │
│Ribbentrop and von Weizsacker and the │ │
│Hungarian Ministers Imredy and von │ │
│Kanya, 23 August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430
│ │ │
2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │
│conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │
│von Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432
│ │ │
*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │
│meeting between Hitler and President │ │
│Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │
│1939. (USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433
│ │ │
*2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │
│conversation with Attolico, the │ │
│Italian Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA│ │
│85) │ V │ 442
│ │ │
*2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │
│conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │
│Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │
│Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443
│ │ │
*2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German│ │
│Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. │ │
│(USA 116) │ V │ 451
│ │ │
*2829-PS │Affidavit of von Ribbentrop, 9 │ │
│November 1945, concerning positions │ │
│held by him. (USA 5) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
*2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 17 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521
│ │ │
*2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 16 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 24 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522
│ │ │
*2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to│ │
│German Legation in Prague, 19 │ │
│September 1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523
│ │ │
*2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │
│Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July │ (USA │
│1941. │ 155) │ V
│ │ │
*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │
│Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July │ │
│1941. (USA 156) │ V │ 566
│ │ │
*2911-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July 1942. │ │
│(USA 157) │ V │ 580
│ │ │
*2921-PS │Decree of Reich Commissar for Occupied│ │
│Dutch Territories concerning │ │
│confiscation of property, 4 July 1940.│ │
│(GB 155) │ V │ 590
│ │ │
*2929-PS │Notes on conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 18 April 1943. │ │
│(USA 159) │ V │ 603
│ │ │
*2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │
│Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │
│76) │ V │ 628
│ │ │
*2952-PS │Memorandum, 19 July 1939, signed │ │
│Doertenbach. (GB 137) │ V │ 655
│ │ │
*2953-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 29│ │
│June 1939, with enclosure. (GB 136) │ V │ 657
│ │ │
*2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │
│Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │
│(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658
│ │ │
*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │
│166) │ V │ 689
│ │ │
3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │
│train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │
│execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │
│entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │
│(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │
│in evidence.) │ V │ 766
│ │ │
*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │
│picture composed of captured German │ │
│film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801
│ │ │
*3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │
│August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │
│Sudeten German Party between 1935 and │ │
│1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855
│ │ │
*3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in │ │
│Prague to Foreign Office in Berlin │ │
│about policy arrangements with │ │
│Henlein, 16 March 1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856
│ │ │
*3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │
│Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │
│Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │
│(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857
│ │ │
*3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt,│ │
│28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100
│ │ │
*3319-PS │Foreign Office Correspondence and │ │
│reports on anti-Jewish action in │ │
│foreign countries. (GB 287) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
*3358-PS │German Foreign Office circular, 31 │ │
│January 1939, “The Jewish Question as │ │
│a factor in German Foreign Policy in │ │
│the year 1938”. (GB 158) │ VI │ 87
│ │ │
3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │
│1938, concerning his conversation with│ │
│Ciano about the Polish demands made on│ │
│Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400
│ │ │
3688-PS │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24 │ │
│September 1942, concerning evacuation │ │
│of Jews from Occupied Territories. │ VI │ 403
│ │ │
*3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │
│Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │
│(USA 790) │ VI │ 752
│ │ │
*C-2 │Examples of violations of │ │
│International Law and proposed counter│ │
│propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October │ │
│1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799
│ │ │
*C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command │ │
│to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB│ │
│146) │ VI │ 908
│ │ │
*C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │
│for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │
│Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916
│ │ │
*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum │ │
│on conference between German and │ │
│Italian Generals on 19 January and │ │
│subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 │ │
│January 1941. (GB 119) │ VI │ 939
│ │ │
*C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 │ │
│to Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. │ │
│(GB 33) │ VI │ 949
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-490 │Interrogation of Ribbentrop, 20 │ │
│September 1945. (GB 138) │ VII │ 66
│ │ │
*D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │
│April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99
│ │ │
*D-636 │Extract from “Examination of Descent │ │
│of SS Leaders”, concerning von │ │
│Ribbentrop. (GB 131) │ VII │ 114
│ │ │
D-639 │Decree of the Fuehrer concerning │ │
│exercise of Governmental Authority in │ │
│Netherlands, 18 May 1940. 1940 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 778. (GB│ │
│154) │ VII │ 115
│ │ │
*D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160
│ │ │
*D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │
│Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent │ │
│by Japanese Government between 1 July │ │
│and 8 December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163
│ │ │
D-734 │Note of conversation between Reich │ │
│Foreign Minister and Duce in presence │ │
│of von Mackenson, Alfieri and │ │
│Bastianini, 25 February 1943. │ VII │ 188
│ │ │
*D-735 │Memorandum of conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Count │ │
│Ciano in presence of Keitel and │ │
│Marshal Cavallero, 19 December 1942. │ │
│(GB 295) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-736 │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer │ │
│and Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283) │ VII │ 190
│ │ │
*D-737 │Memorandum on reception of Hungarian │ │
│Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by│ │
│German Foreign Minister on 29 April │ │
│1939. (GB 289) │ VII │ 192
│ │ │
*D-738 │Memorandum on second conference │ │
│between German Foreign Minister with │ │
│Hungarian Prime and Foreign Minister │ │
│on 1 May 1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193
│ │ │
*D-740 │Minutes of conference between German │ │
│Foreign Minister and Secretary of │ │
│State Bastianini on 8 April 1943. (GB │ │
│297) │ VII │ 194
│ │ │
D-741 │Memorandum on conference between │ │
│German Foreign Minister and Ambassador│ │
│Alfieri on 21 February 1943 in Berlin.│ │
│(GB 296) │ VII │ 196
│ │ │
*D-744-A │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 197
│ │ │
*D-744-B │File of the Reichsfuehrer-SS with │ │
│personal record of SS │ │
│Obergruppenfuehrer Ribbentrop. (GB │ │
│294) │ VII │ 204
│ │ │
*D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308) │ VII │ 232
│ │ │
*D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │
│June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │
│Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233
│ │ │
*D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │
│OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │
│“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │
│Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234
│ │ │
*D-778 │Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning │ │
│treatment of Anglo-American │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311) │ VII │ 235
│ │ │
*D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │
│Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │
│June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236
│ │ │
*D-782 │Note from German Foreign Office, │ │
│Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB │ │
│315) │ VII │ 239
│ │ │
D-784 │Note from Operation Staff of OKW │ │
│signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, │ │
│concerning treatment of Allied │ │
│“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317) │ VII │ 240
│ │ │
*D-786 │Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers.│ │
│(GB 319) │ VII │ 242
│ │ │
EC-265 │German Foreign Office telegram, 1 │ │
│October 1940, concerning the Jews in │ │
│Occupied French Territory. │ VII │ 375
│ │ │
L-74 │Letter from Ribbentrop to Churchill │ │
│with covering letter addressed to │ │
│Field Marshal Montgomery. │ VII │ 839
│ │ │
*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │
│“Indoctrination on the political │ │
│situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847
│ │ │
L-202 │State Department dispatch from D. H. │ │
│Buffum, American Consul at Leipzig, 21│ │
│November 1938, concerning Anti-Semitic│ │
│Onslaught in Germany as seen from │ │
│Leipzig. │ VII │ 1037
│ │ │
*L-205 │Telegram from Kennedy to Department of│ │
│State, 8 December 1938. (GB 157) │ VII │ 1041
│ │ │
*M-158 │Telegram, 23 October 1939, regarding │ │
│location of Nazi organizations in │ │
│Madrid. (GB 285) │ VIII │ 51
│ │ │
*TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │
│Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 │ │
│September 1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370
│ │ │
*TC-24 │Treaty of non-aggression between │ │
│German Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, │ │
│31 May 1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373
│ │ │
*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │
│and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │
│September 1939 relating to it. (GB │ │
│145) │ VIII │ 375
│ │ │
TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate │ │
│of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939.│ │
│(GB 8) │ VIII │ 404
│ │ │
*TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │
│incorporation of Memel with German │ │
│Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents │ │
│of German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. │ │
│(GB 4) │ VIII │ 408
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 37 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 20 February 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 40 Polish White Book. Lipski and │ │
│Ribbentrop, 10 September 1938. │ VIII │ 481
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 42 Polish White Book. Extracts │ │
│from speech by Hitler at Sportz │ │
│Palast, 26 September 1938. │ VIII │ 482
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 44 Polish White Book. Lipski, │ │
│Ribbentrop luncheon, conversation, 24 │ │
│October 1938. (GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 45 Polish White Book. Beck’s │ │
│instructions to Lipski, 31 October │ │
│1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 48 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Hitler conversation, 5 January 1939. │ │
│(GB 34) │ VIII │ 486
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 49 Polish White Book. Beck and │ │
│Ribbentrop conversation, 6 January │ │
│1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 57 Polish White Book. Hitler’s │ │
│Reichstag speech, 30 January 1939. (GB│ │
│37) │ VIII │ 488
│ │ │
*TC-73 │No. 61 Polish White Book. Ribbentrop │ │
│and Lipski conversation, 21 March │ │
│1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489
│ │ │
TC-73 │No. 147 Polish White Book. Final │ │
│report of former Polish Ambassador in │ │
│Berlin, 10 October 1939. │ VIII │ 499
│ │ │
*TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August │ │
│1938. (GB 31) │ VIII │ 515
│ │ │
Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 │ │
│January 1946, substantially the same │ │
│as his testimony on direct examination│ │
│before the International Military │ │
│Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1│ │
│December 1945. │ VIII │ 587
│ │ │
Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │
│Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770
4. WILHELM KEITEL
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY KEITEL._
Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reichs Ministry of War
(_Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerium_), 1 October 1935 to 4
February 1938. (_3019-PS_)
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chief of OKW), equal
in rank to a Reichs Minister. (_1915-PS_)
Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938 to 1945.
(_2031-PS_)
Member of Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich, 30 August
1939 to 1945. (_2018-PS_)
Member of Reichs Defense Council, 4 September 1938 to 1945. (_2194-PS_)
Field Marshal, July 1940 to 1945. (_3020-PS_)
B. _FUNCTIONS OF KEITEL._
As Chief of the _Wehrmachtsamt_ in the Ministry of War, Keitel was Chief
of Staff for von Blomberg, who was both Minister of War and
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
On 4 February 1938 Hitler abolished the Ministry of War, assumed direct
command of the Armed Forces himself, and created the OKW (_Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht_). The OKW advised Hitler on the most important military
questions, and prepared and transmitted directives to the Armed Forces.
Thus it exercised great influence on the formation of the German
military policy and the conduct of military affairs.
Keitel was made Chief of the OKW, with rank equal to that of
Reichsminister. He was also given authorities of the former Minister of
War, and continued to perform the administrative duties of that
position. (_1915-PS_; _1954-PS_; _3704-PS_)
In addition to its ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military
staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and
operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations
Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the commanders and
chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had
approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the respective
military authorities. (_3705-PS_; _3702-PS_; _3707-PS_).
C. _KEITEL’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST PEACE._
Keitel’s conspiratorial activities started immediately after the Nazis
came to power. As early as in May 1933, when Germany was still a member
of the League of Nations, Keitel gave directives for deceiving “Geneva”
in rearmament matters.