THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE
The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not destroy the influence of
Metternich in Europe. He was too able a man to be overthrown as leader
of the legitimists merely because the people were in a ferment. To his
party he was still the man to be trusted, and as legitimacy managed to
beat down revolution in most of the areas in which commotion appeared,
the scope of his power was wide, although it was evident that he could
not use it with former impunity.
At the same time he gave up the pretense of making the Alliance of
the Powers a federation. He was content to try to secure that concert
of action that would enable the states that leaned to legitimacy to
act together against incipient revolution; and for a time he was
successful. In anticipation of the failure of the plan to permit France
to interfere in the Spanish colonies, Canning exclaimed: “Things are
getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and
God for us all!” But the cry of joy was premature. The time had not
returned in which each crisis was to be met in its own way, without
reference to a recognized concert of action, and the reason was the
deep consciousness of the states that certain grave questions that ever
hung over the horizon had in them the possibilities of general war.
Let one of these questions loom large, and common action was taken to
avert the threatened danger. In such way the Concert of Europe was kept
alive, and remained something to be reckoned with as a part of the
background of European policy. In spite of its temporary disuse, it was
a thing to be brought forth again if the nations decided that it was
needed to meet an emergency.
In fact, it reappeared many times in the course of the nineteenth
century, notably in 1840, when the so-called Eastern question became
prominent. At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made himself lord of Egypt
and seized Syria, was threatening Constantinople, having the support of
France. Russia became alarmed, made a close alliance with the sultan,
and seemed about to get that secure foothold on the Bosphorus for
which she had striven many years. Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia
resented this prospect and took steps jointly to counteract it. Their
object was to preserve Turkey from the dangers that threatened to
divide her. Before such a combination Russia was not able to stand,
and she gave up her pretensions in order to join the other three
powers. France, however, held to her purpose, supporting the adventurer
of Egypt. Thus it happened that the four Great Powers, reviving the
Concert of Europe, but leaving out the government of Louis Philippe,
had a conference in London to settle Eastern affairs. They decided
to offer Mehemet Ali certain concessions and to make war on him if
he refused to accept them. He spurned their counsel and was expelled
from Syria but was saved from utter destruction by the interference
of France, who secured a settlement by which he was left in firm
possession of Egypt, as hereditary ruler under the nominal authority of
Turkey. All the powers now united in an agreement by which Turkey was
to exclude foreign warships from the Dardanelles. Thus, by an appeal
to the principle of the Concert of Europe, a grave crisis was averted,
and war between Great Britain and Russia was avoided.
In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of these negotiations,
Europe was thrown into convulsions by the appearance of a new era of
revolution. France became a republic, and Germany, Austria, and Hungary
went through such violent upheavals that the existence of arbitrary
government hung for a time in the balance. Out of the struggle emerged
Napoleon III, of France, who thought some military achievement was
necessary to stabilize his power. At that time Russia was asserting
a protectorate over all Christians in Turkey, and it was generally
believed that she was about to establish vital political control.
Napoleon took up the sword against her and Great Britain came to help,
the result being the Crimean War, 1854-1856.
In the beginning of this struggle the Concert of Europe seemed to be
dead, but two years of heavy fighting and nearly futile losses brought
it to life again. The war, which began in an outburst of international
rivalry, ended in the Conference of Paris, 1856, in which all the
Great Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the Eastern question by
neutralizing the Euxine and the Danube and by making new allotments of
territory which were supposed to adjust boundaries in such a manner
that rivalries would disappear. The Conference went on to take up the
work of a true European congress by agreeing upon the Declaration of
Paris, in which were assembled a body of rules regulating neutral trade
in time of war. England gave up her long defended pretension to seize
enemy goods on neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, and in
return gained the recognition that privateering was unlawful. Thus the
Crimean War, fought by Great Britain and France against Russia, and in
support of Turkey--with Austria and Prussia as neutrals--was at last
ended by an agreement between all the parties concerned. The nations
undertook to settle the long Eastern dispute by pledging the sultan to
reforms which it was not in his nature to carry out.
The next three wars were fought without respect to the Concert of
Europe. They arose from local causes and were soon determined without
the aid of the Great Powers. They were the war of Austria and France
over the liberation of Italy, 1859; the war between Prussia and
Austria, 1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian predominancy in
Germany; and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871, in which Prussia
crushed France and made herself the head of the German Empire. In the
first of these struggles no state could gain enough power to become
a menace to the other states, since Italy was to be the recipient of
all territory gained. Had the contest gone so far as to promise the
vast enlargement of the power of France by reason of an alliance with
enlarged Italy, interference might have resulted. In fact, the German
states began to suspect such a result, and the realization of it was
one of Napoleon’s reasons for withdrawing very unceremoniously from
the war. Here we see, therefore, that the principle of concert was not
entirely dead. The second and third wars were fought by a brilliantly
organized state, Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation cared
to make a trial of strength.
In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and proceeded with such energy
that she soon forced the sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano,
altogether in favor of Russia. The particulars of the struggle belong
to another chapter,[7] but here it is only necessary to point out that
the Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by the Great Powers, and
Russia was forced to submit her well won victory to the Congress of
Berlin, which scaled down the awards of San Stefano until Russia might
well ask what was left of her victory. A similar thing happened in the
Balkan War of 1912-1913. Here the parties concerned had fought their
quarrel out to the end and had nearly expelled Turkey from Europe,
dividing the spoils among themselves. Then in stepped the Great Powers,
prescribing in a treaty at London the limits of gain to the successful
contestants. They acted in the interest of peace; for Austria, watching
the actions of Serbia and Greece, let it be known that she would not
allow Serbia to have Albania, and the Powers interfered in order to
prevent such action from kindling a great European war.
[7] See below, p. 112.
Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War,
and the Balkan War, the action of the Great Powers was not to prevent
war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did this principle go that
writers were known to suggest that war would no longer be profitable
to nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great Powers would ever
nullify the gains of the contestants.
At this time concert had come to mean another thing than it meant in
the decade after the fall of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed system of
consultation and decision in anticipation of some issue that threatened
war: now it was concerted action to keep a local war from going so
far as to involve a general conflict. It was a last resort in the
presence of dire danger. A more present means of preserving peace was
the Balance of Power, which consisted in forming the states in groups
one of which balanced another group and prevented the development of
overwhelming strength. The principle was well known in the past history
of Europe, but it was never so clearly defined in the remote past as in
the last half century. For our purposes its modern phase begins after
the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871.
Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe but not over-whelmingly
great. On one side was Austria, long her enemy, and on the other was
France. Within five years they were defeated with such quick and
crushing blows that the world was startled and the Germans themselves
were as much astonished as delighted. Out of this brilliant period of
success arose the German Empire, with Prussia for its corner-stone and
Bismarck for its builder and guardian. Immediately a singular thing
happened. One would hardly expect that a beaten state would straightway
form an alliance with the power that had humiliated her; yet such a
relation was established between Germany and Austria, and it has lasted
to this day. Where Germany has loved Austria has loved, where Germany
has hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of one has been supported
by the other. Bismarck’s policy had this state of friendship in view
and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in 1866, when she was at
his feet. Common blood bound the two states together and later led to
the hope of unification in a great Pan-German empire.
With France, however, the empire which Bismarck founded was to have
no such state of amity. Between them was no brotherhood, not even in
the tenuous bonds of the theory of the rights of man. Back of 1871 were
many acts of aggression, many bitter wars, and some very humiliating
experiences for states inhabited by Germans. And now the tables were
turned. France was weak and the often beaten Germans were strong and
victorious. Their vengeance was expressed in the long siege of Paris,
the proclamation of the German Empire in the château of the old French
kings, the humiliating indemnity levied on the French people, and
the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, so long in the quiet keeping
of France that they were thoroughly French in sympathy and political
purpose. Bismarck usually ruled his heart with his head, but he lost
himself for the moment when he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke
of needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the price many times over in
maintaining a great army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of France.
The hostile feelings thus engendered gave rise to the particular kind
of balance of power that has existed in Europe since 1871; for on
whatever side Germany was found France was on the other, and however
the elements shifted in the grouping of nations these two states were
always opponents.
It was Bismarck’s idea to form an alliance so powerful that no other
state nor group of states would dare attack it, and by holding his
allies in hand to preserve peace. That was the way the Balance of Power
was to serve to prevent war. For his purpose he formed what was known
as the Three Emperors’ League, consisting of the rulers of Germany,
Russia, and Austria. The combination was weak in one important point;
for Russia and Austria had rival hopes of territorial gains in the
Near East, and they were not likely to remain permanently in accord.
With an eye to such a disruption of the alliance Bismarck looked about
for another state which could be added to the group. He turned to
Italy, bound to him because he had befriended her in her struggle for
nationality.
To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; for she was bitterly
hostile to Austria, who still held the unredeemed part of the Italian
people and who was still hated in the peninsula for her ancient
oppression of Italian provinces. The Iron Chancellor generally carried
his point, partly because of his personal ability and partly because
it was felt that he could and would live up to his promises. He showed
the king of Italy the advantages the kingdom would have under German
protection, which would support it against France, strengthen it in the
quarrel with the pope, and even hold back Austria if that power was
inclined to pay off old scores. These arrangements were completed in
1882 and gave rise to the Triple Alliance, until 1914 a strong factor
in European affairs. The greatness of Bismarck is well shown in the
fact that he could carry this plan through and still retain Russia in
coöperation with Austria and Germany. Until he retired from office in
1890 he had the support of the tsar.
After he withdrew the union of the three emperors was dissolved. But
for his strong hand it could hardly have been formed. Russia and
Austria were at bottom rivals. If Germany supported Russia in her plans
for the Near East she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself to
Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if she favored Russia openly
she was likely to arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was at
that time very suspicious of the tsar’s designs on Constantinople. It
was a delicate situation, and it was only good luck and Bismarck’s
character that kept it intact for more than fifteen years.
After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its existence, Italy
suppressing her dislike for Austria as well as she could in view of her
need of strong friends among the nations. But Russia fell away and in
1895 announced that she had formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing
which Bismarck had been very solicitous to prevent. By holding Russia
in hand he had been able to isolate France in Europe, but her isolation
was now a thing of the past. The Dual Alliance confronted the Triple
Alliance and the result was peace. At the same time the rivalry of
Russia and Austria over Turkey became more energetic, which tended to
increase the probability of war.
Succeeding Bismarck came German statesmen who were not so steady as
he, and their weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity of
the prospects of peace. It can hardly be doubted that the fall of
Bismarck lessened the prospect that Europe would remain at peace. The
Balance of Power, which took so clear a form with the organization of
the Dual Alliance, was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed;
for while it made the checking of powers by powers more apparent, its
very existence was evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of nations
than existed before the Dual Alliance was formed. At the same time the
men who now guided the fortunes of Germany were not so convinced as
Bismarck that the country should have peace.
While these things happened Great Britain remained generally neutral.
She was busy with trade expansion and the development of her colonies,
especially in Africa; and her chief interest, so far as the schemes
of the Continental nations were concerned, was to see that none of
them interfered with her progress in that field of endeavor. Late
in Bismarck’s time, however, she became convinced that Germany was
becoming a rival both in trade and colonization. It is true that
France was also a rival, and between her and Great Britain occurred
some sharp passages; but France was not an aggressive nation and had
no strong military resources to back her ambitions in the field of
peaceful activities. Germany, on the other hand, was increasingly
militaristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate that she would
at some time in the future be willing to support her commercial and
colonial ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. British anxiety was
quickened when the young kaiser began to build a great navy, with the
avowed object of making it equal to the British navy. For centuries
it had been the key-note of British policy to have a navy that could
control the seas; and while there was nothing in the will of Father
Adam that gave Britons the dominion of the seas, the kaiser must have
known that he could not challenge their superiority on water without
arousing their gravest apprehension. During the Boer war (1899-1902)
Germany gave added offense to Britain. She showed sympathy openly for
the Boers, and it was generally believed in Great Britain that she took
advantage of the opportunity to try to form a grand alliance to curb
the power of the “Mistress of the Seas.” Rumor said that the plan was
defeated only by the refusal of France to lend her assistance unless
she received Alsace-Lorraine. If the report is true, it only shows what
a costly thing to Germany was the hatred that Bismarck created when he
put France to the humiliating dismemberment of 1871.
During this period Théophile Delcassé was head of the French foreign
office (1898-1905). He was a man of great original ability and was
desirous of restoring the prestige of France. When he came into office
the French public was excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of
French and British interests in the Sudan which seemed to threaten
war. The British government took a strong attitude, as it was likely
at that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing with a weaker
nation. Delcassé realized that the true welfare of his country demanded
friendship with the one power which could help it against Germany, and
at the risk of denunciation at home he gave up all that Great Britain
demanded in the Sudan. He thus showed that he possessed that high trait
of statesmanship which consists in the ability to convert an opponent
into a firm friend.
The opportunity to which he was looking forward came when Germany set
her plans into operation during the Boer war. He not only held out for
the return of the lost provinces but, that failing, made overtures for
a better understanding with the British. It was a time when a friendly
hand was gladly received by the London government. The result was a
series of agreements which became known as the _Entente Cordiale_,
1904. They marked the reappearance of Great Britain as a leading power
in Continental affairs, after a long period of aloofness. She had
become an active part of the Balance of Power, and her strength was
thrown to the side which was bent on restraining the vast influence
of Germany. Her action caused great alarm at Berlin, where her motive
was interpreted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of that city
apparently forgetting that they had provoked it by their unfriendly
attitude in the Boer war.
In the same year began the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905). At first
glance it would seem that this conflict threatened to weaken the
_Entente Cordiale_, for Japan was allied to Great Britain and Russia
was bound up with France by the Dual Alliance. But the result was
just the opposite. The _Entente_ was not only left intact, but it was
actually strengthened. When Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased
to fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which made it possible for
her to draw nearer to the Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia,
always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her eyes with greater
eagerness than ever to the Near East, which brought her into a more
intense state of opposition to Austria and Germany. Delcassé seized
the opportunity offered him and succeeded in bringing together these
two great nations, which for many years had been continually ready to
fly at one another. He put into motion the negotiations out of which
was formed the Triple _Entente_ (1907) in which Great Britain, France,
and Russia announced that they had settled their differences and would
stand together in future crises.
The incidents that followed the culmination of Delcassé’s diplomacy
are very striking, but they must be deferred until I reach a later
stage of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe that it brought
the theory of the Balance of Power to its logical development. Delcassé
was in a world in which one great and most efficiently armed nation
stood in a position to turn suddenly on the rest of Europe and sweep
it into her lap. By her military and naval power, by her vast trained
army, by her readiness for instantaneous action, by her well planned
strategic railroads, and by her alliances with the middle-European
states she was in a threatening position. At a given signal she could
seize great domains, fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive
her out of what she had taken. There was hardly an intelligent German
who did not believe that this course would be followed in the near
future and who did not feel confident that it would make Germany
the dominating nation of the world. Against this system the Triple
_Entente_ was formed, as a means of balance. It was larger than the
Triple Alliance but not so effectively led.
And here I must observe that these two groups had come into existence
in the most natural way. Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as
a means of preserving peace, not as a means of aggression; but it had
become something more than he intended it to be. It had enabled Germany
to play such a part in European politics that the creation of another
great group as a balance was apparently demanded. Immediately that
her position was lowered Germany felt aggrieved that the combination
had been made against her. So powerful were her convictions about her
wrongs that she threw away all thought of a concert of the Great Powers
for the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted to the Balance to
protect her; but she now considered it something more than a state of
equilibrium and she appealed to arms. Before this narrative recounts
the actual events by which she felt that she was justified in taking
this step, it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a series of
causes and events which for nearly a century has been an open menace to
European peace and stability.