The end of the “Brothers’ War” had made of the United States a nation.
Our country took its place in the world, and its fleets again reached
into every sea. But the lessons of the navy had not touched the dull
minds which in June, 1860, had voted down the supplies of the little
navy which was to expand so greatly in the four succeeding years. To
such, the whole work of defeating the Confederacy appeared to be the
more spectacular work of the army. The constriction of the blockade
was not of the dramatic character of Gettysburg or the battles of
the Wilderness. Its meaning was to filter but slowly into even the
more thoughtful. Thus for years, while immense changes were going on
elsewhere, we were at a standstill in naval matters, or rather slowly
sinking to absolute nonentity. By 1882 the shameful condition of
neglect began to be remedied. That year may be taken as the birth-year
of our navy of to-day. For seven years we had to go abroad for such
material--gun-forgings, shafting, and armor--as we wanted, until our
naval demands forced upon our steel establishments the work of putting
themselves in order. The story of this work has never been told, but
the country can be assured that it was to the navy that the initial
great development of steel manufacture in this country was due. In 1882
we could make only a forged iron shaft for the little _Dolphin_, which
promptly broke on her trial trip. It was through arrangements made by
the Navy Department that our steel works, beginning with Bethlehem,
established modern conditions.
The story of the building of the new navy is outside the scope of
this book. It suffices to say that by 1898 we had in service four
battleships, the _Iowa_, _Indiana_, _Oregon_, and _Massachusetts_, of
the first class; the _Texas_, of the second; two armored cruisers, the
_New York_ and _Brooklyn_; eleven protected cruisers of from 3,000 to
7,735 tons, and twenty unprotected cruisers of from 839 to 2,089 tons.
We also had eight torpedo boats, a dynamite vessel, the _Vesuvius_, and
six ships of the monitor type, from 4,000 to 6,060 tons. It was with
this fleet we fought the war with Spain.
The causes of this war stretch back through generations. Their
foundation was, essentially, a difference in race. The American is
mainly an Anglo-Saxon, direct and practical in his way; the Spaniard an
oriental, courteous, kindly in the relations of friendship and family,
with much that is lovable, but impracticable, tribal in his tendencies,
knowing little of the modern phases of government by a constitution,
and bloodthirsty and devastating in putting down revolt or in settling
political differences. An anarchic century in Spain produced like
conditions in Cuba. Our proximity to Cuba and our many commercial
interests there were very strong elements in the situation.
A great impetus was given to feeling for Cuba and against Spain by the
explosion of the _Maine_ in Havana Harbor about 9:30 P.M., February
15th. Two months, however, were yet to pass before war was declared,
though at the last moment Spain had acceded to all our demands. While
our diplomacy may thus be said to have been not entirely “correct,”
President McKinley may be ruled to have been wise in cutting the
Gordian knot by war, which his message of April 11, 1898, practically
did in referring the whole subject to Congress. The joint resolution
passed and signed on April 20th, demanding that Spain should
relinquish her authority in Cuba, was of course taken as a declaration
of war by Spain, and April 21st was declared by Congress a few days
later as the official date of its beginning.
On the afternoon of May 21st Captain William T. Sampson, who was now
in command of the North Atlantic station, and was with the flagship
_New York_ off the reef at Key West where well-nigh all the available
ships in the Atlantic were collected, received a telegram announcing
his assignment to the command, with the rank of rear-admiral, an
advancement only possible by selection by the President in time of
war. This was the first indication of actual hostilities, but it was
soon followed by another ordering to blockade immediately the coast of
Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda (a little west of Havana). Gathering
during the night outside the reef (distant six miles from Key West) all
the ships ready to move, the fleet early next morning was on its way,
and by evening was off Havana, the searchlights of which were sweeping
the sea in expectancy of the American fleet. Powerfully armed as were
its batteries, they were, curiously enough, so disposed that they
were open to attack from the southwest, with little possibility of
return. It was Sampson’s eager wish to make this attack at once, and a
battle-order had been drawn in anticipation of war, early in April, but
the Navy Department in a letter of April 6th set its face so decidedly
against the attempt, that Sampson had to yield. The department from
the view of the necessity of preserving the fleet to meet Cervera was
justified, but Sampson’s view, as later analysis of the situation
showed, was correct. Had action been allowed, Havana would have been
ours, without loss, on April 23d.
In addition to Sampson’s command, a squadron made up of the _Brooklyn_,
_Massachusetts_, and _Texas_ was stationed at Hampton Roads under
Commodore Schley; and several others, among them the fast _Columbia_
and _Minneapolis_ and the cruiser _San Francisco_, were kept north to
meet the clamor of the seacoast in general for protection. The public
could not understand that the only real protection was concentration
against, and the destruction of, the enemy’s fleet.
As the joint resolution of Congress of April 20th declared the aim
of the United States to be relinquishment of Spanish authority in
the island of Cuba, our main sphere of action was naturally the
Caribbean. As soon as Spain should have yielded the island, the war
would naturally end unless Spain should choose to continue it. There
were in the island, by official statement, 159,297 regular troops and
119,160 volunteers. The American regular army, distributed from Maine
to Alaska, was but 28,183. Of course it was necessary to call for a
large number of volunteers.
To preserve Cuba it was necessary for Spain to preserve communication
with the island. This could be done only by obtaining and keeping
command of the Atlantic. To do this she had an effective force of only
four armored cruisers: the _Infanta Maria Teresa_, _Almirante Oquendo_,
_Vizcaya_ (Biscay), and _Cristóbal Colón_, each of about 7,000 tons. A
battleship, the _Pelayo_, and a large armored cruiser, the _Carlos V_,
were not yet ready for service. This was of course a hopeless disparity
of fighting force as compared with Admiral Sampson’s fleet of five
powerful battleships and two armored cruisers. Admiral Cervera, who had
been placed in command of the Spanish squadron, saw this clearly and
protested, without avail, against sending it across the Atlantic. On
April 29, 1898, he left the Cape Verde Islands with the four armored
cruisers first mentioned and with three torpedo-boat destroyers, with
orders to go to San Juan, Puerto Rico.
* * * * *
Commodore George Dewey, commanding our naval forces in Asia, had, under
the orders of the department, collected his whole force at Hong Kong in
anticipation of the war, and had made ready for the eventuality. The
_Baltimore_, a large cruiser for the period, had fortunately reached
him in time with a precious supply of extra ammunition. The British
Declaration of Neutrality had obliged him to withdraw on April 24th his
force consisting of the _Olympia_, _Baltimore_, _Boston_, _Raleigh_,
_Concord_, _Petrel_, and the revenue cutter _McCulloch_, from Hong Kong
to Mirs Bay, thirty miles away on the China coast. Here, on April 26th,
he received a telegram informing him officially of the declaration of
war and adding: “Commence operations at once, particularly against
the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost
endeavors.” The last three words were certainly unnecessary. He left
as soon as possible, this being the afternoon of May 27th. It was 620
miles to Manila.
It must be confessed that the outlook for the Spanish at Manila was
not cheerful. They had but two vessels of any considerable size, the
_Reina Cristina_ and the _Castilla_, of 3,100 and 3,300 tons, and the
latter, which had been in use as a receiving ship, had no motive power.
In addition there were available two small cruisers of 1,152 tons, two
of 1,040, and a gunboat of 500. Three other small vessels, one the
_Velasco_, of 1,139 tons, were under repairs, with some of their guns
in the batteries at the entrance of the bay, twenty-five miles away.
Dewey had the _Olympia_, of 5,870 tons; _Baltimore_, 4,413; _Raleigh_,
3,183; _Boston_, 3,000; _Concord_, 1,710; and _Petrel_, 892. The guns,
besides a number of 3 and 6 pounders, were:
AMERICAN SPANISH
Ten 8-inch Seven 6.3-inch
Twenty-three 6-inch Four 5.9-inch
Twenty 5-inch Twenty 4.7-inch
Eleven 3.4-inch
2.24-inch
The complements of the two squadrons were: American, 1,707 men;
Spanish, 1,664.
It was a ten-mile stretch across the entrance to the bay, divided into
two deep channels by islands upon which had been hastily established
batteries mounted with seventeen guns varying in calibre from 7 to 4.3
inch; nine of these were muzzle-loaders and thus could not be fired
nearly so rapidly as the 4.3-inch, which were quick-firers. At Manila
were mounted 226 guns of all kinds, most of which were inefficient; but
there were twelve good breech-loaders of from 9.45-inch to 4.7-inch,
with much less range, however, than the modern 8-inch carried by the
_Olympia_. The Manila defences, however, were such that it would have
been much wiser for Montojo to have anchored close as possible to the
fortifications and thus obtain such support as was available. As it
was, he was out of their protection, supported by only eight guns,
mostly ineffective weapons, in battery at Sangley Point and Cavite;
three of these, two 6.3-inch and one 4.7-inch, were of value.
Dewey was off Subig Bay on Saturday, April 30th. After examining the
bay for the Spanish ships he stood for Manila, fifty-seven miles away.
At midnight he passed the rock El Fraile in Boca Grande, the battery on
which fired upon the squadron, which answered with a few shots. At five
o’clock the squadron was near the mouth of the river, on both sides of
which Manila is built, when the Spanish squadron was sighted at anchor
off Cavite, six miles to the southward, and our ships at once turned in
that direction. Fire was opened at 5:41 by the _Olympia_. The American
squadron stood down slowly to the westward, turned and turned again,
passing thus five times before the anchored Spanish ships, thrice to
the west, twice to the east. After an action of two hours, on a report
of shortness of ammunition (which proved incorrect) the squadron
hauled off for a count of its supply and to give the men breakfast,
the captains being called aboard to report damages. None of these were
serious, and no men had been killed, though several were wounded.
During this time the Spanish squadron was seen to be in flames, and the
American squadron then stood in and completed its work. The victory was
complete. The Americans had fired in all 5,859 shots, 1,414 of which
were 5, 6, and 8 inch; there remained 2,861 of the heavier shell and
over 30,000 of the 6, 3, and 1 pounders.
The result of the action depended upon gunnery efficiency, as there
was no ship on either side which was not thoroughly vulnerable to the
guns used. And though our gunnery was (as also at Santiago) far below
the present high standard, the result was positive proof of great
superiority to that of the Spanish.
The Americans had two officers and six men wounded in the _Baltimore_.
Otherwise they were scathless. The Spanish loss, as reckoned by
“painstaking inquiry” by an American officer, was 167 killed and 214
wounded. Admiral Montojo’s own statement, which puts his whole force at
but 1,134, was 75 killed and 281 wounded.
Dewey cut and buoyed the cable on May 2d, took position in the bay,
and awaited the coming of troops which were soon to be on their way.
He sent the revenue cutter _McCulloch_, which had taken no part in the
action, to telegraph his victory home. Before he had cut the cable,
however, the news had been telegraphed to Madrid, and it was thence
received on May 2d with great enthusiasm in the United States. On May
10th Dewey received the thanks of Congress and was raised to the rank
of Admiral of the Navy.
While the victory was to have great results in determining our attitude
toward the Philippines, it could in no sense determine the result of
the war; this could only be attained by the destruction of one or the
other battle fleets now in the Atlantic. The event, however, put a
very different complexion upon the attitude of Europe. There was to be
no further European talk of putting limitations upon our conduct of the
struggle.