I WILL endeavor, my dearest Piso, to send you my opinion concerning
Fate, written with all the clearness and compendiousness I am capable
of; since you, who are not ignorant how cautious I am of writing, have
thought fit to make it the subject of your request.
1. You are first then to know that this word Fate is spoken and
understood two manner of ways; the one as it is an energy, the other
as it is a substance. First therefore, as it is an action, Plato[110]
has under a type described it, saying thus in his dialogue entitled
Phaedrus: “And this is a sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable
ordinance), that whatever soul being an attendant on God,” &c. And
in his treatise called Timaeus: “The laws which God in the nature of
the universe has established for immortal souls.” And in his book of
a Commonweal he calls Fate “the speech of the virgin Lachesis, who is
the daughter of Necessity.” By which sentences he not tragically but
theologically shows us what his sentiments are in this matter. Now if
any one, translating the fore-cited passages, would have them expressed
in more familiar terms, the description in Phaedrus may be thus
explained: That Fate is a divine sentence, intransgressible because
its cause cannot be divested or hindered. And according to what he has
said in his Timaeus, it is a law ensuing on the nature of the universe,
according to which all things that are done are transacted. For this
does Lachesis effect, who is indeed the daughter of Necessity,—as we
have both already related, and shall yet better understand by that
which will be said in the progress of our discourse. Thus you see what
Fate is, when it is taken for an action.
2. But as it is a substance, it seems to be the universal soul of
the world, and admits of a threefold distribution; the first destiny
being that which errs not; the second, that which is thought to err;
and the third that which, being under the heaven, is conversant about
the earth. Of these, the highest is called Clotho, the next Atropos,
and the lowest, Lachesis; who, receiving the celestial influences
and efficacies of her sisters, transmits and fastens them to the
terrestrial things which are under her government. Thus have we
declared briefly what is to be said of Fate, taken as a substance;
what it is, what are its parts, after what manner it is, how it is
ordained, and how it stands, both in respect to itself and to us. But
as to the particularities of these things, there is another fable in
his Commonweal, by which they are in some measure covertly insinuated,
and we ourselves have, in the best manner we can, endeavored to explain
them to you.
3. But we now once again turn our discourse to Fate, as it is an
energy. For concerning this it is that there are so many natural,
moral, and logical questions. Having therefore already in some sort
sufficiently defined what it is, we are now in the next place to say
something of its quality, although it may to many seem absurd. I
say then that Fate, though comprehending as it were in a circle the
infinity of all those things which are and have been from infinite
times and shall be to infinite ages, is not in itself infinite, but
determinate and finite; for neither law, reason, nor any other divine
thing can be infinite. And this you will the better understand, if
you consider the total revolution and the whole time in which the
revolutions of the eight circles (that is, of the eight spheres of the
fixed stars, sun, moon, and five planets), having (as Timaeus[111]
says) finished their course, return to one and the same point, being
measured by the circle of the Same, which goes always after one manner.
For in this order, which is finite and determinate, shall all things
(which, as well in heaven as in earth, consist by necessity from above)
be reduced to the same situation, and restored again to their first
beginning. Wherefore the habitude of heaven alone, being thus ordained
in all things, as well in regard of itself as of the earth and all
terrestrial matters, shall again (after long revolutions) one day
return; and those things that in order follow after, and being linked
together in a continuity are maintained in their course, shall be
present, every one of them by necessity bringing what is its own. But
for the better clearing of this matter, let us understand that whatever
is in us or about us is not wrought by the course of the heavens and
heavenly influences, as being entirely the efficient cause both of my
writing what I now write, and of your doing also what you at present
do, and in the same manner as you do it. Hereafter then, when the same
cause shall return, we shall do the same things we now do, and in the
same manner, and shall again become the same men; and so it will be
with all others. And that which follows after shall also happen by
the following cause; and in brief, all things that shall happen in
the whole and in every one of these universal revolutions shall again
become the same. By this it appears (as we have said before) that
Fate, being in some sort infinite, is nevertheless determinate and
finite; and it may be also in some sort seen and comprehended, as we
have farther said, that it is as it were a circle. For as a motion of a
circle is a circle, and the time that measures it is also a circle; so
the order of things which are done and happen in a circle may be justly
esteemed and called a circle.
4. This therefore, though there should be nothing else, almost shows
us what sort of thing Fate is; but not particularly or in every
respect. What kind of thing then is it in its own form? It is, as far
as one can compare it, like to the civil or politic law. For first it
commands the most part of things at least, if not all, conditionally;
and then it comprises (as far as is possible for it) all things that
belong to the public in general; and the better to make you understand
both the one and the other, we must specify them by an example. The
civil law speaks and ordains in general of a valiant man, and also of
a deserter and a coward; and in the same manner of others. Now this
is not to make the law speak of this or that man in particular, but
principally to propose such things as are universal or general, and
consequently such as fall under them. For we may very well say, that
it is legal to reward this man for having demeaned himself valiantly,
and to punish that man for flying from his colors; because the law has
virtually—though not in express terms and particularly yet in such
general ones as they are comprehended under,—so determined of them.
As the law (if I may so speak) of physicians and masters of corporal
exercises potentially comprehends particular and special things within
the general; so the law of Nature, determining first and principally
general matters, secondarily and consequently determines such as are
particular. Thus, general things being decreed by Fate, particular and
individual things may also in some sort be said to be so, because
they are so by consequence with the general. But perhaps some one of
those who more accurately examine and more subtly search into these
things may say, on the contrary, that particular and individual things
precede the composition of general things, and that the general exist
only for the particular, since that for which another thing is always
goes before that which is for it. Nevertheless, this is not the proper
place to treat of this difficulty, but it is to be remitted to another.
However, that Fate comprehends not all things clearly and expressly,
but only such as are universal and general, let it pass for resolved
on at present, as well for what we have already said a little before,
as for what we shall say hereafter. For that which is finite and
determinate, agreeing properly with divine Providence, is seen more in
universal and general things than in particular; such therefore is the
divine law, and also the civil; but infinity consists in particulars
and individuals.
After this we are to declare what this term “conditionally” means; for
it is to be thought that Fate is also some such thing. That then is
said to be conditionally, which is supposed to exist not of itself or
absolutely, but as really dependent upon and joined to another; which
signifies a suit and consequence. “And this is the sanction of Adrastea
(or an inevitable ordinance), that whatever soul, being an attendant
on God, shall see any thing of truth, shall till another revolution be
exempt from punishment; and if it is always able to do the same, it
shall never suffer any damage.”[112] This is said both conditionally
and also universally. Now that Fate is some such thing is clearly
manifest, as well from its substance as from its name. For it is called
εἱμαρμένη as being εἰρομένη, that is, dependent and linked; and it is
a sanction or law, because things are therein ordained and disposed
consequentially, as is usual in civil government.