section and platoon commanders in the operations in which their
company or battalion is taking part. I have read that in the
Russo-Japanese War the result of one of the battles—I think at
Penlin, 31st July—turned on the action of an infantry section who
gained a footing on the extreme flank of the Russian line, and
drove off the defenders in the immediate vicinity, opened a way for
the advance of the greater numbers, and led to the outflanking and
retreat of the whole Russian force. If you give your unit commanders
some chances of carrying out attacks, acting as if unsupported by
other troops, they will find themselves faced with the same problems
which confront commanders of larger bodies in the attack, and they
will be more likely, when acting in combination, to look beyond just
the limits of their own commands; they will be led to comprehend
the object of operations and the difficulties in the way, and
will become quick to seize any opportunity to further the general
plan without waiting for orders. It is true that so small a body
as a section would seldom be formally told to attack an objective
single-handed, but there are often occasions on service when a
platoon might have to carry out an attack on a small scale, as when a
few of the enemy’s riflemen are making themselves unpleasant, while
not in sufficient force to do more than “snipe,” or to require the
diversion against them of a whole company. Though a section as now
constituted is a very small unit to work with, I think no excuse is
needed for performing the attack with the smallest unit, having in
view the excellent training it forms for non-commissioned officers
and men. However, for this practice, it is advisable to form sections
somewhat above the usual strength, by joining two together, so as
to give at least eighteen rifles in the whole. After having put the
sections through the exercise, you will, of course, let the platoon
commanders carry out the attack with their platoons.
Put out a skeleton enemy of three or four men for each platoon or
section, or one only for all to attack in turn, and post this enemy
in some commanding place, with a good field of view and fire so
that if possible the unit shall have twelve to eight hundred yards
to manœuvre over before coming to close quarters. As an example,
give out the supposition that this enemy are a cavalry patrol of the
enemy, who have dismounted and are using their rifles on the company
as it is on the move from somewhere to somewhere else. The section or
platoon is ordered to drive them off, neutralise their fire, or hold
them in check, in case they should be the forerunners of a greater
number. The enemy should begin to fire on a signal from you (with
your flag), which you should give as you tell off the commander for
the duty. If the other units are to attack the same enemy in turn,
you should halt them under cover or turn them to the rear, so as not
to see too much of the method the first lot choose to carry out their
job.
The method of the attack will depend on the nature of the ground—what
suits one case may not suit another, and there may be two or three
courses open in attacking any one position. The commander should
accordingly look well at the ground before deciding how he will carry
out the attack, but there are certain principles common to attacks,
great or small, which he should put into practice. He should secure
himself from interruption on his flanks and rear, and he should
provide a supporting fire to distract the enemy and cover the advance
of his main force. He cannot make large detachments or indulge in
wide patrolling, nor would such small bodies as platoons be sent
off to attack if such were advisable; but, at least he can post a
file or two on some high ground, or, failing that, on one flank out
of decisive range of the enemy, i.e., about eight hundred yards
from him, with orders to keep up a steady fire until his advance
masks their fire. This will prevent, or at least give warning of,
an attempt to cut in on the rear. He may also send a file perhaps
two or three hundred yards to either flank, to move parallel with
his advance and prevent his being enfiladed at short range, if the
enemy should be tactless enough to avail himself of a chance of
meeting the advance by a counter-attack. Until he sees pretty well
what he has in front of him, he should divide his party into two,
sending one to engage the enemy and keeping the other as a reserve to
support the first by fire if they get into difficulties, and to be
available to carry on the attack after the other has got the enemy
well busy, either by reinforcing it directly, or, better still, by
continuing the advance along a fresh line leading to some position
from which the enemy can be finally turned out, either by fire or
by a charge, the first half joining in and advancing as soon as the
enemy has turned his attention to the new attack. Both parties should
keep scouts or a patrol of some sort out in front of them until the
foreground is proved not to contain any hidden body of the enemy,
or until the opening of fire by their own side makes it necessary
for the scouts to merge into the firing line. I have seen on service
a half-company go off to take post as a piquet on a long ridge; it
neglected the above precautions, beyond having some scouts in front.
There were four or five of the enemy on the ridge, and they waited
till the scouts were close, shot some down and drove the others to
cover, and then turned their fire on to the half-company, who were
also driven to ground, and, as there was little cover, they were
tied up till set free by some more infantry, who had to be specially
sent off to move along the ridge. Had the half-company moved in two
portions, the first would have contained this weak enemy, and the
rear party could easily have circled round and got on to the ridge
farther along, which would at once have caused the enemy to clear
out. See F.S.R., I., I, as to the results of the violation of the
principles of leading troops, and as therein directed, impress the
principles taught on the minds of your non-commissioned officers, who
are commanders, albeit only of platoons and sections.
EXERCISE VIII.
THE PLATOON AS AN ADVANCED GUARD AND AS A FLANK GUARD.
(_a_) When the company is on the march, it should always be preceded
by an advanced guard—either a party of scouts, or, more usually, by
one of the platoons. After the advanced guard comes in contact with
the enemy its further action becomes either an attack to drive off
the enemy, or a defence to delay his advancing, according to his
strength and tactics; so I propose here merely to indicate suitable
formations of march in ordinary, i.e., non-mountainous country, so
that the platoons may be practised in taking them up without delay on
being told off for the duty. The exercise takes little time, and can
be done on the same parade as the flank guard exercise.
An advanced guard may come under Are at any moment, and to provide
against surprise (F.S.R., 64), its leading portions may move in
extended order. The duties are given in F.S.R., 68, and apply quite
completely to so small a body as a platoon. The platoon should be
divided into a vanguard and a main guard. For the vanguard, a common
plan is simply to extend a section on either side of the road, but I
prefer to divide the section into three patrols, or more if strength
permits, who work along in a general line—one to search the road
and its immediate vicinity, and one on each side. The nature of the
country regulates the breadth of ground the centre patrol can search
from the road, and the distance to which the others are sent out on
each side. The other sections follow as main guard, not so close as
to be at once mixed up with the vanguard if fire is opened on the
latter, nor so far as to be unable to support it quickly with fire.
The advanced guard is responsible for keeping touch with the main
body (the company) (F.S.R., 64 (4)), but the company commander should
satisfy himself that this is being done. If view is restricted, the
main guard must drop a connecting file to keep connection. This file
must march with their beards on their shoulders, to see what the
company is doing, and let the commander know, and also to signal
to the company, if the platoon has had to halt. If the country is
open, the commander should still tell off a file for this duty, who
will march with the platoon, but be continually on the look-out to
the rear. The platoon commander ought, of course, to keep a watch
himself, but may have other things to attend to, and it is well to
take precautions against the platoon either getting too far in front
or letting the company get too close to it, by marching on while the
platoon is investigating some suspicious locality.
(_b_) _The Platoon as a Flank Guard._
A platoon may sometimes be used as a flank guard, as when a small
convoy is on the march with only a company or two as escort. Flank
guards are dismissed in a few words in F.S.R., 70. It is worth while
to practise them once or twice to avoid delay in taking up the
formation when the march is being started, or in improvising a method
of fighting off the enemy if he attacks.
Represent the convoy or whatever it is by a man with a red flag to
move along the road; the platoon is then to move along parallel to
the road, and far enough off to afford protection from effective
rifle fire, i.e., at least eight hundred yards in open country. The
skeleton enemy should be instructed to keep about the same distance
again on the flank beyond the platoon, and to move along parallel
with it without closing in, opening fire on an agreed signal.
The march formation should be on the same principles as those for the
advanced guard. The platoon should move in two bodies, and patrols
or scouts should precede it, both in the direction of the march and
towards the flank which is being guarded. It is important to keep
touch with the main body by connecting files at all times, otherwise
if the road changes direction out of view of the flank guard it may
separate them too far or bring them too close to the company.
The method of fighting merely to hold off the enemy resembles that
used by a rear guard for the same purpose, i.e., fire and movement
by alternate portions. When the enemy opens fire on your signal, the
patrol on the flank either falls back, or the platoon reinforces it.
The patrol in the line of advance should still continue to precede
the movements of the platoon in that direction, and should be told to
conform to its movement. The platoon replies to the enemy’s fire as
soon as possible and begins the lateral fight—one half is sent, if
possible under cover, to take up a fire position farther along the
direction of the line of march, preceded by the patrol, which, to
some extent, secures it from surprise from that direction. As soon
as the leading party has found a fire position and opens its fire,
the other follows it, and either halts alongside it, so allowing it
to go off to a new position, or continues its movement beyond it
and takes up a third position to cover the further movements. The
latter method is the quicker, as it saves the time of replacing men
of the first party in their fire position by those of the second. The
exercise need not be prolonged, as a few of these lateral movements
are quite sufficient illustration to enable the men in future to take
up their duty quickly.
EXERCISE IX.
PRELIMINARY FOR THE ATTACK BY THE COMPANY IN BATTALION.
A company attacking as part of the battalion is sure to find the
men of different platoons mixed up in the course of the attack with
those of other platoons, both of that company and of others. Before
practising the attack, accompanied with this mixture of platoons,
it is advisable to train them and their non-commissioned officers
for their duties without allowing any mixing up. This may be done by
bringing all the platoons of the company up into one line, and then
extending each on its own ground. The result is that each platoon
may be taken to represent the leading platoon of four companies told
off to furnish the firing line and supports (I.T., 122). The four
platoons form thus the firing line, the other three supposititious
platoons of each company being in support. This formation would be
taken up when the enemy’s rifle fire began to be effective, i.e.,
at or under fourteen hundred yards. Within this distance the firing
line has to press on through the zones in which it uses collective
and individual fire up to assaulting distance, being reinforced as
needed, firstly by the supports, and finally at the time of the
assault by all or part of the local reserve, which, in this case,
would be composed of the four companies of the battalion not detailed
to furnish the firing line and supports.
Put out a skeleton enemy with orders to remain in one position, and
fire slowly, but continuously. Draw up the four platoons, or as many
as are present of the company at fourteen hundred yards or so from
the enemy, in one line and at sufficient intervals to allow of their
extending to five paces, _plus_ some space between flanks of sections
after extension, to allow plenty of choice of lines of advance.
Indicate to each platoon a part of the enemy’s position which it is
to regard as its final objective of assault (I.T., 121 (3)). Have the
men extended to five paces, and carry out the attack right through on
the lines of Exercise V., and finish with an assault and rally after
it. Each company would have an officer with its platoon in the firing
line to direct the fire. If fire is opened between fourteen hundred
and one thousand yards, it will not be effective against ordinary
targets unless the whole four platoons direct their fire on the same
target. Under one thousand yards fire should be controlled by section
commanders and directed by platoon commanders.
Practise concentration of the fire of the four platoons on one part
of the enemy’s line and lateral distribution of fire _within the
limits of that part_. Give each platoon a fraction of this fraction
of the enemy’s frontage to deal with, and let the platoon commander
again tell off his sections to fire at various marks inside _his_
limits. Again switch the fire of all four platoons on to some other
particular bit of the enemy’s position, as done in previous exercises.
To do this you must introduce and work with thoroughness a system of
inter-communication (I.T., 119), but it should be one approved and
adopted by your battalion commander, otherwise each company of the
battalion may be found using a different one. It is to be understood
that orders as to the direction of fire in no way interfere with the
gaining of ground to the front, a platoon firing at one object ceases
fire in order to advance, but resumes its fire on the same object
when it again halts.
As soon as section fire is opened, encourage mutual support, some
part of the line firing while others advance, and make section
commanders continue to observe this principle.
At some one parade for this exercise halt the whole line during the
attack and practise entrenching under fire, the men working lying
down (I.T., 121 (13)). Thereafter resume the advance.
Move about yourself and let your section commanders do so also, and
check any slovenly work on the part of the men in using, quitting,
or getting into cover, and in the use of their rifles and judging
distance if, as should often be done, it is left to them to estimate
how far they are from the target of the moment.
EXERCISE X.
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK WITH THE BATTALION UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.
When the battalion is moving forward to attack, and before the
enemy’s rifle fire is more than a distant and future danger, that of
his artillery becomes an imminent and formidable menace as soon as
the limits of its range are crossed, because of the suddenness with
which it is capable of dealing destruction. Whether his artillery
actually opens on the battalion is another matter. If the battalion
shows up as a tempting target in column of route or mass, he most
certainly will fire on it, but if it is skilfully led it may possibly
escape his notice altogether; at the same time, it is hardly likely
that it can move from five thousand to fourteen hundred yards from
the enemy’s infantry without giving some indications of its movement,
and the probability is, that at some part of the advance it will
find itself the recipient of the enemy’s attention. To escape the
effect of this fire, the battalion and the company will have to
break up into small shallow columns such as platoons or sections at
least 50 yards from each other laterally (I.T., 118) and two hundred
yards from front to rear; in fact, a lot of little groups of men
sufficiently apart to prevent the burst of one shell covering more
than one group. The advance in this order constitutes the first phase
of the infantry attack. The company must be practised in getting into
this formation, and moving in it so as to avoid confusion in action,
and also to let non-commissioned officers and men understand that
this formation does not free them from the control of their commander.
At manœuvres and exercises the adoption of this formation is
sometimes burked on various pretexts, of which the most heinous is to
say that the results of artillery fire are overrated, and the risk
run in keeping in closed formation is more than compensated for by
the comfort of the men, maintenance of control and saving of time.
This theory I fancy had its origin in the South African War, where
the Boer artillery was skilful but exiguous, if judged by European
standards. I have not been under shell fire myself, but I have seen
the results of it on a column of about two hundred men who came along
a watercourse two thousand yards or so from the guns, in something
resembling a march formation. The guns had the range, and the enemy
left about fifty dead in that watercourse in a few minutes, so
personally I am going to open out my company and trust to my peace
training of it to keep it in hand and get it along fast enough to be
on the spot when wanted.
I need hardly give details how to practise this. The point is, to get
the company opened out quickly and without confusion, and this is to
be done by telling your platoon commanders what you want and where
they are to go, and not by any drill. Platoons may further split up
into columns of sections. Leave it to your platoon commanders to have
the sections moved apart to intervals of fifty yards. If the enemy’s
artillery is straight in front, a diamond formation seems suitable—a
platoon at each angle—the length of the diagonal front to rear being
over two hundred yards and side to side over one hundred; or the
platoons may simply follow each other at two hundred yards distance,
though this is not a very handy arrangement. But, subject to keeping
the distances large enough, it is not the formation that matters, but
the way it is taken up, and I will leave it at that.
At the end of this phase of endurance of the enemy’s artillery fire
the company comes under rifle fire and has to take to extended
order, and on service it would perhaps have to do this and plunge
into the attack without the platoons closing in from the scattered
formation in which they have so far moved. But for the first few
times you should close up at fourteen hundred yards and start from
there, so as to tell the men what is next to be done when they come
under rifle fire, and in any case the size of your exercise ground
would probably necessitate your doing the two phases over more or
less the same bit of ground.
EXERCISE XI.
THE COMPANY IN ATTACK WITH THE BATTALION, UNDER RIFLE FIRE.
The immediate objects of the fire fight within effective rifle range
are to produce a fire sufficiently heavy to overcome the fire of
the defence, and to reach a position from which the assault can be
delivered (I.T., 121 (5 and 6)). In theory, then, the desideratum
is to get so many men up to about two hundred yards from the enemy
that they form a line practically shoulder to shoulder, in order
that their fire may be at least as heavy as that of the enemy,
if the latter are also in one continuous line, and in default of
circumstances admitting of effective covering fire being maintained
from positions in rear or on a flank. On this supposition it is
frequently argued that a battalion and its companies, when advancing
to the attack, should do so on a front not greater than that which
the battalion would occupy if it were in single rank, but this does
not really follow. The nature of the ground may be such that to
attempt to build up a shoulder-to-shoulder firing line all along
the enemy’s position within charging distance, may be merely to send
men to useless destruction by exposing them on fire-swept spaces,
where they are sure to be knocked over before they can do any good.
On the other hand, there may be other points where men may be massed
so as to give not only a firing line of maximum density, but also
a supporting force both to replace casualties and to carry out the
assault. These are the points which it is of importance to gain and
hold in strength sufficient to carry out the object of the attack—the
assault. It is the duty of the battalion commander to give each of
his firing line companies some such point as their objective, and to
define the frontage and direction of their attack. It is similarly
the duty of the commander of a firing line company to give each of
his sections an objective within the limits assigned to his company
(I.T., 122 (4) and 123 (3-)). The problem for solution is, how to
get to those points, and so it does not appear to matter much what
frontage the battalion and its companies occupy when they start off
for the attack at the fourteen hundred yards limit of effective
rifle fire, provided of course, they do not encroach on the frontage
of other units. Indeed, an attack which starts on a wide base and
concentrates only in its later stages seems much more likely than one
which starts from base equal to a single rank frontage to keep the
enemy uncertain of its objective, and to be able to bring oblique
or enfilade fire to bear on portions of his line. Therefore, when
practising the company in attack, do not be bound by cast iron rules
as to the breadth of the zone of ground within which you are to
bring your company from fourteen hundred yards up to the charging
position. Four platoons following one straight behind the other, at
two hundred yards distance, make a very unwieldy procession, and,
in general, I would advise you to use something in the nature of a
diamond formation at first, the three platoons in rear making their
own way forward till they reinforce the leading portion which finally
consists of the whole company.
Put out the skeleton enemy on a front of, roughly, what your company
will occupy in single rank, and let the position, if possible, have
within it two, or at most, three points, which you can assign as
objectives to the platoon commanders. You must consider this position
as having been assigned to you as objective by your battalion
commander, the ground on the right and left of it being the prey
of other companies, and not the object of your assault, though it
should, nevertheless, frequently be the object of your _fire_ during
the advance.
Draw up the company at about fourteen hundred yards from the enemy.
Tell the platoon commanders the relative positions the platoons are
to take up when the advance begins, roughly the distances between
them (I.T., 123 (7)), the direction of the attack, if the enemy’s
position is not quite clearly to be seen, the frontage on which the
company is free to manœuvre, and the points which the sections are to
regard as their objectives; the details contained in I.T., 123 and
124, may also be enumerated if the commanders are not experienced.
As regards these details, I recommend that scouts be formed not in a
line of men extended at wide intervals, but as a line of patrols of
four or six men each, and you or a subaltern should halt them early
in the attack and tell them to send back word that they are held up
by fire, or that they have defined the enemy’s position; on this the
nearest platoon reinforces them, and the process of building up the
firing line begins from that point. As regards inter-communication,
use connecting files and semaphore signalling to join up the various
parts and make real use of them, but avoid sham messages.