CHAPTER XIV.

MAKING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES

The older philosophers and logicians were often at a loss how to

reasonably account for the origin of hypotheses. It will be seen, after

giving the matter a little thought, that the actual formation of the

hypothesis is more than a mere grouping together or synthesis of facts

or ideas--there is another mental process which actually evolves the

hypothesis or theory--which gives _a possible reason_. What is this

mental process? Let us consider the matter. Brooks well says: "The

hypotheses of science originate in what is called anticipation. They are

not the result of a mere synthesis of facts, for no combination of facts

can give the law or cause. We do not see the law; we see the facts and

_the mind thinks the law_. By the power of anticipation, the mind often

leaps from a few facts to the cause which produces them or the law which

governs them. Many hypotheses were but _a happy intuition of the mind_.

They were the result of what La Place calls 'a great guess,' or what

Plato so beautifully designates as 'a sacred suspicion of truth.' The

forming of hypotheses requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a

philosophic imagination, that catches a glimpse of the idea through the

form, or sees the law standing behind the fact."

The student of The New Psychology sees in the mental operation of the

forming of the hypothesis--"the mind thinking the law"--but an instance

of the operation of the activities of the Subconscious Mind, or even the

Superconscious Mind. (See the volume on the Subconscious Mind in this

series.) Not only does this hypothesis give the explanation which the

old psychology has failed to do, but it agrees with the ideas of others

on the subject as stated in the above quotation from Brooks; and

moreover agrees with many recorded instances of the formation of great

hypotheses. Sir Wm. Hamilton discovered the very important mathematical

law of quaternions while walking one day in the Dublin Observatory. He

had pondered long on the subject, but without result. But, finally, on

that eventful day he suddenly "felt the galvanic circle of thought"

close, and the result was the realization of the fundamental

mathematical relations of the problem. Berthelot, the founder of

Synthetic Chemistry, has testified that the celebrated experiments which

led to his remarkable discoveries were seldom the result of carefully

followed lines of conscious thought or pure reasoning processes; but,

instead, came to him "of their own accord," so to speak, "as from a

clear sky." In these and many other similar instances, the mental

operation was undoubtedly purely subjective and subconscious. Dr. Hudson

has claimed that the "Subjective Mind" cannot reason inductively, and

that its operations are purely and distinctly deductive, but the

testimony of many eminent scientists, inventors and philosophers is

directly to the contrary.

In this connection the following quotation from Thomson is interesting:

"The system of anatomy which has immortalized the name of Oken is the

consequence of a flash of anticipation which glanced through his mind

when he picked up in a chance walk the skull of a deer, bleached and

disintegrated by the weather, and exclaimed after a glance, 'It is part

of a vertebral column!' When Newton saw the apple fall, the anticipatory

question flashed through his mind, 'Why do not the heavenly bodies fall

like this apple?' In neither case had accident any important share;

Newton and Oken were prepared by the deepest previous study to seize

upon the unimportant fact offered to them, and to show how important it

might become; and if the apple and the deer-skull had been wanting, some

other falling body, or some other skull, would have touched the string

so ready to vibrate. But in each case there was a great step of

anticipation; Oken thought he saw a type of the whole skeleton in a

single vertebra, while Newton conceived at once that the whole universe

was full of bodies tending to fall.... The discovery of Goethe, which

did for the vegetable kingdom what Oken did for the animal, that the

parts of a plant are to be regarded as metamorphosed leaves, is an

apparent exception to the necessity of discipline for invention, since it

was the discovery of a poet in a region to which he seemed to have paid

no especial or laborious attention. But Goethe was himself most anxious

to rest the basis of this discovery upon his observation rather than his

imagination, and doubtless with good reason.... As with other great

discoveries, hints had been given already, though not pursued, both of

Goethe's and Oken's principles. Goethe left his to be followed up by

others, and but for his great fame, perhaps his name would never have

been connected with it. Oken had amassed all the materials necessary for

the establishment of his theory; he was able at once to discover and

conquer the new territory."

It must not be supposed, however, that all hypotheses flashing into the

field of consciousness from the Subconsciousness, are necessarily true

or correct. On the contrary many of them are incorrect, or at least only

partially correct. The Subconsciousness is not infallible or

omniscient--it merely produces results according to the material

furnished it. But even these faulty hypotheses are often of value in the

later formation of a correct one. As Whewell says: "To try wrong guesses

is with most persons the only way to hit upon right ones." Kepler is

said to have erected at least twenty hypotheses regarding the shape of

the earth's orbit before he finally evolved the correct one. As Brooks

says: "Even incorrect hypotheses may be of use in scientific research,

since they may lead to more correct suppositions." The supposition of

the circular motions of the heavenly bodies around the _earth_ as a

center, which lead to the conception of epicycles, etc., and at last to

the true theory is an illustration of this. So the 'theory of

phlogiston' in chemistry, made many facts intelligible, before the true

one of 'oxidation' superseded it. And so, as Thomson says, "with the

theory that 'Nature abhors a vacuum,' which served to bring together so

many cognate facts not previously considered as related. Even an

incorrect conception of this kind has its place in science, so long as

it is applicable to the facts; when facts occur which it cannot explain,

we either correct it or replace it with a new one. The pathway of

science, some one remarks, is strewn with the remains of discarded

hypotheses."

Halleck says regarding the danger of hasty inference: "Men must

constantly employ imperfect induction in order to advance; but great

dangers attend inductive inferences made from too narrow experience. A

child has experience with one or two dogs at his home. Because of their

gentleness, he argues that all dogs are gentle. He does not, perhaps,

find out the contrary until he has been severely bitten. His induction

was too hasty. He had not tested a sufficiently large number of dogs to

form such a conclusion. From one or two experiences with a large crop in

a certain latitude, a farmer may argue that the crop will generally be

profitable, whereas it may not again prove so for years. A man may have

trusted a number of people and found them honest. He concludes that

people as a rule are honest, trusts a certain dishonest man, and is

ruined. The older people grow, the more cautious they generally become

in forming inductive conclusions. Many instances are noted and compared;

but even the wisest sometimes make mistakes. It once was a generally

accepted fact that all swans were white. Nobody had ever seen a dark

swan, and the inference that all swans were white was regarded as

certainly true. Black swans were, however, found in Australia."

Brooks says regarding the probability of hypotheses: "The probability of

a hypothesis is in proportion to the number of facts and phenomena it

will explain. The larger the number of facts and phenomena that it will

satisfactorily account for, the greater our faith in the correctness of

our supposition.... If there is more than one hypothesis in respect to

the facts under consideration, that one which accounts for the greatest

number of facts is the most probable.... In order to verify a hypothesis

it must be shown that it will account for all the facts and phenomena.

If these facts are numerous and varied, and the subject is so thoroughly

investigated that it is quite certain that no important class of facts

has been overlooked, the supposition is regarded as true, and the

hypothesis is said to be verified. Thus the hypothesis of the 'daily

rotation' of the earth on its axis to account for the succession of day

and night is accepted as absolutely true. This is the view taken by Dr.

Whewell and many other thinkers in respect to the verification of a

hypothesis. Some writers, however, as Mill and his school, maintain that

in order to verify a hypothesis, we must show not only that it explains

all the facts and phenomena, but that there is no other possible

hypothesis which will account for them.... The former view of

verification is regarded as the correct one. By the latter view, it is

evident that a hypothesis could never be verified."

Jevons says: "In the fourth step (verification), we proceed to compare

these deductions with the facts already collected, or when necessary and

practicable, we make new observations and plan new experiments, so as to

find out whether the hypothesis agrees with nature. If we meet with

several distinct disagreements between our deductions and our

observations, it will become likely that the hypothesis is wrong, and we

must then invent a new one. In order to produce agreement it will

sometimes be enough to change the hypothesis in a small degree. When we

get hold of a hypothesis which seems to give results agreeing with a few

facts, we must not at once assume that it is certainly correct. We must

go on making other deductions from it under various circumstances, and,

whenever it is possible, we ought to verify these results, that is,

compare them with facts observed through the senses. When a hypothesis

is shown in this way to be true in a great many of its results,

especially when it enables us to predict what we should never otherwise

have believed or discovered, it becomes certain that the hypothesis

itself is a true one.... Sometimes it will happen that two or even three

quite different hypotheses all seem to agree with certain facts, so that

we are puzzled which to select.... When there are thus two hypotheses,

one as good as the other, we need to discover some fact or thing which

will agree with one hypothesis and not with the other, because this

immediately enables us to decide that the former hypothesis is true and

the latter false."

In the above statements regarding the _verification_ of hypotheses we

see references made to the testing of the latter upon the "facts" of the

case. These _facts_ may be either the observed phenomena or facts

apparent to the perception, or else _facts_ obtained by deductive

reasoning. The latter may be said to be facts which are held to be true

if the hypothesis be true. Thus if we erect the hypothesis that "All men

are mortal," we may reason deductively that it will follow that each and

every thing that is a _man_ must die sooner or later. Then we test our

hypotheses upon _each and every man_ whom we may subject to observation

and experiment. If we find a single man who does not die, then the test

disproves our hypotheses; if on the contrary all men (the "facts" in the

case) prove to be mortal, then is our hypotheses proven or established.

The deductive reasoning in this case is as follows: "_If_ so-and-so is

true regarding such-and-such a class; and if this particular thing

belongs to that class; then it will follow that so-and-so is true

regarding this particular thing." This argument is expressed in what is

called a Hypothetical Proposition (see Chapter IX), the consideration of

which forms a part of the general subject of Deductive Reasoning.

Therefore as Jevons has said, "Deductive Reasoning is the Third Step in

Inductive Reasoning, and precedes Verification", which we have already

considered. Halleck says: "After Induction has classified certain

phenomena and thus given us a major premise, we may proceed

_deductively_ to apply the inference to any new specimen that can be

shown to belong to that class. Induction hands over to deduction a

ready-made major premise.... Deduction takes that as a fact, making no

inquiry about its truth.... Only after general laws have been laid down,

after objects have been classified, after major premises have been

formed, can _deduction_ be employed."

In view of the above facts, we shall now proceed to a consideration of

that great class of Reasoning known under the term--Deductive

Reasoning.

The Art of Logical Thinking; Or, The Laws of Reasoning · 第 14 / 19 章