Naval action now shifts almost entirely to the Caribbean. Until in the
last days of the war there was to be in the Pacific no further special
naval movement beyond the seizure of Guam by the _Charleston_ on June
11th and the sending to Manila the monitors _Monterey_ and _Monadnock_
to reinforce Dewey. The first of the army sailed from San Francisco on
May 28th.
The departure of Cervera from the Cape Verdes caused Admiral Sampson
to move from Havana east 970 miles to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the
expectancy of finding there the Spanish fleet. This move was based
upon the view that as it was but from 1,200 to 1,400 miles from San
Juan to important points on our coast, it was an absolute necessity to
make sure that if the Spanish squadron arrived there it should not be
allowed to leave and be free to raid our seaboard. Sampson’s prescience
was right. Cervera’s orders were to go there and then do as he thought
best. Had he not himself been so slow in crossing the Atlantic, Sampson
would have found him at San Juan, and the Spanish fleet would have been
destroyed on May 12th instead of July 3d.
Continuous breakdowns of the two monitors accompanying Sampson caused
such delay that his squadron was not off San Juan until May 12th. An
attack on the fortifications began at 5 A.M., and continued for three
hours, when Sampson withdrew with no damage to the ships and with the
loss of one man killed and four wounded aboard the _New York_. As
Cervera was clearly not in port, and as it was necessary not to risk
overmuch the American ships before he could be met, it was thought
inadvisable to continue the action, though as known later the place
was ready to surrender to another attack. As Cervera was much overdue
and no word had as yet been received of his whereabouts, the American
squadron stood west (with a view to covering Havana), sending into St.
Thomas, only sixty miles to the east, for news.
It was not until in the early morning of May 15th, off Puerto Plata,
that word came of Cervera’s having reached Curaçao. At the same time a
dispatch from Washington was received by Sampson informing him that
the Flying Squadron was en route to Key West and directing Sampson
himself to proceed there with all possible dispatch.
* * * * *
Cervera had arrived off Martinique on the evening of May 11th and had
sent in a destroyer for news, which brought next morning the word
of Sampson’s being off Puerto Rico. Unable now to go to San Juan
without meeting the American fleet, a council of war was called, and
on its decision Cervera shaped his course for Curaçao in search of
coal, leaving the destroyer _Terror_, whose boilers had given out, at
Martinique. Leaving Curaçao in the evening of May 15th, he entered the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba at dawn on May 19th.
Sampson was now, as mentioned, standing at full speed for Key West. It
is very remarkable that he had the same instinct as to Cervera’s second
destination as to his first; as in a telegram to the scout _Harvard_
(the _New York_ of the American line of steamers) he mentioned Santiago
or San Juan as the ports likely to be entered. The peremptory orders
from Washington left no freedom of action, however, and on May 18th Key
West was reached. There were found the ships of the Flying Squadron,
the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_, just arrived from Hampton
Roads and coaling.
On May 11th, the day before Sampson’s attack at San Juan, there
were two affairs of great gallantry: the one the cable-cutting at
Cienfuegos; the other an action at Cardenas. The former was carried
out by two sailing launches for lifting and cutting the cables and
two steam launches carrying marines to “stand off” the Spaniards.
The _Marblehead_ and _Nashville_ kept up a fire against the forces
entrenched on the edge of the low bluff which finally had to be
approached within 150 feet before the work was accomplished. Grappling
for the cables was long and tedious, and the operation of sawing
through each took nearly half an hour. To perform such work under a
constant fire from the Spaniards in trenches not more than 200 yards
away showed a cool courage of which Americans can be proud. The boats
were back to their ships in a little over three hours, with two killed
and seven wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Winslow in
command.
The action on the same day at Cardenas on the north side of Cuba,
but seventy-five miles from Cienfuegos by land, but 500 by sea, was
between the _Wilmington_, the _Machias_, the revenue cutter _Hudson_,
and the torpedo boat _Winslow_ against three Spanish gunboats which
lay well within the harbor in water which could not be entered by
our heavier draft vessels. The torpedo boat, which of course was
never intended for such service, ventured in too far and was severely
handled. Ensign Bagley and four of the men were killed, and three, one
being Lieutenant Bernadou in command, were wounded. The _Winslow_,
wholly disabled, was towed out of her dangerous position by the
intrepid handling of the _Hudson_.
We return to Key West, where all was movement to take measures to
intercept Cervera.
The Navy Department had become convinced from information received that
Cervera had imperative orders to go either to Cienfuegos or Havana
to land material necessary for the defence of Havana, and urged the
utmost dispatch in blockading both ports. Thus next morning, May 19th,
Commodore Schley sailed with the three ships of his squadron mentioned,
to be followed next day by the _Iowa_, our newest battleship of the
time, and which reached Cienfuegos only seven hours after Commodore
Schley. There followed the torpedo boat _Dupont_, the collier
_Merrimac_, the cruisers _Marblehead_, _Castine_, and two auxiliary
vessels; an ample force, should Cervera be met.
Events were now following one another with the utmost rapidity. To
deal with these in detail is quite beyond our scope. One must look to
the larger histories of the war for the full account of the happenings
of this stirring time.[54] One can give here but a running mention
of the reception on the late afternoon of May 19th of the news by
the way of Havana of Cervera’s arrival that morning at Santiago de
Cuba; the repetition of this news with an expression of doubt in the
telegram from Washington to Sampson during that night; its verification
next day, the 20th; the dispatch of the news to Schley with orders,
if convinced that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos Bay,[55] to go to
Santiago and blockade; Sampson’s movement 300 miles east with the rest
of the fleet available into the narrow waters of Nicholas Channel, to
intercept Cervera should he leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana;
the delay of Schley at Cienfuegos, not being satisfied that Cervera
was not there; the final assurance that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos
received from insurgents on May 24th, and the departure that evening of
Commodore Schley’s squadron for Santiago; his arrival twenty-two miles
south of the entrance on May 26th; Cervera’s intention (but given up
through vacillation) to leave Santiago that evening at almost the same
moment when Schley started with intention to return to Key West on the
plea of inability to coal his ships; his change of mind on May 28th and
arrival that evening off Santiago; the arrival of the _Oregon_ at Key
West on May 26th, completing her remarkable journey of 14,000 miles
from the west coast; Sampson’s finally determining to go to Santiago
on account of Schley’s dispatch that he could not blockade for want
of coal; the recognition of the _Colón_ in the harbor entrance on May
29th; the ineffectual attack on the _Colón_ on May 30th; the arrival
of Sampson on June 1st with the _New York_, _Oregon_, _Mayflower_,
and torpedo boat _Porter_; the establishment of a close blockade; the
sinking of the _Merrimac_ in the entrance channel; the stationing every
evening of a battleship with searchlights upon the harbor entrance;
the occupancy of Guantánamo Bay; the driving off, by the battalion
of marines established there in camp, of the Spanish troops in the
vicinity; the frequent bombardment of the Spanish batteries at Santiago
entrance; the arrival on June 20th of the army under General Shafter;
its debarkation and movement against Santiago; the attack of July 1st
on El Caney and San Juan Hill; the sortie of Cervera’s squadron; its
destruction: these are but the chief events of the many which happened
between May 18th and July 3d. On the forenoon of Sunday, this latter
date, was decided the fate of Spain in America.
More than half the crews of the Spanish ships had been used ashore
on July 1st in the defence of Santiago, and the commander of these,
Captain Bustamante, Cervera’s chief-of-staff, had, to the great grief
of all who knew him both in the Spanish and American services, been
mortally wounded. Cervera had, after the battle of July 1st, received
orders to leave the harbor and endeavor to save his squadron. He and
his captains accepted the situation with calm courage and prepared to
leave the evening of July 2d. The slow work of returning the crews
aboard ship caused delay until the next morning.
At 9:30 the crews of the American ships were just falling in for the
usual Sunday “inspection.” The admiral had started a little before nine
in the _New York_ under easy steam to arrange with General Shafter a
plan of combined attack. The _New York_ had gone about five miles when
a shot was heard from the battery at the entrance and a ship almost
immediately after seen coming out. The _New York_ at once turned.
In accord with the admiral’s standing order, all the ships immediately
started to close in on the entrance. The flagship _Infanta Maria
Teresa_, which was the ship first sighted, was naturally exposed for
some little time to the fire of all, and was quickly a mass of flames
and heading in for the land. She was run ashore about six miles west
of the harbor entrance; the _Oquendo_, though she was the last of the
large ships to come out, was beached, also burning, soon after the
_Maria Teresa_, about a quarter of a mile west of the latter; the
_Vizcaya_, afire, went on to the reef fifteen miles west of Santiago
about 11:30, shortly after which her forward magazine exploded. The
destroyer _Furor_ had been sunk, and the _Pluton_ was ashore destroyed,
having made only three miles to the west. The _Colón_ only was left,
in full flight and practically uninjured, pursued by the _Oregon_,
_Brooklyn_, _New York_, and _Texas_. At 1:15 she turned ashore, the
13-inch shell of the _Oregon_, fired at 9,000 yards, going over her.
Her sea-valves had been opened, and though she was pushed on to the
beach stern foremost by the _New York_, her bow overhung into deep
water and as she filled she turned on her side. She was never raised.
The heroic efforts of the American crews in saving life from the
burning ships are deserving every praise.
The Spanish loss may be taken as about 264 killed and drowned and
151 wounded; the prisoners, including officers, numbered 1,813. The
Americans lost 1 killed, 1 wounded, both in the _Brooklyn_.
The Spanish could not have expected to escape, nor did they. They went
to their death like heroes. There has been nothing finer than the calm
bravery of their exit from the narrow harbor entrance without accident
or delay on the part of any ship. We had against them six heavy ships
to four; fourteen 12-inch and 13-inch guns against six 11-inch; thirty
8-inch against none of that calibre; forty-four 6, 5, and 4 inch
against thirty-six 5.5 and 4.7 inch, and ninety-six 6-pounders against
thirty-eight Spanish. We had a like superiority in armor. In one
point, speed, the Spanish were, nominally at least, decidedly superior,
all their ships being of twenty knots. Only two of the Americans: the
_New York_ and _Brooklyn_, had such.
There remained now only the question of reducing the city of Santiago,
in which the navy took an active part in bombardment of the city from
the sea. On July 17th it surrendered.
The success of the navy at Santiago was due to the circular blockade
instituted by Admiral Sampson on his arrival, and to the lighting up
the harbor entrance nightly with the searchlights of the battleships,
which were relieved every two hours. Escape at night was thus, by
Cervera’s own report, made impossible. The circular form of Sampson’s
blockade during the day and night left no such chance of finding an
extensive unguarded space, such as existed in steaming in column to
and fro across the entrance. The whole is summed up in the report of
Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Clark of the _Oregon_ to Admiral Sampson:
“We went ahead at full speed with the determination of carrying out to
the utmost your order: ‘If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must
close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels
or force them to run ashore.’”
* * * * *
With their only battle fleet destroyed, the preservation by the Spanish
of communication with Cuba was now impossible and the fall of the
island certain. Thus an expedition under the command of Admiral Cámara
left Cadiz on June 17th for the Philippines. It reached Port Said on
June 25th. A strong force was detailed from Admiral Sampson’s fleet
to go to the Philippines under Commodore Watson, to be accompanied
through the Mediterranean by the rest of the available ships of the
fleet under Sampson himself. The news of the 3d of July, and also of
the preparation of this fleet, caused Spain to recall Cámara’s force
before it had left the vicinity of Suez. Meanwhile a large number of
ships had taken a prominent part in the convoying of part of General
Miles’s force to Puerto Rico and in the seizure of the south coast of
that island.
Spain, with full recognition of the meaning of her loss, opened
negotiations for peace, and on August 12, 1898, the protocol was
signed by which she relinquished all sovereignty over Cuba, ceded to
the United States Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones to be
selected, and agreed to our occupancy of the city of Manila pending the
conclusion of a treaty of peace which would determine the future of the
Philippines.
At the moment of the signing of the protocol our fleet and troops were
preparing for the assault at Manila. By noon the city had surrendered
and was in our possession. The date at Manila, owing to difference in
time, was August 13th. Thus there were but a few hours between the
surrender and the signing, but the latter had preceded the surrender
and Manila could not be claimed as ours by right of conquest.
Although the claim was put forward, it was soon withdrawn, and we
now possess the archipelago by right of purchase, though indeed it
must be said that the sale by Spain was an enforced one. The war thus
ended with Puerto Rico and Guam as possessions by conquest, with the
Hawaiian Islands a United States territory by annexation, with Cuba a
protectorate, and the Philippines a purchased possession. We had gone
far afield and had incurred heavy responsibilities which stretched
eight thousand miles westward from California, and had taken up a naval
base adjacent to what is sure to be one of the great fields of future
world action--Eastern Asia.
It is difficult to leave the subject of the Philippines without a word
as to the continuation of naval action among the islands and the share
taken by the navy in the release of Spaniards held by the natives,
in frequent punitive expeditions, and in the general pacification of
the region. For several years our ships were active equally with the
army in this work. In February, 1899, the important point of Ilo-Ilo
was bombarded and captured by the small cruiser _Petrel_. Constant
work of patrol and blockade was carried out, not always without loss.
Throughout there was active coöperation with the army in transporting
troops and in attack and defence, with for some years separate
expeditions by the marines of great hardship and courage.