THE BALKAN STATES
Viscount Grey has been criticized for not understanding the Balkan
problem. If his critics understood how complex is the story of the last
century in this part of Europe they would withold their strictures.
I, at least, do not blame any man for failing to carry in his mind
an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of races and religions
in the Balkan country have striven and hoped for during the recent
past. In this chapter the best that can be promised is an account of
the main facts of Balkan history. A more detailed narrative would be
confusing to the reader. A failure to mention the subject would leave
much unexplained that is essential to an understanding of the origin
of the present war. And we shall hardly know how to decide what kind
of a peace the future security of Europe demands, if we leave out of
consideration the proper disposition to be made of the small states of
the Southeast.
In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began a series of conquests that
carried her to the very gates of the city of Vienna. That important
stronghold seemed about to fall into her hands in 1683, when an army
of Polish and German soldiers came to its rescue in the name of
Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched Hungary out of their
hands for the benefit of the Austrian power. This struggle proved the
highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. From that time to this,
wars of reconquest have followed one another, the pagans always playing
a losing game. But for a long time all that part of Southeastern Europe
that could be reached from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the
part that was easily reached from Germany was held by the Christians,
and the part that lay between, a broad belt of hilly country, was
continually in dispute. Across it armies fought back and forth, each
side winning and losing in turn, but with the general result in favor
of the Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier of their enemies.
The region held by the Turks was tenacious of its Christian faith and
recognized the religious authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople,
who, Christian though he was, stood under the control of the sultan.
The inhabitants suffered many hardships and were reduced to the
condition of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The long bondage to their
overlords had a peculiar effect on their characters. They came to
think it right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge against their
oppressors, and so they employed religion and patriotism to defend the
commission of acts which in ordinary situations are considered without
the pale of civilized conduct. To this day the Balkan states are not
rid of their heritage from these years of moral darkness.
The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish subjects, have gradually
formed themselves into five principal groups as follows: the Serbians,
dwelling in the interior of the country northwest of Turkey proper
and occupying much of the hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the
Bulgars, settled east of the Serbs and extending as far as the shores
of the Black Sea; the Wallachians and Moldavians, who were of kindred
stock and became known as Rumanians because they believed themselves
the descendants of the inhabitants of the ancient Roman colony of
Dacia; the Albanians living along the lower eastern shores of the
Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of the same race as the Serbians,
who defended themselves so well in their mountain strongholds that
they could say they had never been conquered by the Turks. Many race
elements entered into these groups, but the Serbs and Montenegrins were
largely Slavic, while the Bulgars were generally of a distinct race
of Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were generally Vlachs, a name
given to the Latin speaking population of the Eastern Roman Empire.
The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but they have a strong sense
of nationality. These five groups correspond respectively to the five
civil divisions that have emerged from the Turkish provinces, each
playing its part in the modern Balkan problem.
Montenegro aside, the first group to become a state was Serbia, whose
hardy mountain inhabitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number of brave
leaders appeared and valley by valley the Turks were forced out of
the country. The Serbs were practically independent for a time,
but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, and the constant
preparedness that was necessary to repel any attack he might launch was
a source of much expense and anxiety to the people.
In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination of Turkey, rose in
revolt. Great sympathy was aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite
of the disposition of the Great Powers to allow Turkey a free hand to
preserve her territory intact, lest one of them gain over-balancing
territory, public opinion forced them to intervene. The first to
show sympathy was Russia, who had an interest in making herself the
protector of the Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented
her assistance to the Greeks, and finally Great Britain and France
united in a project of intervention, sending a joint fleet to the
Mediterranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827.
The stubborn sultan remained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered
the war openly, having come to an agreement with the other Powers. She
sent an army across the border which carried all before it, and the
sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adrianople, in which Turkey
recognized the independence of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an
autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. At the same time Wallachia
and Moldavia, where Rumans lived, were recognized as independent
under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sovereign and three dependent
but locally autonomous states stood forth out of the confused and
misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in Europe.
The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars and Albanians, with Bosnia
and Herzegovina, claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their
national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition and were governed
by agents appointed by the sultan. Montenegro retained her position of
practical independence, which Turkey had been forced to acknowledge in
1799. These arrangements were confirmed in a more formal treaty in 1832.
The successes of this period quickened the spirit of nationality in
the Balkans. Just as the Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for
their classical culture and sought to revive the language and ideals of
the remote past, so the Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient
culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish masters. Serbs, Rumans,
and Bulgars made grammars of their own languages, gathered up what was
preserved of their ancient literatures and traditions, taught their
children to revere the national heroes, and sought in many other ways
to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The Slavic portion turned
to Russia for support, whom they called their “big brother,” while
the Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and France, whom they
considered kindred descendants of the ancient Romans. To their national
hopes in these things was added the desire for religious independence.
They disliked being under the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch
of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan, and looked forward
to a time when they might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction
not limited by the Patriarch.
In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance in the region of the
Balkans, hoping to gain at last what Peter the Great had declared was
essential to her progress, a window looking out on the Mediterranean.
Great Britain and France came to the help of the sultan and the
Crimean War followed. After a hard struggle it ended in Russia’s
defeat, and at the Conference of Paris, 1856, the affairs of the
Balkans were again up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned
to the side of the Turk, although it was modified by the restraining
hand of his two allies. The purport of the treaty was to reduce the
power of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the Balkans
states were checked. The protectorate the tsar had established over
Wallachia and Moldavia was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had expected
independence, remained under the rule of the sultan, while Greece, who
had desired a large portion of Macedonia, was forced to continue in
her old boundaries. This crisis was not the last in which the vexed
Balkan question, seemingly near solution, was made to give way before
the complicated problems of the general European situation. Looking
backward we may well say that if Russia had secured her wish, expelled
the Turk from Constantinople and liberated the Balkan states, the
fortunes of France would not have been lessened, and Great Britain,
safe through her supremacy at sea, would not have lost any of the
strength she had in India. At the same time the sore spot of European
relations would have been healed, and we should probably have had no
war in 1914.
Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same stock and wished to unite as
one kingdom. They made their desires known in the negotiations that
resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the Powers did not mean to create
a large state on the borders of Russia which might prove a bulwark
of influence for the tsar, and accordingly they denied the request.
The two states found a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the
conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to select rulers each chose
Alexander John Cuza simultaneously, and after hesitating two years the
Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus was formed the united kingdom
of Rumania; and its formation illustrated a weak point in the Concert
of Europe. However much the Powers might interfere to prevent the
consummation of an act they considered dangerous, they would think
twice before trying to punish a Balkan state, since in doing so they
might set off an explosion in the very system they were working to keep
peaceful. Rumania understood this phase of the matter and took her
chances. Her firm course had its reward.
The influence of Great Britain was now paramount at Constantinople.
The sultan was satisfied with his ally, since he knew that of all the
Powers he had least to fear from this state, which had no territories
in that part of the Mediterranean and was committed to the preservation
of his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from the Bosphorus.
To justify herself for defending the Turk, Great Britain gave the
world assurances that the sultan was about to become good. Under her
insistance a series of reforms was announced, but they did not go far
in the realization. Some of the promises referred to the government of
the Balkans, but they were as fruitless as the others. Meanwhile French
and British merchants found large profits in Turkish trade.
The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence in the Southeast,
and in 1877 he began another war against Turkey. He thought the time
favorable for such action. Impeded for a while at Plevna, in Bulgaria,
he at last swept the enemy before him and took Adrianople on January
16, 1878. His successes created great enthusiasm among the Serbs,
Bulgars, and Rumans, who flocked to his victorious standard. The
panic-stricken sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano signed a treaty
which granted all that was demanded of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and
Rumania were recognized as completely independent, Bulgaria as an
autonomous tributary province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assured
of important administrative reforms. Russia was awarded some territory
not strictly in the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the prestige she
now had as liberator of Christian states.
The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great Britain and Austria, both
of whom felt that they had major interests at stake. They got a
congress of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, 1878, which revised
the treaty in what they were pleased to call the interest of European
peace. Complete independence was announced for Serbia, Rumania,
and Montenegro, and the sultan accepted the fact of their perfect
sovereignty. By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to include
Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making one great buffer province between
the Turkish and the Christian states. The three parts were now
left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autonomous but under Turkish
suzerainty, and the other two less independent.
To create a “Big Bulgaria” as a bulwark against Turkey had been
Russia’s chief hope in the war. Her initial success awakened enthusiasm
in all the Balkan people, and the results were expressed in the way
in which they rallied to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an
opportunity had come to found a strong Balkan confederacy which would
play an important part in the development of the Near East. The hand of
Russia seemed strong enough to hold these nascent states to one policy,
allay their incipient jealousies, and bring them to a great common
ideal. If such a course could have been adopted the future of Europe
would have been profoundly altered. It was defeated by that Concert of
Europe which was supposed to exist in order that the world might be
spared the burden of war. It was really prevented through the operation
of the forces of national selfishness, safely esconced in the system
which we have called the Concert of Europe.
The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a large part at the Congress
of Berlin. This nation had long looked upon the region that separated
her from the Adriatic as a sphere through which she was justified in
extending her power at the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that
the time had come to realize her plans. If she waited, Russia would
acquire such an influence as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her
eyes were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some time in revolt
against Turkish misgovernment. Her influence was such that the congress
gave her the right to occupy and administer the two provinces under
the reservation of sovereignty to the sultan. The inhabitants, who
were largely Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, although they
did not relax their cherished hopes of independence. They were pawns
thrown to Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. The transaction
only whetted the Austrian appetite for more and deepened the Serbian
resentment for Austria.
Great Britain had her advantage out of the bargain also. She retained
her position of paramount friend at Constantinople, justifying herself
with the assurance that the sultan would carry out reforms in his
empire. She seemed to think that the “Sick Man of Europe” would cure
himself under her guidance and then defend himself against states
that tried to oust him from his seat of power. To enable her to watch
the bedside of her patient from a convenient position, as well as
to safeguard the Suez Canal, Great Britain was given the right to
occupy and administer the island of Cyprus under nominal authority of
Turkey. To be perfectly fair we must admit that there is little moral
difference between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria’s gain in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear that in this case the Concert
of Europe was a concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also worth
while to note that two of the Great Powers took no benefit from the
agreement. France was slowly recovering from the war of 1870-1871
and was in no condition to fight, although in 1881 she established
a protectorate over Tunis. The German Empire, newly founded and not
yet fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in no condition to
undertake a stiff encounter. There were many Germans who wished that
their government should not allow the other states to get large gains
of territory while Germany got nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck’s
wise policy which held that it was not yet time for Germany to assume
an aggressive position in the world. The impatience of the German
patriots lost nothing through having to wait.
No treaty ends the march of time, and the Balkan situation continued
to develop along the old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in
accordance with a promise made to her at the Congress of Berlin. In
1885 East Rumelia declared herself united to Bulgaria, acting in
defiance of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The Powers did not
interfere for the same reason that they did not act when Wallachia
and Moldavia united in 1862. To attempt to undo the union would have
precipitated a general war. The Concert was stronger to prevent a given
action than to correct it after it was done. Serbia, however, took
the action of the two provinces as a menace and declared war against
the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about to throw herself on her
adversary when she suddenly made peace, evidently feeling she was not
strong enough to carry on the war alone.
Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did not mean to allow the
Balkan states to profit by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish
Empire. But for their restraint it seems that the Turk would have been
expelled from Europe before the end of the nineteenth century.
Their intention was clearly manifested in regard to the island of
Crete, whose population long suffered from Turkish oppression. In
1896 the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced to promise
reforms. The assurance proved empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in
behalf of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks fought heroically
but alone and were no match for Turkey in operations on land. They
made peace without success, but through the instrumentality of the
Great Powers the sultan agreed to allow Crete self-government under
an elected assembly. The powers let it be known that they would not
have the island annexed to Greece, which they did not mean to make a
preponderating influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a great Cretan
leader, Eleutherios Venezelos, whom his admirers call the Cavour of
Greece. Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the union of the
island with Greece in 1905, but again the Powers interposed, insisting
that the sovereignty of the sultan should not be abrogated. However,
they permitted the Greek king to appoint a representative to rule the
island as a Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to train the
Cretan soldiers and police. At last the Balkan war (1912-1913) brought
the completion of union, the Great Powers yielding their assent.
The explanation of the conduct of the Powers in this incident is to be
found in the delicate nature of the whole Balkan question. With Austria
and Russia keenly aroused and each of the Balkan states anxiously
looking for the moment when the rest of the sultan’s territory in
Europe was to be divided between them, it was evident that a little
thing could precipitate a serious conflict. It was in view of this
phase of the situation that the Balkans were called “the tinder-box of
Europe.”
It will be observed that while these things happened the Balkan states
were developing steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece,
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally organized powers, it
became more and more evident that they were no longer mere pawns in the
diplomatic game, and the time was fast approaching when they would wish
to take parts on their own initiative. So assertive were they becoming
that it was certain that the time would soon come when the Great Powers
would tire of the process of holding conferences to keep these states
out of trouble. It is not an easy task to serve as custodian for a
“tinder-box.”
A fair warning of this kind of danger occurred in 1908. For
twenty-three years Bulgaria had remained undisturbed, giving herself
to a rapid process of educational and industrial development, in both
of which lines she had come under the influence of German methods.
Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish sovereignty and declared
herself an entirely independent state. At the same time, and evidently
by agreement with the German Empire, Austria-Hungary announced that
she would hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of her empire,
thus superseding the “occupation” that was authorized by the congress
of Berlin, in 1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, but she
could do nothing alone. Her natural ally was Russia, then recovering
from the severe losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar been
ready for war it is doubtful if he would have drawn the sword in this
instance; for a world war would have resulted, and the nations were
not yet ready to think of such an undertaking. But Serbia nursed her
wrongs and to Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought how her
weakness had been flaunted in the face of the world. The day came when
the fire could no longer be smothered.
To understand Serbia’s feelings we must recall the national ideal by
which her hopes had been formed for many years. Most of the people
of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern
corner of Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them into a great
Serbia had long been spoken of in Serbia as the “Great Idea.” When,
therefore, Austria took definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina the
“Great Idea” seemed defeated forever. Rage and despair possessed the
Serbs wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the feeling of
the people, and vengeance was plotted. Probably it was the feeling that
this wide-spread hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough manner
that prompted Austria to make the heavy conditions that were demanded
as atonement for the crime of Sarajevo.
After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 Turkey still held the
territory just north of the Bosphorus, organized as the province of
Adrianople. She also had in Europe the provinces of Macedonia, Albania,
and the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these possessions
was the object of the Balkan states. In 1911 Italy began a war against
the sultan to gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their enemy
embarrassed, concluded that the hour of fate had come. They formed the
Balkan League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, and
made ready for war. Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who brought
the Concert of Europe to bear against the League. They gave the allies
fair notice that they would not permit them to take any of the sultan’s
territory in Europe, even though a war was won against him. The reply
to this threat shows how weak the Concert had become. It was voiced by
Montenegro, the smallest of the states, whose king immediately declared
war and called on his allies to aid him in driving the pagan out of
Europe. The call was accepted gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the
sultan, who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied his opponents.
In the war that followed Turkey was confronted by a united army of
nearly a million men. It was impossible to withstand them and in two
months most of Macedonia was lost, Constantinople was threatened,
and Turkey asked for an armistice. Negotiations began in London, the
Powers seemingly forgetting their empty threat that they “would not
permit at the end of the conflict any modification of the territorial
_status quo_ in European Turkey.” The allies demanded hard terms which
seemed about to be accepted by Turkey when by a _coup d’état_ the
“Young Turks,” a patriotic party of reformers, got possession of the
government at Constantinople and resumed the fighting. Although they
fought well, they could not withstand the large numbers that were
against them. Janina fell to the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a
Serbo-Bulgarian force, and Scutari was taken by the Montenegrins. The
Turks now yielded definitely and negotiations for peace were resumed.
Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the following interesting
situation: Austria-Hungary was dismayed at the prospect of having a
strong and permanent league organized in the Balkans; for it would
probably make it impossible for her to realize her desire to extend
her territory in that direction. She was especially unwilling to allow
Serbia and Montenegro to hold the conquered shore of the Adriatic,
since it was here that she designed to gain additional outlets to the
seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at the extension of Serbian
power, since she, also, did not relish the prospect of having a
strong state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with unexpected
short-sightedness, however, that she was willing to block Serbia in
order to promote the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable rival
in that quarter, if she were ever firmly established there. Both
states, therefore, appeared at London to limit the expansion of Serbia,
and Germany supported them, seemingly on the principle that she was
merely standing by the members of the Triple Alliance. It has been
supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir-apparent of Austria,
when he came to rule, would promote a vital union of the two great
Mid-Continental empires. If we accept this theory, we must conclude
that she had a still more vital reason for wishing Austria to have a
large Adriatic coast-line, with important commercial harbors.
These considerations ran exactly counter to Serbia’s hopes in Albania.
She had already occupied the Albanian port of Durazzo and expected to
make it the center of a fair commercial life. When ordered to withdraw
she did not dare refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to cut
off the possibility of her future growth. For a second time Austria had
given her a vital blow, and there was another wrong to be remembered
by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. By the decree of the
Powers Albania was made an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty,
and later on a German prince was appointed to rule it.
While these affairs were being discussed Montenegro besieged Scutari,
in northern Albania and continued operation until the place was
taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the Powers was well known.
Her courageous conduct won the admiration of lovers of brave men
everywhere. Eight days after the capture of Scutari, Austria announced
that she would enter the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy
and Germany declared they would support her. Throughout all Slavic
countries arose a cry of indignation. In Russia especially it was loud
and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was about to begin when
King Nicholas, of Montenegro, gave the world the assurance of peace by
withdrawing his army from Scutari.
Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by which the Balkan League was
dissolved and the hope disappeared that a strong power would arise
which would take the Near East out of the position of pawn for the
greed of the Great Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made an
ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the territory they would take
from Turkey, and the first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied
this region she asked her allies to make a new allotment. Bulgaria
raised strong objection, since the new demand, if granted, would mean
that her gains would be smaller than was first agreed. Angry speeches
led to war, and after a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced
to make peace without honor. While they were locked in the conflict
Turkey seized the opportunity to recover Adrianople, and eventually
held it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of the Balkan states
that Rumania entered this war for purely predatory purposes. She had
remained neutral during the common effort to drive the Turk out; but
now that Bulgaria was marching to sure defeat she came into the battle
against her, and at the end of the war she demanded and was given a
large part of Bulgarian territory. The “July War,” as this stage of
the Balkan conflict is called, left the allies filled with bitter
hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened as she was, felt little
inclined to lean on any of her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for
the reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and the result was soon
seen of all men.
I have thus followed the complex story of the Balkan States to the
year 1913. Through a century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Montenegro had emerged from the
Christian lands over which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria had
taken small portions of those lands and had definite plans to secure
influence over larger portions. In the Balkans Russian prestige was
great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look to Austria, or to
Germany--which was the same thing--as a means of balancing against
Russia. At the same time it was known that Russia was planning to
construct strategic lines of railroad leading to the Black Sea along
the western border of her empire, and this was considered an ominous
sign for the future. Altogether, the “tinder-box” was ready for
ignition.
As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily. At the end of the Balkan
War she retained only 1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of
the district around Adrianople. She was becoming a distinctly Asiatic
power, and the sultan must have felt that his hold on Constantinople
was precarious. At the same time, as we shall see later on, Great
Britain had secured a foothold on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and
Russia was extending her influence in Persia, two threats from the
eastward. Any far sighted Turk could see that his country was in danger
of being crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To which of the great
states should Turkey turn for that protection which had long been her
safety? Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Constantinople itself,
nor to Great Britain, who seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and
who was safely established in Egypt. In her extremity she listened to
the suggestions of German wooers, who promised industrial development,
railroads, and financial aid. Here was laid the foundation of
Turko-German sympathy which was to be very important in the Great War.
After a calamity has occurred it is easy to point out the course by
which it might have been avoided. It seems certain that if we stood
again where the world stood in 1914 we should not do what we did in
1914. So we can see in what respects the events of the Balkan history
went wrong. But the men who settled the crises of the past were not
able to see what we see. They had the same blindness for the future
that we have for that which lies before us now. They fumbled their
problems as most men fumble problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on
fumbling until the end of time. It is asking much to expect that
statesmen shall be as wise as we who review their deeds.
But there are great facts in history which it is possible to know and
use with profit. One of them is the incompetency of the principle
of the Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like that we have
reviewed in the Balkans. Concert predicates a group of satisfied great
states, without over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to unite
their efforts to restrain small states, or even one large state, from
a course which shall force the rest of the world into conflict. When
a group of great states have united to carry out a certain policy,
and another tries to restrain the first group, concert is in great
danger of breaking down. That was the situation in the Balkans. These
states were drawn into the whirl of general European politics, and they
intensified its velocity at one particular corner, so that what may
be contemplated as a harmonious rotary movement broke into a twisting
tornado. If, when the present war is over, the nations of the world
undertake to go on under the old system, trusting to concert as the
means of avoiding war, there is no reason to expect that the future
will be less turbulent than the past.