learnt one’s Grammar! As, i. e. _because_, _quatenus_, say you. How
exactly and critically the English language may be studied in _Dublin_,
I pretend not to say: But we in _England_ understand the particle as,
not only in the sense of _because_, _quatenus_, but also, and, I think,
more frequently, in the sense of _in proportion as_, _according as_,
or, if you will needs have a Latin term to explain an English term,
_prout, perinde ac_. So that the proposition stands thus: _These tropes
and figures_, ACCORDING AS _they are a deviation from the principles of
metaphysics and logic, are frequently vicious_. The premises, you now
see, are qualified, as well as the conclusion. Figured language, WHEN it
deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is—what? _always_
vicious? But the Bishop did not say, that figured language is _always_
a deviation from those principles. He only says, _when_ it so deviates,
it is vicious. It is implied in the expression that figured language
at least _sometimes_ deviates from those principles, and the Bishop,
as appears, is of opinion that it _frequently_ deviates: He therefore
says, consistently with his premises, and with his usual accuracy, It is
_frequently_ vicious.
In short, the Bishop’s argument, about which you make so much noise, if
drawn out in mood and figure, would, I suppose, stand thus—“Tropical and
figured language, WHEN it deviates from the principles of metaphysics
and logic, is vicious—Tropical and figured language FREQUENTLY deviates
from those principles—Therefore tropical and figured language is
FREQUENTLY vicious.” And where is the defect of sense or logic, I want
to know, in this argumentation? But you impatiently ask, Are _metaphors,
allegories, and comparisons_ then included in this _figured language_,
which is pronounced _vicious_? To this question I can only reply, That I
know not whether _metaphors, allegories, and comparisons_, are, in the
Bishop’s opinion, _deviations_ from the principles of metaphysics and
logic; for I cannot find that he says any thing, in _particular_, of
this kind of tropes and figures. But if you, or any one for you, will
shew clearly, that _metaphors, allegories, and comparisons_ are such
_deviations_, the Bishop, for any thing I know, might affirm, and might
be justified in affirming, that they were in themselves _vicious_. But
be not too much alarmed for your favourites, if he should: They would
certainly keep their ground, though convicted of such _vice_; at least
unless the Rhetoricians of our time should be so dull as not to be able
to find out what QUINCTILIAN calls _probabile aliquid_, some probable
pretext to justify or excuse them.
But, instead of troubling ourselves to guess what the Bishop _might_
say on a subject on which he has said nothing, it is to better purpose
to attend to what he _has_ said, on the subject in question. The Bishop
_has_ said, _That tropical and figured language is frequently vicious_.
You ask when? He replies, _When it deviates from the principles of
metaphysics and logic_. But in what particular instances does this
appear? He tells you this too. He gives you instances enough, to justify
his affirmation, that tropical and figured language is _frequently_
vicious; for he exemplifies his affirmation in ONE WHOLE class of
such figured speech, as deviates from the principles of metaphysics
and logic, and is therefore vicious, namely, _in the class of verbal
figures_. ‘This, [_i. e._ the truth of the affirmation, That figured
language, according as it is found to be a deviation from the principles
of metaphysics and logic, is frequently vicious] the great master,
QUINCTILIAN, freely confesseth, where, speaking of that ornamented
speech, which he calls σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the following confession
and apology—esset enim omne schema VITIUM, si non peteretur, sed
accideret. Verum auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine, plerumque
defenditur, sæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum sit à simplici
rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, _virtus est_, si habet PROBABILE
ALIQUID quod sequatur[159].’
The difficulty, I trust, now begins to clear up. Figured language, is
frequently vicious. Of this we have an instance given in one entire
species of figured or ornamented speech, namely σχήματα λέξεως, or
_verbal figures_. Can any thing be clearer and plainer? Yet, because you
had taken it into your head that by _tropes and figures of composition_
the Bishop understood, nay could only understand, _metaphors, allegories,
and comparisons_, you dreamt of nothing, here, but the same fine things.
And though QUINCTILIAN lay before the Bishop, when he quoted these
words, though the Bishop’s own express words shew the contrary, for he
speaks not of tropes and figures in general, much less of such tropes
and figures as you speak of, but solely of _that ornamented speech_,
called σχήματα λέξεως, you will needs have him quote QUINCTILIAN in
this place as speaking of _Rhetorical figures_. But let us attend to
QUINCTILIAN’S words. _Esset omne schema vitium, si non peterentur,
sed acciderent._ What! Shall we think the Bishop could mean to affirm
of _rhetorical figures_, that they would _always be vicious_, if they
_were not sought for, but occurred of themselves_? For that, I think,
is the translation of—_si non peterentur, sed acciderent_. Surely one
way, and that the chief, in which _rhetorical figures, metaphors,
allegories, and comparisons_, become vicious, is, when they ARE _sought
for, sollicitously hunted after, and affectedly brought in_. The very
contrary happens with regard to these verbal figures: they are vicious,
when they _are_ NOT _sought for and purposely affected_. I conclude
then, that his Lordship, who surely does not want common sense, and, I
think, understands Latin, did not, and could not intend to exemplify his
observation in the case of _rhetorical figures_.
Still you are something puzzled and perplexed by the Bishop’s
observation. Admitting him to mean, as his author does, _verbal figures_,
how can these be considered _as a deviation from the principles of
metaphysics and logic_? How? Why, has not the Bishop told us, or, if
he had not, is it not certain in itself, that _to give a language
clearness is the office of philosophy; and that Definition, a part of
Logic, performs that service by a resolution of the ideas, which make up
the terms_? But these verbal figures are often a deviation from, nay a
willful defiance of, _all logical definition_. Witness the very instance
you and QUINCTILIAN give us, in VIRGIL’S _timidi damæ_. Logic defines
_Damæ_ to be the _females_ of that species of animals called _Deer_. The
figurative VIRGIL confounds this distinction by using this term for the
_males_, as well as females. But, universally, _Grammar_ itself, whose
peculiar office is to _give precision to language_, is a part of logic:
the Bishop says, _its rules are conducted on the principles of Logic_.
But _verbal figures_, even when they do not offend against the strictness
of definition, are universally violations, in some degree or other, of
_Grammar_, i. e. of _Logic_. Yet these violations of _Logical Grammar_,
QUINCTILIAN tells us, may be allowed, _si habent probabile aliquid quod
sequantur_; that is, for some fantastical reason or other, by which the
masters of Rhetoric are pleased to recommend them to us.
And now, Sir, let me ask, what becomes of your fine comment on
QUINCTILIAN’S chapter concerning _verbal figures_, and, particularly,
of your nice distinction between these, and _rhetorical figures_, which
the Bishop, no doubt, wanted to be informed of? The issue of your
exploits in Logic and Criticism is now seen to be this, That you have
grossly misrepresented the Bishop; and needlessly, at least, explained
QUINCTILIAN. _First_, you make the Bishop talk of _rhetorical figures_
ONLY, in the _specific_ sense of these terms, when his Lordship was all
the while speaking of _figured language, in general_. _Next_, you make
him deliver a bold position concerning rhetorical figures, as being
_frequently_ vicious, because _always_ deviations from the principles of
metaphysics and logic; when all he maintains, is, That figured language
is FREQUENTLY vicious, according as it deviates from those principles;
and, in particular, that _that_ part of figured speech, called
grammatical or verbal figures, is ALWAYS vicious.
To conclude, if you had shewn any compunction, or even common respect in
exposing what you took to be the Bishop’s absurdities on this subject,
I should have made a conscience of laying you open on this head of
_Rhetorical and Grammatical figures_. As it is, your unmerciful triumph
over the poor Bishop makes it allowable for me to lay your dealing with
him before the reader in all its nakedness; and, after what has been
said, I cannot do it better than by letting him see how the Bishop’s
argumentation is represented by you, as drawn out in your own words, and
that in full mood and figure.
“I should by no means,” say you, “willingly misrepresent the argument of
my Lord Bishop; but upon repeated examination of the passage here quoted,
I must state it thus:
“Quinctilian declares, that what are called grammatical figures are
really no more than faulty violations of grammatical rules, unless when
purposely introduced upon some reasonable or plausible grounds.”
Therefore,
“He confesses that tropes and figures of composition, as they are a
deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently
vicious.”
You add, “If this be a fair representation, it were to be wished that the
learned author _had so far condescended to men of confined abilities_, as
to explain the connexion between these two propositions[160].”
As the _learned author_, I guess, may be better employed than in this
unnecessary task, which you _wish_ to impose upon him, I have taken
upon me to discharge that office, with less able hands; and, yet, have
_explained the connexion between these two propositions_ in such sort,
that, if I mistake not, we shall never hear more from you, of any
inconsistency between them.
I have NOW, Sir, gone through the several particulars of your
Dissertation, and have shewn, I think, clearly and invincibly, that all
your objections to the Bishop’s paradoxical sentiments on the subject of
Eloquence are mistaken and wholly groundless.
The TWO propositions his Lordship took upon him to confute, 1. _That an
inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence_; and,
2. _That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech,
and inherent in the constitution of things_: These two propositions,
I say, are so thoroughly confuted by the Bishop, that not one word of
all you say in any degree affects his reasoning, or supports those two
propositions against the force of it. I am even candid enough to believe
that, on further thoughts, you will not yourself be displeased with this
ill success of your attack on the learned Prelate’s _principles_; which
are manifestly calculated for the service of religion and the honour of
inspired scripture. For, though you attempt to shew us in your two last
chapters, how the honour of inspired scripture may be saved on _other
principles_, yet allow me to say that, for certain reasons, I much
question the validity of those principles; at least, that the persons,
most concerned in this controversy, will by no means subscribe to them.
If there be an Archetype of eloquence in nature, ‘one should be apt
enough, as the Bishop says, to conclude, that when the Author of nature
condescended to inspire one of these plastic performances of human art,
he would make it by the exactest pattern of the Archetype[161].’ Or,
whatever you and I and the Bishop might conclude, assure yourself that
the objectors to inspired scripture will infallibly draw that conclusion.
And, when they do so, and fortify themselves, besides, with the authority
of so great a master of eloquence, as yourself, it will be in vain, I
doubt, to oppose to them your ingenious harangues and encomiums on the
eloquent composition of the sacred scriptures. Nay, it would give you, no
doubt, some pain to find that, though they should accept your authority
for the truth of their favourite principle of there being _an Archetype
in nature of perfect eloquence_, they would yet reject your _harangues
and encomiums_ with that disdain which is so natural to them. The
honour of sacred scripture will then hang on a question of _Taste_: and
unluckily the objectors are of such authority in that respect, that there
is no appeal from their decisions of it.
The contemplation of these _inconveniencies_, together with the _love of
truth_, determined me to hazard this address to you. I will not deny,
besides, that the mere _justice_ due to a great character, whom I found
somewhat freely, not to say injuriously treated by you, was also, _one_
motive with me. If I add still _another_, it is such as I need not
disown, and which you, of all men, will be the last to object to, I mean
a motive of _Charity_ towards yourself.
I am much a stranger to your person, and, what it may perhaps be scarce
decent for me to profess to you, even to your writings. All I know of
YOURSELF, is, what your book tells me, that you are distinguished by
an honourable place and office in the University of _Dublin_: and what
I have heared of your WRITINGS, makes me think favourably of a private
scholar, who, they say, employs himself in such works of learning and
taste, as are proper to instill a reverence into young minds for the best
models of ancient eloquence. While you are thus creditably stationed,
and thus usefully employed, I could not but feel some concern for the
hurt you were likely to do yourself by engaging in so warm and so
unnecessary an opposition to a _writer_, as you characterize him, _of
distinguished eminence_[162]. Time was, when even with us on this side
the water, the novelty of this writer’s positions, and the envy, which
ever attends superior merit, disposed some warm persons to open, and
prosecute with many hard words, the unpopular cry against him, of his
being a bold and PARADOXICAL writer. But reflexion and experience have
quieted this alarm. Men of sense and judgment now consider his Paradoxes
as very harmless, nay as very sober and certain truths; and even vye with
each other in their zeal of building upon them, as the surest basis,
on which a just and rational vindication of our common religion can be
raised. This is the present state of things with us, and especially, they
say, in the Universities of this kingdom.
It was, therefore, not without some surprize, and, as I said, with much
real concern, that I found a gentleman of learning and education revive,
at such a juncture, that stale and worn-out topic, and disgrace himself
by propagating this clamour, of I know not what _paradoxical boldness_,
now long out of date, in the much-approved writings of this great
Prelate. Nor was the dishonour to yourself, the only circumstance to be
lamented. You were striving, with all your might, to infuse prejudices
into the minds of many ingenious and virtuous young men; whom you would
surely be sorry to mislead; and who would owe you little thanks for
prepossessing them with unfavourable sentiments of such a man and writer,
as the Bishop of _Gloucester_, they will find, is generally esteemed to
be.
These, then, were the considerations, which induced me to employ an hour
or two of leisure in giving your book a free examination. I have done it
in as few words as possible, and in a _manner_ which no reasonable and
candid man, I persuade myself, will disapprove. I know what apologies
may be requisite to the learned Bishop for a stranger’s engaging in
this officious task. But to you, Sir, I make none: It is enough if any
benefits to yourself or others may be derived from it.
I am, with respect, &c.
FINIS.
Printed by J. Nichols and Son, Red Lion Passage, Fleet Street, London.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Prov. xvi. 7.
[2] Isaiah, xxvi. 9.
[3] Rev. ii. 4, 5.
[4] Eph. i. 7.
[5] John i. 1.
[6] Col. i. 17.
[7] Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13.
[8] Heb. i. 8.
[9] Micah v. 2.
[10] Rev. i. 8.
[11] John xvii. 5.
[12] Ps. iii. 2.
[13] Eph. iii. 9, 10, 11.
[14] Eph. iii. 18, 19.
[15] Acts x. 18.
[16] Eph. iii. 21.
[17] 1. Pet. i. 12.
[18] Eph. i. 10.
[19] Rev. xiv. 6.
[20] Gal. i. 6.
[21] Rom. x. 18.
[22] Col. xi. 10.
[23] Matth. xxviii. 19.
[24] 2 Cor. i. 12.
[25] 2 Cor. xii. 9.
[26] 1 Cor. vii. 21-24.
[27] John xv. 16.
[28] 1 Tim. iv. 16.
[29] Phil. i. 10, 11.
[30] Archbishop’s Injunctions, S. xi.
[31] Canon LXXV.
[32] Phil. i. 9-11.
[33] Rom. xii. 16.
[34] Erasmi in Evang. Joannis Paraphrasis, cap. i.
[35] 1 Cor. ii. 14.
[36] 1 Cor. ii. 14.
[37] 2 Tim. iv. 2.
[38] Lord Bacon, A. L. B. i. p. 417.
[39] _Fiduciam_ orator præ se ferat, semperque ità dicat tanquàm de causâ
optimè sentiat. Quint. l. v. c. 13, p. 422.
[40] Matth. vii. 29.
[41] Matth. xv. 6.
[42] “In omnibus quæ dicit tanta auctoritas inest, ut dissentire pudeat;
nec advocati studium, sed testis aut judicis afferat fidem.” Said of
Cicero by Quintilian. The Roman orator acquired this praise by consummate
art and genius. The plainest Christian homilist, who does his duty in
_speaking as the oracles of God_, attains it with ease, and deserves it
much better. Such is the pre-eminence of what the Apostle calls _the
foolishness of preaching_!
[43] Tanta in oratione auctoritas, ut _probationis_ locum obtineat.
Quintil. p. 422.
[44] Bishop Stillingfleet, Sermon IV.
[45] _Afficiamur_, antequam afficere conemur. Quint. p. 461. _moveamur_
ipsi. Ib.
[46] If I mention the names of the Bishops BEVERIDGE and BLACKALL, it
is not in exclusion of many others, but because I suspect they are less
known to the younger clergy than they deserve to be.
[47] Matth. xxviii. 20.
[48] “Parentes et Pædagogi pueros olim cum primum per ætatem sapere, et
intelligere cœpissent, primis Christianæ religionis rudimentis diligenter
instituebant, ut pietatem unà penè cum lacte nutricis imbiberent, et
à primis statim cunis, virtutis incunabilis ad vitam illam beatam
alerentur. Quem etiam ad usum breves libri, quos _Catechismos_ nostri
appellant, conscribebantur.”
Noelli Catechismus de Baptismo.
[49] 2 Cor. xiii. 14.
[50] W. Weston, B. D. Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge; and vicar
of Campden, Gloucestershire. Camb. 1746.
[51] Pref. p. ii.
[52] Pref. p. ii.
[53] Ded. p. iv.—“The best compliment I can make your Lordship on the
occasion is the true one, _that I have a good opinion of the present
performance myself_,” &c.
[54] Pref. p. iii.
[55] Pref. p. iii.
[56] Pref. p. ii.
[57] The following passages brought to confirm this _fact_ are so well
known, that, if there was not something uncommonly strong, and subversive
of the writer’s objection in the very turn of expression, I should scarce
think myself at liberty to transcribe them.—Visa est mihi res digna
consultatione, maximè propter perielitantium _numerum_. Multi enim _omnis
ætatis, omnis ordinis_, utriusque sexûs etiam vocantur in periculum
et vocabuntur. Neque enim civitates tantum, sed vicos etiam atque
_agros_ superstitionis istius contagio pervagata——_propè jam desolata
templa,——sacra solemnia diu intermissa_.—Plin.
[58] Hesterni sumus, et _vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas,
castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias,
palatium, senatum, forum_; sola vobis relinquimus templa. Tertull.
Apol. c. 37. And before speaking of the heathens, _Obessam vociferantur
civitatem, in agris, in castellis, in insulis_ Christianos, _omnem
sexum, ætatem, conditionem & dignitatem_ transgredi ad hoc nomen quasi
detrimento mærent. c. i. See also Arnobius, contr. Gentes, insisting on
the same fact.—Vel hæc saltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi,
quod jam per _omnes terras_ in _tam brevi tempore et parvo immensi
nominis hujus sacramenta diffusa sunt_? &c. L. ii. sub fin.
[59] Pref. p. iii.
[60] Chap. iii. p. 38.
[61] Speaking of I know not what _sour and dogmatical_ divines, “I am not
sure (says he) that I shall escape _their anathema_; since it is their
custom generally to be displeased with every thing that does not fall in
with their _fixed and settled sentiments_; and every defence of religion
that is _out of their way_ wants another to support it.” Pref. p. viii.
And again: “With some, I suppose, the _novelty_ of this matter will be
for ever a bar to its reception.” P. 370.
[62] The reader sees I complaisantly allow the writer’s representation
of the cases both of _Pilate and Gallio_; though much might, with good
reason, be objected to each of them. For, 1. If I should lay any stress
on the _acts of Pilate_, which, he owns, if admitted, would overturn
the whole use of his evidence, I should but follow in this the best
authorities, and those too supported by such reasonings as the Inquirer
would find it difficult to confute. And, 2. As to Gallio’s case, however
inattentive he might be to the fame of Paul’s miracles, the passage
alledged is certainly insufficient to prove it. Acts, chap. xviii. 17.
For, indeed, the Inquirer did not so much as apprehend the purpose of
the sacred writer in that whole narration; which manifestly was not
to signify to us Gallio’s inattention to the Apostle’s miracles, but
his candour, and prudent conduct in refusing to interfere in religious
matters, and in chusing rather to overlook an act of violence done in
his presence (which, though strictly speaking illegal, he might probably
think not altogether undeserved of the malicious intolerating Jew), than
gratify the complainant’s passion in punishing either Paul or his heathen
advocates. For this is the sense of those words, _He cared for none of
these things_; which the writer ought to have seen is so far from proving
Gallio’s disregard of miracles, that, had he been Paul’s convert, the
very same thing had been observed of him.
[63] Aristeas.—The writers referred to in the margin are _Strabo_,
_Maximus Tyrius_, _Pliny_, and _Herodotus_. Of these, the three first
mention Aristeas _occasionally_ only; and yet Strabo calls him ανηρ
γοης ει τις αλλος; and _Max. Tyrius_ and _Pliny_, though they explode
miracles, yet plainly enough declare the common creed to run in his
favour. Max. Tyrius in particular, after having given us his opinion of
his miracles, together with his reasons for pretending to them, adds,
_And Aristeas gained more credit by this pretension to wonders and
supernatural communications, than Xenagoras, Xenophanes, or any other
philosopher could have acquired by relating the plain truth_. Και ην
πιθανωτερος ταυτα λεγων ὁ Αριστεας η ὁ Ξεναγορας η Ξενοφανης, η τις αλλος
των εξηγησαμενων τα οντα ὡς εχει. Lastly, the account Herodotus gives us
is so much to the credit of his miracles, that one cannot imagine how
the writer should think it to his purpose to refer to him. For he _was_,
indeed, delivering the popular history of Aristeas; and therefore did,
as might be expected, represent him, not only as a worker of miracles,
but as much reverenced and _esteemed_ for them. This he attests upon his
own knowledge of several cities, all concurring in the firm belief of
his miracles; and one of them in particular transported by so religious
a veneration of him, as to erect a statue to his memory; which they also
caused to be set up in the most public part of their city, and even close
to one they had at the same time decreed to Apollo. And for the historian
himself, though in truth the story be even foolish enough, yet so far
is he from speaking of it with disregard, that I am not certain if he
did not believe it, at least that part which relates to the Metapontini;
which, after the mention of some other things from hearsay only, he
introduces in the following assured manner: “Thus far the report of these
cities: But what I am now going to relate, I _certainly know_ to have
happened to the Metapontini in Italy, &c.” Ταυτα μεν αἱ πολεις αὑται
λεγουσι, τα δε οιδα Μεταποντινοισι εν Ιταλιη συγκυρησαντα, &c. L iv. 15;
and then mentions the affair which gave occasion to the statue; which, he
tells us, he saw himself, placed, as I have said, and inscribed to the
memory of Aristeas.