CHAPTER XV.

DEDUCTIVE REASONING

We have seen that there are two great classes of reasoning, known

respectively, as (1) Inductive Reasoning, or the discovery of general

truth from particular truths; and (2) Deductive Reasoning, or the

discovery of particular truths from general truths.

As we have said, Deductive Reasoning is the process of discovering

particular truths from a general truth. Thus from the general truth

embodied in the proposition "All horses are animals," when it is

considered in connection with the secondary proposition that "Dobbin is

a horse," we are able to deduce the particular truth that: "Dobbin is an

animal." Or, in the following case we deduce a particular truth from a

general truth, as follows: "All mushrooms are good to eat; this fungus

is a mushroom; therefore, this fungus is good to eat." A deductive

argument is expressed in a deductive syllogism.

Jevons says regarding the last stated illustration: "Here are three

sentences which state three different facts; but when we know the two

first facts, we learn or gather the third fact from the other two. When

we thus learn one fact from other facts, we _infer or reason_, and we do

this in the mind. Reasoning thus enables us to ascertain the nature of a

thing without actual trial. If we always needed to taste a thing before

we could know whether it was good to eat or not, cases of poisoning

would be alarmingly frequent. But the appearance and peculiarities of a

mushroom may be safely learned by the eye or the nose, and reasoning

upon this information and the fact already well known, that mushrooms

are good to eat, we arrive without any danger or trouble at the

conclusion that the particular fungus before us is good to eat. _To

reason, then, is to get some knowledge from other knowledge._"

The student will recognize that Deductive Reasoning is essentially _an

analytic process_, because it operates in the direction of analyzing a

universal or general truth into its particulars--into the particular

parts which are included within it--and asserting of them that "what is

true of the general is true of the particular." Thus in the general

truth that "All men are mortal," we see included the particular truth

that "John Smith is mortal"--John Smith having been discovered to be a

man. We deduce the particular truth about John Smith from the general

truth about "all men." We analyze "all men" and find John Smith to be

one of its particular parts. Therefore, "Deduction is an inference from

the whole to its parts; that is, an analytic process."

The student will also recognize that Deductive Reasoning is essentially

_a descending process_, because it operates in the direction of a

descent from the universal to the particular; from the higher to the

lower; from the broader to the narrower. As Brooks says: "Deduction

descends from higher truths to lower truths, from laws to facts, from

causes to phenomena, etc. Given the law, we can by deduction descend to

the facts that fall under the law, even if we have never before seen the

facts; and so from the cause we may pass down to observed and even

unknown phenomena."

The general truths which are used as the basis of Deductive Reasoning

are discovered in several ways. The majority arise from Inductive

Reasoning, based upon experience, observation and experiment. For

instance in the examples given above, we could not truthfully assert our

belief that: "All horses are animals" unless we had previously studied

both the horse and animals in general. Nor without this study could we

state that "Dobbin is a horse." Nor could we, without previous study,

experience and experiment truthfully assert that: "All mushrooms are

good to eat;" or that "this fungus is a mushroom;" and that "therefore,

this fungus is good to eat." Even as it is, we must be sure that the

fungus really is a mushroom, else we run a risk of poisoning ourselves.

General truths of this kind are _not intuitive_, by any means, but are

based upon our own experience or the experience of others.

There is a class of general truths which are called _intuitive_ by some

authorities. Halleck says of these: "Some psychologists claim that we

have knowledge obtained neither through induction nor deduction; that

we recognize certain truths the moment we perceive certain objects,

without any process of inference. Under the head of intuitive knowledge

are classified such cases as the following: We perceive an object and

immediately know that it is a time relation, as existing now and then.

We are said to have an intuitive concept of time. When we are told that

the whole is greater than a part; that things equal to the same thing

are equal to each other; that a straight line cannot enclose space, we

_immediately_, or intuitively, recognize the truth of these statements.

Attempts at proof do not make us feel surer of their truth.... We say

that it is self-evident, or that we know the fact intuitively. The

axioms of mathematics and logic are said to be intuitive."

Another class of authorities, however, deny the nature of intuitive

knowledge of truth, or intuitive truths. They claim that all our ideas

arise from sensation and reflection, and that what we call "intuition"

is merely the result of sensation and reflection _reproduced by memory

or heredity_. They hold that the _intuitions_ of animals and men are

simply the representation of experiences of the race, or individual,

arising from the impressions stored away in the subconsciousness of the

individual. Halleck states regarding this: "This school likens intuition

to instinct. It grants that the young duck knows water instinctively,

plunges into it, and swims without learning. These psychologists believe

that there was a time when this was not the case with the progenitors of

the duck. They had to gain this knowledge slowly through experience.

Those that learned the proper aquatic lesson survived and transmitted

this knowledge through a modified structure, to their progeny. Those

that failed in the lesson perished in the struggle for existence....

This school claims that the intuition of cause and effect arose in the

same way. Generations of human beings have seen the cause invariably

joined to the effect; hence, through inseparable association came the

recognition of their necessary sequence. The tendency to regard all

phenomena in these relations was with steadily increasing force

transmitted by the laws of heredity to posterity, until the recognition

of the relationship has become an intuition."

Another class of general truths is merely hypothetical. Hypothetical

means "Founded on or including a hypothesis or supposition; assumed or

taken for granted, though not proved, for the purpose of deducing proofs

of a point in question." The hypotheses and theories of physical science

are used as general truths for deductive reasoning. Hypothetical general

truths are in the nature of premises assumed in order to proceed with

the process of Deductive Reasoning, and without which such reasoning

would be impossible. They are, however, as a rule not mere assumptions,

but are rather in the nature of assumptions rendered plausible by

experience, experiment and Inductive Reasoning. The Law of Gravitation

may be considered hypothetical, and yet it is the result of Inductive

Reasoning based upon a vast multitude of facts and phenomena.

The _Primary Basis of Deductive Reasoning_ may be said to rest upon the

logical axiom, which has come down to us from the ancients, and which is

stated as follows: "_Whatever is true of the whole is true of its

parts_." Or, as later authorities have expressed it: "Whatever is true

of the general is true of the particular." This axiom is the basis upon

which we build our Deductive Reasoning. It furnishes us with the

validity of the deductive inference or argument. If we are challenged

for proof of the statement that "This fungus is good to eat," we are

able to answer that we are justified in making the statement by the

self-evident proposition, or axiom, that "Whatever is true of the

general is true of the particular." If the general "mushroom" is good to

eat, then the particular, "this fungus" being a mushroom, must also be

good to eat. All horses (general) being animals, then according to the

axiom, Dobbin (particular horse) must also be an animal.

This axiom has been stated in various terms other than those stated

above. For instance: "Whatever may be affirmed or denied of the whole,

may be denied or affirmed of the parts;" which form is evidently derived

from that used by Hamilton who said: "What belongs, or does not belong,

to the containing whole, belongs or does not belong, to each of the

contained parts." Aristotle formulated his celebrated Dictum as follows:

"Whatever can be predicated affirmatively or negatively of any class or

term distributed, can be predicated in like manner of all and singular

the classes or individuals contained under it."

There is another form of Deductive Reasoning, that is a form based upon

another axiom than that of: "Whatever is true of the whole is true of

the parts." This form of reasoning is sometimes called Mathematical

Reasoning, because it is the form of reasoning employed in mathematics.

Its axiom is stated as follows: "Things which are equal to the same

thing, are equal to one another." It will be seen that this is the

principle employed in mathematics. Thus: "x equals y; and y equals 5;

therefore, x equals 5." Or stated in logical terms: "A equals B; B

equals C; therefore, A equals C." Thus it is seen that this form of

reasoning, as well as the ordinary form of Deductive Reasoning, is

strictly _mediate_, that is, made through the medium of a third thing,

or "two things being compared through their relation to a third."

Brooks states: "The real reason for the certainty of mathematical

reasoning may be stated as follows: First, its ideas are definite,

necessary, and exact conceptions of quantity. Second, its definitions,

as the description of these ideas are necessary, exact, and indisputable

truths. Third, the axioms from which we derive conclusions by comparison

are all self-evident and necessary truths. Comparing these exact ideas

by the necessary laws of inference, the result must be absolutely true.

Or, stated in another way, using these definitions and axioms as the

premises of a syllogism, the conclusion follows inevitably. There is no

place or opportunity for error to creep in to mar or vitiate our derived

truths."

In conclusion, we wish to call your attention to a passage from Jevons

which is worthy of consideration and recollection. Jevons says: "There

is a simple rule which will enable us to test the truth of a great many

arguments, even of many which do not come under any of the rules

commonly given in books on logic. This rule is that _whatever is true of

one term is true of any term which is stated to be the same in meaning

as that term_. In other words, we may always _substitute one term for

another if we know that they refer to exactly the same thing_. There is

no doubt that a horse is some animal, and therefore the head of a horse

is the head of some animal. This argument cannot be brought under the

rules of the syllogism, because it contains four distinct logical terms

in two propositions; namely, horse, some animal; head of horse, head of

some animal. But it easily comes under the rule which I have given,

because we have simply to put 'some animal' instead of 'a horse'. A

great many arguments may be explained in this way. Gold is a metal;

therefore a piece of gold is a piece of metal. A negro is a fellow

creature; therefore, he who strikes a negro, strikes a fellow creature."

The same eminent authority says: "When we examine carefully enough the

way in which we reason, it will be found _in every case to consist in

putting one thing or term in place of another, to which we know it to

have an exact resemblance in some respect_. We use the likeness as a

kind of bridge, which leads us from a knowledge of one thing to a

knowledge of another; thus _the true principle of reasoning may be

called the substitution of similars, or the passing from like to like_.

We infer the character of one thing from the character of something

which acts as a go-between, or third term. When we are certain there is

an exact likeness, our inference is certain; when we only believe that

there probably is, or guess that there is, then our inferences are only

probable, not certain."

The Art of Logical Thinking; Or, The Laws of Reasoning · 第 15 / 19 章