mutual relation and affection; that is, what reference and respect Fate
has to divine Providence, what to Fortune, what also to “that which
is in our power,” what to contingent and other such like things; and
furthermore we are to determine, how far and in what it is true or
false that all things happen and are done by and according to Fate.
For if the meaning is, that all things are comprehended and contained
in Fate, it must be granted that this proposition is true; and if any
would farther have it so understood, that all things which are done
amongst men, on earth, and in heaven are placed in Fate, let this also
pass as granted for the present. But if (as the expression seems rather
to imply) the “being done according to Fate” signifies not all things,
but only that which is an immediate consequent of Fate, then it must
not be said that all things happen and are done by and according to
Fate, though all things are so according to Fate as to be comprised in
it. For all things that the law comprehends and of which it speaks are
not legal or according to law; for it comprehends treason, it treats
of the cowardly running away from one’s colors in time of battle,
of adultery, and many other such like things, of which it cannot be
said that any one of them is lawful. Neither indeed can I affirm of
the performing a valorous act in war, the killing of a tyrant, or the
doing any other virtuous deed, that it is legal; because that only is
proper to be called legal, which is commanded by the law. Now if the
law commands these things, how can they avoid being rebels against
the law and transgressors of it, who neither perform valiant feats of
arms, kill tyrants, nor do any other such remarkable acts of virtue?
And if they are transgressors of the law, why is it not just they
should be punished? But if this is not reasonable, it must then be
also confessed that these things are not legal or according to law;
but that legal and according to law is only that which is particularly
prescribed and expressly commanded by the law, in any action
whatsoever. In like manner, those things only are fatal and according
to Fate, which are the consequences of causes preceding in the divine
disposition. So that Fate indeed comprehends all things which are done;
yet many of those things that are comprehended in it, and almost all
that precede, should not (to speak properly) be pronounced to be fatal
or according to Fate.
6. These things being so, we are next in order to show, how “that
which is in our power” (or free will), Fortune, possible, contingent,
and other like things which are placed among the antecedent causes,
can consist with Fate, and Fate with them; for Fate, as it seems,
comprehends all things, and yet all these things will not happen by
necessity, but every one of them according to the principle of its
nature. Now the nature of the possible is to presubsist, as the genus,
and to go before the contingent; and the contingent, as the matter and
subject, is to be presupposed to free will; and our free will ought as
a master to make use of the contingent; and Fortune comes in by the
side of free will, through the property of the contingent of inclining
to either part. Now you will more easily apprehend what has been said,
if you shall consider that every thing which is generated, and the
generation itself, is not done without a generative faculty or power,
and the power is not without a substance. As for example, neither the
generation of man, nor that which is generated, is without a power;
but this power is about man, and man himself is the substance. Now
the power or faculty is between the substance, which is the powerful,
and the generation and the thing generated, which are both possibles.
There being then these three things, the power, the powerful, and the
possible; before the power can exist, the powerful must of necessity
be presupposed as its subject, and the power must also necessarily
subsist before the possible. By this deduction then may in some measure
be understood what is meant by possible; which may be grossly defined
as “that which power is able to produce;” or yet more exactly, if to
this same there be added, “provided there be nothing from without to
hinder or obstruct it.” Now of possible things there are some which
can never be hindered, as are those in heaven, to wit, the rising and
setting of the stars, and the like to these; but others may indeed be
hindered, as are the most part of human things, and many also of those
which are done in the air. The first, as being done by necessity, are
called necessary; the others, which may fall one way or other, are
called contingent; and they may both thus be described. The necessary
possible is that whose contrary is impossible; and the contingent
possible is that whose contrary is also possible. For that the sun
should set is a thing both necessary and possible, forasmuch as it is
contrary to this that the sun should not set, which is impossible;
but that, when the sun is set, there should be rain or not rain, both
the one and the other is possible and contingent. And then again of
things contingent, some happen oftener, others rarely and not so often,
others fall out equally or indifferently, as well the one way as the
other, even as it happens. Now it is manifest that those are contrary
to one another,—to wit, those which fall out oftener and those which
happen but seldom,—and they both for the most part depend on Nature;
but that which happens equally, as much one way as another, depends on
ourselves. For that under the Dog it should be either hot or cold, the
one oftener, the other seldomer, are both things subject to Nature; but
to walk and not to walk, and all such things of which both the one and
the other are submitted to the free will of man, are said to be in us
and our election; but rather more generally to be in us. For there are
two sorts of this “being in our power;” the one of which proceeds from
some sudden passion and motion of the mind, as from anger or pleasure;
the other from the discourse and judgment of reason, which may properly
be said to be in our election. And some reason there is to believe that
this possible and contingent is the same thing with that which is said
to be in us and according to our free will, although differently named.
For in respect to the future, it is styled possible and contingent; and
in respect of the present, it is named “in our power” and “in our free
will.” So that these things may thus be defined: The contingent is that
which is itself—as well as its contrary—possible; and “that which is in
our power” is one part of the contingent, to wit, that which now takes
place according to our will. Thus have we in a manner declared, that
the possible in the order of Nature precedes the contingent, and that
the contingent subsists before free will; as also what each of them
is, whence they are so named, and what are the qualities adjoined or
appertaining to them.
7. It now remains, that we treat of Fortune and casual adventure, and
whatever else is to be considered with them. It is therefore certain
that Fortune is a cause. Now of causes, some are causes by themselves,
and others by accident. Thus for example, the proper cause by itself
of an house or a ship is the art of the mason, the carpenter, or the
shipwright; but causes by accident are music, geometry, and whatever
else may happen to be joined with the art of building houses or ships,
in respect either of the body, the soul, or any exterior thing. Whence
it appears, that the cause by itself must needs be determinate and one;
but the causes by accident are never one and the same, but infinite and
undetermined. For many—nay, infinite—accidents, wholly different one
from the other, may be in one and the same subject. Now the cause by
accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done for some
end but has in it free will and election, is then called Fortune; as is
the finding a treasure while one is digging a hole to plant a tree, or
the doing or suffering some extraordinary thing whilst one is flying,
following, or otherwise walking, or only turning about, provided it be
not for the sake of that which happens, but for some other intention.
Hence it is, that some of the ancients have declared Fortune to be
a cause unknown, that cannot be foreseen by the human reason. But
according to the Platonics, who have approached yet nearer to the true
reason of it, it is thus defined: Fortune is a cause by accident,
in those things which are done for some end, and which are of our
election. And afterwards they add, that it is unforeseen and unknown
to the human reason; although that which is rare and strange appears
also by the same means to be in this kind of cause by accident. But
what this is, if it is not sufficiently evidenced by the oppositions
and disputations made against it, will at least most clearly be seen by
what is written in Plato’s Phaedo, where you will find these words:
PHAED. Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed?
ECH. Yes indeed; for there came one and told us of it. At which we
wondered very much that, the judgment having been given long before, it
seems that he died a great while after. And what, Phaedo, might be the
cause of it? PHAED. It was a fortune which happened to him, Echecrates.
For it chanced that, the day before the judgment, the stern of the
galley which the Athenians send every year to the isle of Delos was
crowned.[113]
In which discourse it is to be observed, that the expression _happened
to him_ is not simply to be understood by _was done_ or _came to pass_,
but it much rather regards what befell him through the concurrence of
many causes together, one being done with regard to another. For the
priest crowned the ship and adorned it with garlands for another end
and intention, and not for the sake of Socrates; and the judges also
had for some other cause condemned him. But the event was strange,
and of such a nature that it might seem to have been effected by the
providence of some human creature, or rather of some superior powers.
And so much may suffice to show with what Fortune must of necessity
subsist, and that there must be first some subject of such things as
are in our free will: its effect is, moreover, like itself called
Fortune.
But chance or casual adventure is of a larger extent than Fortune;
which it comprehends, and also several other things which may of their
own nature happen sometimes one way, sometimes another. And this, as
it appears by the derivation of its name, which is in Greek αὐτόματον,
_chance_, is that which happens of itself, when that which is ordinary
happens not, but another thing in its place; such as cold in the
dog-days seems to be; for it is sometimes then cold.... Once for all,
as “that which is in our power” is a part of the contingent, so Fortune
is a part of chance or casual adventure; and both the two events are
conjoined and dependent on the one and the other, to wit, chance on
contingent, and Fortune on “that which is in our power,”—and yet not on
all, but on what is in our election, as we have already said. Wherefore
chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those which are
animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man only, who has his actions
voluntary. And an argument of this is, that to be fortunate and to be
happy are thought to be one and the same thing. Now happiness is a
certain well-doing, and well-doing is proper only to man, and to him
perfect.
8. These then are the things which are comprised in Fate, to wit,
contingent, possible, election, “that which is in our power,” Fortune,
chance, and their adjuncts, as are the things signified by the words
_perhaps_ and _peradventure_; all which indeed are contained in Fate,
yet none of them is fatal. It now remains, that we discourse of divine
Providence, and show how it comprehends even Fate itself.
9. The supreme therefore and first Providence is the understanding
or (if you had rather) the will of the first and sovereign God,
doing good to every thing that is in the world, by which all divine
things have universally and throughout been most excellently and most
wisely ordained and disposed. The second Providence is that of the
second Gods, who go through the heaven, by which temporal and mortal
things are orderly and regularly generated, and which pertains to the
continuation and preservation of every kind. The third may probably
be called the Providence and procuration of the Daemons, which, being
placed on the earth, are the guardians and overseers of human actions.
This threefold Providence therefore being seen, of which the first and
supreme is chiefly and principally so named, we shall not be afraid to
say, although we may in this seem to contradict the sentiments of some
philosophers, that all things are done by Fate and by Providence, but
not also by Nature. But some are done according to Providence,—these
according to one, those according to another,—and some according to
Fate; and Fate is altogether according to Providence, while Providence
is in no wise according to Fate. But let this discourse be understood
of the first and supreme Providence. Now that which is done according
to another, whatever it is, is always posterior to that according to
which it is done; as that which is according to the law is after the
law, and that which is according to Nature is after Nature, so that
which is according to Fate is after Fate, and must consequently be more
new and modern. Wherefore supreme Providence is the most ancient of
all things, except him whose will or understanding it is, to wit, the
sovereign author, maker, and father of all things. “Let us therefore,”
says Timaeus, “discourse for what cause the Creator made and framed
this machine of the universe. He was good, and in him that is good
there can never be imprinted or engendered any envy against any thing.
Being therefore wholly free from this, he desired that all things
should, as far as it is possible, resemble himself. He therefore,
who admits this to have been chiefly the principal original of the
generation and creation of the world, as it has been delivered to us by
wise men, receives that which is most right. For God, who desired that
all things should be good, and nothing, as far as possibly might be,
evil, taking thus all that was visible,—restless as it was, and moving
rashly and confusedly,—reduced it from disorder to order, esteeming
the one to be altogether better than the other. For it neither was
nor is convenient for him who is in all perfection good, to make any
thing that should not be very excellent and beautiful.”[114] This,
therefore, and all that follows, even to his disputation concerning
human souls, is to be understood of the first Providence, which in the
beginning constituted all things. Afterwards he speaks thus: “Having
framed the universe, he ordained souls equal in number to the stars,
and distributed to each of them one; and having set them, as it were,
in a chariot, showed the nature of the universe, and appointed them the
laws of Fate.”[115] Who then will not believe, that by these words he
expressly and manifestly declares Fate to be, as it were, a foundation
and political constitution of laws, fitted for the souls of men? Of
which he afterwards renders the cause.
As for the second Providence, he thus in a manner explains it, saying:
“Having prescribed them all these laws to the end that, if there should
afterwards happen any fault, he might be exempt from being the cause of
any of their evil, he dispersed some of them upon the earth, some into
the moon, and some into the other instruments of time. And after this
dispersion, he gave in charge to the young Gods the making of human
bodies, and the making up and adding whatever was wanting and deficient
in human souls; and after they had perfected whatever is adherent and
consequent to this, they should rule and govern, in the best manner
they possibly could, this mortal creature, so far as it should not be
the cause of its own evils.”[116] For by these words, “that he might
be exempt from being the cause of any of their evil,” he most clearly
signifies the cause of Fate; and the order and office of the young
Gods manifests the second Providence; and it seems also in some sort
to have touched a little upon the third, if he therefore established
laws and ordinances that he might be exempt from being the cause of any
of their evil. For God, who is free from all evil, has no need of laws
or Fate; but every one of these petty Gods, drawn on by the providence
of him who has engendered them, performs what belongs to his office.
Now that this is true and agreeable to the opinion of Plato, these
words of the lawgiver, spoken by him in his Book of Laws, seems to me
to give sufficient testimony: “If there were any man so sufficient by
Nature, being by divine Fortune happily engendered and born, that he
could comprehend this, he would have no need of laws to command him.
For there is not any law or ordinance more worthy and powerful than
knowledge; nor is it fitting that Mind, provided it be truly and really
free by Nature, should be a subject or slave to any one, but it ought
to command all.”[117]
10. I therefore do for mine own part thus understand and interpret
this sentence of Plato. There being a threefold Providence, the first,
as having engendered Fate, does in some sort comprehend it; the second,
having been engendered with Fate, is with it totally comprehended and
embraced by the first; the third, as having been engendered after Fate,
is comprehended by it in the same manner as are free will and Fortune,
as we have already said. “For they whom the assistance of a Daemon’s
power does aid in their intercourse with me” says Socrates, declaring
to Theages what is the almost inevitable ordinance of Adrastea
“are those whom you also mean; for they grow and come forward with
speed.”[118] In which words, what he says of a Daemon’s aiding some
is to be ascribed to the third Providence, and the growing and coming
forward with speed, to Fate. In brief, it is not obscure or doubtful
but that this also is a kind of Fate. And perhaps it may be found much
more probable that the second Providence is also comprehended under
Fate, and indeed all things that are done; since Fate, as a substance,
has been rightly divided by us into three parts, and the fable of the
chain comprehends the revolutions of the heavens in the number and
rank of those things which happen conditionally. But concerning these
things I will not much contend, to wit, whether they should be called
conditional, or rather conjoined with Fate, the precedent cause and
commander of Fate being also fatal.
11. Our opinion then, to speak compendiously, is such. But the contrary
sentiment does not only include all things in Fate, but affirms them
all to be done by and according to Fate. It accords indeed in all
things to the other (the Stoic) doctrine; and that which accords to
it, ’tis clear, is the same thing with it. In this discourse therefore
we have first spoken of the contingent; secondly, of “that which is
in our power;” thirdly, of Fortune and chance, and whatever depends on
them; fourthly, of praise, blame, and whatever depends on them; the
fifth and last of all may be said to be prayers to the Gods, with their
services and ceremonies.
For the rest, as to those which are called idle and reaping arguments,
and that which is named the argument against destiny, they are indeed
but vain subtleties and captious sophisms, according to this discourse.
But according to the contrary opinion, the first and principal
conclusion seems to be, that there is nothing done without a cause, but
that all things depend upon antecedent causes; the second, that the
world is governed by Nature, and that it conspires, consents, and is
compatible with itself; the third seems rather to be testimonies,—of
which the first is divination, approved by all sorts of people, as
being truly in God; the second is the equanimity and patience of wise
men, who take mildly and bear patiently whatever befalls, as happening
by divine ordinance and as it ought; the third is the speech so common
and usual in every one’s mouth, to wit, that every proposition is true
or false. Thus have we contracted this discourse into a small number of
short articles, that we might in few words comprehend the whole matter
of Fate; into which a scrutiny ought to be made, and the reasons of
both opinions to be weighed with a most exact balance. But we shall
hereafter come to discuss particulars.