Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke
out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of
inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today
the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge
the superiority of our heavy artillery.
The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense
activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the
employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved
in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front
represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is
an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in
the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance.
The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of
all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.
With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for
lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into
use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.
_There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this
kind of warfare._
Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the
various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only
is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine
guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been
increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.
_The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has
worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This
section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army,
which are described as abundant._
_LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)--The eighth
installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters
of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers,
the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the
German Army."_
_The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the
condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is
bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession,
has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December
showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were
only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the
present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional
officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new
formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have
to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units._
"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it
continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional
officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."