THE AFRICAN COMMERCE,
OR
SLAVE TRADE.
* * * * *
CHAP. I.
As we explained the History of Slavery in the first part of this Essay,
as far as it was necessary for our purpose, we shall now take the
question into consideration, which we proposed at first as the subject
of our inquiry, viz. how far the commerce and slavery of the human
species, as revived by some of the nations of Europe in the persons of
the unfortunate Africans, and as revived, in a great measure, on the
principles of antiquity, are consistent with the laws of nature, or the
common notions of equity, as established among men.
This question resolves itself into two separate parts for discussion,
into _the African commerce (as explained in the history of
slavery)_ and _the subsequent slavery in the colonies, as founded
on the equity of the commerce_. The former, of course, will be first
examined. For this purpose we shall inquire into the rise, nature, and
design of government. Such an inquiry will be particularly useful in the
present place; it will afford us that general knowledge of subordination
and liberty, which is necessary in the case before us, and will be
found, as it were, a source, to which we may frequently refer for many
and valuable arguments.
It appears that mankind were originally free, and that they possessed an
equal right to the soil and produce of the earth. For proof of this, we
need only appeal to the _divine_ writings; to the _golden age_
of the poets, which, like other fables of the times, had its origin in
truth; and to the institution of the _Saturnalia_, and of other
similar festivals; all of which are so many monuments of this original
equality of men. Hence then there was no rank, no distinction, no
superiour. Every man wandered where he chose, changing his residence, as
a spot attracted his fancy, or suited his convenience, uncontrouled by
his neighbour, unconnected with any but his family. Hence also (as every
thing was common) he collected what he chose without injury, and enjoyed
without injury what he had collected. Such was the first situation of
mankind; [036]a state of _dissociation_ and _independence_.
In this dissociated state it is impossible that men could have long
continued. The dangers to which they must have frequently been exposed,
by the attacks of fierce and rapacious beasts, by the proedatory
attempts of their own species, and by the disputes of contiguous and
independent families; these, together with their inability to defend,
themselves, on many such occasions, must have incited them to unite.
Hence then was _society_ formed on the grand principles of
preservation and defence: and as these principles began to operate, in
the different parts of the earth, where the different families had
roamed, a great number of these _societies_ began to be formed and
established; which, taking to themselves particular names from
particular occurrences, began to be perfectly distinct from one another.
As the individuals, of whom these societies were composed, had
associated only for their defence, so they experienced, at first, no
change in their condition. They were still independent and free; they
were still without discipline or laws; they had every thing still in
common; they pursued the same, manner of life; wandering only, in
_herds_, as the earth gave them or refused them sustenance, and
doing, as a _publick body_, what they had been accustomed to do as
_individuals_ before. This was the exact situation of the Getæ and
Scythians[037], of the Lybians and Goetulians[038], of the Italian
Aborigines[039], and of the Huns and Alans[040]. They had left their
original state of _dissociation_, and had stepped into that, which
has been just described. Thus was the second situation of men a state of
_independent society_.
Having thus joined themselves together, and having formed themselves
into several large and distinct bodies, they could not fail of
submitting soon to a more considerable change. Their numbers must have
rapidly increased, and their societies, in process of time, have become
so populous, as frequently to have experienced the want of subsistence,
and many of the commotions and tumults of intestine strife. For these
inconveniences however there were remedies to be found.
_Agriculture_ would furnish them with that subsistence and support,
which the earth, from the rapid increase of its inhabitants, had become
unable spontaneously to produce. An _assignation_ of _property_
would not only enforce an application, but excite an emulation,
to labour; and _government_ would at once afford a security
to the acquisitions of the industrious, and heal the intestine
disorders of the community, by the introduction of laws.
Such then were the remedies, that were gradually applied. The
_societies_, which had hitherto seen their members, undistinguished
either by authority or rank, admitted now of magistratical pre-eminence.
They were divided into tribes; to every tribe was allotted a particular
district for its support, and to every individual his particular spot.
The Germans[041], who consisted of many and various nations, were
exactly in this situation. They had advanced a step beyond the
Scythians, Goetulians, and those, whom we described before; and thus was
the third situation of mankind a state of _subordinate society_.
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 036: This conclusion concerning the dissociated state of
mankind, is confirmed by all the early writers, with whose descriptions
of primitive times no other conclusion is reconcileable.]
[Footnote 037: Justin. L. 2. C. 2.]
[Footnote 038: Sallust. Bell. Jug.]
[Footnote 039: Sallust. Bell. Catil.]
[Footnote 040: Ammianus Marcellinus. L. 31. C. 2. et. inseq.]
[Footnote 041: Agri pro Numero Cultorum ab universis per vicos
occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur. Tacitus.
C. 26. de Mor. Germ.]
* * * * *
CHAP. II.
As we have thus traced the situation of man from unbounded liberty to
subordination, it will be proper to carry our inquiries farther, and to
consider, who first obtained the pre-eminence in these _primoeval
societies_, and by what particular methods it was obtained.
There were only two ways, by which such an event could have been
produced, by _compulsion_ or _consent_. When mankind first saw
the necessity of government, it is probable that many had conceived the
desire of ruling. To be placed in a new situation, to be taken from the
common herd, to be the first, distinguished among men, were thoughts,
that must have had their charms. Let us suppose then, that these
thoughts had worked so unusually on the passions of any particular
individual, as to have driven him to the extravagant design of obtaining
the preeminence by force. How could his design have been accomplished?
How could he forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all
being equally free, there was not a single person, whose assistance he
could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force
had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper.
As _empire_ then could never have been gained at first by
_compulsion_, so it could only have been obtained by _consent_;
and as men were then going to make an important sacrifice,
for the sake of their _mutual_ happiness, so he alone could
have obtained it, (not whose _ambition_ had greatly distinguished
him from the rest) but in whose _wisdom, justice, prudence_,
and _virtue_, the whole community could confide.
To confirm this reasoning, we shall appeal, as before, to facts; and
shall consult therefore the history of those nations, which having just
left their former state of _independent society_, were the very
people that established _subordination_ and _government_.
The commentaries of Cæsar afford us the following accounts of the
ancient Gauls. When any of their kings, either by death, or deposition,
made a vacancy in the regal office, the whole nation was immediately
convened for the appointment of a successor. In these national
conventions were the regal offices conferred. Every individual had a
voice on the occasion, and every individual was free. The person upon
whom the general approbation appeared to fall, was immediately advanced
to pre-eminence in the state. He was uniformly one, whose actions had
made him eminent; whose conduct had gained him previous applause; whose
valour the very assembly, that elected him, had themselves witnessed in
the field; whose prudence, wisdom and justice, having rendered him
signally serviceable, had endeared him to his tribe. For this reason,
their kingdoms were not hereditary; the son did not always inherit the
virtues of the sire; and they were determined that he alone should
possess authority, in whose virtues they could confide. Nor was this
all. So sensible were they of the important sacrifice they had made; so
extremely jealous even of the name of superiority and power, that they
limited, by a variety of laws, the authority of the very person, whom
they had just elected, from a confidence of his integrity; Ambiorix
himself confessing, "that his people had as much power over him, as he
could possibly have over his people."
The same custom, as appears from Tacitus, prevailed also among the
Germans. They had their national councils, like the Gauls; in which the
regal and ducal offices were confirmed according to the majority of
voices. They elected also, on these occasions, those only, whom their
virtue, by repeated trial, had unequivocally distinguished from the
rest; and they limited their authority so far, as neither to leave them
the power of inflicting imprisonment or stripes, nor of exercising any
penal jurisdiction. But as punishment was necessary in a state of civil
society, "it was permitted to the priests alone, that it might appear to
have been inflicted, by the order of the gods, and not by any superiour
authority in man."
The accounts which we have thus given of the ancient Germans and Gauls,
will be found also to be equally true of those people, which had arrived
at the same state of subordinate society. We might appeal, for a
testimony of this, to the history of the Goths; to the history of the
Franks and Saxons; to, the history, in short, of all those nations, from
which the different governments, now conspicuous in Europe, have
undeniably sprung. And we might appeal, as a farther proof, to the
Americans, who are represented by many of the moderns, from their own
ocular testimony, as observing the same customs at the present day.
It remains only to observe, that as these customs prevailed among the
different nations described, in their early state of subordinate
society, and as they were moreover the customs of their respective
ancestors, it appears that they must have been handed down, both by
tradition and use, from the first introduction of _government_.
* * * * *
CHAP. III.
We may now deduce those general maxims concerning _subordination_,
and _liberty_, which we mentioned to have been essentially
connected with the subject, and which some, from speculation only, and
without any allusion to facts, have been bold enough to deny.
It appears first, that _liberty_ is a _natural_, and
_government_ an _adventitious_ right, because all men were
originally free.
It appears secondly, that government is a [042]_contract_ because,
in these primeval subordinate societies, we have seen it voluntarily
conferred on the one hand, and accepted on the other. We have seen it
subject to various restrictions. We have seen its articles, which could
then only be written by tradition and use, as perfect and binding as
those, which are now committed to letters. We have seen it, in short,
partaking of the _federal_ nature, as much as it could in a state,
which wanted the means of recording its transactions.
It appear thirdly, that the grand object of the _contrast_, is the
_happiness_ of the people; because they gave the supremacy to him
alone, who had been conspicuous for the splendour of his abilities, or
the integrity of his life: that the power of the multitude being
directed by the _wisdom_ and _justice_ of the prince, they
might experience the most effectual protection from injury, the highest
advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_.
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 042: The author has lately read a work, intitled Paley's Moral
and Political Philosophy, which, in this one respect, favours those
which have been hinted at, as it denies that government was a contract.
"No social compact was ever made in fact,"--"it is to suppose it
possible to call savages out of caves and deserts, to deliberate upon
topicks, which the experience and studies, and the refinements of civil
life alone suggest. Therefore no government in the universe begun from
this original." But there are no grounds for so absurd a supposition;
for government, and of course the social compact, does not appear to
have been introduced at the time, when families coming out of their
caves and deserts, or, in other words, quitting their former
_dissociated_ state, joined themselves together. They had lived a
considerable time in _society_, like the Lybians and Gætulians
before-mentioned, and had felt many of the disadvantages of a want of
discipline and laws, before government was introduced at all. The author
of this Essay, before he took into consideration the origin of
government, was determined, in a matter of such importance, to be
biassed by no opinion whatever, and much less to indulge himself in
speculation. He was determined solely to adhere to fact, and, by looking
into the accounts left us of those governments which were in their
infancy, and, of course in the least complicated state, to attempt to
discover their foundation: he cannot say therefore, that upon a very
minute perusal of the excellent work before quoted, he has been so far
convinced, as to retract in the least from his sentiments on this head,
and to give up maxims, which are drawn from historical facts, for those,
which are the result of speculation. He may observe here, that whether
government was a _contract_ or not, it will not affect the
reasoning of the present Essay; since where ever the contract is
afterwards mentioned, it is inferred only that its object was "the
_happiness of the people_," which is confessedly the end of
government. Notwithstanding this, he is under the necessity of inserting
this little note, though he almost feels himself ungrateful in
contradicting a work, which has afforded him so much entertainment.]
* * * * *
CHAP. IV.
Having now collected the materials that are necessary for the
prosecution of our design, we shall immediately enter upon the
discussion.
If any man had originally been endued with power, as with other
faculties, so that the rest of mankind had discovered in themselves an
_innate necessity_ of obeying this particular person; it is evident
that he and his descendants, from the superiority of their nature, would
have had a claim upon men for obedience, and a natural right to command:
but as the right to empire is _adventitious_; as all were
originally free; as nature made every man's body and mind _his
own_; it is evident that no just man can be consigned to
_slavery_, without his own _consent_.
Neither can men, by the same principles, be considered as lands, goods,
or houses, among _possessions_. It is necessary that all
_property_ should be inferiour to its _possessor_. But how
does the _slave_ differ from his _master_, but by _chance_?
For though the mark, with which the latter is pleased to
brand him, shews, at the first sight, the difference of their
_fortune_; what mark can be found in his _nature_, that can
warrant a distinction?
To this consideration we shall add the following, that if men can justly
become the property of each other, their children, like the offspring of
cattle, must inherit their _paternal_ lot. Now, as the actions of
the father and the child must be thus at the sole disposal of their
common master, it is evident, that the _authority_ of the one, as a
_parent_, and the _duty_ of the other, as a _child_, must
be instantly annihilated; rights and obligations, which, as they are
sounded in nature, are implanted in our feelings, and are established by
the voice of God, must contain in their annihilation a solid argument to
prove, that there cannot be any _property_ whatever in the _human
species_.
We may consider also, as a farther confirmation, that it is impossible,
in the nature of things, that _liberty_ can be _bought_ or
_sold_! It is neither _saleable_, nor _purchasable_. For
if any one man can have an absolute property in the liberty of another,
or, in other words, if he, who is called a _master_, can have a
_just_ right to command the actions of him, who is called a
_slave_, it is evident that the latter cannot be accountable for
those crimes, which the former may order him to commit. Now as every
reasonable being is accountable for his actions, it is evident, that
such a right cannot _justly_ exist, and that human liberty, of
course, is beyond the possibility either of _sale_ or _purchase_.
Add to this, that, whenever you sell the liberty of a man,
you have the power only of alluding to the _body_: the _mind_
cannot be confined or bound: it will be free, though its
mansion be beset with chains. But if, in every sale of the _human
species_, you are under the necessity of considering your slave in
this abstracted light; of alluding only to the body, and of making no
allusion to the mind; you are under the necessity also of treating him,
in the same moment, as a _brute_, and of abusing therefore that
nature, which cannot otherwise be considered, than in the double
capacity of _soul_ and _body_.
But some person, perhaps, will make an objection to one of the former
arguments. "If men, from _superiority_ of their nature, cannot be
considered, like lands, goods, or houses, among possessions, so neither
can cattle: for being endued with life, motion, and sensibility, they
are evidently _superiour_ to these." But this objection will
receive its answer from those observations which have been already made;
and will discover the true reason, why cattle are justly to be estimated
as property. For first, the right to empire over brutes, is
_natural_, and not _adventitious_, like the right to empire
over men. There are, secondly, many and evident signs of the
_inferiority_ of their nature; and thirdly, their liberty can be
bought and sold, because, being void of reason, they cannot be
_accountable_ for their actions.
We might stop here for a considerable time, and deduce many valuable
lessons from the remarks that have been made, but that such a
circumstance might be considered as a digression. There is one, however,
which, as it is so intimately connected with the subject, we cannot but
deduce. We are taught to treat men in a different manner from brutes,
because they are so manifestly superiour in their nature; we are taught
to treat brutes in a different manner from stones, for the same reason;
and thus, by giving to every created thing its due respect, to answer
the views of Providence, which did not create a variety of natures
without a purpose or design.
But if these things are so, how evidently against reason, nature, and
every thing human and divine, must they act, who not only force men into
_slavery_, against their own _consent_; but treat them altogether
as _brutes_, and make the _natural liberty_ of man an article
of publick commerce! and by what arguments can they possibly
defend that commerce, which cannot be carried on, in any single
instance, without a flagrant violation of the laws of nature and of God?
* * * * *
CHAP. V.
That we may the more accurately examine the arguments that are advanced
on this occasion, it will be proper to divide the _commerce_ into
two parts; first, as it relates to those who _sell_, and secondly,
as it relates to those who _purchase_, the _human species_
into slavery. To the former part of which, having given every previous
and necessary information in the history of servitude, we shall
immediately proceed.
Let us inquire first, by what particular right the _liberties_ of
the harmless people are invaded by the _prince_. "By the _right
of empire_," it will be answered; "because he possesses dominion and
power by their own approbation and consent." But subjects, though under
the dominion, are not the _property_, of the prince. They cannot be
considered as his _possessions_. Their _natures_ are both the
same; they are both born in the same manner; are subject to the same
disorders; must apply to the same remedies for a cure; are equally
partakers of the grave: an _incidental_ distinction accompanies
them through life, and this--is all.
We may add to this, that though the prince possesses dominion and power,
by the consent and approbation of his subjects, he possesses it only for
the most _salutary_ ends. He may tyrannize, if he can: he may alter
the _form_ of his government: he cannot, however, alter its
_nature_ and _end_. These will be immutably the same, though
the whole system of its administration should be changed; and he will be
still bound to _defend_ the lives and properties of his subjects,
and to make them _happy_.
Does he defend those therefore, whom he invades at discretion with the
sword? Does he protect the property of those, whose houses and effects
he consigns at discretion to the flames? Does he make those happy, whom
he seizes, as they are trying to escape the general devastation, and
compels with their wives and families to a wretched _servitude?_ He
acts surely, as if the use of empire consisted in violence and
oppression; as if he, that was most exalted, ought, of necessity, to be
most unjust. Here then the voice of _nature_ and _justice_ is
against him. He breaks that law of _nature_, which ordains, "that no
just man shall be given into slavery, against his own _consent_:"
he violates the first law of _justice_, as established among men,
"that no person shall do harm to another without a previous and
sufficient _provocation_;" and he violates also the sacred
condition of _empire_, made with his ancestors, and necessarily
understood in every species of government, "that, the power of the
multitude being given up to the wisdom and justice of the prince, they
may experience, in return, the most effectual protection from injury,
the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible
_happiness_."
But if kings then, to whom their own people have granted dominion and
power, are unable to invade the liberties of their harmless subjects,
without the highest _injustice_; how can those private persons be
justified, who treacherously lie in wait for their fellow-creatures, and
sell them into slavery? What arguments can they possibly bring in
their defence? What treaty of empire can they produce, by which their
innocent victims ever resigned to them the least portion of their
_liberty_? In vain will they plead the _antiquity_ of the
custom: in vain will the _honourable_ light, in which _piracy_
was considered in the ages of barbarism, afford them an excuse. Impious
and abandoned men! ye invade the liberties of those, who, (with respect
to your impious selves) are in a state of _nature_, in a state of
original _dissociation_, perfectly _independent_, perfectly
_free_.
It appears then, that the two orders of slaves, which have been
mentioned in the history of the African servitude, "of those who are
publickly seized by virtue of the authority of their prince; and of
those, who are privately kidnapped by individuals," are collected by
means of violence and oppression; by means, repugnant to _nature_,
the principles of _government_, and the common notions of
_equity_, as established among men.
* * * * *
CHAP. VI.
We come now to the third order of _involuntary_ slaves, "to
convicts." The only argument that the sellers advance here, is this,
"that they have been found guilty of offences, and that the punishment
is just." But before the equity of the sentence can be allowed two
questions must be decided, whether the punishment is _proportioned_
to the offence, and what is its particular _object_ and _end_?
To decide the first, we may previously observe, that the African
servitude comprehends _banishment_, a _deprivation_ of _liberty_,
and many _corporal_ sufferings.
On _banishment_, the following observations will suffice. Mankind
have their _local_ attachments. They have a particular regard for
the spot, in which they were born and nurtured. Here it was, that they
first drew their infant-breath: here, that they were cherished and
supported: here, that they passed those scenes of childhood, which, free
from care and anxiety, are the happiest in the life of man; scenes,
which accompany them through life; which throw themselves frequently
into their thoughts, and produce the most agreeable sensations. These
then are weighty considerations; and how great this regard is, may be
evidenced from our own feelings; from the testimony of some, who, when
remote from their country, and, in the hour of danger and distress, have
found their thoughts unusually directed, by some impulse or other, to
their native spot; and from the example of others, who, having braved
the storms and adversities of life, either repair to it for the
remainder of their days, or desire even to be conveyed to it, when
existence is no more.
But separately from these their _local_, they have also their
_personal_ attachments; their regard for particular men. There are
ties of blood; there are ties of friendship. In the former case, they
must of necessity be attached: the constitution of their nature demands
it. In the latter, it is impossible to be otherwise, since friendship is
founded on an harmony of temper, on a concordance of sentiments and
manners, on habits of confidence, and a mutual exchange of favours.
We may now mention, as perfectly distinct both from their _local_
and_ personal_, the _national_ attachments of mankind, their
regard for the whole body of the people, among whom they were born and
educated. This regard is particularly conspicuous in the conduct of
such, as, being thus _nationally_ connected, reside in foreign
parts. How anxiously do they meet together! how much do they enjoy the
fight of others of their countrymen, whom fortune places in their way!
what an eagerness do they show to serve them, though not born on the
same particular spot, though not connected by consanguinity or
friendship, though unknown to them before! Neither is this affection
wonderful, since they are creatures of the same education; of the same
principles; of the same manners and habits; cast, as it were, in the
same mould; and marked with the same impression.
If men therefore are thus separately attached to the several objects
described, it is evident that a separate exclusion from either must
afford them considerable pain. What then must be their sufferings, to be
forced for ever from their country, which includes them all? Which
contains the _spot_, in which they were born and nurtured; which
contains their _relations_ and _friends_; which contains the
whole body of the _people_, among whom they were bred and educated.
In these sufferings, which arise to men, both in bidding, and in having
bid, adieu to all that they esteem as dear and valuable,
_banishment_ consists in part; and we may agree therefore with the
ancients, without adding other melancholy circumstances to the account,
that it is no inconsiderable punishment of itself.
With respect to the _loss_ of _liberty_, which is the second
consideration in the punishment, it is evident that men bear nothing
worse; that there is nothing, that they lay more at heart; and that they
have shewn, by many and memorable instances, that even death is to be
preferred. How many could be named here, who, having suffered the
_loss_ of _liberty_, have put a period to their existence! How
many, that have willingly undergone the hazard of their lives to destroy
a tyrant! How many, that have even gloried to perish in the attempt! How
many bloody and publick wars have been undertaken (not to mention the
numerous _servile_ insurrections, with which history is stained)
for the cause of _freedom_!
But if nothing is dearer than _liberty_ to men, with which, the
barren rock is able to afford its joys, and without which, the glorious
fun shines upon them but in vain, and all the sweets and delicacies of
life are tasteless and unenjoyed; what punishment can be more severe
than the loss of so great a blessing? But if to this _deprivation_
of _liberty_, we add the agonizing pangs of _banishment_; and
if to the complicated stings of both, we add the incessant _stripes,
wounds_, and _miseries_, which are undergone by those, who are
sold into this horrid _servitude_; what crime can we possibly
imagine to be so enormous, as to be worthy of so great a punishment?
How contrary then to reason, justice, and nature, must those act, who
apply this, the severest of human punishments, to the most insignificant
offence! yet such is the custom with the Africans: for, from the time,
in which the Europeans first intoxicated the African princes with their
foreign draughts, no crime has been committed, no shadow of a crime
devised, that has not immediately been punished with _servitude_.
But for what purpose is the punishment applied? Is it applied to amend
the manners of the criminal, and thus render him a better subject? No,
for if you banish him, he can no longer be a subject, and you can no
longer therefore be solicitous for his morals. Add to this, that if you
banish him to a place, where he is to experience the hardships of want
and hunger (so powerfully does hunger compel men to the perpetration of
crimes) you force him rather to corrupt, than amend his manners, and to
be wicked, when he might otherwise be just.
Is it applied then, that others may be deterred from the same
proceedings, and that crimes may become less frequent? No, but that
_avarice_ may be gratified; that the prince may experience the
emoluments of the sale: for, horrid and melancholy thought! the more
crimes his subjects commit, the richer is he made; the more
_abandoned_ the subject, the _happier_ is the prince!
Neither can we allow that the punishment thus applied, tends in any
degree to answer _publick happiness_; for if men can be sentenced
to slavery, right or wrong; if shadows can be turned into substances,
and virtues into crimes; it is evident that none can be happy, because
none can be secure.
But if the punishment is infinitely greater than the offence, (which has
been shewn before) and if it is inflicted, neither to amend the
criminal, nor to deter others from the same proceedings, nor to advance,
in any degree, the happiness of the publick, it is scarce necessary to
observe, that it is totally unjust, since it is repugnant to
_reason_, the dictates of _nature_, and the very principles of
_government_.
* * * * *
CHAP. VII.
We come now to the fourth and last order of slaves, to _prisoners of
war_. As the _sellers_ lay a particular stress on this order of
men, and infer much, from its _antiquity_, in support of the
justice of their cause, we shall examine the principle, on which it
subsisted among the ancients. But as this principle was the same among
all nations, and as a citation from many of their histories would not be
less tedious than unnecessary, we shall select the example of the Romans
for the consideration of the case.
The law, by which prisoners of war were said to be sentenced to
servitude, was the _law of nations_[043]. It was so called from the
universal concurrence of nations in the custom. It had two points in
view, the _persons_ of the _captured_, and their _effects_; both
of which it immediately sentenced, without any of the usual
forms of law, to be the property of the _captors_.
The principle, on which the law was established, was the _right of
capture_. When any of the contending parties had overcome their
opponents, and were about to destroy them, the right was considered to
commence; a right, which the victors conceived themselves to have, to
recall their swords, and, from the consideration of having saved the
lives of the vanquished, when they could have taken them by the laws of
war, to commute _blood_ for _service_. Hence the Roman lawyer,
Pomponius, deduces the etymology of _slave_ in the Roman language.
"They were called _servi_[044], says he, from the following
circumstance. It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners,
and sell them: now this circumstance implies, that they must have been
previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the
_right of capture_. It was a right, which the circumstance of
_taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive,
gave the conquerors to their persons. By this right, as always including
the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said
_to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are
themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of
their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and
became the property of the captors."
To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves,
we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to
the present case[046]. "If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of
his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to
rob him of his liberty. We admit the conclusion to be just, if the
supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that,
which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the
same instant, to commit that, which is considered as a less. But what
shall we say to the _hypothesis_? We deny it to be true. The voice
of nature is against it. It is not lawful to kill, but on
_necessity_. Had there been a necessity, where had the wretched
captive survived to be broken with chains and servitude? The very act of
saving his life is an argument to prove, that no such necessity existed.
The _conclusion_ is therefore false. The captors had no right to
the _lives_ of the captured, and of course none to their
_liberty_: they had no right to their _blood_, and of course
none to their _service_. Their right therefore had no foundation in
justice. It was founded on a principle, contrary to the law of nature,
and of course contrary to that law, which people, under different
governments, are bound to observe to one another.
It is scarce necessary to observe, as a farther testimony of the
injustice of the measure, that the Europeans, after the introduction of
Christianity, exploded this principle of the ancients, as frivolous and
false; that they spared the lives of the vanquished, not from the sordid
motives of _avarice_, but from a conscientiousness, that homicide
could only be justified by _necessity_; that they introduced an
_exchange_ of prisoners, and, by many and wise regulations,
deprived war of many of its former horrours.
But the advocates for slavery, unable to defend themselves against these
arguments, have fled to other resources, and, ignorant of history, have
denied that the _right of capture_ was the true principle, on which
slavery subsisted among the ancients. They reason thus. "The learned
Grotius, and others, have considered slavery as the just consequence of
a private war, (supposing the war to be just and the opponents in a
state of nature), upon the principles of _reparation_ and
_punishment_. Now as the law of nature, which is the rule of
conduct to individuals in such a situation, is applicable to members of
a different community, there is reason to presume, that these principles
were applied by the ancients to their prisoners of war; that their
_effects_ were confiscated by the right of _reparation_, and
their _persons_ by the right of _punishment_."--
But, such a presumption is false. The _right of capture_ was the
only argument, that the ancients adduced in their defence. Hence
Polybius; "What must they, (the Mantinenses) suffer, to receive the
punishment they deserve? Perhaps it will be said, _that they must be
sold, when they are taken, with their wives and children into
slavery_: But this is not to be considered as a punishment, since
even those suffer it, by the laws of war, who have done nothing that is
base." The truth is, that both the _offending_ and the _offended_
parties, whenever they were victorious, inflicted slavery
alike. But if the _offending_ party inflicted slavery on
the persons of the vanquished, by what right did they inflict it? It
must be answered from the presumption before-mentioned, "by the right of
_reparation_, or of _punishment:_" an answer plainly absurd
and contradictory, as it supposes the _aggressor_ to have a
_right_, which the _injured_ only could possess.
Neither is the argument less fallacious than the presumption, in
applying these principles, which in a _publick_ war could belong to
the _publick_ only, to the persons of the _individuals_ that
were taken. This calls us again to the history of the ancients, and, as
the rights of reparation and punishment could extend to those only, who
had been injured, to select a particular instance for the consideration
of the case.
As the Romans had been injured without a previous provocation by the
conduct of Hannibal at Saguntum, we may take the treaty into
consideration, which they made with the Carthaginians, when the latter,
defeated at Zama, sued for peace. It consisted of three articles[047].
By the first, the Carthaginians were to be free, and to enjoy their own
constitution and laws. By the second, they were to pay a considerable
sum of money, as a reparation for the damages and expence of war: and,
by the third, they were to deliver up their elephants and ships of war,
and to be subject to various restrictions, as a punishment. With these
terms they complied, and the war was finished.
Thus then did the Romans make that distinction between _private_
and _publick_ war, which was necessary to be made, and which the
argument is fallacious in not supposing. The treasury of the vanquished
was marked as the means of _reparation_; and as this treasury was
supplied, in a great measure, by the imposition of taxes, and was,
wholly, the property of the _publick_, so the _publick_ made
the reparation that was due. The _elephants_ also, and _ships of
war_, which were marked as the means of _punishment_, were
_publick_ property; and as they were considerable instruments of
security and defence to their possessors, and of annoyance to an enemy,
so their loss, added to the restrictions of the treaty, operated as a
great and _publick_ punishment. But with respect to the
Carthaginian prisoners, who had been taken in the war, they were
retained in _servitude:_ not upon the principles of _reparation_
and _punishment_, because the Romans had already received,
by their own confession in the treaty, a sufficient satisfaction:
not upon these principles, because they were inapplicable
to _individuals:_ the legionary soldier in the service of the
injured, who took his prisoner, was not the person, to whom the
_injury had been done_, any more than the soldier in the service of
the aggressors, who was taken, was the person, who had _committed the
offence:_ but they were retained in servitude by the _right of
capture_; because, when both parties had sent their military into the
field to determine the dispute, it was at the _private_ choice of
the legionary soldier before-mentioned, whether he would spare the life
of his conquered opponent, when he was thought to be entitled to take
it, if he had chosen, by the laws of war.
To produce more instances, as an illustration of the subject, or to go
farther into the argument, would be to trespass upon the patience, as
well as understanding of the reader. In _a state of nature_, where
a man is supposed to commit an injury, and to be unconnected with the
rest of the world, the act is _private_, and the right, which the
injured acquires, can extend only to _himself:_ but in _a state
of society_, where any member or members of a particular community
give offence to those of another, and they are patronized by the state,
to which they belong, the case is altered; the act becomes immediately
_publick_, and the _publick_ alone are to experience the
consequences of their injustice. For as no particular member of the
community, if considered as an individual, is guilty, except the person,
by whom the injury was done, it would be contrary to reason and justice,
to apply the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_,
which belong to the people as a collective body, to any individual of
the community, who should happen to be taken. Now, as the principles of
_reparation_ and _punishment_ are thus inapplicable to the
prisoners, taken in a _publick_ war, and as the _right of
capture_, as we have shewn before, is insufficient to intitle the
victors to the _service_ of the vanquished, it is evident that
_slavery_ cannot justly exist at all, since there are no other
maxims, on which it can be founded, even in the most equitable wars.
But if these things are so; if slavery cannot be defended even in the
most _equitable_ wars, what arguments will not be found against
that servitude, which arises from those, that are _unjust?_ Which
arises from those African wars, that relate to the present subject? The
African princes, corrupted by the merchants of Europe, seek every
opportunity of quarrelling with one another. Every spark is blown into a
flame; and war is undertaken from no other consideration, than that
_of procuring slaves:_ while the Europeans, on the other hand,
happy in the quarrels which they have thus excited, supply them with
arms and ammunition for the accomplishment of their horrid purpose. Thus
has Africa, for the space of two hundred years, been the scene of the
most iniquitous and bloody wars; and thus have many thousands of men, in
the most iniquitous manner, been sent into servitude.
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 043: _Jure Gentium_ servi nostri sunt, qui ab hostibus
capiuntur. Justinian, L. 1. 5. 5. 1.]
[Footnote 044: _Serverum_ appellatio ex eo fluxit, quod imperatores
nostri captivos vendere, ac per hoc _servare_, nec occidere
solent.]
[Footnote 045: Nam sive victoribus _jure captivitatis_ servissent,
&c. Justin, L. 4. 3. et passim apud scriptores antiquos.]
[Footnote 046: Neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem
honestum est necare. Cicero de officiis. L. 3. 6.]
[Footnote 047: 1. Ut liberi suis legibus viverent. Livy, L. 30. 37. 2.
Decem millia talentum argenti descripta pensionibus æquis in annos
quinquaginta solverent. Ibid. 3. Et naves rostratas, præter decem
triremes, traderent, elephantosque, quos haberent domitos; neque
domarent alios; Bellum neve in Africa, neve extra Africam, injussu P. R.
gererent, &c. Ibid.]
* * * * *
CHAP. VIII.
We shall beg leave, before we proceed to the arguments of the
_purchasers_, to add the following observations to the substance of
the three preceding chapters.
As the two orders of men, of those who are privately kidnapped by
individuals, and of those who are publickly seized by virtue of the
authority of their prince, compose together, at least[048], nine tenths
of the African slaves, they cannot contain, upon a moderate computation,
less than ninety thousand men annually transported: an immense number,
but easily to be credited, when we reflect that thousands are employed
for the purpose of stealing the unwary, and that these diabolical
practices are in force, so far has European _injustice_ been
spread, at the distance of a thousand miles from the factories on the
coast. The _slave merchants_, among whom a quantity of European
goods is previously divided, travel into the heart of the country to
this amazing distance. Some of them attend the various markets, that are
established through so large an extent of territory, to purchase the
kidnapped people, whom the _slave-hunters_ are continually bringing
in; while the rest, subdividing their merchandize among the petty
sovereigns with whom they deal, receive, by an immediate exertion of
fraud and violence, the stipulated number.
Now, will any man assert, in opposition to the arguments before
advanced, that out of this immense body of men, thus annually collected
and transported, there is even _one_, over whom the original or
subsequent seller can have any power or right? Whoever asserts this, in
the first instance, must, contradict his own feelings, and must consider
_himself_ as a just object of prey, whenever any daring invader
shall think it proper to attack _him_. And, in the second instance,
the very idea which the African princes entertain of their villages, as
_parks_ or _reservoirs_, stocked only for their own convenience,
and of their subjects, as _wild beasts_, whom they may pursue
and take at pleasure, is so shocking, that it need only be
mentioned, to be instantly reprobated by the reader.
The order of slaves, which is next to the former in respect to the
number of people whom it contains, is that of prisoners of war. This
order, if the former statement be true, is more inconsiderable than is
generally imagined; but whoever reflects on the prodigious slaughter
that is constantly made in every African skirmish, cannot be otherwise
than of this opinion: he will find, that where _ten_ are taken, he
has every reason to presume that an _hundred_ perish. In some of
these skirmishes, though they have been begun for the express purpose of
_procuring slaves_, the conquerors have suffered but few of the
vanquished to escape the fury of the sword; and there have not been
wanting instances, where they have been so incensed at the resistance
they have found, that their spirit of vengeance has entirely got the
better of their avarice, and they have murdered, in cool blood, every
individual, without discrimination, either of age or sex.
The following[049] is an account of one of these skirmishes, as
described by a person, who was witness to the scene. "I was sent, with
several others, in a small sloop up the river Niger, to purchase slaves:
we had some free negroes with us in the practice; and as the vessels are
liable to frequent attacks from the negroes on one side of the river, or
the Moors on the other, they are all armed. As we rode at anchor a long
way up the river, we observed a large number of negroes in huts by the
river's side, and for our own safety kept a wary eye on them. Early next
morning we saw from our masthead a numerous body approaching, with
apparently but little order, but in close array. They approached very
fast, and fell furiously on the inhabitants of the town, who seemed to
be quite _surprized_, but nevertheless, as soon as they could get
together, fought stoutly. They had some fire-arms, but made very little
use of them, as they came directly to close fighting with their spears,
lances, and sabres. Many of the invaders were mounted on small horses;
and both parties fought for about half an hour with the fiercest
animosity, exerting much more courage and perseverance than I had ever
before been witness to amongst them. The women and children of the town
clustered together to the water's edge, running shrieking up and down
with terrour, waiting the event of the combat, till their party gave
way and took to the water, to endeavour to swim over to the Barbary
side. They were closely pursued even into the river by the victors, who,
though they came for the purpose of _getting slaves_, gave no
quarter, _their cruelty even prevailing over their avarice_. They
made no prisoners, but put all to the sword without mercy. Horrible
indeed was the carnage of the vanquished on this occasion, and as we
were within two or three hundred yards of them, their cries and shrieks
affected us extremely. We had got up our anchor at the beginning of the
fray, and now stood close in to the spot, where the victors having
followed the vanquished into the water, were continually dragging out
and murdering those, whom by reason of their wounds they easily
overtook. The very children, whom they took in great numbers, did not
escape the massacre. Enraged at their barbarity, we fired our guns
loaden with grape shot, and a volley of small arms among them, which
effectually checked their ardour, and obliged them to retire to a
distance from the shore; from whence a few round cannon shot soon
removed them into the woods. The whole river was black over with the
heads of the fugitives, who were swimming for their lives. These poor
wretches, fearing _us_ as much as their conquerors, dived when we
fired, and cried most lamentably for mercy. Having now effectually
favoured their retreat, we stood backwards and forwards, and took up
several that were wounded and tired. All whose wounds had disabled them
from swimming, were either butchered or drowned, before we got up to
them. With a justice and generosity, _never I believe before heard of
among slavers_, we gave those their liberty whom we had taken up,
setting them on shore on the Barbary side, among the poor residue of
their companions, who had survived the slaughter of the morning."
We shall make but two remarks on this horrid instance of African
cruelty. It adds, first, a considerable weight to the statements that
have been made; and confirms, secondly, the conclusions that were drawn
in the preceding chapter. For if we even allow the right of capture to be
just, and the principles of reparation and punishment to be applicable
to the individuals of a community, yet would the former be unjust, and
the latter inapplicable, in the present case. Every African war is a
robbery; and we may add, to our former expression, when we said, "that
thus have many thousands of men, in the most iniquitous manner, been
sent into servitude," that we believe there are few of this order, who
are not as much the examples of injustice, as the people that have been
kidnapped; and who do not additionally convey, when we consider them as
prisoners of war, an idea of the most complicated scene of murder.
The order of _convicts_, as it exists almost solely among those
princes, whose dominions are contiguous to the European factories, is
from this circumstance so inconsiderable, when compared with either of
the preceding, that we should not have mentioned it again, but that we
were unwilling to omit any additional argument that occurred against it.
It has been shewn already, that the punishment of slavery is inflicted
from no other motive, than that of gratifying the _avarice_ of the
prince, a confederation so detestable, as to be sufficient of itself to
prove it to be unjust; and that it is so disproportionate, from its
_nature_, to the offence, as to afford an additional proof of its
injustice. We shall add now, as a second argument, its disproportion
from its _continuance:_ and we shall derive a third from the
consideration, that, in civil society, every violation of the laws of
the community is an offence against the _state_[050].
Let us suppose then an African prince, disdaining for once the idea of
emolument: let us suppose him for once inflamed with the love of his
country, and resolving to punish from this principle alone, "that by
exhibiting an example of terrour, he may preserve that _happiness of
the publick_, which he is bound to secure and defend by the very
nature of his contract; or, in other words, that he may answer the end
of government." If actuated then by this principle, he should adjudge
slavery to an offender, as a just punishment for his offence, for whose
benefit must the convict labour? If it be answered, "for the benefit of
the state," we allow that the punishment, in whatever light it is
considered, will be found to be equitable: but if it be answered, "for
the benefit of any _individual whom he pleases to appoint_," we
deny it to be just. The state[051] alone is considered to have been
injured, and as _injuries cannot possibly be transferred_, the
state alone can justly receive the advantages of his labour. But if the
African prince, when he thus condemns him to labour for the benefit of
an _unoffended individual_, should at the same time sentence him to
become his _property_; that is, if he should make the person and
life of the convict at the absolute disposal of him, for whom he has
sentenced him to labour; it is evident that, in addition to his former
injustice, he is usurping a power, which no ruler or rulers of a state
can possess, and which the great Creator of the universe never yet gave
to any order whatever of created beings.
That this reasoning is true, and that civilized nations have considered
it as such, will be best testified by their practice. We may appeal here
to that _slavery_, which is now adjudged to delinquents, as a
punishment, among many of the states of Europe. These delinquents are
sentenced to labour at the _oar_, to work in _mines_, and on
_fortifications_, to cut and clear _rivers_, to make and
repair _roads_, and to perform other works of national utility.
They are employed, in short, in the _publick_ work; because, as the
crimes they have committed are considered to have been crimes against
the publick, no individual can justly receive the emoluments of their
labour; and they are neither _sold_, nor made capable of being
_transferred_, because no government whatsoever is invested with
such a power.
Thus then may that slavery, in which only the idea of _labour_ is
included, be perfectly equitable, and the delinquent will always receive
his punishment as a man; whereas in that, which additionally includes
the idea of _property_, and to undergo which, the delinquent must
previously change his nature, and become a _brute_; there is an
inconsistency, which no arguments can reconcile, and a contradiction to
every principle of nature, which a man need only to appeal to his own
feelings immediately to evince. And we will venture to assert, from the
united observations that have been made upon the subject, in opposition
to any arguments that may be advanced, that there is scarcely one of
those, who are called African convicts, on whom the prince has a right
to inflict a punishment at all; and that there is no one whatever, whom
he has a power of sentencing to labour for the benefit of an unoffended
individual, and much less whom he has a right to sell.
Having now fully examined the arguments of the _sellers_[052], and
having made such additional remarks as were necessary, we have only to
add, that we cannot sufficiently express our detestation at their
conduct. Were the reader coolly to reflect upon the case of but
_one_ of the unfortunate men, who are annually the victims of
_avarice_, and consider his situation in life, as a father, an
husband, or a friend, we are sure, that even on such a partial
reflection, he must experience considerable pain. What then must be his
feelings, when he is told, that, since the slave-trade began,
[053]_nine millions_ of men have been torn from their dearest
connections, and sold into slavery. If at this recital his indignation
should arise, let him consider it as the genuine production of nature;
that she recoiled at the horrid thought, and that she applied instantly
a torch to his breast to kindle his resentment; and if, during his
indignation, she should awaken the sigh of sympathy, or seduce the tear
of commiseration from his eye, let him consider each as an additional
argument against the iniquity of the _sellers_.
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 048: The total annual exportation from Africa, is estimated
here at 100,000 men, two thirds of whom are exported by the British
merchants alone. This estimate is less than that which is usually made,
and has been published. The author has been informed by disinterested
people, who were in most of the West India islands during the late war,
and who conversed with many of the most intelligent of the negroes, for
the purpose of inquiring by what methods they had originally been
reduced to slavery, that they did not find even two in twenty, who had
been reduced to that situation, by any other means than those mentioned
above. The author, desirous of a farther confirmation of this
circumstance, stopped the press till he had written to another friend,
who had resided twenty years in the West-Indies, and whose opinion he
had not yet asked. The following is an extract from the answer. "I do
not among many hundreds recollect to have seen but one or two slaves, of
those imported from Africa, who had any scars to shew, that they had
been in war. They are generally such as are kidnapped, or sold by their
tyrants, after the destruction of a village. In short, I am firmly of
opinion, that crimes and war together do not furnish one slave in an
hundred of the numbers introduced into the European colonies. Of
consequence the trade itself, were it possible to suppose convicts or
prisoners of war to be justly sentenced to servitude, is accountable for
ninety-nine in every hundred slaves, whom it supplies. It an insult to
the publick, to attempt to palliate the method of procuring them."]
[Footnote 049: The writer of the letter of which this is a faithful
extract, and who was known to the author of the present Essay, was a
long time on the African coast. He had once the misfortune to be
shipwrecked there, and to be taken by the natives, who conveyed him and
his companions a considerable way up into the country. The hardships
which he underwent in the march, his treatment during his captivity, the
scenes to which he was witness, while he resided among the inland
Africans, as well as while in the African trade, gave occasion to a
series of very interesting letters. These letters were sent to the
author of the present Essay, with liberty to make what use of them he
chose, by the gentleman to whom they were written.]
[Footnote 050: Were this not the case, the government of a country could
have no right to take cognizance of crimes, and punish them, but every
individual, if injured, would have a right to punish the aggressor with
his own hand, which is contrary to the notions of all civilized men,
whether among the ancients or the moderns.]
[Footnote 051: This same notion is entertained even by the African
princes, who do not permit the person injured to revenge his injury, or
to receive the convict as his slave. But if the very person who has been
_injured_, does not possess him, much less ought any other person
whatsoever.]
[Footnote 052: There are instances on the African continent, of
_parents_ selling their _children_. As the slaves of this
description are so few, and are so irregularly obtained, we did not
think it worth our while to consider them as forming an order; and, as
God never gave the parent a power over his child to make him
_miserable_, we trust that any farther mention of them will be
unnecessary.]
[Footnote 053: Abbè Raynal, Hist. Phil. vol. 4. P. 154.]
* * * * *
CHAP. IX.
It remains only now to examine by what arguments those, who
_receive_ or _purchase_ their fellow-creatures into slavery,
defend the _commerce_. Their first plea is, "that they receive
those with propriety, who are convicted of crimes, because they are
delivered into their hands by _their own magistrates_." But what is
this to you _receivers_? Have the unfortunate _convicts_ been
guilty of injury to _you_? Have they broken _your_ treaties?
Have they plundered _your_ ships? Have they carried _your_
wives and children into slavery, that _you_ should thus retaliate?
Have they offended _you_ even by word or gesture?
But if the African convicts are innocent with respect to you; if you
have not even the shadow of a claim upon their persons; by what right do
you receive them? "By the laws of the Africans," you will say; "by which
it is positively allowed."--But can _laws_ alter the nature of
vice? They may give it a sanction perhaps: it will still be immutably
the same, and, though dressed in the outward habiliments of
_honour_, will still be _intrinsically base_.
But alas! you do not only attempt to defend yourselves by these
arguments, but even dare to give your actions the appearance of lenity,
and assume _merit_ from your _baseness_! and how first ought
you particularly to blush, when you assert, "that prisoners of war are
only purchased from the hands of their conquerors, _to deliver them
from death_." Ridiculous defence! can the most credulous believe it?
You entice the Africans to war; you foment their quarrels; you supply
them with arms and ammunition, and all--from the _motives of
benevolence_. Does a man set fire to an house, for the purpose of
rescuing the inhabitants from the flames? But if they are only
purchased, to _deliver them from death_; why, when they are
delivered into your hands, as protectors, do you torture them with
hunger? Why do you kill them with fatigue? Why does the whip deform
their bodies, or the knife their limbs? Why do you sentence them to
death? to a death, infinitely more excruciating than that from which you
so kindly saved them? What answer do you make to this? for if you had
not humanely preserved them from the hands of their conquerors, a quick
death perhaps, and that in the space of a moment, had freed them from
their pain: but on account of your _favour_ and _benevolence_,
it is known, that they have lingered years in pain and agony, and have
been sentenced, at last, to a dreadful death for the most insignificant
offence.
Neither can we allow the other argument to be true, on which you found
your merit; "that you take them from their country for their own
convenience; because Africa, scorched with incessant heat, and subject
to the most violent rains and tempests, is unwholesome, and unfit to be
inhabited." Preposterous men! do you thus judge from your own feelings?
Do you thus judge from your own constitution and frame? But if you
suppose that the Africans are incapable of enduring their own climate,
because you cannot endure it yourselves; why do you receive them into
slavery? Why do you not measure them here by the same standard? For if
you are unable to bear hunger and thirst, chains and imprisonment,
wounds and torture, why do you not suppose them incapable of enduring
the same treatment? Thus then is your argument turned against
yourselves. But consider the answer which the Scythians gave the
Ægyptians, when they contended about the antiquity of their
original[054], "That nature, when she first distinguished countries by
different degrees of heat and cold, tempered the bodies of animals, at
the same instant, to endure the different situations: that as the
climate of Scythia was severer than that of Ægypt, so were the bodies of
the Scythians harder, and as capable of enduring the severity of their
atmosphere, as the Ægyptians the temperateness of their own."
But you may say perhaps, that, though they are capable of enduring their
own climate, yet their situation is frequently uncomfortable, and even
wretched: that Africa is infested with locusts, and insects of various
kinds; that they settle in swarms upon the trees, destroy the verdure,
consume the fruit, and deprive the inhabitants of their food. But the
same answer may be applied as before; "that the same kind Providence,
who tempered the body of the animal, tempered also the body of the tree;
that he gave it a quality to recover the bite of the locust, which he
sent; and to reassume, in a short interval of time, its former glory."
And that such is the case experience has shewn: for the very trees that
have been infested, and stripped of their bloom and verdure, so
surprizingly quick is vegetation, appear in a few days, as if an insect
had been utterly unknown.
We may add to these observations, from the testimony of those who have
written the History of Africa from their own inspection, that no country
is more luxurious in prospects, none more fruitful, none more rich in
herds and flocks, and none, where the comforts of life, can be gained
with so little trouble.
But you say again, as a confirmation of these your former arguments, (by
which you would have it understood, that the Africans themselves are
sensible of the goodness of your intentions) "that they do not appear to
go with you against their will." Impudent and base assertion! Why then
do you load them with chains? Why keep you your daily and nightly
watches? But alas, as a farther, though a more melancholy proof, of the
falsehood of your assertions, how many, when on board your ships, have
put a period to their existence? How many have leaped into the sea? How
many have pined to death, that, even at the expence of their lives, they
might fly from your _benevolence_?
Do you call them obstinate then, because they refuse your favours? Do
you call them ungrateful, because they make you this return? How much
rather ought you receivers to blush! How much rather ought you receivers
to be considered as abandoned and execrable; who, when you usurp the
dominion over those, who are as free and independent as yourselves,
break the first law of justice, which ordains, "that no person shall do
harm to another, without a previous provocation;" who offend against
the dictates of nature, which commands, "that no just man shall be given
or received into slavery against his own consent;" and who violate the
very laws of the empire that you assume, by consigning your subjects to
misery.
Now, as a famous Heathen philosopher observes, from whose mouth you
shall be convicted[055], "there is a considerable difference, whether an
injury is done, during any perturbation of mind, which is generally
short and momentary; or whether it is done with any previous meditation
and design; for, those crimes, which proceed from any sudden commotion
of the mind, are less than those, which are studied and prepared," how
great and enormous are your crimes to be considered, who plan your
African voyages at a time, when your reason is found, and your senses
are awake; who coolly and deliberately equip your vessels; and who spend
years, and even lives, in the traffick of _human liberty_.
But if the arguments of those, who _sell_ or _deliver_ men
into slavery, (as we have shewn before) and of those, who _receive_
or _purchase_ them, (as we have now shewn) are wholly false; it is
evident that this _commerce_, is not only beyond the possibility of
defence, but is justly to be accounted wicked, and justly impious, since
it is contrary to the principles of _law_ and _government_,
the dictates of _reason_, the common maxims of _equity_, the
laws of _nature_, the admonitions of _conscience_, and, in
short, the whole doctrine of _natural religion_.
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FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 054: Justin, L. 2. C. 1.]
[Footnote 055: Cicero de Officiis. L. 1. C. 8.]
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