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FOOD GUIDE FOR WAR SERVICE AT HOME
Prepared under the Direction of the United States Food Administration
in Co-Operation with the United States Department of Agriculture and
the Bureau of Education
With a Preface by Herbert Hoover
United States Food Administrator
1918
[Illustration: Reproduced by courtesy of National Geographic Society]
ANNOUNCEMENT
In the spring of 1918 the Collegiate Section of the United States Food
Administration was called upon to prepare a simple statement of the
food situation as affected by the war, suitable for elementary and
high school teachers, high-school pupils, and the general public. The
demand arose because of the wide adoption of the three courses on
this subject then being sent out weekly to universities, colleges, and
normal schools throughout the country.
This little volume is the response to that request. It was written by
Katharine Blunt, of the University of Chicago, Frances L. Swain, of
the Chicago Normal School, and Florence Powdermaker, of the United
States Department of Agriculture.
The records of the Food Administration have been open to the writers
and they have had the advice and criticism of its officials and
specialists. No effort has been spared to secure accuracy of statement
in the text.
OLIN TEMPLIN,
Director of the Collegiate Section.
July 1, 1918.
PREFACE
The long war has brought hunger to Europe; some of her peoples stand
constantly face to face with starvation.
All agriculture has been seriously interfered with. Food production
has been lessened to the point of danger. Millions of men who had
given all their time and energy to raising food have been killed; more
millions are still fighting; other millions have gone from the farms
into the great war-factories. Women, too, have been drafted from the
fields and home gardens into the factories and to replace the absent
men in a host of occupations. Great stretches of once fertile land
have been temporarily ruined by the scourge of war; some are still
under falling shot and shell. Belgium and France have lost millions of
acres of productive land to the enemy. The fertilizers necessary for
keeping up the production of the land still available are lacking.
All this means that the Allies have to rely on the outside for the
maintenance of their food-supply. But because ships are fewer than
they were, and because many of them must carry troops and munitions
exclusively, these ships cannot be sent on voyages longer than
absolutely necessary to find and bring back the needed food. They
cannot afford to go the long time-consuming way to Australia and back;
but few of them can be let go to India and the Argentine. They must
carry food by the shortest routes. The shortest is from North America
to England and France.
Therefore by far the greater part of the food provided for the Allies
from the outside must come from us. As a matter of fact more than 50
per cent of this outside food for the Allies does now come from North
America. And that is a great deal. It is very much more than we ever
sent them before. Also we are sending more and more food overseas for
our own growing armies in France and our growing fleets in European
waters.
To meet all this great food need in Europe--and meeting it is an
imperative military necessity--we must be very careful and economical
in our food use here at home. We must eat less; we must waste nothing;
we must equalize the distribution of what food we may retain for
ourselves; we must prevent extortion and profiteering which make
prices so high that the poor cannot buy the food they actually need;
and we must try to produce more food by planting more wheat and other
grain, raising more cattle and swine and sheep, and making gardens
everywhere.
To help the people of America do all these things, and to coordinate
their efforts, the President and Congress created the United States
Food Administration. The Food Administration, therefore, asks all the
people to help feed the Allies that they may continue to fight, to
help feed the hungry in Belgium and other starving lands that they
may continue to live, and to help feed our own sailors and soldiers so
that they may want nothing. It asks help, also, in its great task of
preventing prices from going too high and of stabilizing them, and of
keeping the flow of distribution even, so that all our people, rich
and poor alike, may be able to obtain the food they need.
For all this there is needed a "food education" of all our people.
Every home in our broad land must be reached. One of the most
effective ways of accomplishing this is by getting information to the
children of the nation about food and the possibilities and methods
of its most wise and economical use. To obtain this result we must get
this information into the hands of parents and teachers.
For the purpose of diffusing this information this little book has
been prepared under the direction of the Food Administration. By
following the suggestions for food conservation herein contained every
one can render his country an important war service. I am sure that
all will be glad to do this.
HERBERT HOOVER.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. THE WHEAT SITUATION
The world's supply of wheat--Wheat in the United
States--Meeting the wheat shortage
CHAPTER II. THE WAR-TIME IMPORTANCE OF WHEAT AND OTHER CEREALS
The significance of different kinds of food--The social
importance of cereals, especially wheat--Wheat flour in
war-time--The 50-50 rule. Another way to cut the consumption
of wheat--Substitutes for wheat flour
CHAPTER III. WAR BREAD
The bakers' regulations. Victory bread--The individual's
answer to the bread cry--Flour and bread in the Allied
countries--Why we in the United States do not have bread cards
CHAPTER IV. THE MEAT SITUATION
Where Europe's meat has been produced--The war and the
European meat-supply--The meat rations of Europe--The part of
the United States--Meat conservation--Meat and other protein
foods--The meat substitutes
CHAPTER V. FATS
The situation abroad--The situation in the United States
CHAPTER VI. SUGAR
Why is there a sugar shortage?--The effect of the shortage--In
place of sugar--The price of sugar--To cut down on sugar
CHAPTER VII. MILK--FOR THE NATION'S HEALTH
The valuable constituents of milk--Our milk problem--Our milk
abroad
CHAPTER VIII. VEGETABLES AND FRUITS
In the war diet--Canning and drying vegetables and fruits
CONCLUSION
A FEW REFERENCES
INDEX
CHAPTER I
THE WHEAT SITUATION
Wheat is as much a war necessity as ammunition--wheat is a war weapon.
To produce it and distribute it where it is needed and in sufficient
quantities is the most serious food problem of the Allied world. The
continent of Europe, with her devastated fields, can raise but a small
fraction of the wheat she needs, and ships are so few that she cannot
import it from many of the usual sources.
Not one of the warring European countries has escaped serious
suffering, and the neutral countries have suffered with them.
THE WORLD'S SUPPLY OF WHEAT
France, always an agricultural nation, was the most nearly
self-sustaining of the western Allies. Now one-third of her
wheat-fields are barren. Thousands of her acres have been taken by the
enemy, or are in No Man's Land. Much of the land that has been fought
over these past four years is now hopeless for farming, and will
be for years to come. Even the territory still under cultivation
cannot be expected to yield large returns, for laborers, tools, and
fertilizers are lacking.
The men who have left the fields to fight have been replaced chiefly
by women, children, and old men, while furloughed soldiers at times
help to bring in the crops. To get adequate return from the soil
which has been tilled for centuries, tons of fertilizer are necessary.
Fertilizers are an absolute necessity, and nitrates, one of the
most important of them, can no longer be imported from Chile. The
work-animals have been driven off by the enemy or slaughtered for want
of food, and mechanics are lacking to repair and replace the worn-out
farm-machinery. As a result of this, in 1917 France raised only enough
wheat to supply 40 per cent of her need, instead of 90 per cent, as in
pre-war years.
In England the situation is not much better. Unlike France, England
has always imported far more wheat than she raised. But now through
vigorous effort she alone of all the European countries has increased
her cereal production so that it has actually been doubled. Being free
from the devastation of war at home, she has been able to convert
the great lawns of her parks and country estates into grain-fields.
English women of all classes, an army of half a million, are working
on the land. At the same time the consumption of wheat has been
reduced. Even yet, however, the home-grown supply in England is only
one-fourth of the wheat required.
In Belgium the devastation is so complete that the women, children,
and old people left there would die of famine if food were not sent
to them. Two and a half million Belgians daily stand in line waiting
for food to be doled out to them. The United States must supply
three-fourths of the wheat contained in their meagre bread ration.
In Italy, too, the condition is serious, for she produces far less
than she needs, despite every effort of her Government to stimulate
production.
[Illustration: WHEAT FIELDS OF THE WORLD]
Germany and Austria-Hungary have not escaped universal suffering from
lack of wheat. Germany before the war was a wheat-importing country,
and Austria-Hungary was able to supply herself with wheat, but had
none to export. Their war crops have been below normal, and even
the wheat taken from conquered territory has not been sufficient
to prevent severe shortage, resulting in bread riots in industrial
centres.
The imports of wheat into both the Allied and enemy European countries
to supplement the wheat of their own raising came in peace-times
from seven countries--Russia, Roumania, Australia, the United States,
Canada, Argentina, and India. Most of these have now failed as a
source of supply.
Russia and Roumania were the great wheat-bins of Europe. They produced
as much wheat as the United States, and sometimes more, and they were
always able to make up or nearly make up the deficiencies of western
Europe. Russia and Roumania are now themselves on the verge of famine.
Even before their own situation became so desperate, they could get
little wheat to the western Allies, because the enemy territory and
the battle-lines made a great wall of separation.
Australia and India both continue to grow large crops of wheat, and
have a surplus in storage, but it cannot be sent to Europe because of
lack of ships. Australia has wheat stored from her last three crops.
The Argentine had very poor crops in 1916 and 1917, and although
the 1918 crop is good, it is scarcely more available to Europe than
Australia's wheat.
SO THE WHEAT SCARCITY IS NOT A QUESTION ONLY OF THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT
IN THE WORLD. IT IS A PROBLEM OF GETTING IT WHERE IT IS NEEDED--WHEAT
PLUS SHIPS. Not a single ship must go farther than is absolutely
necessary. A glance at the map shows why wheat for Europe should come
from North America rather than from Australia or India, or even the
Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from
North America, so it takes only one-third as many ships to carry food
to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is
twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice
as many ships are needed to carry an equal amount of Argentine food
to Europe. If this continent could produce and save enough next year
to provide the whole of the Allied food necessities, we could save
1,500,000 tons of world shipping to be used for other purposes. EVERY
SHIP SAVED IS A SHIP BUILT TO CARRY MORE MEN AND MORE AMMUNITION TO
FRANCE.
WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has never had a large wheat surplus to export, and
the last few years it has had an unusually low supply to meet the
extraordinary demand. The 1916 crop was small. The 1917 crop was
only four-fifths of normal, little more than we ordinarily consume
ourselves. We entered the last harvest with our stocks of wheat and
other cereals practically exhausted. Hence to feed the Allies until
the 1918 harvest, we had to send wheat which we should ordinarily have
eaten. All that we could send under normal conditions from July, 1917,
to July, 1918, has usually been estimated at about 20,000,000 bushels,
but in the first eleven months of this time we actually did send
120,000,000 bushels, six times as much as we could have shipped
without conservation. One-half of the total output of our flour-mills
in the month of May, 1918, went abroad.
This achievement in feeding the Allies has been made possible and
will continue to be possible, through the measures of economy and
substitution established by the Food Administration, and the constant
and continued personal sacrifice of each one of us.
Even the 1918 wheat crop, successful as it promises to be, will
not mean freedom from saving. Throughout the war there can be no
relaxation. We must build up a great national reserve in years of good
harvest for the greater and greater demands of Europe. NEVER AGAIN
MUST WE LET OURSELVES AND THE WORLD FACE THE DANGER THAT WAS BEFORE US
IN THE SPRING OF 1918.
MEETING THE WHEAT SHORTAGE
To keep wheat constantly going over to our Allies and sufficient
stores in the United States at the same time, is one of the big
problems of the Food Administration. Production has had to be
increased and consumption decreased. The price has had to be kept
down, for in a time of shortage prices always tend to go up. It is
true that high prices furnish one method of decreasing the consumption
of food, but it is a method that means enforced conservation by the
poor and no conservation by the rich. The burden thus falls on those
least able to bear it.
To meet this situation the Food Administration has gone into the
wheat business itself. PRACTICALLY ENTIRE CONTROL OF THE BUYING AND
SELLING OF WHEAT IS IN THE HANDS OF THE GREAT UNITED STATES FOOD
ADMINISTRATION GRAIN CORPORATION. Through this organization all
wheat sales are made to the Army and Navy, to our allies, and to
the neutrals. The price which it pays for these huge quantities
sets the price for the entire country. The Food Administration also
makes the movement of wheat from the farmer to the miller and to the
wholesaler as simple and direct as possible. It prevents hoarding
and speculation. "I am convinced," said Mr. Hoover, in April, 1918,
"that at no time in the last three years has there been as little
speculation in the nation's food as there is to-day."
[Illustration: COST OF A POUND LOAF OF BREAD]
As a result of this business management of wheat, the consumer pays
less for flour, although the farmer gets more for his wheat. In May,
1917, the difference between the price of the farmer's wheat and of
the flour made from it was $5.86 per barrel of 196 pounds. Fifteen
months later the difference was 64 cents. In February, 1917, before
the United States went into the war, flour sold at wholesale for $8.75
a barrel. In May, 1917, the war, with no food control, had driven the
price up to $17. But in February, 1918, after six months of the Food
Administration, it had gone down to $10.50 wholesale, and this in
spite of unprecedented demand for our very short supply. Without
control, flour would undoubtedly be selling for $50 a barrel. During
the Civil War, with no world wheat shortage, but without food control,
the price of wheat increased 130 per cent over the price in 1861.
The milling and sale of flour, the baking of bread, and the purchases
of the individual are all regulated to a greater extent than would
have scarcely been thought possible before the war.
Every effort has been made to produce a great 1918 wheat-crop.
Congress, at the time the Food Control Bill was passed, fixed the
price of the 1918 wheat at a minimum of $2 per bushel, and the
President later fixed the price at $2.20. This has been high enough to
encourage the farmer to increase his crop and not too high to be fair
to the consumer. The Department of Agriculture, during the winter of
1917-18, had for its slogan, "a billion-bushel crop for 1918." It has
worked intensively to help the farmer in selecting and testing seed
and in fighting destructive insects and plant-diseases, and in every
way to help him grow more wheat.
Constant reliance has been placed on the individual's intelligence
and patriotism in wheat-saving. One of the unusual aspects of the Food
Administration is its confidence in the co-operation of the country
and the response which this confidence has met. Wheatless meals are
now a commonplace occurrence. Wheatless days are being observed
in many hotels and homes. People all over the country have pledged
themselves to do entirely without wheat until the 1918 harvest is
available. About 100,000 barrels of flour were returned by individuals
and companies during the spring of 1918, to be shipped to the Allies
and the Army and Navy. The individual all over the country, consumer,
dealer, miller, or farmer, has risen to the occasion to do his share
toward the fulfilment of the Government's promise to Europe.