average number is distinctly smaller than in the families of our lower
classes, let us look for a moment at some of the causes creating this
difference. First, in the higher classes men may have mistresses whose
children are unacknowledged; and frequently they form the marriage tie
with heiresses whose hereditary tendency is necessarily—as expounded by
Francis Galton—towards sterility. Second, women of the higher classes
are often delicate. They cannot support the strain of frequent
maternity. Is this a condition that, in an advancing civilization, will
persist? By no means. The ideal of womanhood, as of manhood, points to
strength, not weakness—“a combination of brain power and skill with
bodily health and vigour. Many intellectual men are physically robust
and capable in a polygamous state of patriarchal propagation.”
(_Over-population_, John M. Robertson.) And it is impossible to doubt
that a rational education, embracing free play to activities hitherto
denied to the sex, and promoting physical development, will lift women
to a superior level of health and of physiological capacity. Third, the
higher classes avail themselves to some extent of neo-Malthusian
preventive checks, whereas the mass of the people are either ignorant of
them or opposed to their use. Fourth, enforced celibacy in the case of a
large proportion of women of the cultured classes is a cause of
relatively fewer numbers. Obviously it is from the “warrens of the poor”
that prolific life persistently springs. There we have the highest rate
of genesis; and as the refined restrain propagation and limit their
numbers, the poor enter the breach and fill up the ranks from their own
inferior stock. Now, mark the result. The individuating process is
checked, and ultimately fails, through the crowding out of the
individuated. What occurs, naturally, inevitably, by the action of the
process is a gradual subsidence, finally a limiting of the individuating
factor, the very social force to which Herbert Spencer directs
attention! Surely it suffices to point out “that no theory of the
ultimate effects of mere refinement on rate of increase can give us help
while nine-tenths of the human race are not refined, and not visibly in
the way of becoming so.” (_Over-population_, John M. Robertson.)
We are compelled to dismiss Herbert Spencer’s “law of population” as
irrelevant to the situation, and to declare that he has no more solved
the riddle of the Sphinx than have Malthus, Darwin and Huxley.
The population problem, as it faces us to-day, is serious beyond all
comparison. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of finding
its true solution. But while thousands of men and women are ready now to
admit the seriousness, nowhere as yet has a movement appeared of united
action applicable and adequate to the exigency.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF SEX
How glorious will be the awakening when man’s desires will be
honoured, his passions utilized, his labour exalted, whilst life is
loved, and ever and ever creates love afresh.—ZOLA.
The Law of Population derives its force from an innate, powerful
instinct or passion in man, the unguarded exercise of which brings about
reproduction of the species. The thing therefore of greatest importance
to general well-being is the discovery of means whereby to prevent this
imperious instinct dominating and controlling the reproductive
conditions—which imperatively need to be governed by reason and moral
sense.
The sexual instinct, irresponsibly exercised, keeps population up to the
margin of the means of subsistence—whatever that may be at the
time—perpetuates disease, constitutional weakness and inherited taint,
and frustrates the community’s best efforts to make life easier and
happier to all.
My immediate purpose is to show that the prevention of all this evil is
possible, for rational man may slowly and surely guide the above vital
instinct into a new course—a course that will lead to the redemption of
his physical nature, the purifying and elevating of his intellectual and
emotional nature, and the direct creation of social virtue and
happiness.
I must first point out the obstacles standing in the way of this
fundamental far-reaching readjustment. There is a fatal ignorance of the
true nature of the instinct in question, there is an obstinate prejudice
that prevents frank discussion of the subject, there is Puritan or
ascetic feeling that shuns pleasure as evil, and there is an optimistic
fatalism which, basing itself on Darwinian law—already superseded by
man’s interference—persists in the _laissez-faire_ policy, however
suicidal.
Sexual relations form the background of human life and are the primary
sources of our finest emotions. Therefore the instinct that prompts to
sex-union ought to hold a supremely honourable place in public
estimation, and be carefully guarded from reproach and every hurtful or
degrading condition. This great factor in physical and emotional life
stands, at present, in disgrace. It is ignominiously repressed, it
produces heart-rending misery and unmitigated evil. Publicly and in
current literature, either it is ignored (hypocritically) or misjudged
and condemned; and all the time privately it is intensely felt; and in
every direction throughout society its licentious, furtive indulgence
swirls into the vicious circles of destruction, the broken hearts and
lives of women, the fallen dignity and besmirched consciences of men.
If we look at the matter of sexual intercourse calmly and in the light
of pure reason alone, we must perceive that its intrinsic qualities are
good, not evil. It creates happiness in the giving and receiving of
pleasure, and the physiological exaltation connected with pleasure
promotes individual health and buoyancy. To quote Herbert Spencer:
“Pleasure increases vitality and raises the tide of life.” If man “eats
and drinks immoderately,” said W. R. Greg, “nature punishes him with
dyspepsia and disease; but nature never forbids him to eat when he is
hungry and to drink when he is thirsty, provided he does so with
discretion. Indeed, she punishes him equally if he abstains, as if he
exceeds.” Mr. Greg further showed that the action of nature is precisely
similar in respect of the sexual function. If man indulges to excess, he
is punished by premature exhaustion, with appropriate maladies, not
otherwise however. On the contrary, enforced and total abstinence is
punished often, if not habitually, by “nervous disturbance and suffering
and by functional disorder.” (_Enigmas of Life_, Chapter II.) Observe
also the sexual desire “is the especial one of all our animal wants
which is redeemed from animalism by being blended with our strongest and
least selfish affections; which is ennobled by its associations in a way
in which the appetites of eating and drinking and sleeping can never be
ennobled in a degree to which the pleasures of the eye and ear can be
ennobled only by assiduous and lofty culture.” (_Enigmas of Life._ W. R.
Greg, p. 71.) We have no fastidious recoil from eating and drinking
because these are merely animal functions. We take pains to improve our
methods of preparing food, and we embellish our repasts with
super-sensual surroundings in order to elevate the nutritive functions
and free them from grossness or brutality. The fundamentally animal
nature of sexual passion does not imply brutality, it is sociable to a
far greater degree than eating or drinking, and this element of
sociality purifies and ennobles, causing the function to become the
basis of tender unselfish love. In its physiological aspect we may rest
assured that the average normal human being has as little inherent
tendency to sexual excess as to gluttony or drunkenness.
But apart from the question of excess, an attitude of mind towards the
whole subject is common which must be condemned. This attitude consists
of an element of shame, misnamed delicacy, and a sense of moral
superiority. Women chiefly cherish the feeling, but men pay homage to
it, with the result that in no friendly communion of men and women does
it seem compatible with good taste to discuss questions of sex.
All vulgar allusions to love, all flippant talk on the subject of sex
are distinctly contrary to good taste, they dishonour human nature, but
I submit that it is an outrage on common sense, and an immoral action,
when students of the Population—or any other grave social question—allow
this spurious delicacy to interfere with their facing the whole facts of
life, or to bias judgment in reasoning from the facts.
On the publication of my previous volume, _Scientific Meliorism and the
Evolution of Happiness_, in 1885, a woman of superior intellect and
attainments reviewed the book. One passage in her criticism stands thus:
“A certain instinct that in such matters the instinct of reprobation is
as healthy as it is superficially unreasonable, may make one sicken at
the suggestions of neo-Malthusianism.” (_The Academy_ of May 15th,
1886.) Such squeamishness is no indication of health or good taste. Its
unreasonableness condemns it, and the source from which it springs is
prejudice induced through specific conditions. The reviewer appears to
suspect as much, for, later she remarks: “One cannot put down the book
without a greatly increased sense of the supreme necessity of
criticizing all established theories and institutions and of the supreme
duty of refraining from precipitate action.” This is a sentiment one can
endorse, and I appeal to all my readers, especially to women, to refrain
from forming any judgment on any part of this difficult, all-important
problem, until they have mastered the subject in all its aspects. To
pursue the opposite course is to act irrationally and immorally. It
causes to spring up in other minds the prejudice which distorts and
disguises truth.
In nutritive functions, all repulsive animalism becomes overborne, as
human nature refines and civilizes, and in a profounder sense the
brutality of sex-passion vanishes through the growth of a higher love,
which has for its dominant quality—not eagerness for possession—but
unselfish tenderness. This tenderness, permeating the individual and
extending its benign influence into society, issues in the gentle
manners and virtuous actions that seem to spring directly from a
universal principle of sympathy and love.
The scientific exposition of the phenomena has long been before the
public. G. H. Lewes, in his _Problems of Life and Mind_, demonstrated
that whilst the individual functions of man (alimentation being one of
these) arise in relation to the cosmos, his general functions, including
sex-appetite, arise in relation to the social medium, and “animal
impulses become blended with human emotions,” until “in process of
evolution, starting from the merely animal appetite of sexuality, we
arrive at the purest and most far-reaching tenderness.” The social
instincts, which he calls analogues of the individual instincts, tend
more and more to make “sociality dominate animality and thus subordinate
personality to humanity.” (_Problems of Life and Mind_, vol. 1, p. 159.)
It is only recently that the full significance of these facts has begun
to influence general thought and to create a revolt against the
unscientific attitude of mind that covers the sexual instinct with
contumely and hypocritical disdain. There dawns in consequence a new
light upon the afflicting problem of our social impurity. It is seen
that the horrible struggle for existence which makes grief and pain,
exhausting mental effort and physical restraint, enter so largely into
the lot of unhappy man, is the paramount evil to cast out. “The
wonderful cycles of normal life are for ever clean and pure.” (_The New
Spirit_, Havelock Ellis.) And with far more of sex-union—especially for
the young—and all the tender social joys that emanate from that union,
and far more of ease and happiness in life, there becomes possible a
great increase of goodness.[2]
Footnote 2:
It is well to know moments of material happiness, since they teach us
where to look for loftier joys.—_Wisdom and Destiny_, by Maurice
Maeterlinck.
The late James Hinton spoke truly of the matter when he said: “Sensuous
pleasure will be to the moral life of the future as sense-impressions
are to the knowledge of the present, and with the same history. It will
not be a thing put aside as evil or degrading or misleading, but
recognized as the very basis and means of the life, and used with
enhancements and multiplied powers undreamt of by us.” And again, “This
is what sets the soul on fire—the union of goodness and pleasure. It is
a new possibility, a hope we never saw before, a means whereby all may
be brought into goodness.” (_The Law Breaker_, pp. 275, 236.) The key to
the position, he points out, is the taking of pleasure unselfishly and
with complete regard to the happiness of others.
The region of sex is indeed to this day unreclaimed, but, as Mr. Ellis
asks: “Why should the sweetening breath of science be guarded from this
spot? Our attitude towards this part of life affects profoundly our
attitude towards life altogether.” (_The New Spirit_, pp. 127, 125).
Which of us has not felt the truth of that deep saying of Thoreau’s that
“for him to whom sex is impure there are no flowers in nature.”
It is precisely here that development in the sense of purity gives a
sure hope of moral regeneration. And very remarkable is it that as in
the old days when prophetic poetry took the lead in all religious
reforms so now we have art in the van of social reform boldly
confronting the great enemies of progress—ignorance, pride, prejudice
and malicious insinuation. When Ibsen’s “Ghosts” was first put upon the
stage of a London theatre, a dramatic critic delivered himself thus: “It
is a dream of revolt—the revolt of the ‘joy of life’ against the gloom
of hidebound, conventional morality, the revolt of the natural man and
woman, the revolt of the individual against the oppression of social
prejudice. The joy of life, the joy of life—it rings like a clarion
through the play.” (_Star_ of March 14th, 1891.) The fine women of
Ibsen’s creation speak out upon questions of sex with a pure, earnest
candour that breathes a new morality, and this moral element is one of
the central features in Whitman’s attitude towards sex. For the lover,
there is nothing in the loved one impure or unclean; a breath of passion
has passed over, and all things are sweet. For most of us this influence
spreads no farther, for the man of strong moral instinct it covers all
human things in infinitely widening circles; his heart goes out to every
creature that shares the loved one’s delicious humanity, henceforth
there is nothing human that he cannot touch with reverence and love.
_Leaves of Grass_ is penetrated by this moral element. (_The New
Spirit_, Havelock Ellis, p. 123.)
Walt Whitman himself says: “Difficult as it will be, it has become, in
my opinion, imperative to achieve a shifted attitude from superior men
and women towards the thought and fact of sexuality as an element in
character, personality, the emotions, and a theme in literature.” (_How
I made a Book._ An Essay by Walt Whitman.)
The principles underlying the new morality may be thus stated: Goodness
does not consist in starving or denying any normal animal appetite,
therefore chastity in the sense of total abstinence is essentially
immoral. Life is not so prodigal of joys that man can wisely forego any
source of innocent happiness, hence asceticism has no place in a
rational theory and code of morals. The course for rational man to adopt
in reference to sexual appetite is duly to satisfy and regulate it; and
by removing every loathsome condition that superinduces degradation, to
compel it to raise the tide of life in promoting individual comfort and
general virtue.
To the reader who grasps the population problem it may seem that this
moral code would place society on the horns of a painful dilemma, for
while morality is said to require a closer union between the sexes than
has hitherto prevailed, propagation—which is the actual result of that
union—must be limited to an extent hitherto unknown, and by many people
deemed impossible of attainment. By its patient investigations of
nature, however, science here comes to the rescue of those whose
standpoint in viewing the sexual problem is one of ardent sympathy with
the essential needs and the moral aspirations of man in a social
position truly pathetic.
Physiology has revealed that sexual organs are naturally divided into
amative and reproductive organs, each class functionally distinct from
the other. Amative organs relate primarily to sexual union, while
reproductive organs relate primarily to impregnation and gestation. The
process of reproduction may take place without use of the amative organs
by simply bringing spermatozoa to ova (this has been done), and on the
other hand the amative organs can be exercised without effecting
reproduction. Sexual intercourse and procreation are not vitally
related, as they are ordinarily assumed to be.
Moreover, the instincts connected with sexual union and with offspring
are separate and distinct. In popular, confused thought, a reproductive
instinct is attributed to animals and man. In reality, no direct
instinct to reproduce the species exists. Animals unite sexually from an
instinct directed to a pleasurable exercise of function; and although,
in man, the relation has been made complex by his knowledge of the facts
of reproduction and of social life, the sexual instinct is connected
solely with pleasure and social feeling—not with reproduction. On the
other hand, instincts associated with the presence and nurture of the
young are not sexual or related to sexual passion. Therefore any
doctrine requiring man’s exercise of the sexual function to be
restricted to the end of reproduction is without justification in nature
and directly conflicts with the facts of life.
The sexual act, in the natural order of things, is only occasionally in
accidental relation to the reproductive process, for with married people
in a thousand acts only a dozen may be reproductive. If social morality
then requires the satisfaction of normal sexual feeling—and I think I
have shown this to be the case—the desideratum is to prevent at will
instead of leaving to accident the above occasional relation, and make
the separation between amative and reproductive conditions as complete
as their functional separation.
An American writer has well said: “If there is one social phenomenon
which human ingenuity ought to bring completely under the control of the
will, it is the phenomenon of procreation.” “Just as everyone is his own
judge of how much he shall eat and drink, of what commodities he wants
to render life enjoyable, so everyone should be his own judge of how
large a family he desires, and should have power in the same degree to
leave off when the requisite number is reached.” (Lester F. Ward.
_Dynamic Sociology_, vol. 2, p. 465.) The Bible Communists of Oneida
Creek practised voluntary control over the propagative function during
thirty years with marked success. The number of births was regulated in
accordance with the wishes of the community, and such careful attention
was paid to the laws of heredity that no children of defective organisms
or unsound constitutions were born. Were man universally intelligent and
morally self-controlled, the knowledge of physiological facts and of
invention applied to those facts would suffice to create general
spontaneous limitation of the birth-rate and hygienic propagation of
species. But one has only to think of the battered humanity in the back
slums of every great city—the physical, mental and moral weaklings of
our degraded populace—to realize that it is fantastic folly to expect
individual intelligence under vicious and utterly depressing conditions,
to counteract habit and save society from a rising tide of overwhelming
numbers, the product of random pregnancy and sportive chance.
It cannot be a solution nor even a relief to the population difficulty
that the intelligent—comparatively few—should limit their families so
long as the masses refuse or fail to limit theirs. When society,
becoming fully alive to the imminent danger of a too rapid birth-rate
solves the population and social problems combined—in the only way
possible—it will facilitate and promote the use of scientific checks to
conception, and, if necessary, exact their adoption by some legislative
device. (See _Social Control of the Birth-rate_, by G. A. Gaskell.)
By the aid of these personal means of avoiding or preventing conception
the desired complete separation of amative and reproductive conditions
is effected. Love is set free to rule in its own domain, and reason
controls procreation to the infinite benefit of all future generations.
In an article by Mr. J. Holt Schooling in the _Contemporary Review_ for
February, 1902, entitled “The Natural Increase of Three Populations,” it
is shown how widely in the United Kingdom the use of preventive checks
has spread within the last twenty years. The writer says in comparing
the birth-rates of Germany, England and France since 1880: “There has
been a fall in the birth-rate during each period in each country. But
England’s fall has been larger than all; larger than the fall in the
French birth-rate. During 1880–1884 there were 323 births per year per
10,000 of our population; during 1895–1899 there were only 291 births
per year per 10,000 of population—a yearly fall of 32 births per 10,000
of population. France’s fall was 28 births and Germany’s fall was only
10 births, although Germany’s birth-rate was higher throughout than that
of England or of France.” This is very satisfactory, and in regard to
the strength of a nation that depends upon the adults, and there are
more adults in a population where the children are fewer. The death-rate
in England during the last twenty years has been always the lowest of
the three countries.
At the present moment, society has no scientific sex-philosophy
whatever. It affects to be governed by Puritanism—a vague doctrine
belonging to the past history of the race and not in connexion with any
ethical code directed to the development of goodness through a careful
regard to the happiness of man and the satisfaction of his normal human
nature. Puritanism, whether affected or real, spreads abroad hypocrisy,
deceit, lying; it tends to licentiousness in men and the utter
defilement of women, to social disorder and decay. Above all, it
frustrates the development of that higher love, which, having animalism
allied, but subordinate, fills the mind with exquisite emotion and
creates unselfish delights.
Many years ago Miss Martineau wrote: “A thing to be carefully remembered
is that asceticism and licentiousness universally co-exist. All
experience proves this, and every principle of human nature might
prophesy the proof. Passions and emotions cannot be extinguished by
general rules.” (_How to observe Morals and Manners_, p. 169.)
Puritanism ignores the sexual needs of the young. In a scientific age
man is bound to recognize physiological reasons for early satisfaction
of the sexual appetite and physiological reasons for delayed parentage.
Of the former, I have here to say that an early moderate stimulation of
the female sexual organs (after puberty is reached) tends, by the law of
exercise promoting development of structure, to make parturition in
mature life easy and safe; and that the healthy functional and emotional
life of love and gratified passion is the best preventive of hysteria,
chlorosis, love melancholy, and other unhappy ailments to which our
young women are cruelly and barbarously exposed, and which, I do not
hesitate to say, make them in many cases feel their youth to be an
almost insufferable martyrdom.
There are no less serious sexual evils which overtake masculine youth,
if continent, namely, persistent and miserable cravings, abnormally
directed instinct, spermatorrhoea, self-abuse; and these are usually
hidden from sight and knowledge in consequence of a feeling that, in
sexual matters, adults have no sympathy with the young.
In _Lecky’s History of European Morals_, vol. 2, p. 301, prostitution is
thus referred to:—“However persistently society may ignore this form of
vice, it exists, nevertheless, and on the most gigantic scale, and an
evil rarely assumes such inveterate and perverting forms as when it is
shrouded in obscurity and veiled by a hypocritical appearance of
unconsciousness. The existence in England of unhappy women, sunk in the
very lowest depths of vice and misery ... shows what an appalling amount
of moral evil is festering uncontrolled, undiscussed and unalleviated
under the fair surface of decorous society.” The number of London
prostitutes was estimated at 80,000 in the year 1870. Since then, it has
probably increased. In Paris, according to Von Dettingen, the actual
number at that period was upwards of 60,000; in Berlin, 25,000 to
30,000. In Hamburg, in 1860, every ninth woman above the age of 15 was a
prostitute, and in Leipzig the women depending principally or
exclusively on prostitution was estimated at 2,000. This field of
prostitution encloses whole armies of women finding there their only
means of earning a miserable livelihood and a corresponding number of
victims claimed by death and disease. (_Woman in the Past, Present and
Future._ August Bebel, pp. 100–101.)
The prostitute, in her thousands; the married drudge, weary of
child-bearing; the desolate old maid; these are all alike victims to
social oppression. They are compelled to abstain from, or compelled to
engage in, a specific function which is only natural, pleasurable,
healthful and virtuous in the absence of all tyranny. Love to be real
must be prompted by personal desire, and free to express itself in
unhurtful conditions: I mean conditions that involve individual liberty,
social respect and human dignity. The facts of prostitution alone would
amply suffice to put Puritanism out of court in social reform. As a
result of conduct, it has no control over vicious propensities, whilst
it restrains tormentingly impulses that are normal and virtuous, that
need only fitting conditions of healthful freedom.
Discarding asceticism and conventional purism as alike immoral, the
social reforms that are based on a knowledge of human nature and a
knowledge of the possibilities allied with conscious evolution, will
bring all the institutions of our social life into accordance with the
needs of the individual; and one essential condition of happy life is
sexual love, with such union of the sexes as conforms to the general or
collective interests.
In view of the law of population, and the fact that science has made
plain how practically to separate the amative from the reproductive
conditions of physical union, the love of the sexes can harmonize with
the highest interests of our collective social life, and eugenics, _not
sexual love_, may become paramount in generation.
What social morality requires is that the forces of philoprogenitiveness
and a public conscience combined should dominate the function of
reproduction, while love is left free from coercive control in the
sphere of individual life.
CHAPTER III
EUGENICS OR STIRPICULTURE
The first step towards the reduction of disease is beginning at the
beginning to provide for the health of the unborn.—Dr. RICHARDSON.
The whole theory concerning heredity and its marvellous influence for
good or evil is a nauseous draught for mankind to swallow. No wonder we
revolt instinctively from a doctrine that charges tender parents with
transmitting an evil heritage to the offspring they passionately love.
“Although many important books draw attention to the facts, as far as
they are ascertained, these momentous facts have as yet made no
impression on the general mind.” (_Scientific Meliorism and the
Evolution of Happiness_, p. 329.) This statement is no longer true. It
was written in 1884, and since then immense strides have been made in
the realization of the action of heredity. The subject is frequently and
persistently brought forward now, and urged upon the attention of the
public. Zola’s _mère idée_ is not found only in French fiction, the new
Russian school of fiction is permeated by it; and even in England some
novelists, following in the footsteps of George Eliot, are assuming a
scientific attitude towards life, and the facts of heredity are not
ignored.
Moreover, in science and in all high-class criticism of life the
doctrine of heredity is directly taught.
Apart from purely literary work, the examination of criminal statistics
as a whole, and the practical observations of physicians, doctors,
dentists, schoolmasters, poor-guardians, systematized and made public at
congresses and stored in scientific handbooks so inexpensive as to be
well within reach of all students—these, I say, combine to impress upon
the general mind the conviction that racial degeneracy is a palpable
fact; and that inheritance is prime factor in the degenerating process.
And recently indeed a suspicion of danger in over-estimating this factor
has been publicly expressed. Whereas formerly, it is said, a child was
supposed to be born with a mind like a clean sheet of paper, on whose
fair surface we might write what we chose, opinion points in the present
day to an opposite extreme, viz., this, that the hereditary tendencies
born with the child determine its future career, and that education
cannot modify this destiny in any essential respect. Now, to disallow
the importance of education as also a prime factor in progress is an
error of judgment; but so long as the human race continues scourged by
sickness, martyred by pain, demoralized by disease and innate debility,
and decimated by premature death, it is not possible for thinkers to
over-estimate the profound significance for weal or woe of this question
of heredity.
Where individual life is not menaced by poverty or destitution, disease
is the bane of existence, the barrier to physical comfort and to both
mental and moral advance. Alas! how few of us have any permanent
possession of sound health. In spite of medical science, sanitary
protection, progress made during the last hundred years in knowledge of
pathological conditions, and vast resources now at our command for
subduing and mitigating every form of physical evil, disease dogs our
footsteps from infancy to maturity and onwards to the grave. We have the
young attacked by consumption, the middle-aged suffering from failing
health, the aged struck by paralysis or bowed down by rheumatism; and
everywhere we meet husbands and wives permanently saddened by the loss
of the chosen companion of their life, and mothers whose light-hearted
buoyancy died out for ever when the babe, prized beyond all treasure,
was snatched from their arms to be laid in our appallingly numerous
children’s graves.
In order to form an approximately correct conception of disease, we must
glance for a moment at the conditions of health. Life in all its forms,
physical or mental, morbid or healthy, is in close relation to the
individual organism and external forces. Health, as the consequence and
evidence of a successful adaptation to the conditions of existence,
implies the preservation, well-being and development of the organism;
while disease marks a failure in organic adaptation to external
conditions, and leads to disorder, decay and death.
If we could perceive all the conditions, outward and inward, and take
them into account, a distinct line of causation would become apparent.
We should find disease no more an accident than the storm that breaks
upon the seaboard or the volcanic flames that burst from the mountain
top. The extreme complexity and delicacy of biological phenomena
precludes a wide grasp of conditions in individual cases, but scientific
investigation has established the point that of the antecedents to
disease the largest proportion is some heritage of weakness transmitted
from parents—some disabilities for healthy life resulting from a bad
descent.
When, for instance, mental anxiety produced by adverse circumstances is
said to have made a man mad, there is implied some inherent infirmity of
nervous element which has co-operated. “Were the nervous system in a
state of perfect soundness and in possession of that reserve power which
it then has of adapting itself, within certain limits, to the varying
external conditions, it is probable,” says Maudsley, “that the most
unfavourable circumstances would not disturb permanently the relation
and initiate mental disease. But when unfavourable action from without
conspires with an infirmity of nature within, then the conditions of
disorder are established and a discord or madness is produced.” (_The
Physiology and Pathology of the Mind_, p. 199.)
Thus although outward circumstances often decide the character of a
disease, inherited infirmity is its primary cause. A being liable to
madness, if subjected to anxiety, may, under different conditions,
acquire not madness but consumption. A child may fall a victim to the
special ailment from which one or both parents suffered; but equally it
is possible that disease in him may assume a totally different form. All
that can be affirmed with certainty is this: of diseased parents the
offspring invariably inherit a constitution liable to “some kind of
morbid degeneration, or a constitution destitute of that reserve power
necessary to meet the trying occasions of life!”
The trying occasions of life have multiplied with every new complexity
in social structure; and there has been no corresponding increase of
constitutional strength; but, on the contrary, a growing feebleness of
physique and instability of nerve-function. “Our children in these
times,” remarks Dr. Richardson, “are our reproach. Where is there a
healthy child? You may put before me a child showing to the unskilled
mind no trace of disease.... It is sure to have some inherited failure.
We are as yet unacquainted with all the phenomena of disease that pass
in the hereditary line.... We admit, as proved, scrofula or struma,
cancer, consumption, epilepsy, rheumatism, gout. It would be wrong to
limit the hereditary proclivities of disease to this list. The further
my own observations extend, the stronger is the impression made on my
mind that the majority of the phenomena of disease have hereditariness
of character.” (_Diseases of Modern Life_, p. 38.) Sir James Paget and
Sir William Jenner gave evidence of a similar kind before a Committee of
the House of Lords in 1882. From the former eminent physician’s speech I
may quote one passage: “We now know that certain diseases of the lungs,
liver and spleen are all of syphilitic origin, and the mortality from
syphilis in its later forms is every year found to be larger and larger,
by its being found to be the source of a number of diseases which
previously were referred to other origins.” (_The Times_ Report, August
11th, 1882.)
In August Bebel’s work on _Woman, her Position in the Past, Present and
Future_, this passage occurs: “With regard to the decimating effects of
venereal disease, we will only mention that in England between 1857 and
1865 the authenticated cases which ended fatally amounted to over
12,000, among which no fewer than 69 per cent. were children under
twelve months, the victims of parental infection.” (p. 101.)
Of the original source from which syphilis sprang, of its implication in
the sex problem, and of the ultimate eradication of its virus—to be
attained only by the true solution of the sex problem—we cannot here
speak; the point under immediate consideration is the fact that the
civilized races of mankind persist in propagating and perpetuating
disease. They unscrupulously bring into the world individual organisms
that are pre-destined to failure because not endowed with the potential
qualities indispensable to complete and successful life.
In America the same conditions are noted and publicly referred to. Mr.
Nathan Allen, M.D., before a medical society at Massachusetts, reported:
“A gradual change is taking place in the organization of our New England
people—a change which has occurred principally within the last two or
three generations. The nervous temperament with all its advantages and
disadvantages is becoming too predominant for other parts of the body.
The frame-work of the body generally is not so large ... the countenance
is paler, the features are more pointed and not so expressive of health.
We have a larger class of diseases arising from general debility ... we
have more disease of the brain and nervous system, more sudden deaths
from apoplexy, paralysis, and also diseases of the heart. In sound
healthy stock we have in a far higher degree the recuperative powers of
nature; while the original constitution is feeble, diseases of almost
every kind become complicated, and their treatment more difficult as
well as doubtful in result.”
Laws of inheritance affect the moral as well as the physical and mental
health of the nation. Their action is fatally legible in the public
records of crime. Not that many criminals inherit the actual attributes
of crime—brutality, cruelty, malignity, propensity to abnormal sexual
practices—these develop through the interaction of external with
internal forces—but the ordinary criminal is born deficient in the
elemental qualities necessary to the establishment of the average moral
nature.
From observations carried on in English prisons, it appears that in
these days of careful school-board education 25 per cent. of prisoners
can neither read nor write, and a certain number are quite incapable of
receiving and benefiting by school instruction. “The memory and
reasoning powers are so utterly feeble that attempts to school them is a
waste of time.” (_Crime and its Causes_, William Douglas Morrison, of
H.M. Prison, Wandsworth, p. 195.) Intellectually, criminals are
“unquestionably less gifted than the rest of the community”; emotionally
they “have the family sentiment only feebly developed,” and morally the
will is “morbidly variable.” A prisoner may be animated by good
resolutions, anxious to do what is right, often possessing a sense of
moral responsibility, yet may plunge again and again into crime from the
absence of a sustained power of volition. “Persons afflicted in this way
are generally convicted for crimes of violence, such as assault,
manslaughter, murder. They experience real sentiments of remorse, but
neither remorse nor penitence enables them to grapple with their evil
star. The will is stricken with disease, and the man is dashed hither
and thither a helpless wreck on the sea of life.”
The harmony of the social organism depends upon congruity of thought and
feeling in its members and upon action made promptly conformable through
exercise of the power of control centred in the inner part or spiritual
nature of man.
A criminal is an unsocial man, an undeveloped being, one, generally
speaking, whose pregenital stock was below par, and failed in the
conservation, development and transmission of a physical, mental and
moral capacity equalling that of the average of his race. The physical
debility or inherited tendency to nerve weakness—so universal in the
present day—has clearly a causal relation with the increase of crime
deplored by the principal authorities on the subject in Europe and
America.
In the United States we are told by Mr. D. A. Wells and by Mr. Howard
Wines, an eminent specialist in criminal matters, that crime is steadily
increasing at a faster rate than in due proportion to the increase of
population. Nearly all the chief statisticians abroad tell the same
tale. Dr. Mischler, of Vienna, and Professor Von Liszt, of Marburg, draw
a deplorable picture of the increase of crime in Germany. In France, the
criminal problem is as formidable and perplexing as in Germany. M. Henri
Joli estimates that crime has increased 133 per cent. within the last
half century, and is steadily rising. Taking Victoria as a typical
Australasian colony, we find that even in the antipodes, which are not
vexed to the same extent as Europe with social and economic
difficulties, crime is persistently raising its head ... it is a more
menacing danger among the Victorian Colonists than it is at home.
(_Crime and its Causes_, W. D. Morrison. Published in 1891, pp. 12 and
13.)
While physical degeneracy creates crime, a non-moral life on the other
hand causes further physical deterioration. The pursuit of wealth for
purely personal ends is pre-eminently anti-social. Breadth of thought
and social feeling grow impossible to the man whose life is devoted to
the business of amassing riches; and Dr. Henry Maudsley gives it as his
conviction, based upon wide observation of family life, that such men
are extremely unlikely to beget healthy children. In cases where the
father has toiled upwards from poverty to vast wealth, “I have witnessed
the results,” he says, “in a degeneracy mental and physical of his
offspring which has sometimes gone as far as extinction of the family in
the third or fourth generation. I cannot but think after what I have
seen that the extreme passion for getting rich does predispose to mental
degeneration in the offspring, either to moral defect or to moral and
intellectual deficiency, or to outbreaks of positive insanity under the
conditions of life.” (_The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind_, p.
206.)
This fact alone is amply sufficient to condemn an industrial system that
creates monopolies, concentrates wealth, stimulates greed, degrades the
upper classes by superfluous luxury, the lower by envy, poverty,
despair, and tends generally to physical, mental and moral decay. But
were the entire economic system judiciously reconstructed, fatal
elements would remain so long as man fails to grapple with the
biological problem and fails to bring the great life forces of
reproduction under conscientious direction and control.
Gravitation and all well studied mechanical and chemical forces have
been adapted by man to special purposes in relation with his civilized
life; even so must the sexual forces that belong to his basic existence
be in their turn dominated and made conformable with his higher moral
and spiritual needs. In this regard his primary need is that there shall
be no transmission of disease or constitutional debility from one
generation to another; but that the entire strength of the laws of
heredity shall create an improvement of stock and thereby lift humanity
to a higher level of physical health and efficiency.
In seeking the true method of attaining this end, it is our duty to look
first to the teaching of the great founders of social philosophy.
Without their invaluable services in discovering and setting forth the
one unbroken process of law which “connects all phenomena from the
motion of molecules and the courses of the suns to the phenomena of
human thought and the destinies of nations” (J. M. Robertson), no
intellects could to-day grasp the causes of misery and, conceiving the
possibility of circumventing these causes, devise a scheme of scientific
action to reverse the trend of general movement and evolve conditions of
genuine and universal happiness.
In _this_ sphere, however—the sphere of _eugenics_, or improvement of
the human stock, as also in regard to the population and sex
problems—Darwin and Herbert Spencer have failed us. The mind of the
former, habituated to dwell on the favourable aspects of the struggle
for existence during the early epochs of man’s history, was blind to the
consequences of the genesis and growth of the broadly social element in
man. Barbarous man could let cosmic forces prevail to exterminate the
weak. Sympathetic man is compelled by virtue of his enlarged subjective
nature to institute a new struggle, viz., a struggle against the
struggle for existence (a phrase used by Lange), and already his triumph
is everywhere visible in the survival of the unfit to struggle.
Darwin opposed the proposal to restrain population on the score that
this would minimize the struggle which had created civilization in the
past and which must needs, he thought, carry it on in the future, and
both Darwin and Herbert Spencer “assumed that a generalization which
sums up the progressive forces of a collectively unconscious society,
i.e. a society without the conception of evolution and of a universal
sociology, must equally sum up the progressive principles of a
collectively _conscious_ society, a society which has realized evolution
and is constructing a universal sociology. Though they themselves are
our greatest helpers towards such consciousness, they failed to realize
that our attainment of it must revolutionize human history.” (_Modern
Humanists_, J. M. Robertson, p. 234).
Turning then to less illustrious men, Mr. Francis Galton is our most
advanced teacher in the field of eugenics. He faces the problem of race
regeneration and has put forth a scheme or policy of action, resting on
Dr. Matthews Duncan’s alleged facts regarding the relative fertility in
early and late marriages. He shows that a group of a hundred mothers
whose marriages and those of their daughters should take place at the
age of twenty, would, in the course of a few generations, breed down a
group of a hundred mothers whose marriages and those of their daughters
were delayed until the age of twenty-nine. Let us then, he reasons,
promote by every means in our power the early marriage of human beings
of superior quality, whilst we discountenance early marriage in those
social members who are less favourably endowed. And “few,” he says,
“would deserve better of their country than those who determine to live
celibate lives through a reasonable conviction that their issue would
probably be less fitted than the generality to play their part as
citizens.” (_Inquiries into Human Faculty_, p. 336.)
In examination for official appointments he would have attention paid to
a candidate’s ancestral qualifications as well as his personal ability.
The man of inherited sound constitution and average ability should be
preferred to the man of superior ability who belongs to a delicate and
short-lived family. The former will in all probability become the more
valuable servant of the two. Some scheme should be devised by which to
bestow marks for family merit, to put, as it were, a guinea stamp to the
sterling guinea’s worth of natural nobility; and this, he conceives,
might set a great social avalanche in motion. It would open the eyes of
every family, and of society at large, to the importance of marriage
alliance with a good stock; it would introduce the subject of race as a
permanent topic of consideration, and lead to a careful collecting of
family histories and noting of those facts which are absolutely
necessary for guidance in right conduct. Late marriage, as advised by
Malthus, Mr. Galton utterly condemns. The prudent alone are influenced
by that doctrine, and it is, he says, a most pernicious rule of conduct
in its bearing upon race. His policy, then, is early and fruitful
marriage for the best specimens of our race, and widespread celibacy in
the case of those less highly favoured, whilst everywhere the sentiment
should prevail that _eugenics_, or the improvement of the human stock,
is the primary consideration in marriage and the guiding principle in
sex relations.
This theory I hold to be one-sided, and the policy misleading and to
some extent false. Mr. Galton ignores the fundamental principle of
social life, viz., that the happiness of all, at all times, should be
the aim and object of rational man, and he mistakes the quality of human
nature in highly civilized man. To demand celibacy of men and women
whose defective organisms it is not desirable to perpetuate, would be in
hundreds and thousands of instances to sacrifice unnecessarily present
happiness to future gain—to build up the comfort and enjoyment of coming
generations at the expense of the comfort and enjoyment of our own
generation. The sentiment of justice repudiates this action as well as
condemns the reverse position of a reckless self-indulgent procreating
to the deterioration of the human stock, whilst reason distinctly shows
that individual liberty, in respect of marriage, is a social necessity
perfectly compatible with the well-being of all. Physical regeneration
of race will not be achieved by an overstrained morality that does
violence to the emotional human nature of the normal and average man.
Mr. Galton’s system of social reform accords in some respects with that
which it is the purpose of this work to set forth. Both systems premise
teaching that it is man’s duty and within his power to improve the
physical, intellectual and moral structure of his race. He may, in part,
achieve this by intelligent forethought and careful action in exercising
the function of propagating his kind. Population must not be kept up by
consumptives or persons whose pedigree is tainted by any disease known
to be hereditary, and public opinion must enforce the necessary
restraints. (Temporary illness ought also to be considered. It is when
parents are in their best state of health only that they are morally
justified in bringing children into the world.)
Of these, celibacy is a restraint commended and advised by Mr. Galton,
whilst scientific meliorism deliberately rejects it, for celibacy is a
vital evil, destroying individual happiness and tending obviously to
social disorder. Wherever love in its highest form exists between two
individuals, union is eminently desirable; but if either or both be
afflicted by disease or hereditary taint, the sacrifice demanded of them
is to carefully abstain from giving birth to children. Whether the means
adopted be those of natural self-control or of artificial aids to
self-control will depend on the views of the individuals immediately
concerned, and in this matter society has no right of interference.
It is the business, however, of society to sweep away ignorance and make
it possible for the poor as well as the rich to enter on the right path
voluntarily, and where, from physical or moral degeneracy,
self-regulation is impossible, society must exercise authority and
coercively restrain the vital social force of propagation. It will not
be by means of the lonely lives celibacy entails that civilized men and
women will refrain from having children disqualified for useful
citizenship. We shall, to quote the late poet laureate’s words, “move
upward, working out the beast, and let the ape and tiger die,” by other
means more worthy of humanity, i.e. by socialized freedom and sex
equality; by intelligent self-control voluntarily practised (with or
without artificial appliance), and by control, enforced wherever
necessary by the State in fulfilment of its responsible duty—the careful
guardianship of the congenital blood of future generations.
In the savage epoch of our history, the force of natural selection
produced survival of the fittest. From that epoch we have long since
passed into a semi-civilized epoch in which the force of sympathetic
selection produces a miserable state of indiscriminate survival; we have
now to pass forward to the epoch in which the rational force of a wise,
intelligent selection will systematically secure the birth of the
physically fit.
CHAPTER IV
MARRIAGE
Marriage is that union of the sexes which is most in accordance with
the moral and physical necessities of human beings and which
harmonizes best with their other relations of life.—RICHARD HARTE.
It is of vast importance to bear clearly in mind that all the great
social institutions that confront us to-day are of genetic origin and
evolution. They have not been devised by man to bring about the true end
of all intelligent effort—namely, happiness. They are simply the
undesigned, unforeseen results of various natural and social forces of
the past. They survive through their tendency to maintain the existence
of the race. They subserve life, not happiness. It is not my intention
to treat marriage historically and trace back the various forms of it to
their social origins. It is sufficient to bear in mind the fact of the
natural, undevised origin of every form, including that form of monogamy
which prevails in the most civilized countries of to-day. _A priori_, we
should have expected that monogamy, being the ideal sex-union of the
civilized races of Western Europe, would have been everywhere the last
form to appear; that, in short, its fitness to survive all other forms
would be shown by lateness of development as well as by superior
qualifications for satisfying the needs of a highly developed humanity.
This is not so, however. Mr. Herbert Spencer gives reasons for believing
that monogamy dates as far back as any other marital relation. “Indeed,
certain modes of life necessitating wide dispersion such as are pursued
by the lowest forest tribes in Brazil and the interior of Borneo—modes
of life which in earlier stages of human evolution must have been
commoner than now—hinder other relations of the sexes.” (_Sociology_,
vol. i. p. 698.) Two of the lowest tribes of savages existing, the
Wood-Veddahs of Ceylon and the Bushmen of South Africa, are customarily
monogamous. It is plain, therefore, that if monogamy is to be reckoned
the final form of sexual relations, no argument can be based on any
theory of its recent date in evolution. The opinion must seek to rest
upon different ground—upon the quality of the institution, its fitness
and adequateness, not only to human needs in the present system of
society, but in the reformed system of the future.
While a number of primitive tribes are monogamous, as also are certain
monkeys and birds, many civilized peoples have adopted polygamy,
sometimes openly, at other times in a masked form. Polyandry is also a
form of marriage not uncommon among semi-civilized peoples, as the Nairs
of Malabar, the Kandyans of Ceylon and the Tibetans.
The Nairs are especially interesting because there is among them a
regulated system of complex marriage which will compare in its results
very favourably with the monogamous marriage of Western nations. The
rule of the Matriarchate prevails, “inheritance is from mother to
daughter and from the uncle to the children of the eldest sister; the
household is directed by the mother or the eldest girl; polyandry and
polygamy exist side by side or are inextricably mixed. Thus each woman
is the wife of several men, each of whom has in turn several wives.”
(Elisee Reclus, _Primitive Folk_, p. 162.) The men are under
well-understood obligations to assist in the support of the domestic
establishments, while the children look up to their mothers and uncles
as their special protectors. The result of these customs on the status
of women is most remarkable. It is said that “in no country are women
more influential and respected than in Malabar.” (Ibid. p. 156.) The
Nair lady may possess property, choose her own husbands and rule her own
children. Marriage is not, as elsewhere, the taking possession of a
woman by the man, but is really her emancipation from male thraldom. It
puts her as nearly on a footing of social equality with the man as is
possible in a semi-militant community. What is it that has decided the
selection or unconscious choice—if we may call it so—of matrimonial
usage among the various races of mankind, since no special form is
necessarily connected with the degree of general civilization? The
conditions and exigencies of social life; and as those conditions and
exigencies change in the future, matrimonial usages will also change. As
a matter of fact, every possible method, speaking generally, has been
adopted. Sometimes a regulated promiscuity—for each man claimed his
rights—sometimes the mixed polyandric and polygamic household;
occasionally simple polyandry or polygamy; at other times monogamy;
marriage experimental also, as with the Redskins of Canada, who pair and
unite for a few days, then quit each other if the trial has not proved
satisfactory to both parties; or temporary marriage as in the case of
the Jews in Morocco, who unite for three or six months according to
agreement; or free marriages as those of the Hottentots and Abyssinians,
who marry, part, and remarry at will; or partial, as the marriages of
the Assanyeh Arabs, which only bind the parties for certain days of the
week. Every possible general method, I repeat, has been tried, and when
the practice hit upon has served human needs and also promoted the
solidarity and increase of the group, it has tended to persist.
In tracing the evolution of the modern European form of monogamous
marriage, we become aware that at a very early period, and for a long
time subsequently, the wife was regarded as the absolute property of the
husband. The wife was a bought or a captured article, and like other
articles of property was at the entire disposal of the owner to use,
sell, lend or abuse as he thought fit. The Roman law makes no essential
difference between the marital law and the law of property, and modern
marriage laws in the different States of Europe and America treat the
wife as if she were in a very large degree a personal possession of her
husband.
The history of modern marriage, in short, is the history of man’s
domination of woman and the measures he has taken to assume, assert and
establish his rights of possession. Amid changing outward conditions of
life, he has made good his claim to control her destiny in accordance
with his own varying desires.
In appraising the value of our much-vaunted monogamy, we must clearly
understand that its legal basis is not, and never was, a strong personal
adhesion of sympathy and affection, but a compact respecting personal
property, involving in the cases where the “contracting parties are
possessed of wealth, both property in person and in things.” It is quite
legal, and indeed quite respectable, for marriages to be formed on a
pecuniary and social foundation, into which love does not enter. The
woman who sells herself in marriage to a man for the sake of money and
position is not regarded as a prostitute, but as a respectable, “honest”
woman who has made a “fortunate” marriage.
To understand how thoroughly marriage is based upon property and not
upon love, it should suffice to contemplate the grounds on which legal
divorce is granted. Divorce is not granted, in this country at least, on
proofs of incompatibility of nature and absence of affection, but on
proof of adultery, in which co-respondents may be compelled to
pecuniarily compensate the husband on account of having made use of his
wife without his permission as her owner. Connivance by the husband
precludes the granting of a divorce. Man’s supremacy and woman’s
subjection become evident in the fact that no amount of simple adultery
in a husband can be made the ground of a divorce, nor is a wife able to
claim any pecuniary compensation from the paramours of a husband.
Matrimony, at this epoch, is for the most part a “commercial
transaction,” but in the words of Herbert Spencer, “already increased
facilities for obtaining divorce point to the probability that whereas
in those early stages during which permanent monogamy was being evolved,
the union by law (originally the act of purchase) was regarded as the
essential part of marriage and the union by affection non-essential; and
whereas at present the union by law is thought the more important and
the union by affection the less important, there will come a time when
the union by affection will be held of primary moment, and the union by
law as of secondary moment; and hence reprobation of marital relations
in which the union by affection has dissolved. That this conclusion will
seem unacceptable to most is probable, I may say certain.” (_Principles
of Sociology_, vol. i. p. 788.)
Herbert Spencer strikes here at the very foundation of modern marriage.
Moreover, in making affection rule sexual relations, he opens up all the
possibilities of other forms of marriage than the monogamous, for
affection may not only be transitory, but unrestricted to one. In face
of the barbarous origin of marriage, there exists no reason why people
of liberal thought should make a dogged, pious stand at monogamy while
lightly dismissing promiscuity, polygamy, polyandry as disreputable
forms of sex-union. Mr. Spencer holds that “the monogamic form of the
sexual relation is manifestly the ultimate form,” but he gives no
reasons to prove his case that are not sufficiently disproved by the
form of marriage existing among the Nairs. Again, the fact of the
numerical equality of the sexes does not make monogamy the only suitable
form, although it supplies a reasonable objection to pure polygamy and
pure polyandry. Mr. Spencer says that “monogamy is a pre-requisite to a
high position of women.” Here he plainly overlooks the facts of the
respected and comparatively independent position of women among peoples
practising mixed polygamy and polyandry under fixed rules and
regulations.
With the actual facts of life before us, we are forced to admit that
under the régime of man’s dominancy and woman’s subjection, monogamy has
been gross throughout all history, while with polyandry it has not been
so. Note, in this regard, one fact alone—jealousy, that mean, selfish
emotion which destroys the happiness of so many lives, is not in
evidence among the simple polyandric Nairs. The associated husbands live
on a good understanding with one another, there is a complete absence of
jealousy. Which of us can say, in view of the monogamy that surrounds
us: Tolstoi’s graphic picture, “the wild beast of jealousy began to roar
in its den,” applies only to a marriage in fiction? It is to monogamy
that we owe the typical domestic tyrant and many tyrannous attributes
that survive in modern masculine human nature. Monogamy, too, has always
been accompanied by other sexual relations in which both sexes are
degraded and one sex is socially and physically ruined. As Mr. W. E. H.
Lecky has pointed out, monogamy on one side of the shield implies
prostitution on the other.
In its normal form, monogamy signifies the attachment of one man to one
woman, involving—first, permanent and exclusive sexual union; second,
conjoint domestic life; third, the generating and rearing of a family;
fourth, social intercourse in the class of society to which the parties
belong. Beyond these features of marriage, the economic and social
forces of the age bring about in the vast majority of marriages a
constant subjection of the wife to the husband, by reason of her being
dependent on him for her living, and a general freedom to the husband
but not to the wife to commit adultery. There is usually compelled also
lateness of marriage, which implies unhealthful, painful conditions of
life in the celibate youth of both sexes. I will ask here: Ought we to
look upon permanency and exclusiveness as essential elements in the form
of sex-union best suited to humanity at the present stage of its
evolving civilization? Permanency is necessarily essential to our ideal
of the final form of marriage, for the strongest, most valuable bond of
affection implies it, and loss of love from whatever cause is a real
calamity. But where that calamity has already befallen, for society to
enforce a mere outward permanency of the matrimonial bond is
irrational—the counterfeit union is productive only of private misery
and public disorder. And further, under our present wretched economic
conditions, the struggle for bread and absence of leisure and freedom in
the case of the workers, and, amid the upper classes, frequent financial
difficulties, false notions and customs of propriety and etiquette—all
these combine to make it rare indeed that a man or woman chances to meet
and unite with his or her counterpart or true life companion.
Commercialism is no safe guide in the quest for a vital, permanent
sex-union, and until commercialism wholly disappears, the exigencies of
life demand freedom of divorce to rectify unavoidable errors of judgment
in matrimony, and make more possible the forming of ties that are truly
and naturally permanent.
As human beings become more moral inwardly and create the outward
conditions in which they can live a truly moral existence, Mr. Emerson’s
principle that the great essentials in human conduct are to escape from
all false ties and to reveal ourselves as we are, will be more and more
acknowledged and acted upon. Great thinkers like Milton in the past and
Herbert Spencer in the present, condemn as contrary to religion and
reason a permanency that involves falsity or absence of love. “It is a
less breach of wedlock,” says Milton, “to part with wise and quiet
consent betimes, than still to foil and profane that mystery of joy and
union with a polluting sadness and perpetual distemper; for it is not
the outward continuing of marriage that keeps whole that covenant, but
whatsoever does most according to peace and love, whether in marriage or
in divorce, he it is that breaks marriage least, it being so often
written that ‘Love only is the fulfilment of every commandment.’” (John
Milton, _The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce_, chap. v.) Divorce made
attainable to all men and women, rich and poor, without any disgraceful
accompaniment, is a necessary condition of progress. And in effect, each
nation of Western Europe accepts and facilitates divorce concurrently
with its advance in civilization.
Not long ago, in my hearing, a Roman Catholic barrister, whose practice
makes him familiar with all that occurs in the Divorce Court, delivered
himself to this effect: “My church anathematises divorce, and to my mind
she is right. But I am not the fool to think that the divorce law passed
in our Statute Books in the year 1858 will ever be annulled or departed
from. In the interests of morality, the pressing desideratum is that the
basis of divorce be made the same for man and woman. It is a crying
iniquity that whereas a husband by avoiding physical force, may legally
be as unfaithful to his marriage vows as he chooses, and may tyrannize
over and trample under his feet the feelings of his wife, one single
slip in an unguarded moment on her part, one act of adultery committed,
it may be in a fit of despair, entitles him by law to repudiate her
summarily as barbarian husbands dismissed their wives.”
While permanency is eminently valuable in sexual relations, can we
venture to say the same as regards exclusiveness? This distinctive
quality of exclusiveness is not an extension of love, but a narrowing of
it down—a restraint upon personal feeling. When woman wins her freedom
and is no longer under any circumstances man’s dependent and slave, but
his friend and comrade in the battle of life, will she restrain the
physical expression of sex-love, yet fearlessly respond to all the
tender ties certain to unite her with the opposite sex? To give at
present a dogmatic reply is impossible. Personally, my instincts—so far
as I know them—accord with Herbert Spencer’s dictum: the ultimate form
of sexual relation will be monogamic; but I recognize my own
limitations. Since the women of my generation are children of
bond-slaves, hampered within and without by survivals from an epoch of
sex subjection wherein man’s dominancy superimposed upon woman a
chastity he repudiated for himself, the standpoint from which the freed
being of the future will decide her sex-morality is not in the grasp of
my apprehension.
Nevertheless, the immediate path of progress is distinctly marked out. I
agree with the author who holds the opinion that: “Better indeed were a
Saturnalia of _free_ men and women than the spectacle which, as it is,
our great cities present at night.” (Edward Carpenter.) But set women
free “from the mere cash-nexus to a husband, from the money slavery of
the streets, from the nameless terrors of social opinion, and from the
threats of the choice of perpetual virginity or perpetual bondage,” and
we need not fear for sex-morality. “Sex in man is an organized passion,
an individual need or impetus; but in woman it may more properly be
termed a constructive instinct, with the larger signification that that
involves.... Nor does she often experience that divorce between the
sentiment of love and the physical passion which is so common with men.
Sex with her is a deep and sacred instinct, carrying with it a sense of
natural purity.” (_Woman_, Edward Carpenter, p. 9.) And from woman
herself let me quote a passage occurring in a women’s journal: “Love is
an emotion separate from sex-impulse, it may or may not exist in
co-relation to it. The testimony easily taken from the lives of many
women is to the effect that love enters not into the impulse which,
active and unrestrained on the part of those to whom they are yoked for
life, has created for them a life which can be called by no name save
slavery.” (_Shafts_, October, 1895.) Again, turning to the opposite sex,
Havelock Ellis states (in his study of _Man and Woman_, Contemporary
Science Series) that: “In women men find beings who have not wandered so
far as men from the typical life of earth’s creatures; women are for men
the human embodiments of the restful responsiveness of Nature.”
I am convinced that however polygamous the male-sex—under a system of
industrial commercialism may appear—the great mass of our women are not
licentious and not polyandrous in tendency. While a Saturnalia of free
men and women would, as compared with present sexual conditions, be a
preferable evil, we need not in our forecast of the future dread such a
Saturnalia, or face its possibility. It is a libel on humanity to assume
that no self-restraints are inherent to withhold mankind from sexual
excesses when freed from control by Church and State. And although it
might be said that “the growing complexity of man’s nature would be
likely to lead him into more rather than fewer sex relations, on the
other hand it is obvious that as the depth and subtlety of any
attachment that really holds him increases, so does such attachment
become more permanent and durable and less likely to be realized in a
number of persons.... In man and woman we find a distinct tendency
towards the formation of this double unit of wedded life ... and while
we do not want to stamp such natural unions with any false
irrevocability or dogmatic exclusiveness, what we do want is a
recognition to-day of the tendency to their formation as a natural fact
independent of any artificial laws.” (_Marriage_, Edward Carpenter, p.
31.)
The natural restraints or checks upon undue indulgence in
sex-intercourse extend from the physical or material plane to the
spiritual plane. These are—considerations of health; feelings of
unselfishness and social duty; and a spiritual, i.e. an ideal,
conception of humanity and of all the manifold relations of life.
Unselfishness is pre-eminently the natural check and regulator of sex
relations, and not until love is emancipated from selfishness will it
reach an ideal form. If we love unselfishly we desire the happiness and
freedom of the being loved even to the extent of self-abnegation;
tyranny and jealousy become impossible. All natural checks will
necessarily strengthen and grow as humanity rises higher in the scale of
being; moreover, education is bound—under racial progress—to become to
each succeeding generation a much more adequate guide than hitherto.
Even in the present day, it would not be difficult to get youths and
girls at the age of romance to understand that “though they may have to
contend with some superfluity of passion in early years, the most
permanent and deeply-rooted desire within them will, in all probability,
lead them at last to find their complete happiness and self-fulfilment
only in a close union with a life-mate”; to understand also that
“towards this end they must be prepared to use self-control, to prevent
the aimless straying of their passions, and patience and tenderness
towards the realization of the union when its time comes.” (Edward
Carpenter.) This teaching would bring to the young a far truer
conception of the sacredness of marriage than our marriage laws and
customs give.
It must never be forgotten, however, that this question of marriage and
every other social question must be viewed in relation to kindred
topics. A sectional treatment of society will surely mislead if we fail
to recall the changes going forward in every department of life, and the
close connexion that exists between the forces of social and individual
evolution. Scientific meliorism implies a reconstruction of domestic
life; and, within the new environment, the instructing of youth and its
guidance in sex-conduct will become comparatively easy. Nor is it only
by the training and guidance of youth that marriage will be favourably
affected in a new domestic system. The tendency to tyranny within the
home—an abhorrent feature of past monogamy—will have no opportunity to
appear; and two undesirable female types—the idle fine lady and the
household drudge—will become as extinct as the dodo.
Outside the precincts of home, large social and industrial changes will
promote the disappearance of the prostitute, and finally there will
emerge the truly emancipated woman, fearless and enlightened—a capable
guide to man in the task of consciously subordinating passions that are
selfish and transitory to those deeper attachments and higher emotions
that give birth to spiritual love. “Is marriage a failure?” has been
boldly asked and widely discussed in comparatively recent years; and
that the audible answer—sadly re-echoed in thousands of hearts—was in
the affirmative, shows a wholesome awakening to facts—an awakening that
inevitably precedes all real reforms in an epoch of conscious evolution.
So permeated with selfishness is the mental atmosphere surrounding all
questions of sex that the rule of life I here indicate will be utterly
distasteful to those who accept the régime of custom. Yet as regards
morality or an ethical code, there are two, and two only, logical
attitudes of mind. Either we must think of the stamping out of all
sexual feeling on the ground of its purely animal nature, and limiting
physical union to the utmost that is compatible with perpetuation of
species; or we must think of a gradual elevating of sexual instinct and
action to a dignified position in human life with due consideration for
the desires and needs of every one after puberty is reached. The first
is practically impossible to the vast majority of the race at its
present stage of development. They would simply refuse submission to the
intolerable restraints necessitated. In effect, the ascetic answer to
problems of sex is no actual solution, but a shelving of the fundamental
question, with a tacit acceptance of the prodigious evils around us in
respect both of sex-union and the advent of children. The only rational
course is that of elevating and regulating these relations in view of
human happiness. This implies a steady repression of anti-social
emotions and persistent cultivation of unselfishness. Our marital habits
of selfish appropriation and jealous control are in direct opposition to
the moral elevation of sexual instinct. Selfishness degrades where it
penetrates, and the problem is to rescue our sexual forces from
selfishness, and utilize these forces, i.e. make them subserve the
interests of social virtue. Hitherto, they have been ignored and
neglected—a result of false thinking and ascetic teaching, while in
actual life they have run riot, creating incalculable evils.
The British race publicly professes monogamy and preaches to the young a
Puritan doctrine. Privately the drama enacted would disgrace a
civilization of the Middle Ages. In the lower classes wife-beating and
murder, in the upper classes the hideous revelations of the Divorce
Court, witness to the impurity and the misery of our boasted monogamy.
We tolerate licence, we condemn and conceal vicious propensities; we
harbour a social evil of gigantic magnitude, we permit hypocrisy to
prevail, we instigate the young to form self-interested mercantile
marriages. We are corrupt in our social life and mentally debased, for
we refuse to think out a rational code of sex morals, and without that
we shall never attain to a lofty conception, a true ideal of what life
ought to be. Our modern monogamy in its inwardness is not falsely
pictured in this indictment: “The commercialism which buys and sells all
human things; the narrow physical passion of jealousy; the petty sense
of private property in another person; social opinions and legal
enactments, have all converged to choke and suffocate wedded love in
egoism, lust and meanness.” (Edward Carpenter’s _Marriage_, p. 38.)
In view of general happiness and virtue, we must seek the abrogation of
all laws based on or involving sex-inequality. And, further, that
marriage may become transformed into a sacred, sympathetic and permanent
bond—a deeper and truer relation of life—we must seek facilities for
divorce or the abrogation of the specific law that binds beings together
for life in ill-assorted or artificial unions.
CHAPTER V
PARENTAGE
The simple fact that the birth of a human being, the image of God, as
religious people say, is in so many cases regarded as of very much
less importance than that of a domestic animal, proves the degraded
condition in which we live.—AUGUST BEBEL.
The reproduction of species yields to no other special function of life
in respect of importance and the wide scope of its vital issues.
Notwithstanding that vast numbers of illegitimate children are born in
every civilized country where monogamy reigns, this function of
reproduction is popularly regarded as allied with marriage in the order
of a natural and necessary consequence—a result irrespective of human
will. Now scientific meliorism makes a clear distinction between
marriage and parentage on the ground that, while the former
comparatively is of insignificant importance to the interests of
humanity in general, parentage is of vital moment to these interests;
moreover, between the two there exists no integral or essential
relation. On the one hand, progeny spring from unions not legalized by
marriage; on the other, many married people, swayed by motives chiefly
egoistic, but sometimes altruistic, are consciously exercising a
voluntary restraint over propagation.
The late Matthew Arnold tells us that when gazing on one occasion in
company with a benevolent man upon a multitude of slum children eaten up
with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half-clothed, neglected by their
parents, without health, without home, without hope, the good man said:
“The one thing really needful is to teach these little ones to succour
one another, if only with a cup of cold water.” Mr. Arnold promptly
rejected that theory. “So long as the multitude of these poor children
is perpetually swelling,” said he, “they must be charged with misery to
themselves and us, whether they help one another with a cup of cold
water or no, and the knowledge how to prevent them accumulating is what
we want.” That knowledge is no longer inaccessible to man. There are
known rational methods by which to keep the populating tendency within
due limits, and at the same time to promote individual prudence,
foresight and self-dependence.
Neo-Malthusianism, with its power of subjugating the law of population
and deferring parentage, is a new key to the social position, and
neo-Malthusian practice has already taken root in British society. The
discovery is of vast significance, so great are its latent possibilities
of promoting universal happiness. But as long as reproduction of human
physical life is left to haphazard, and the rule of private, personal
interests alone, without any honourable recognition, intelligent
guidance, or moral and economic support, the immediate effect on
national life is, and will continue to be, the very reverse of
beneficial.
Matthew Arnold’s exhortation in respect of the slum children was: “We
must let conscience play freely and simply upon the facts of the case;
we must listen to what it tells us of the intelligible law of things as
concerns these children, and what it tells us is that a man’s children
are not really sent any more than the pictures upon his walls or the
horses in his stable are sent, and that to bring people into the world
when one cannot afford to keep them and oneself decently, or to bring
more of them into the world than one can afford to keep thus, is by no
means an accomplishment of the Divine Will or a fulfilment of nature’s
simplest laws, but is contrary to reason and the will of God.” (_Culture
and Anarchy_, p. 246.)
This remonstrance addressed to the rich (these alone have pictures on
their walls and horses in their stables) may have had some effect, for
certain it is that in the upper classes artificial checks to conception
are now widely used, while slum children show no tendency to
proportionately diminish in number. Individuals whose standard of living
is high, and whose pecuniary means are small, or who are thoughtful,
intelligent, prudent, either refrain from marriage, or, marrying, check
propagation. The natural result is that children of the comparatively
superior types are becoming numerically weaker than children of the
thoughtless, reckless members of society who exercise their reproductive
powers to the utmost. It is supremely important that we should recognize
how parentage bears upon human life and happiness in far wider relations
than either sexual union alone or marriage alone.
Maintenance of species has hitherto been accomplished at an enormous
sacrifice of individual life. The requirement that there shall arise a
full number of adults in successive generations is fulfilled by means
which subordinate the existing and next succeeding members of the
species in various degrees. (See Herbert Spencer’s _Principles of
Sociology_, vol. i. p. 621.)
Among low forms—inferior to the human organism—the germs of new
individuals are produced in immense numbers, the larger part of the
parental substance being sometimes transformed into these germs. Birth
here may be immediately followed by the death of the parent organism,
and an immense mortality of the young may take place—consequent on
defenceless exposure, insufficient food and other untoward conditions.
“Of a million minute ova left uncared for, the majority are destroyed
before they are hatched, so that very few have considerable amounts of
individual life.” (Ibid. p. 622.)
Throughout the course of evolution the natural order in moving from
higher to higher types is a gradual decrease of this condition, viz. the
sacrifice of individual life to the life of the species, and at the same
time an increase of compensating pleasures allied with the reproductive
function. When illustrating this natural order, Herbert Spencer points
to the methods among fishes and amphibians contrasted with those among
birds and mammals. The spawn of the former when safely deposited is
generally left to its fate.[3] There is physical cost to adults with
apparently no accompanying gratifications. Birds and mammals, however,
carefully rear and tend their offspring. “The activities of parenthood
are sources of agreeable emotions, just as are the activities which
achieve self-sustentation.”
Footnote 3:
There are exceptions to the rule, as in the case of the male
stickleback.
Passing from the less intelligent vertebrates which produce many young
at short intervals and abandon them at an early age, to the more
intelligent higher vertebrates which produce few young at longer
intervals and aid them for longer periods, this principle clearly
emerges—“While the rate of juvenile mortality is diminished, there
results both a lessened physical cost of maintaining the species and an
augmented satisfaction of the affections.” (_Principles of Sociology_,
vol. i. p. 628.)
There is no reversal of this genetic order of nature in the epoch of
conscious evolution. The processes are different, because man possesses
developed intellect, aided by scientific knowledge and invention as a
new and skilled ally in the struggle to maintain his species at less and
less cost of individual life and happiness; but the general forward
movement takes precisely the same course. With the highest evolved type
of man this sacrifice of individual life to the species is reduced to a
minimum, while the interests of species are conserved in a painless, a
wholly superior manner. And, further, the entire range of domestic
feelings—parental, filial, fraternal and intimately social, become
extended and increasingly capable of bestowing enduring pleasure. The
ultimate goal is easy maintenance of species, without—to any
unpleasurable extent—subordinating single members of species to that
end.
Love of offspring, as already explained, has no reproductive instinct at
its base. It is a feeling—superimposed on organic nature—dependent on
family life or arrangements that involve parental care and more or less
of adult activity directed to the well-being of the young. This
sentiment of love of offspring or philoprogenitiveness, is well
established in the British race; but with rampant poverty in our midst,
can we wonder that in hundreds of thousands of individual cases the
paternal relation—so capable of filling the heart with tender emotions
and joy—creates an actual disgust, or a feeling of despair, malignancy,
even injustice, as is shown in the touching little satire, _Ginx’s
Baby_. Ginx frankly gave his wife notice that, as his utmost efforts
could scarcely maintain their existing family, if she ventured to
present him with any more, either single or twins ... “he would most
assuredly drown him.” Later, when the arrival of number thirteen is
imminent—the wife being unable longer to hide the impending event—Ginx
fixed his determination by much thought and a little extra drinking. He
argued thus: “He wouldn’t go on the parish. He couldn’t keep another
youngster to save his life. He had never taken charity and never would.
There was nothink to do with it but drown it.”
Nor is even the maternal relation proof against bitterness in untoward
conditions, although the feelings will be differently expressed, and may
possibly assume a pious garb. “I’ve ’ad my fifteen or my twenty on ’em,
but, thank ’eaven, the churchyard ’as stood my friend.” These or similar
words have often been heard in an English factory town. The women
speaking thus were not otherwise callous or incapable of mother-love.
They were gentle, patient, toiling drudges, who had had the
philoprogenitiveness of average human nature and the tender joys of
maternity perverted into secret care and open hypocritical cant by the
physical strain of a too-frequent child-bearing, combined with the
miseries of ceaseless labour, pinched means, and comfortless, crowded
homes.
The frequent advent of children who are unwelcome to their own parents
in a society no longer ignorant of the scientific means by which its
weakest members may avoid parentage, without any destruction of life or
any injury to sexual function, is marvellously irrational, and it
indicates divergence from the well-marked path of evolutional progress.
Opposition to neo-Malthusian practice arises from primitive conceptions
of life (conceptions antecedent to evolutional theory), while all the
various undefined scruples painfully experienced by individuals are
survivals of the sentiment allied with these false conceptions.
Prejudice dies slowly, as ignorance is dispelled by the growing light of
new knowledge.
I have shown that asceticism is an immoral principle, the action of
which tends to fill individual life with gloom and depression, and to
thwart or counteract general happiness. I have also shown the absolute
necessity for retarding the multiplication of human beings to suit the
limits of available subsistence. And now, after pointing out that
philoprogenitiveness—which is the groundwork of domestic and social
virtue, and ought to be the mainspring of reproduction of species—is
continually liable to be strained, depressed or perverted into
anti-social bitterness in parental bosoms among the lower classes, I
must ask the question: How otherwise than by the easiest method known to
science could the difficulties of the position be met and overcome?
Messrs. Patrick Geddes and J. A. Thomson, in their treatise on the
_Evolution of Sex_, urge the necessity of what they call “an ethical
rather than a mechanical prudence after marriage, of a temperance
recognized to be as binding on husband and wife as chastity on the
unmarried.” (_The Evolution of Sex_, p. 297.) But what do these
gentlemen mean by the temperance here recommended? It is surely well
known that the birth of a large family is perfectly consistent with a
sparing, most temperate exercise of the procreative function; and surely
also it would be folly on our part to look for parental conduct
controlled by ethical motive in the warrens of the poor of our large
cities, from whence springs an important section of the national life.
(_Social Control of the Birth Rate_, Pamphlet by G. A. Gaskell.)
In the homes of the upper classes, adorned with all the amenities and
refinements of civilization, parental prudence results mainly from
egoistic motive. Practical reformers will hesitate to assume that
those—the less favoured social units—are likely to surpass these in
moral elevation, and demean themselves generally in a superior manner!
But further, a parental prudence, dispensing with mechanical methods of
checking propagation, may even prove the converse of ethical conduct.
Advanced sexual morality requires a free and healthful exercise of
sexual function. That such freedom is not possible under present social
conditions is irrelevant to the question at issue; the point is that
conduct unnecessarily traversing this advanced sexual morality is not in
accordance with rationalized social ethics; it has no scientific basis.
Parental morals must conform to the principle indicated by Herbert
Spencer—reduce to a minimum the sacrifice of individual life and
happiness to the life of the species; augment to the maximum the joys of
affection involved in parental relations. This is possible to a race
among which are beings of low intelligence and unrestrained passion only
by bringing into play the laws of heredity through rational breeding.
But rational breeding depends on an appeal to ordinary egoistic motive
and practical resort to the painless mechanical means of checking
conception.
There is no general unwillingness to limit their families among the
poor; what is lacking consists simply in power of control over the
physical conditions of fertility. To see children half-starved and wives
sickly and miserable is no more pleasant to parents of the Ginx order
than to those of us who view it from a safe distance; and there is ample
intelligence to perceive the connexion between, on the one hand,
discomfort and poverty attendant on a family of ten or twelve, on the
other, comparative comfort allied with a family of only three or four.
A code of ethics covering the interests of the entire nation commands
strenuous effort on the part of all thoughtful, intelligent people to
make the artificial checks known to the thoughtless and unintelligent.
It is not by proudly rejecting scientific invention in this matter that
we shall attain to development of higher and higher types of man, but by
skilfully using it as a powerful ally in our struggle to maintain and
regenerate species at less and less cost to individual happiness.
Apart altogether from man’s partial practice of neo-Malthusian art,
under egoistic motives, civilization has created an interference with
the original order of race preservation under generous or altruistic
motive. Social feeling slowly developing revolts—in detail—from the
cruel method of the law of natural selection. It spontaneously
supersedes that law by one of sympathetic selection. But whereas the
former law issued in survival of the fittest, the latter issues day by
day in indiscriminate survival, and consequent race deterioration. A
controlled rate of increase is not therefore the only position to which
reason and science must guide us; we have further to escape from the
disastrous consequences of the above law and pass to conditions of life
evolved under the benign influence of a rational and moral law—a law of
social selection, resulting in appropriate birth, or the birth of the
socially fit.
There are thousands of our present day population with whom family life
is no whit superior to that of birds, whose pairing is immediately
followed by rapid breeding and a complete scattering of the brood when
the young are barely fledged. A wise philanthropy in line with the march
of progressive evolution may lift these thousands to the level of the
higher vertebrates, “which produce few young at longer intervals and
give them aid for longer periods.” The recalcitrant minority refusing to
practice parental prudence must be treated by society as abnormal
individuals, incapable of rising to the standard of average civilized
human nature, and these must be subjected to social restraint.
_PART III_
ABNORMAL HUMANITY
Men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things.
—From _In Memoriam_.
THE ELIMINATION OF CRIME
Many a man thinks that it is his goodness which keeps him from crime,
when it is only his full stomach. On half allowance, he would be as
ugly and knavish as anybody. Don’t mistake potatoes for
principles.—CARLYLE.
A normal child of five years once asked the meaning of this
expression—“hanging a murderer,” and after explanation said eagerly,
“But will hanging the man make that other man alive again?” On receiving
a negative reply, the remonstrance burst forth, “Then why kill him,
since when he is dead we can never make him good again?”
This is a true picture of the thinking and feeling about crime which is
natural to the best types of our present-day humanity. These demand that
our punishments shall either reform the criminal or protect society
effectively from his malfeasance. As a matter of fact, our criminal code
and whole machinery and procedure relative to crime accomplish neither,
and this is freely admitted by men whose position enables them to judge
accurately and entitles them to express an opinion.
Mr. Justice Matthew has said at the Birmingham Assizes that the present
state of the criminal law is a hundred years behind the times. Sir
Edmund Du Cane, Chairman of the Directors of Convict Prisons, says of
the solitary system practised in our penal prisons: “It is an artificial
state of existence, absolutely opposed to that which nature points out
as the condition of mental, moral and physical health.... The minds of
the prisoners become enfeebled by long-continued isolation.” In the
Official Report of the Departmental Committee on Prisons, 1895, these
words occur: “The prisoners have been treated too much as a hopeless or
worthless part of the community. The moral condition in which a large
number of prisoners leave the prison, and the serious number of
recommittals, have led us to think there is ample cause for a searching
inquiry into the main features of prison life.” The late Judge
Fitz-Stephen published his _History of the Criminal Law_ in 1883, and
pointed there to “notorious evils of which it is difficult,” said he,
“to find a satisfactory remedy.” Nevertheless, he put down his finger on
the crucial spot when he wrote “the law proceeds upon the principle that
it is morally right to hate criminals. It confirms and justifies that
sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishment which expresses it.”
But it is not right to hate criminals. It is morally wrong, i.e. it is
contrary to these laws of nature, by which alone an elevated and happy
social life may be attained. The emotion of hatred creates vibrations
producing evil on the moral plane, as certainly as discordant sounds,
acting on sensitive ears, produce discomfort; and, if persisted in,
produce organic disorganization on the physical plane. Hence, all
punishment or legal procedure directed against crime, having hatred at
its foundation, or historic base, must fail. On the negative side,
hatred has proved ineffectual in protecting society from crime. On the
positive side, it increases the anti-social feelings, whose natural
outcome is crime, and frustrates, or annuls, the human forces of love,
which already widely existent, and swaying humanity’s best types, are
the true evolutional factors by which to annihilate crime.
Mr. Justice Matthew was simply asserting a fact of social science when
he stated that the criminal law is out of date. It consists with a
primitive stage of social life; but it is totally inconsistent with even
the semi-civilization of to-day. The fundamental discord between our
action and feeling relative to crime declares itself in the uncertainty
of a criminal’s fate and the steady survival of his type. But, my
reader, while accepting Justice Matthew’s premise, may doubt the
conclusion at which Judge Fitz-Stephen arrived—that vindictiveness or
hate lies at the root of our criminal code, and that our punishments
express it. Moreover, he may condemn by anticipation a supposed tendency
on my part to censure all punishments, and rely solely on a
_laissez-faire_ system of dealing with crime. Scientific meliorism,
however, does not imply anarchy or the absence of governing law. Its
methods repudiate the _laissez-faire_ principle in every department of
life, for this reason: Our developed faculties and accumulated knowledge
make untenable the negative or inert position. We are impelled in an
epoch of conscious evolution to take positive action favourable to
progress.
My contention is this: love of all men, not hatred of any man or class
of men ought to be the basis of our criminal code. Modern science,
experience and skill are competent to redeem the criminal class,
speaking generally, and in exceptional cases, where redemption is
impossible, can render the criminal innocuous to society, while giving
him throughout life such innocent happiness as a being organically
defective may enjoy.
This thesis embraces a very wide range of action. It means the
systematic rational treatment of evil-doers, from the refractory infant
and juvenile pickpocket to the burglar, the fraudulent bankrupt, the
felon, the traitor, the murderer, and if any exist, the born criminal.
It signifies, in short, a complete science complementary to that of true
education. For whereas the latter comprises all manner of attractive
stimuli to noble living, this is the science of necessary social
restraints to be applied in nursery, school and prison with the
universal gentleness which springs from universal love. The purpose to
be aimed at is, first, improving character by restraining obnoxious
tendencies; second, reforming character already become anti-social;
third, protecting society from all corrupt infusion that might proceed
from morally diseased character.
A leading principle of the criminal law of Great Britain is that
punishment be adjusted in proportion to the supposed magnitude of each
individual offence. If we study this principle, we must perceive the
truth of Judge Fitz-Stephen’s allegation, for what connexion has it with
the reformation of the criminal? A judge or a jury makes no attempt to
compute the amount of prison restraint and discipline necessary to
reformation, nor are they possessed of facts for forming a judgment.
Their whole attention has been focussed on the crime, not on the
character of the criminal, or the antecedent and future conditions
affecting the character. Neither does the judicial sentence connect
itself proportionately with the mischief done to society. A fraudulent
banker or commercial speculator, whose downfall involves the ruin of
thousands, is not dealt with, as compared with a petty thief, on a scale
of severity expressive of the magnitude of suffering entailed. And the
petty thief, who steals the rich man’s goods, as compared with the
criminal who beats and abuses his wife, is adjudged a severer penalty—a
measure of punishment indicating the superior value of goods over wives,
which is a sentiment appropriate only to barbarous times.
These anomalies, however, are explainable. Our laws have descended to us
from a barbarous age, when might was right, irrespective of justice; and
from a race whose punishments sprang from revenge, and were roughly
proportioned to the feeling of revenge. They are little else than
reactionary forces, of which some are always present in an inchoate
society. Their inapplicability to the task of reforming criminals is
easily proved.
In Scotland in a single year not fewer than “six hundred and ninety
persons were committed to prison who had been in confinement at least
ten times before. Of these, three hundred and ninety-three had been in
prison at least twenty times before, and twenty-three at least fifty
times!” (_Hill on Crime_, p. 28.) These figures speak for themselves.
Our whole system is glaringly unscientific. We do not remove the
conditions that act as causes of crime. We punish, and sometimes
severely, yet we let loose again offenders not one whit more prepared
than before to withstand the temptations of freedom. We calmly support
and approve an enormous expenditure of public funds upon criminals and
crime; we carefully select good men to be prison managers, officers and
chaplains; we secure cleanliness and sanitation within the prisons, and
so forth; but these efforts are utterly futile because the system is
wrong—the criminal law of Great Britain is based upon a false, an
irrational principle.
The causes of crime within our province to deal with are of a two-fold
nature—objective and subjective. Poverty, i.e. hunger and want, a slum
environment, rough handling in infancy and childhood, a mischievous
training and the absence of all conditions favourable to gentle,
virtuous life—these are some of the objective causes creating crime
which society is bound to remove. Among causes deciding the innate
character of every newly-born babe, the forces of heredity stand out
conspicuously. I have demonstrated that aggregate humanity, in a
scientific age, has the means of controlling these forces and directing
them to the production of physical, mental and moral health in the
individual, and consequently in the community. The born criminal type
may become gradually improved by careful and wise treatment under
life-long restraints. Meanwhile, to seek reformation of this type, by
prison discipline alone, and treat it by methods adapted to corrigible
culprits, is a folly dishonouring to the developed reason of man. We
have abundant evidence that the type exists. Mr. Frederick Hill, late
Inspector of Prisons, says: “Nothing has been more clearly shown in the
course of my inquiries than that crime is hereditary to a considerable
extent ... it proceeds from father to son in a long line of succession.”
(_Hill on Crime_, p. 55.) Mr. J. B. Thomson, Resident Surgeon of the
Perth Prison, states of the facts of prison life: “They press on my mind
the conviction that crime in general is a moral disease of a chronic and
congenital nature, intractable when transmitted from generation to
generation.” And Mr. George Combe, speaking of prisons in the United
States of America, wrote: “I have put the question to many keepers of
prisons whether they believed in the possibility of reforming all
offenders. From those whose minds were humane and penetrating, I have
received the answer—they did not, for experience had convinced them that
some criminals are incorrigible by any human means hitherto discovered.
These incorrigibles,” says George Combe—and this is the point to
observe, “were always found to have defective organizations; ... they
are morally idiotic; and justice, as well as humanity, dictates our
treating them as patients. They labour under great natural defects; ...
to punish them for actions proceeding from these natural defects is no
more just or beneficial to society than it would be to punish men for
having crooked spines or club feet.” (George Combe’s _Moral Philosophy_,
p. 306.) And I could refer to many more authorities on the subject were
it necessary.
Accepting the theory that our born-criminals are victims of moral
disease, the question arises—how should we treat them? Fifty years ago
we sorely maltreated our victims to mental disease. We bound them hand
and foot, we punished them sternly for their congenital defects, we
shunned and hated them, and because they were martyrs to a pitiful
disease we made them also the victims of unnecessary and cruel
sufferings. Few men to-day could glance without a shudder at the record
of our treatment of lunatics. We consign the history gladly to oblivion,
and point to changes betokening the better feeling of to-day. “No one
thinks of sending a madman to a lunatic asylum for a certain number of
days, weeks or months. We carefully ascertain that he is unfit to be at
large, and that those in whose hands we are about to place him act under
due inspection and have the knowledge and skill which afford the best
hope for his cure; that they will be kind to him, and inflict no more
pain than is necessary for his secure custody ... we leave it to them to
determine if, or when, he can be safely liberated.” (_Hill on Crime_, p.
151.)
These are the lines on which also should run our treatment of moral
disease. If a man is unfit morally to be at large, we must narrow the
conditions of his life, but make it as enjoyable within the coercive
restraints as is compatible with improvement. And on no account must we
restore his liberty until those who professionally and officially watch
his daily conduct are convinced that he will not again be likely to
abuse that liberty.
But apart altogether from individual delinquents, the subjective racial
tendency to crime demands special treatment, and in this regard I
maintain that the enlightened action of an advanced society will be
analogous to the ignorant action of an earnest church in the Middle Ages
with precisely opposite results. “The long period of the Dark Ages,
under which Europe lay, was due, I believe, in a very considerable
degree,” says Francis Galton, “to the celibacy enjoined by religious
orders on their votaries. Whenever a man or woman was possessed of a
gentle nature that fitted him or her to deeds of charity, to meditation,
to literature or to art, the social condition of the time was such that
they had no refuge elsewhere than in the bosom of the church. But the
church preached and exacted celibacy. The consequence was that these
gentle natures had no continuance, and by a policy so singularly unwise
and suicidal that I am hardly able to speak of it without impatience,
the church brutalized the breed of our forefathers. She acted as if she
aimed at selecting the rudest portion of the community to be alone the
parents of future generations. She practised the arts which breeders
would use who aimed at creating ferocious, currish and stupid natures.
No wonder that club law prevailed for centuries over Europe; the wonder
is, that enough good remained in the veins of Europeans to enable their
race to rise to its present very moderate level of natural morality.”
(_Hereditary Genius_, F. Galton, p. 356.)
A humane society, guided by rational forces in the epoch of conscious
evolution, will practise the policy of the church of the Middle Ages on
a different class of subjects. It will gather poor criminals into its
bosom, and secure for them a safe and happy refuge while exacting
celibacy. The racial blood shall not be poisoned by moral disease. The
guardians of the present-day social life dare not be careless of future
social life and the happiness of generations unborn; therefore the
criminal breed must be forcibly restrained from perpetuating its kind.
Now mark the result. Not gentle natures—as in the case of the church—but
the innately vicious natures will have no continuance. The criminal type
slowly but surely disappears.
To promote the contentment and comfort of congenital criminals within
their asylum or prison home an alternative to celibacy might be offered,
viz. surgical treatment, to render the male incapable of reproduction.
(The treatment indicated is not the operation ordinarily performed upon
some domestic animals; this, applied to human beings, would be morally
and physically injurious. Particulars of the appropriate method were
published in the _British Medical Journal_ as early as May 2, 1874, at
p. 586.) Were this course voluntarily chosen, the sexes might
intermingle without danger to posterity; and since fuller social life
tends to make all human beings happier, these convicts would become more
manageable, and coercive restraints cease to be indispensable.
But the criminal stock is not great when compared with the actual crimes
of to-day. Crime in a vast measure is simply produced by the outward
accidental conditions of life—an evil environment and a grossly
inadequate training. If we alter the environment of our masses—by
establishing a new industrial system that banishes poverty from the
land, by initiating a Malthusian and neo-Malthusian practice that puts
the physical life on a healthy basis, by creating a family life suitable
to man’s emotional nature, and supplying a true education that embraces
scientific restraints on all anti-social tendencies—then, but not till
then, will crime and the criminal type alike become things of the past.
We are surrounded to-day in our reformatories and board schools, in our
homes and on our streets, by children of naïvely-disobedient or
rebellious tendency. These are the embryo criminals of a few years
hence. When a clever romanticist makes one his hero, and describes the
development of trickiness in the child, and how he uses it as a weapon
of defence against the “polissman” whom he defies, trips up and
otherwise evades (_Cleg Kelly_, by Crockett), we read the account
without compunction, nay, we relish the humour of the situation, and
half approve the issue! Yet this assuredly is no legitimate outcome of
childish bravery and sportiveness. Our levity arises from the underlying
conviction, or the universal feeling begotten of genetic evolution, that
the policeman’s jurisdiction here is flagrantly inappropriate.
Infantile disobedience and full-fledged crime seem far apart, but they
are united by an inward deteriorating process, an outward chain of
trespasses more or less petty. The links are all there, connecting the
tender babe and fascinating street-arab with the thief and murderer.
Similarly, on the moral plane, flow the sequences of cause and effect
that bring retribution—that inalienable feature of the law of evolution.
The crime that society deplores is the natural penalty for society’s
neglect of children; and there is no escape from the penalty as long as
the cause continues. Nor can society plead ignorance here. Herbert
Spencer and Ruskin have spoken out plainly on this subject. “What we
need is cessation from all these antagonisms which keep alive the brutal
elements of human nature, and persistence in a peaceful life, giving
unchequered play to the sympathies.” (_Herbert Spencer on Arbitration._)
“It is,” says Ruskin, “the lightest way of killing to stop a man’s
breath. But if you bind up his thoughts by lack of true education, if
you blind his eyes, if you blunt his hopes, if you steal his joys, if
you stunt his body and blast his soul ... this you think no sin!”
Verily, there _is sin_, acknowledged by the noblest, wisest of men, and
brought home to us on the lips of babes—“Why kill the man, since when he
is dead we can never make him good again!”
Society has to compass the task of making men good from the beginning;
and in exceptional cases, where the task is impossible, the victims are
simply society’s patients, to be impounded without hurt. We are as able
to protect our social life from moral as from mental lunatics. The
initial step, however (hardly yet taken), is to pass from the mental
attitude of a barbarous race, whose habits of defence are those of
arbitrary punishment, to that of a civilized nation bent on reforming
its criminals, and treating its morally diseased members with uniform
humanity and brotherly love. As yet the resources of man’s reason and
scientific knowledge and aptitude have never been called into play to
devise a system of consecutive restraints on the “brutal elements,” a
system to make men good from the beginning by “working out the beast.”
The crux of the problem is how to imbue children painlessly with the
truth that social life has responsibilities and limitations, obedience
to which is indispensable. And I submit that this may be done in the
homes and nurseries of the future, under a scientifically adapted system
of training. Hard blows and even chiding tones of the human voice must
have no place in childhood’s environment, but authority may be exercised
through the use of a simple appliance for limiting infant freedom. When
baby trespasses against some natural law of health or social life, of
which he knows nothing, he is gently but promptly and firmly placed in a
baby-prison standing within reach, viz. a goodly-sized basket, high at
the sides, softly cushioned all round and weighted, so that it cannot be
overturned by the infant culprit, who, if refractory, may kick or scream
in safety there till the paroxysm passes, and he falls asleep. On waking
he recalls vaguely, when older, more clearly the occurrence, and he
becomes lightly possessed by a subtle sense of authority quite distinct
from individual kindness or unkindness. His human relations are unhurt
by the necessary training in infancy. He has been checked in wrong-doing
without any wrong association of ideas, and without an awakening of
anti-social feeling.
I have seen an ignorant nurse teach a child to seek solace for pain in
an anti-social emotion! “Beat the naughty chair that has hurt poor
baby’s head,” was the evil counsel, and the child held out to the chair
struck his tiny revengeful blows, and was kissed and caressed in
consequence. This happened in a rich man’s nursery. Could one blame the
ignorant nurse? Her infancy was passed in a city slum, and in every such
locality children swarm who freely strike out both in self-protection
and brutal aggressiveness. From birth these little ones live more or
less in an atmosphere of savage assault. Tyranny and force are the
ruling conditions of their childhood, and the natural result—under the
unalterable law of cause and effect—is this: vindictive, barbaric
feeling is carried hither and thither throughout society at large, and
degrades every social class.
When home-life in the middle classes has been reorganized, and nursery
training is the outcome of scientific thought, children there at least
will escape this taint. They will pass from nursery to schoolroom with
nerves that have never been unnecessarily jarred. They will be
physically stronger, and in temperament more serene. Reared without
harshness, they will know no craven fear; and since the native attitude
of childhood towards elders never seen angry or cross is that of
confiding love, teachers will have no difficulty in bringing into play
the tender emotions that are natural checks upon evil doing, and natural
incentives to effort in action that is right. If playfulness intrudes,
and the serious work of a class is hindered by some little urchin’s fun,
the master or mistress needs neither to scold nor to cane the offender,
for unspoken satisfaction and dissatisfaction are quickly perceived and
responded to by children unused to punishment or an elder’s frown.
But even in the schoolroom an appeal to mechanism may sometimes prove
useful. An instrument called “a characterograph” was described by its
inventor to an Edinburgh audience half a century ago. This instrument
for registering had been in use in Lady Byron’s Agricultural School at
Ealing Grove, with moral effects markedly beneficial. There were many
comments in the press of that period. It supersedes all necessity for
prizes, place-taking, or any kind of reward or punishment, and renders
unnecessary the master’s expressing anger or irritation—“the worst
example a teacher can set to his pupils.” (Mr. E. T. Craig was inventor
of the characterograph.)
If we bear in mind that the supreme object of training is _social
solidarity_, and that social solidarity rests fundamentally on tender
relations between the old, the young, and the middle-aged, we shall
recognize the wisdom of elders resigning at the earliest possible moment
all manifestations of personal authority. The average boy and girl, if
well trained, has at fifteen, or about that age, moral powers
sufficiently developed to control innate propensities. At that epoch to
the young themselves should be relegated the ruling of youthful conduct
in the interests of society. Not to the young singly, however, but in
their corporate capacity. The organizing of juvenile committees and
conduct clubs will ensue. I need not, however, treat of these here. They
belong to the subject of general education, and I am merely touching on
training in its relations to specific crime.
The point in social science to emphasize is this: At every stage of the
nation’s history its moral health or disease is the actual resultant of
previous conditions of its child-life throughout the length and breadth
of the land. At the present moment the public mind is astray on this
subject. There is no understanding of the restraints necessary on
infantile wrong-doing, the wholesome because painless checks to apply to
juvenile delinquents. Science must guide us to the right path of action,
society must enlist parental authority, or, if need be, coerce the child
to take the indicated course. By the absence of wholesome checks and the
presence of brutal conditions in childhood we suffer a vast amount of
preventible crime. We evolve the criminal by sins of omission outside
the prison; we brutalize him further inside the prison by undue,
ill-adapted restraints.
Very significant was the experience of Mr. Obermair, of the State Prison
in Munich. When appointed governor there, he found from six to seven
hundred prisoners in the worst state of insubordination, and whose
excesses he was told defied the harshest, most stringent discipline. The
prisoners were chained together. The guard consisted of about 100
soldiers, who did duty not only at the gates and round the walls, but in
the passages, and even in the workshops and dormitories; and, strangest
of all, from twenty to thirty large dogs of the bloodhound breed were
let loose at night in the passages and courts to keep watch and ward.
The place was a perfect pandemonium, comprising the worst passions, the
most slavish vices, and the most heartless tyranny within the limits of
a few acres.
Mr. Obermair quickly dispensed with dogs, and nearly all the guards. He
gradually relaxed the harsh system, and treated the prisoners with a
consideration that gained their confidence. In the year 1852 Mr. Baillie
Cochrane visited the prison, and his account is as follows: “The gates
were wide open, without any sentinel at the door, and a guard of only
twenty men idling away their time in a room off the entrance hall....
None of the doors were provided with bolts and bars; the only security
was an ordinary lock, and as in most of the rooms the key was not
turned, there was no obstacle to the men walking into the passage....
Over each workshop some of the prisoners with the best characters were
appointed overseers, and Mr. Obermair assured me that when a prisoner
transgressed a regulation, his companions told him ‘_es ist verboten_,’
and it rarely happened that he did not yield to the will of his
fellow-prisoners. Within the prison walls every description of work is
carried on ... each prisoner by occupation and industry maintains
himself. The surplus of his earnings is given him on release, which
avoids his being parted with in a state of destitution.” (This account
is taken from Herbert Spencer’s _Essay on Prison Ethics_.) It is then
clearly proved by actual experience that rough handling and brutal
words—bolts and bars and bloodhounds—are alike unnecessary in the case
of first offenders and in the case of the “desperate gang.”
But, turning once more from the criminal to the ultimate causes of
crime, these are—destitution, or more or less grinding poverty,
inherited disease, ignorance and all the degraded nurture that crushes
the humanities and develops the brutalities of man. A scientific
treatment of crime will eradicate these various causes of crime. No
summary methods are applicable. There is no short cut to the end in
view; but by patient perseverance in the scientific meliorism indicated
in my chapters on Industrial Life, Sex Relations and Parentage, and to
be further explained in those on Education and Home Life, the forces
brought into play will prove effective in social redemption. They are
essentially radical and all-embracing. Within reformatories and prisons
there may be partially supplied the training for forming and reforming
character that is nowhere present in the homes and schools of the lower
classes to-day. Those criminals who are not structurally defective may
recover moral health, and become virtuous or at least harmless social
units. In all such cases liberty should be restored; but the State can
never be justified in discharging its rescued criminals without
resources and without protection. They must be supplied with work, i.e.
some means of self-support, and guarded from dangers besetting the
critical period of liberation. The educating of ignorant criminals, the
reforming of corrigible criminals, the restraining from further crime of
incurable criminals—these are duties of the State.
The time, however distant, will finally arrive when science, applied for
generations to the task of skilfully removing all the causes of crime,
will accomplish that glorious aim. By attention to the laws of heredity,
by checking the too rapid increase of population, by the moral training
of every member of the community, and by well-ordered, happy, domestic,
industrial and social life, the criminal nature will die out, and crime
itself be simply historical—a thing to study with interest, an
extirpated social disease.
_PART IV_
EVOLUTION OF THE EMOTIONS
We must never forget that human aspirations, human ideals, are as much a
part of the phenomena which makes up this causally-connected Universe as
the instincts and appetites that are common to man and the other
animals.—DAVID G. RITCHIE.
CHAPTER I
THE SENTIMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
The dawning century will have to undertake a new education of mankind
if we are not to relapse.... New inventions are less needed than new
ethics.—Dr. MAX NORDAU.
Herbert Spencer tells us that: “Free institutions can only be properly
worked by men, each of whom is jealous of his own rights and
sympathetically jealous of the rights of others—who will neither himself
aggress on his neighbour in small things or great, nor tolerate
aggression on them by others.”
The state of mind or sentiment to which Mr. Spencer here points is
complex. It comprises an egoism that is not anti-social, and an altruism
that is broadly social. The genesis of this sentiment is intellectual,
implying a recognition in some sort of the laws of nature, by virtue of
which individual rights do not conflict with nature’s harmonies or its
fundamental organic unity. It is possible, therefore, only to a race
comparatively advanced, i.e. intellectually endowed; but the children
and children’s children of that race may possess the sentiment of
individual rights as an instinct with no apprehension whatever of its
source or its justification. Its alliance with, and perfect conformity
to, natural law are certainly not understood, and confusion is increased
in the public mind by the unscientific teaching of the daily press.
Here, for instance, is a paragraph from a middle-class journal. “Law is
command, control. Nature is instinctive force, and can neither give nor
receive laws. There are no laws of nature, and there are no rights of
man. We are using meaningless phrases when we speak of either. Man has
no natural rights any more than the wolf and the bear. All rights are
conventional.”
Now, before man had made a direct study of nature, and, marking the
invariability of sequence in the precision of its phenomena, had
attached to that invariability the term “laws of nature,” the word “law”
denoted a lawgiver issuing arbitrary commands. It is in this primitive
sense that our journalist uses the word “law.” He entirely ignores its
appropriation by science and the modern acceptation of the term “laws of
nature.” Nature has no arbitrary commands, he says, and therefore infers
no laws. We admit the premise while denying the inference. The laws of
health are invariable, although they do not necessarily dominate, since
other and opposing laws of disorganization may at any moment get the
upper hand. Man is competent to disregard the laws of life; but if he so
acts, another course of natural order is initiated, and he becomes
subject to pathological laws which conduct him steadily to the grave.
Necessity without arbitrary command rules in the cosmos; and if
happiness, which all humanity desires, is attained, it will be by
conforming to all the laws of nature that favour that end. Within, there
are the laws of human organization, without, the laws of circumstance or
environment. The humanity that has intellect and scientific knowledge
may, by union and co-operation, take a firm advantage of these laws or
uniformities of nature and march steadily forward, controlling the
forces of nature by a willing obedience to natural law.
No sooner, observe, does this control become possible than natural
rights come into existence. Man rises in the scale of being to a sphere
of self-direction and comparative liberty. The wolf and bear and all
wild animals are on the lower level, and have no natural rights. They
are controlled by forces external to themselves, and the struggle for
existence and survival of the fittest is the law of destiny to them. It
is not so, however, with the horse, dog, cat, etc., for man has lifted
all domesticated animals from under the rule of genetic forces, and
placed them under the rule of reasoned forces. He controls their
breeding, limits their numbers, and gives them a happy life consistent
with his own. Further, he claims for them and concedes to them natural
rights; and note this point, the last phrase of our journalist’s
misleading paragraph is strictly true: “All rights are conventional.”
Convention means by tacit agreement, and it is by tacit agreement on the
part of civilized men that rights of men and rights of animals exist and
are respected. An impulse of the higher life, viz., a law of sympathy,
impels civilized man to seek happiness for other beings as well as
himself, and intelligence shows him that individual happiness promotes
general happiness, and further that no individual happiness is possible
without a certain amount of personal liberty.
Individual rights, then, are a claim for a certain amount of personal
liberty, and the sentiment of individual rights is an unconscious inward
preparedness to defend that claim. It lies at the very foundation of
modern ethics, since from it there springs the outward equipoise of
egoistic and altruistic forces, the inward, subtle, delicate sense of
equitable relations, in other words, _justice_—the moral backbone of the
modern conscience.