all, tell the platoon commanders to move off their platoons to their
positions and extend them ready to advance, and the scouts to get off
in front. Five paces is the least extension to ensure that a bullet
aimed at one man may miss him with a fair chance of not hitting his
neighbour. Do not let the scouts go too far away, because at this
time of getting to grips with the enemy, their usefulness, when
acting with their companies is mainly limited to guarding against
ambush at close range, and as ground scouts to prevent the company
coming against some unseen obstacle, barbed wire, donga, canal, or
what not.
As soon as all are in position, the company may be considered as
being in the formation in which it would have arrived at the point
where, in addition to the enemy’s artillery fire, it comes under
heavy and fairly accurate rifle fire. Give the signal to advance,
and let the platoon commanders begin to work their platoons forward,
using what covered ways they can find. After a little of this, have
the scouts halted and reinforce them by one platoon, order fire to be
opened, bearing in mind that one platoon’s fire is probably useless
at over one thousand yards from the enemy, but if your company is in
the diamond formation the platoons on each flank will probably be
able to fire, and with favourable ground, e.g., a knoll, or bluff
somewhere on the line of advance, the rear platoon also will be able
to fire over the heads of the firing line. There is no danger in this
if the men hold their rifles straight, and it would assuredly be done
in war. I have myself seen it, and the chances of an accident are
minimised by practice in peace. During this early opening of fire
use every effort to keep the fire from being merely a make-believe,
i.e., send word round by your connecting files or semaphore to fire
at certain targets, and see that section commanders direct their
fire accordingly. In battle the information as to which part of the
enemy’s position seemed most to demand attention would, of course,
reach you from those of your side who were suffering fire coming from
that part of the position, and the result of your passing the word
to fire at it as above would be that a shower of bullets would come
dropping all round it, to the upsetting of the aim of the hostile
marksmen. Under cover of this fire your firing line may be allowed to
gain a little ground, platoons moving alternately so as to avoid a
cessation of fire. Thereafter continue to gain ground, and gradually
reinforce the firing line till all your supports are absorbed and
the whole company is in the firing line. When this has taken place
the line will consist of a mixture of men of different sections
and platoons. Avoid unreal movements in attempting to keep the men
of each unit together in reinforcing and recognise that admixture
is unavoidable. (I.T., 93 (11) and 123 (9)). The organising of the
resultant disorder is one of the essential objects of training for
the attack. Make your section commanders call on the men to right and
left of them, if they are nearer them than any other unit commander,
to act under their orders. Thus: “Private A to Private J under my
orders.” Have this done constantly till it becomes a matter of
course. The men of files can always hang together, but prove that
this is being done by asking men where their file mates are. Get this
system started as soon as reinforcement is begun, and keep it in full
swing throughout. Once it is started, these extemporized fire units
must apply the principles learnt by the intact sections and squads
in Exercise IX., i.e., supporting fire by part to cover movement of
the others, control and distribution of fire, etc., and so work on
up to assaulting distance and deliver an assault. After this, let
section and platoon commanders reform their men and units as quickly
as possible, and then reform the company under your own orders. At
subsequent parades introduce casualties among the section and platoon
commanders, and let the senior privates in each of the mixed up fire
units step into their places and carry on the attack without halt or
confusion.
EXERCISE XII.
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK ACTING ALONE.
On service a company may often have to attack some post of the
enemy without having the support of either artillery or infantry,
and exercises framed to illustrate these conditions are very useful
in developing the initiative of all ranks. In paragraph V. of the
preamble I gave an example, and I think, if you will peruse it again,
you will see what sort of thing you should arrange for the exercise.
At inspections one sometimes sees a company sent off by itself to
carry out such an attack, and the method often adopted is to tell
off the company into the firing line and supports, and, perhaps, a
reserve. The whole then go straight for the object and perform a
sort of travesty of what the company does when acting as part of a
battalion. By this time I trust you will be quick to perceive that
this is just what it ought not to do. As an isolated force it has
to do much more than simply to form a firing line and bring off an
assault. It must secure its flanks, have a real reserve, employ a
flank as well as a frontal attack, provide for its own withdrawal
if worsted, be prepared to deal with a counter-attack, and observe
all the principles laid down in I.T., 121. _Mutatis mutandis_, your
reserve may consist of only a platoon, your flank guards a file or
two of men, your flank attacks a section or platoon with a subaltern
accompanying it, and so on, but the precautions must be taken and
the principles put into practice, or your attack would run risk
of failure. You would do it all on service; therefore, do it all
in peace. Carry out such exercises, carefully planned, and with
observance of service conditions, and I am quite sure you will see
what a great deal there is to be done in this direction before you
feel yourself and your company quite competent to undertake a similar
task in the field. That first exercise against a skeleton enemy will
be the forerunner of many others. Your criticism of the action of
your non-commissioned officers must be carefully considered, as there
are usually several justifiable ways of doing a thing, and it should
always be constructive and not merely destructive (T. & M.R., 2 (2)).
EXERCISE XIII.
THE COMPANY IN RETIREMENT.
The men have been practised in retirement in pairs in Exercise
II., and the sections and platoons have also learned their part in
Exercise VI. It remains to train the company for this duty, which
it might have to do either as acting as rearguard to the battalion,
whether the latter was, or was not, in conjunction with other troops,
or as if effecting its withdrawal when isolated. In both cases the
procedure and distribution are pretty much alike. In the former case,
the company, if it gets into difficulties, _may_ be able to get help
from the rest of the force, but in the latter it will not be able
to do so, and the commander should be especially careful to have
in hand some portion of his company which he can use to extricate
any detachment which gets “tied up.” On the other hand, it is very
desirable that the main body should not be called on to reinforce
the rearguard when the company is not acting alone. So that in both
cases you should be prepared to meet eventualities from your own
resources. Again, a rearguard is bound to have the majority of
its force in action in order to hold back the enemy and present an
appearance of force, so that it is not always possible to set apart
a portion of so small a body as a company to act solely as reserve,
and to remain continuously outside the actual combat. The solution
of the difficulty seems to lie in an intelligent application of the
principles of rearguard fighting given in F.S.R., 71 to 73, and the
early but timeous withdrawal from the fighting line of a portion
of the company who move back to a position in rear from which they
can cover the withdrawal of the remainder, but are still available
to be thrown into the fight, if it is necessary to inaugurate some
sort of a counter attack to give portions heavily engaged a chance
to break away from close grips. It is important in this exercise
to teach non-commissioned officers and men to be ready to adopt
quickly any method of withdrawal that may be ordered, because the
nature of the ground must determine the way in which a withdrawal can
best be effected, and the nature of the ground may vary every few
hundred yards. Therefore I merely suggest some ways of practising
retirements, and during the course of the exercise you should change
from one to another, and also encourage commanders to act on their
own initiative, when, as will probably happen, your system of
inter-communication fails to act with sufficient speed and accuracy.
I.T., 137, gives general rules as to the action of platoons and
sections, and the standard set up in Exercises II. and VI. should be
adhered to. Send out the skeleton enemy with orders to follow up the
retirement, but not to close in under six hundred yards.
(_a_) Get the whole company deployed into one line of platoons,
with intervals between them, occupying a wide front, four to eight
hundred yards, the men at five or more paces extension. This may
seem too wide a front, but, after all, the intervals between the
platoons are only two hundred and forty yards, and an enemy trying
to break straight through the line would be under fire at one
hundred and twenty yards or less, while a wide front is the best
precaution against having your flanks turned and your retreat
intercepted.
Send back a platoon from one of the flanks to take up quickly a
position in rear clear away from the firing line; three hundred to
six hundred yards is not too much; let it open fire, and let the
remainder of the firing line work back by retirement of alternate
sections, each running back thirty or forty yards, beginning this
movement from the flank from which the first platoon went, the
platoon on the other flank holding on and only giving ground when the
two centre platoons have got well on their way to the line on which
the first platoon is halted. This is a slow retirement, but gives a
maximum of continuous fire and the flanks are strong.
(_b_) With the whole company extended in one line, and no intervals
between platoons. Retire by short rushes of alternate sections;
the rushes must be quite short, twenty yards at most, so that the
sections that have retired can fire through the intervals of the
rear portion of the line the instant that it begins to retire. This
is meant for use after an unsuccessful assault, and only on flat
ground.
(_c_) With the company extended in one line, but with intervals
between the platoons. Order the flank platoons to retire and take
post to cover the withdrawal of the two centre platoons, who remain
in position till the flank platoons are ready to open fire. Watch
how the platoon commanders handle their platoons; they should do so
artfully, as taught in Exercise VI.
(_d_) Retire by half-companies, two platoons together, using your
subalterns as half-company commanders, and putting the onus of
finding suitable covering positions on them, merely telling them
to cover each other’s retirement.
(_e_) With the company all holding one position, leave the scouts
or picked men to cover the retirement by rapid fire, and withdraw
the remainder at full speed, then cover the retirement of the
scouts by the fire of the whole from a position in rear. Watch
that the scouts creep back from their cover without letting the
enemy know they are going; and of this screen of scouts the flank
men ought usually to be the last to go in order to make the enemy
believe that the position is still occupied.
EXERCISE XIV.
OUTPOSTS.
I.
The general rules for outposts and the part played by an outpost
company are to be found in I.T., 147 to 157, and it is necessary
accordingly to train for those duties in peace. Let us begin from
the beginning, and see what infantry outposts are and what they have
to do. A line of infantry outposts will very often have to be taken
up after a day’s fighting, or in close proximity to the enemy before
a battle. The commander of an outpost battalion will be told by the
staff to take up with his battalion a certain length of the front,
say, from Farm A to Hill B, inclusive—perhaps a mile or even two in
extent. He cannot possibly have time to ride all along the front and
fix places for piquets and sentries. Instead of this, he looks at
the ground and comes to the conclusion that it will require, say,
all his four companies in the outpost line. He divides up his front
into four parts, and gives each of his companies one part. It is
his duty to see that the eight companies form along the line that
combines the best facilities for defence and reconnaissance to the
front. Accordingly, he tells the captain of A Company to take from
Farm A to, say, the wood X, inclusive, the captain of B Company
from the wood X, exclusive, to, say, the stream ML, inclusive, and
so along. The captains of companies then have to go off and take up
their frontages. As beforesaid, infantry outposts must expect to take
up their line close to the enemy, and often when dusk is falling.
This gives you your clue as to how it should be done. You must march
your company in fighting formation, so as not to be ambushed—a screen
of scouts or other covering troops in front and on the flanks, a
party, section, or platoon ready to succour the covering party, and
hold up the enemy, and a reserve ready to act under your orders,
either for attack or defence. Your movement and the taking up of
your line should be unseen by the enemy; therefore, move carefully
under cover both from distant and close positions, from which you
may be seen. The line must be taken up quickly. The main thing is
to get it occupied; therefore, it is a mistake to halt the company
while you plod round the whole of the front and plan just where each
piquet and sentry will be. Instead, take a good look at the line as
you march and decide what are the essential points to be held for
defence and as observation points. As soon as your scouts have made
good the ground a little in front of those points, send off what you
think are necessary, sections or platoons, to seize these points,
and act as piquets till you go round and adjust details. Thus your
company will occupy the line in rough-and-ready fashion as quickly
as they can advance. When the company breaks up to go to the piquet
posts, go with any one of the piquets which is to be on one flank and
settle the exact position of the piquet with reference to the line
you intend to hold as your line of resistance, and any other details
which you think the piquet commander should attend to, such as what
localities should be patrolled, and estimate the number of men
required. Any surplus sections should accompany you from this piquet,
and you and they then go along the line to the other piquets which
you arrange similarly, using the surplus to reinforce those piquets
that need them, and if at the end you have still a surplus of men you
may either form them as a support in rear or dismiss them to remain
with their own platoons. For purposes of messing on service the
latter is convenient, but, tactically, a support is often needed, in
which case the men’s comfort must take second place.
You must make a clear distinction between day and night outposts,
though you practise the latter by daylight. Infantry outposts by day
and until the enemy advances, are firstly patrols and look-out men,
whose business is to look for any movement on the part of the enemy,
and to prevent his seeing their own side’s doings, and to report
what they see of the enemy’s, and, secondly, a line of piquets who
occupy the line decided on as the line of resistance, and who may
fall out and rest while things are quiet, with supports and sometimes
a reserve behind them. The patrols are active agents in getting
information in front of the outpost line, and they will mostly
consist of mounted troops except in close country or thick weather.
The look-out sentries are passive obstacles to the enemy’s patrols
or scouts penetrating the line; the piquets are the reserve of force
ready to be called into action when needed. But a line suitable for
observation and resistance by day is seldom suitable by night also.
Fighting by day is done by shooting, and rough ground affording cover
is likely to be chosen for the advance of the attackers. By night,
however, the attack will be made with the bayonet, and the attacker
will avoid broken country, which will confuse and delay his advance.
Choose your outpost line accordingly. By day seek for a good field
of fire, mutually supporting positions, and good facilities for
observation, and strengthen the position you mean to fight on. By
night close the likely ways by which an enemy may advance by putting
piquets on them in strengthened positions with obstacles prepared
in front, and patrols lying out on intervening ground to intercept
scouts. Thus, in an undulating hedge-covered country with many roads,
by day your piquets would be behind the crests of the undulations,
sentries only on the look-out, and patrols scouting in front. By
night your piquets would be on the roads, which they would block with
barbed wire or abattis of cut hedge stuff, and your patrols in the
fields between and lying out along the road in front at some place
where they could watch anything passing, and get back to the piquet
line without running risks of being shot by their own side. We will
see below what training is required for non-commissioned officers
and men in their duties on piquet, patrol and sentry. When you have
trained them in these duties, take up an outpost line as a tactical
exercise with your company, acting as an outpost company by day,
and then as by night, and if you have scouts send them out to act
as an enemy’s patrol in front to see how much of the operation of
taking up the line is visible to them; then, after a certain hour,
let them try to make their way through the line unseen. They must
not work round the flanks as _ex hypothesi_; these are held by other
outpost companies; finally, let them start sniping the outposts as
if ushering in an attack, and let your piquets take up the line of
resistance, your patrols falling back on the firing beginning.
II.
_The Training of Men and Platoons in Outpost Duties._
An outpost company will more often consist of two or more small
piquets of one or more platoons with a support, than simply of one
large piquet with its support, so that when you come to train the
whole company, as above, in taking up a part of an outpost line, the
performance of the work will depend largely on the ability of your
platoon and section commanders to direct the men in their duties.
Unless they are capable of doing this, time will be wasted as you
will be occupied with one portion of the line while the rest are
doing nothing and awaiting your arrival, for in this class of work
the instructor must remain for some time with each piquet while the
men are being put through the various duties, and cannot supervise
concurrently at all points. Therefore, it is best, before taking
the men out for instruction, to give a day or two solely to the
instruction of subalterns and non-commissioned officers. When they
have got a knowledge of what is required, have the men out, divide
them into piquets under subalterns and section commanders, who will
put them through the duties, and the work will go on on proper lines,
and you will be free to go round and supervise each in turn.
You will have four subalterns, sixteen section commanders, and other
non-commissioned officers, a total of twenty rifles or so, but if you
are short of non-commissioned officers, have out enough privates to
give you sixteen or twenty rifles. Form them up as a piquet and make
the supposition that it has just received its orders to break off
from the company and go to a certain point in the outpost line and
take up its duties there.
_Day Piquets._
Indicate some such point as a day piquet position at a reasonable
distance from where the piquet is when you give it its orders,
and let the senior non-commissioned officer march it there, as on
service, the point chosen being, if possible, such a one as would be
occupied on service.
(_a_) This advance to the piquet is the first duty. In spite of the
company covering troops being supposed to be somewhere in advance,
the piquet on its march should be protected by a small patrol
(F.S.R., 64 (1)). In taking up the position, it must not let the
enemy see it; that is, neither the men nor their commander should
show themselves. Very often the men are kept under cover, but the
commander wanders about fixing places for sentries in full view of
everyone. He should lie down and peep over the crest or whatever it
is while making his plans.
Having arrived at the piquet position, indicate a position on the
right and on the left where other piquets are supposed to be and
proceed with:—
(_b_) Duties of outpost sentries.—These are given in I.T., 152. Post
as many groups as will use up the whole strength in places which
would need watching on service; if there are not enough such places
near by, then merely for the purpose of this semi-drill, post two or
more groups close together. A group consists of one or two men on
duty, and their reliefs, who lie down near them. These groups are
relieved every eight or twelve hours. Let it be understood that the
position of their own piquet is occupied by the reliefs of these
groups and of patrols, and it is a good plan to show the position
by a flag. The sentries must see without being seen, know where
other groups are, where their own and other piquets are, be told to
challenge and halt anyone approaching as in I.T., 152 (3), and what
to do if attacked. Let them do this to you personally, as if you were
someone not belonging to the troops, and impress on them that they
must be careful to teach it to their men so that _no stranger may
ever be allowed to get close_ to a group, and to shoot if he does
not halt. Neglect of this simple rule has led to many mishaps in all
armies. Concealment is not easy, but must be got somehow—by artifice,
if the ground is unfavourable. After putting all through “sentry go”
close to the groups and teach them:—
(_c_) Patrolling, for which see I.T., 111 and 156. Patrols are not
meant for fighting, but to get information or watch dangerous places.
But they may have to fight to avoid capture, and they do no good
by walking blindly into an ambush. To bring back information or
news that the enemy are coming on, it is evidently essential that
whatever happens to the rest of the party, one man at least should
always be able to escape, and to avoid ambush the patrol should move
in a formation which will prevent a surprise overwhelming the whole
party. In short, one portion must scout, and the other be prepared
to cover their movement and help them to get away, if possible, but
in any case to get away itself and carry news of the enemy. But
patrols must be limited in strength, or they will not be able to
escape notice, and must make up for their weakness by cunning and
stealthiness of movement.