1. Is it because he is (as Homer calls him) of created Gods and men
the Father, and of brutes and things that have no soul the maker? If
Chrysippus may be credited, he is not properly styled the father of
the afterbirth who supplied the seed, although it springs from the
seed. Or has he figuratively called the maker of the world the father
of it? In his Convivium he calls Phaedrus the father of the amatorious
discourse which he had introduced; and so in his Phaedrus[154] he
calls him “father of noble children,” when he had been the occasion of
many excellent discourses about philosophical matters. Or is there any
difference between a father and a maker? Or between procreation and
making? For as what is procreated is also made, but not the contrary;
so he that procreated did also make, for the procreation of an animal
is the making of it. Now the work of a maker—as of a builder, a weaver,
a musical-instrument maker, or a statuary—is altogether distinct and
separate from its author; but the principle and power of the procreator
is implanted in the progeny, and contains his nature, the progeny being
a piece pulled off the procreator. Since therefore the world is neither
like a piece of potter’s work nor joiner’s work, but there is a great
share of life and divinity in it, which God from himself communicated
to and mixed with matter, God may properly be called Father of the
world—since it has life in it—and also the maker of it.
2. And since these things come very near to Plato’s opinion, consider,
I pray, whether there may not be some probability in them. Whereas the
world consists of two parts, body and soul, God indeed made not the
body; but matter being provided, he formed and fitted it, binding up
and confining what was infinite within proper limits and figures. But
the soul, partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, was not only the work
of God, but, part of him; not only made by him, but begot by him.
_QUESTION III._
In the Republic,[155] he supposes the universe, as one line, to be cut
into two unequal sections; again he cuts each of these sections in two
after the same proportion, and supposes the two sections first made to
constitute the two genera of things sensible and things intelligible
in the universe. The first represents the genus of intelligibles,
comprehending in the first subdivision the primitive forms or ideas,
in the second the mathematics. Of sensibles, the first subdivision
comprehends solid bodies, the second comprehends the images and
representations of them. Moreover, to every one of these four he has
assigned its proper judicatory faculty;—to the first, reason; to the
mathematics, the understanding; to sensibles, belief; to images and
likenesses, conjecture.
BUT WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY DIVIDING THE UNIVERSE INTO UNEQUAL PARTS?
AND WHICH OF THE SECTIONS, THE INTELLIGIBLE OR THE SENSIBLE, IS THE
GREATER? FOR IN THIS HE HAS NOT EXPLAINED HIMSELF.
1. At first sight it will appear that the sensible is the greater
portion. For the essence of intelligibles being indivisible, and in
the same respect ever the same, is contracted into a little, and pure;
but an essence divisible and pervading bodies constitutes the sensible
part. Now what is immaterial is limited; but body in respect of matter
is infinite and unlimited, and it becomes sensible only when it is
defined by partaking of the intelligible. Besides, as every sensible
has many images, shadows, and representations, and from one and the
same original several copies may be taken both by nature and art;
so the latter must needs exceed the former in number, according to
Plato, who makes things intelligible to be patterns or ideas of things
sensible, like the originals of images and reflections. Further, Plato
derives the knowledge of ideas from body by abstraction and cutting
away, leading us by various steps in mathematical discipline from
arithmetic to geometry, thence to astronomy, and setting harmony above
them all. For things become geometrical by the accession of magnitude
to quantity; solid, by the accession of profundity to magnitude;
astronomical, by the accession of motion to solidity; harmonical, by
the accession of sound to motion. Abstract then sound from moving
bodies, motion from solids, profundity from superficies, magnitude from
quantity, we are then come to pure intelligible ideas, which have no
distinction among themselves in respect of the one single intelligible
essence. For unity makes no number, unless joined by the infinite
binary; then it makes a number. And thence we proceed to points, thence
to lines, from them to superficies, and profundities, and bodies, and
to the qualities of the bodies so and so qualified. Now the reason is
the only judicatory faculty of intelligibles; and the understanding
is the reason in the mathematics, where intelligibles appear as by
reflection in mirrors. But as to the knowledge of bodies, because of
their multitude, Nature has given us five powers or distinctions of
senses; nor are all bodies discerned by them, many escaping sense by
reason of their smallness. And though every one of us consists of a
body and soul, yet the hegemonic and intellectual faculty is small,
being hid in the huge mass of flesh. And the case is the same in the
universe, as to sensible and intelligible. For intelligibles are the
principles of bodily things, but every thing is greater than the
principle whence it came.
2. Yet, on the contrary, some will say that, by comparing sensibles
with intelligibles, we match things mortal with divine, in some
measure; for God is in intelligibles. Besides, the thing contained is
ever less than the containing, and the nature of the universe contains
the sensible in the intelligible. For God, having placed the soul in
the middle, hath extended it through all, and hath covered it all round
with bodies. The soul is invisible, and cannot be perceived by any of
the senses, as Plato says in his Book of Laws; therefore every man
must die, but the world shall never die. For mortality and dissolution
surround every one of our vital faculties. The case is quite otherwise
in the world; for the corporeal part, contained in the middle by the
more noble and unalterable principle, is ever preserved. And a body is
said to be without parts and indivisible for its minuteness; but what
is incorporeal and intelligible is so, as being simple and sincere, and
void of all firmness and difference. Besides, it were folly to think
to judge of incorporeal things by corporeal. The present, or _now_, is
said to be without parts and indivisible, since it is everywhere and no
part of the world is void of it. But all affections and actions, and
all corruptions and generations in the world, are contained by this
_now_. But the mind is judge only of what is intelligible, as the sight
is of light, by reason of its simplicity and similitude. But bodies,
having several differences and diversities, are comprehended, some
by one judicatory faculty, others by another, as by several organs.
Yet they do not well who despise the intelligible and intelligent
faculty in us; for being great, it comprehends all sensibles, and
attains to things divine. The most important thing he himself teaches
in his Banquet, where he shows us how we should use amatorious matters,
turning our minds from sensible goods to things discernible only by the
reason, that we ought not to be enslaved by the beauty of any body,
study, or learning, but laying aside such pusillanimity, should turn to
the vast ocean of beauty.[156]
_QUESTION IV._
WHAT IS THE REASON THAT, THOUGH PLATO ALWAYS SAYS THAT THE SOUL IS
ANCIENTER THAN THE BODY, AND THAT IT IS THE CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE OF
ITS RISE, YET HE LIKEWISE SAYS, THAT NEITHER COULD THE SOUL EXIST
WITHOUT THE BODY, NOR THE REASON WITHOUT THE SOUL, BUT THE SOUL IN
THE BODY, AND THE REASON IN THE SOUL? FOR SO THE BODY WILL SEEM TO BE
AND NOT TO BE, BECAUSE IT BOTH EXISTS WITH THE SOUL, AND IS BEGOT BY
THE SOUL.
Perhaps what we have often said is true; viz., that the soul without
reason and the body without form did mutually ever coexist, and neither
of them had generation or beginning. But after the soul did partake of
reason and harmony, and being through consent made wise, it wrought
a change in matter, and being stronger than the other’s motions, it
drew and converted these motions to itself. So the body of the world
drew its original from the soul, and became conformable and like to
it. For the soul did not make the Nature of the body out of itself, or
out of nothing; but it wrought an orderly and pliable body out of one
disorderly and formless. Just as if a man should say that the virtue
of the seed is with the body, and yet that the body of the fig-tree
or olive-tree was made of the seed, he would not be much out; for the
body, its innate motion and mutation proceeding from the seed, grew
up and became what it is. So, when formless and indefinite matter
was once formed by the inbeing soul, it received such a form and
disposition.
_QUESTION V._
WHY, SINCE BODIES AND FIGURES ARE CONTAINED PARTLY BY RECTILINEARS
AND PARTLY BY CIRCLES, DOES HE MAKE ISOSCELES TRIANGLES AND TRIANGLES
OF UNEQUAL SIDES THE PRINCIPLES OF RECTILINEARS; OF WHICH THE
ISOSCELES TRIANGLE FORMS THE CUBE, THE ELEMENT OF THE EARTH; AND A
SCALENE TRIANGLE FORMS THE PYRAMID WHICH IS THE SEED OF FIRE, THE
OCTAHEDRON WHICH IS THE SEED OF AIR, AND THE ICOSAHEDRON WHICH IS THE
SEED OF WATER;—WHILE HE DOES NOT MEDDLE WITH CIRCULARS, THOUGH HE
DOES MENTION THE GLOBE, WHERE HE SAYS THAT EACH OF THE AFORE-RECKONED
FIGURES DIVIDES A ROUND BODY THAT ENCLOSES IT INTO EQUAL PARTS.[157]
1. Is their opinion true who think that he ascribed a dodecahedron
to the globe, when he says that God made use of it in delineating
the universe? For upon account of the multitude of its bases and the
obtuseness of its angles, avoiding all rectitude, it is flexible,
and by circumtension, like globes made of twelve skins, it becomes
circular and comprehensive. For it has twenty solid angles, each of
which is contained by three obtuse planes, and each of these contains
one and the fifth part of a right angle. Now it is made up of twelve
equilateral and equangular quinquangles (or pentagons), each of which
consists of thirty of the first scalene triangles. Therefore it seems
to resemble both the Zodiac and the year, it being divided into the
same number of parts as these.
2. Or is a right line in Nature prior to circumference; or is
circumference but an accident of rectilinear? For a right line is said
to bend; and a circle is described by a centre and distance, which is
the place of a right line by which a circumference is measured, this
being everywhere equally distant from the middle. And a cone and a
cylinder are made by rectilinears; a cone by keeping one side of a
triangle fixed and carrying another round with the base,—a cylinder,
by doing the like with a parallelogram. Further, that is nearest to
principle which is less; but a right is the least of all lines, as
it is simple; whereas in a circumference one part is convex without,
another concave within. Besides, numbers are before figures, as unity
is before a point, which is unity in position. But indeed unity is
triangular; for every triangular number[158] taken eight times, by
adding unity, becomes quadrate; and this happens to unity. Therefore
a triangle is before a circle, whence a right line is before a
circumference. Besides, no element is divided into things compounded
of itself; indeed there is a dissolution of all other things into the
elements. Now a triangle is divided into no circumference, but two
diameters cut a circle into four triangles; therefore a rectilinear
figure is before a circular, and has more of the nature of an element.
And Plato himself shows that a rectilinear is in the first place, and
a circular is only consequential and accidental. For when he says the
earth consists of cubes, each of which is contained with rectilinear
superficies, he says the earth is spherical and round. Therefore there
was no need of making a peculiar element for round things, since
rectilinears, fitted after a certain manner among themselves, do make
up this figure.
3. Besides, a right line, whether great or little, preserves the same
rectitude; but as to the circumference of a circle, the less it is,
the crookeder it is; the larger, the straighter. Therefore if a convex
superficies stands on a plane, it sometimes touches the subject plane
in a point, sometimes in a line. So that a man may imagine that a
circumference is made up of little right lines.
4. But observe whether this be not true, that no circle or sphere in
this world is exact; but since by the tension and circumtension of
the right lines, or by the minuteness of the parts, the difference
disappears, the figure seems circular and round. Therefore no
corruptible body moves circularly, but altogether in a right line. To
be truly spherical is not in a sensible body, but is the element of
the soul and mind, to which he has given circular motion, as being
agreeable to their nature.
_QUESTION VI._
HOW COMES IT TO PASS THAT IN PHAEDRUS IT IS SAID, THAT THE NATURE
OF A WING, BY WHICH ANY THING THAT IS HEAVY IS CARRIED UPWARDS,
PARTICIPATES MOST OF THE BODY OF GOD?[159]
Is it because the discourse is of love, and love is of beauty inherent
in a body? Now beauty, by similitude to things divine, moves and
reminds the soul. Or it may be (without too much curiosity) he may
be understood in plain meaning, to wit, that the several faculties
of the soul being employed about bodies, the power of reasoning and
understanding partakes most about divine and heavenly things; which he
did not impertinently call a wing, it raising the soul from mean and
mortal things to things above.
_QUESTION VII._
IN WHAT SENSE DOES PLATO SAY, THAT THE ANTIPERISTASIS (OR REACTION)
OF MOTION—BY REASON THERE IS NO VACUUM—IS THE CAUSE OF THE EFFECTS IN
PHYSICIANS’ CUPPING-GLASSES, IN SWALLOWING, IN THROWING OF WEIGHTS,
IN THE RUNNING OF WATER, IN THUNDER, IN THE ATTRACTION OF THE
LOADSTONE, AND IN THE HARMONY OF SOUNDS?[160]
1. For it seems unreasonable to ascribe the reason of such different
effects to the selfsame cause.
2. How respiration is made by the reaction of the air he has
sufficiently shown. But the rest, he says, seem to be done
miraculously, but really the bodies thrust each other aside and change
places with one another; while he has left for us to determine how each
is particularly done.
3. As to cupping-glasses, the case is thus: the air next to the flesh
being comprehended and inflamed by the heat, and being made more rare
than the pores of the brass, does not go into a vacuum (for there is no
such thing), but into the air that is without the cupping-glass, and
has an impulse upon it. This air drives that before it; and each, as it
gives way, strives to succeed into the place which was vacuated by the
cession of the first. And so the air approaching the flesh comprehended
by the cupping-glass, and exciting it, draws the humors into the
cupping-glass.
4. Swallowing takes place in the same way. For the cavities about the
mouth and stomach are full of air; when therefore the meat is squeezed
down by the tongue and tonsils, the elided air follows what gives way,
and also forces down the meat.
5. Weights also thrown cleave the air and dissipate it, as they fall
with force; the air recoiling back, according to its natural tendency
to rush in and fill the vacuity, follows the impulse, and accelerates
the motion.
6. The fall also of thunderbolts is like to darting any thing. For by
the blow in the cloud, the fiery matter exploded breaks into the air;
and it being broken gives way, and again being contracted above, by
main force it presses the thunderbolt downwards contrary to Nature.
7. And neither amber nor the loadstone draws any thing to it which is
near, nor does any thing spontaneously approach them. But this stone
emits strong exhalations, by which the adjoining air being impelled
forceth that which is before it; and this being carried round in the
circle, and returning into the vacuated place, forcibly draws the iron
in the same direction. In amber there is a flammeous and spirituous
nature, and this by rubbing on the surface is emitted by recluse
passages, and does the same that the loadstone does. It also draws the
lightest and driest of adjacent bodies, by reason of their tenuity
and weakness; for it is not so strong nor so endued with weight and
strength as to force much air and to act with violence and to have
power over great bodies, as the magnet has. But what is the reason the
air never draws a stone, nor wood, but iron only, to the loadstone?
This is a common question both by them who think the coition of these
bodies is made by the attraction of the loadstone, and by such as think
it done by the incitement of the iron. Iron is neither so rare as wood,
nor altogether so solid as gold or a stone; but has certain pores and
asperities, which in regard of the inequality are proportionable to
the air; and the air being received in certain seats, and having (as
it were) certain stays to cling to, does not slip away; but when it is
carried up to the stone and strikes against it, it draws the iron by
force along with it to the stone. Such then may be the reason of this.
8. But the manner of the waters running over the earth is not so
evident. But it is observable that the waters of lakes and ponds stand
immovable, because the air about them stagnates immovable and admits of
no vacuity. For the water on the surface of lakes and seas is troubled
and fluctuates as the air is moved, it following the motion of the
air, and moving as it is moved. For the force from below causes the
hollowness of the wave, and from above the swelling thereof; until
the air ambient and containing the water is still. Therefore the flux
of such waters as follow the motion of the retreating air, and are
impelled by that which presses behind, is continued without end. And
this is the reason that the stream increases with the waters, and is
slow where the water is weak, the air not giving way, and therefore
suffering less reaction. So the water of fountains must needs flow
upwards, the extrinsic air succeeding into the vacuity and throwing the
water out. In a close house, that keeps in the air and wind, the floor
sprinkled with water causes an air or wind, because, as the sprinkled
water falls, the air gives way. For it is so provided by Nature that
air and water force one another and give way to one another; because
there is no vacuity in which one can be settled without feeling the
change and alteration in the other.
9. Concerning symphony, he shows how sounds harmonize. A quick sound
is acute, a slow is grave. Therefore acute sounds move the senses the
quicker; and these dying and grave sounds supervening, what arises
from the contemperation of one with the other causes pleasure to the
ear, which we call harmony. And by what has been said, it may easily
be understood that air is the instrument of these things. For sound is
the stroke upon the sense of the hearer, caused by the air; and the air
strikes as it is struck by the thing moving,—if violent, acutely,—if
languid, softly. The violent stroke comes quick to the ear; then the
circumambient air receiving a slower, it affects and carries the sense
along with it.
_QUESTION VIII._
WHAT MEANS TIMAEUS,[161] WHEN HE SAYS THAT SOULS ARE DISPERSED INTO
THE EARTH, THE MOON, AND INTO OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF TIME?
1. Does the earth move like the sun, moon, and five planets, which
for their motions he calls organs or instruments of time? Or is the
earth fixed to the axis of the universe; yet not so built as to remain
immovable, but to turn and wheel about, as Aristarchus and Seleucus
have shown since; Aristarchus only supposing it, Seleucus positively
asserting it? Theophrastus writes how that Plato, when he grew old,
repented him that he had placed the earth in the middle of the
universe, which was not its place.
2. Or is this contradictory to Plato’s opinion elsewhere, and in the
Greek instead of χρόνου should it be written χρόνῳ, taking the dative
case instead of the genitive, so that the stars will not be said to
be instruments, but the bodies of animals? So Aristotle has defined
the soul to be “the actual being of a natural organic body, having
the power of life.”[162] The sense then must be this, that souls are
dispersed into meet organical bodies in time. But this is far besides
his opinion. For it is not once, but several times, that he calls the
stars instruments of time; as when he says, the sun was made, as well
as other planets, for the distinction and conservation of the numbers
of time.
3. It is therefore most proper to understand the earth to be here an
instrument of time; not that the earth is moved, as the stars are;
but that, they being carried about it, it standing still makes sunset
and sunrising, by which the first measures of time, nights and days,
are circumscribed. Wherefore he called it the infallible guard and
artificer of night and day. For the gnomons of dials are instruments
and measures of time, not in being moved with the shadows, but in
standing still; they being like the earth in intercepting the light of
the sun when it is down,—as Empedocles says that the earth makes night
by intercepting light. This therefore may be Plato’s meaning.
4. And so much the rather might we consider whether the sun is not
absurdly and without probability said to be made for the distinction
of time, with the moon and the rest of the planets. For as in
other respects the dignity of the sun is great; so by Plato in his
Republic[163] the sun is called the king and lord of the whole sensible
nature, as the Chief Good is of the intelligible. For it is said to
be the offspring of Good, it giving both generation and appearance to
things visible; as it is from Good that things intelligible both are
and are understood. But that this God, having such a nature and so
great power, should be only an instrument of time, and a sure measure
of the difference that happens among the eight orbs, as they are slow
or swift in motion, seems neither decent nor highly rational. It must
therefore be said to such as are startled at these things, that it is
their ignorance to think that time is the measure of motion in respect
of sooner or later, as Aristotle calls it; or quantity in motion, as
Speusippus; or an interval of motion and nothing more, as some of the
Stoics define it, by an accident, not comprehending its essence and
power, which Pindar has not ineptly expressed in these words: Time,
who surpasses all in the seats of the blest. Pythagoras also, when he
was asked what time was, answered, it was the soul of this world. For
time is no affection or accident of motion, but the cause, power, and
principle of that symmetry and order that confines all created beings,
by which the animated nature of the universe is moved. Or rather, this
order and symmetry itself—so far as it is motion—is called time. For
this,
Walking by still and silent ways,
Mortal affairs with justice guides.[164]
According to the ancients, the essence of the soul is a number moving
itself. Therefore Plato says that time and heaven were coexistent,
but that motion was before heaven had being. But time was not. For
then there neither was order, nor measure, nor determination; but
indefinite motion, as it were, the formless and rude matter of time.
... But when matter was informed with figures, and motion with
circuitions, from that came the world, from this time. Both are
representations of God; the world, of his essence; time, of his
eternity in the form of motion, as the world is God in creation.
Therefore they say heaven and motion, being bred together, will perish
together, if ever they do perish. For nothing is generated without
time, nor is any thing intelligible without eternity; if this is to
endure for ever, and that never to die when once bred. Time therefore,
having a necessary connection and affinity with heaven, cannot be
called simple motion, but (as it were) motion in order having terms and
periods; whereof since the sun is prefect and overseer, to determine,
moderate, produce, and observe changes and seasons, which (according
to Heraclitus) produce all things, he is coadjutor to the governing
and chief God, not in trivial things, but in the greatest and most
momentous affairs.
_QUESTION IX._
Since Plato in his Commonwealth, discoursing of the faculties of
the soul, has very well compared the symphony of reason and of the
irascible and the concupiscent faculties to the harmony of the middle,
lowest, and highest chord,[165] some men may properly ask this
question:—
DID PLATO PLACE THE RATIONAL OR THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY IN THE MIDDLE?
FOR HE IS NOT CLEAR IN THE POINT.
1. Indeed, according to the natural order of the parts, the place of
the irascible faculty must be in the middle, and of the rational in
the highest, which the Greeks call hypate. For they of old called
the chief and supreme ὕπατος. So Xenocrates calls Jove, in respect of
immutable things, ὕπατος (or _highest_), in respect of sublunary things
νέατος (or _lowest_). And long before him, Homer calls the chief God
ὕπατος κρειόντων, _Highest of Rulers_. And Nature has of due given
the highest place to what is most excellent, having placed reason as
a steersman in the head, and the concupiscent faculty at a distance,
last of all and lowest. And the lowest place they call νεάτη, as the
names of the dead, νέρτεροι and ἔνεροι, do show. And some say, that
the south wind, inasmuch as it blows from a low and obscure place, is
called νότος. Now since the concupiscent faculty stands in the same
opposition to reason in which the lowest stands to the highest and the
last to the first, it is not possible for the reason to be uppermost
and first, and yet for any other part to be the one called ὕπατος (or
_highest_). For they that ascribe the power of the middle to it, as
the ruling power, are ignorant how they deprive it of a higher power,
namely, of the highest, which is competible neither to the irascible
nor to the concupiscent faculty; since it is the nature of them both
to be governed by and obsequious to reason, and the nature of neither
of them to govern and lead it. And the most natural place of the
irascible faculty seems to be in the middle of the other two. For it is
the nature of reason to govern, and of the irascible faculty both to
govern and be governed, since it is obsequious to reason, and commands
the concupiscent faculty when this is disobedient to reason. And as
in letters the semi-vowels are middling between mutes and vowels,
having something more than those and less than these; so in the soul
of man, the irascible faculty is not purely passive, but hath often
an imagination of good mixed with the irrational appetite of revenge.
Plato himself, after he had compared the soul to a pair of horses and
a charioteer, likened (as every one knows) the rational faculty to
the charioteer, and the concupiscent to one of the horses, which was
resty and unmanageable altogether, bristly about the ears, deaf and
disobedient both to whip and spur; and the irascible he makes for the
most part very obsequious to the bridle of reason, and assistant to
it. As therefore in a chariot, the middling one in virtue and power
is not the charioteer, but that one of the horses which is worse than
his guider and yet better than his fellow; so in the soul, Plato gives
the middle place not to the principal part, but to that faculty which
has less of reason than the principal part and more than the third.
This order also observes the analogy of the symphonies, i.e. the
relation of the irascible to the rational (which is placed as hypate)
forming the diatessaron (or fourth), that of the irascible to the
concupiscent (or nete) forming the diapente (or fifth), and that of the
rational to the concupiscent (as hypate to nete) forming an octave or
diapason. But should you place the rational in the middle, you would
make the irascible farther from the concupiscent; though some of the
philosophers have taken the irascible and the concupiscent faculty for
the selfsame, by reason of their likeness.
2. But it may be ridiculous to describe the first, middle, and last by
their place; since we see hypate highest in the harp, lowest in the
pipe; and wheresoever you place the mese in the harp, provided it is
tunable, it sounds more acute than hypate, and more grave than nete.
Nor does the eye possess the same place in all animals; but wherever
it is placed, it is natural for it to see. So a pedagogue, though he
goes not foremost but follows behind, is said to lead (ἄγειν), as the
general of the Trojan army,
Now in the front, now in the rear was seen,
And kept command;[166]
but wherever he was, he was first and chief in power. So the faculties
of the soul are not to be ranged by mere force in order of place or
name, but according to their power and analogy. For that in the body
of man reason is in the highest place, is accidental. But it holds
the chief and highest power, as mese to hypate, in respect of the
concupiscent; as mese to nete, in respect of the irascible; insomuch
as it depresses and heightens,—and in fine makes a harmony,—by abating
what is too much and by not suffering them to flatten and grow dull.
For what is moderate and symmetrous is defined by mediocrity. Still
more is it the object of the rational faculty to reduce the passions
to moderation, which is called sacred, as effecting a harmony of the
extremes with reason, and through reason with each other. For in
chariots the best of the beasts is not in the middle; nor is the skill
of driving to be placed as an extreme, but it is a mediocrity between
the inequality of the swiftness and the slowness of the horses. So the
force of reason takes up the passions irrationally moved, and reducing
them to measure, constitutes a mediocrity betwixt too much and too
little.
_QUESTION X._