ON MODERATION IN ACQUIRING DOMINION.
How far internal justice permits us to acquire dominion--Moderation,
in the use of this right over the conquered,
laudable--Incorporating them with the conquerors--Allowing them
to retain their dominions--Placing garrisons therein--Imposing
tributes or other burdens--Utility of such moderation--Change in
the form of a conquered government--The conquered permitted to
retain some part of their former liberties--Especially in matters
of religion--Clemency to be shewn.
I. That equity and moderation towards individuals, which are so highly
extolled, are still more deserving of admiration, when exercised
towards nations and kingdoms; where injustice would be attended with
more signal calamities, and moderation with more beneficial effects.
In just war the right of dominion over a people, and the sovereign
power, which that people possess, may be acquired as well as any
other right. But the claims to such a right ought by no means to be
prosecuted beyond indemnity for aggression, and security against future
evils.
But this motive, so necessary to be observed, especially in all
treaties of peace, as well as in the use of victory, is often
confounded with others. In other points a sovereign prince or state may
relinquish a claim from a principle of moderation, but where the future
security of their subjects is concerned, it is an act of cruelty rather
than of moderation to relax too far in favour of a conquered enemy.
II. Aristotle has, more than once, said, that war is undertaken for
the sake of peace, and toil endured in order to obtain rest. And in
the same manner, Cicero has observed, that men go to war, that they
may live in peace without molestation and injury. War too, as we are
instructed by the teachers of true religion, may be made, to remove
every thing that interrupts, and stands in the way of peace.
In the primitive ages, as we find from history, wars in general were
made to preserve territories rather than to extend them. And any
deviation from this rule was thought unlawful: thus the prophet Amos
reproves the Ammonites for their love of making conquests.
III. The prudent moderation of the ancient Romans approaches nearly to
this model of primitive innocence. For although they made conquests,
they mitigated the fate of the conquered by incorporating them with
themselves.
IV. Another mark of moderation in the use of victory is leaving to
conquered kings, or nations the dominions, which they LAWFULLY held
before.
Polybius highly extols the merit and wisdom of Antigonus, who, having
Sparta in his power, allowed the inhabitants to retain their national
polity and freedom.
V. Sometimes indeed a conqueror, though allowing a subjugated people
to retain their dominion and sovereignty, must provide for his own
security, by placing garrisons in their country.
VI. Contributions too are frequently imposed and levied, not so much
by way of indemnity for expences incurred, as for a future security
between the conqueror, and the conquered country. Upon the same
principle, as was before[70] observed, in explaining the nature of
unequal treaties, conditions may be imposed also requiring a conquered
power to deliver up a certain number of her ships and forts, and to
reduce her troops to a limited number.
VII. But leaving to conquered powers a part or the whole of their
dominions is not only sometimes an act of justice and humanity, but
an act of sound policy also. Among other of Numa's institutions, his
manner of celebrating the rites of TERMINUS, the DEITY OF BOUNDARIES,
is much commended; for he prohibited the use of blood in those
ceremonies, as an intimation that nothing was more conducive to the
peace and harmony of the world, than for every nation to confine
herself within her proper bounds.
In conformity to which maxim Florus observes, that it is more easy to
make conquests than to keep them. To which rule Plato, in his third
book of Laws, adapts the proverbial expression of Hesiod, that HALF IS
BETTER THAN THE WHOLE.
VIII. The Lacedaemonians and the Athenians anciently claimed no farther
dominion over conquered cities and states, than purely wishing them to
adopt forms of government like their own, the Lacedaemonians living
under an aristocratic, and the Athenians under a democratic system. But
whether such changes were conducive to a conqueror's security, it is
not to our present purpose to examine.
IX. If it is not perfectly safe to forbear exercising ANY dominion over
a conquered enemy, the matter may be so regulated as to leave him some
portion of his former sovereignty and power. Thus among the Jews the
sceptre remained with the Sanhedrim, even after Archelaus was deprived
of his kingdom; and Alexander in many cases allowed Darius to remain a
sovereign over others, while he required of him submission to himself.
X. Even though a conquered power was deprived of all sovereignty,
she might be allowed to retain some of her laws, privileges, and
magistracies of inferior importance. Thus, Pliny, in his letters,
informs us, that in the proconsular province of Bithynia, the city of
Apamaea was allowed to regulate the form of her government at her own
pleasure, and, in other places, the Bithynians were permitted to retain
their own magistrates, and their own senate.
XI. This indulgence ought to be shewn to every people, especially in
their attachment to the religion of their forefathers, of which they
should never be deprived but with their own consent and conviction. An
indulgence, which Agrippa in his address to Caius, as cited by Philo
in the account of his embassy, approves of, as highly grateful to the
conquered people, and by no means prejudicial to the conqueror. At the
same time a conqueror will take care that erroneous opinions do not
prevail to the prejudice and overthrow of true religion, as was done by
Constantine upon his crushing the party of Licinius, and afterwards by
the Franks and other kings.