As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have
been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the
western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half
corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions--the
rain, mud, and mist--were such as to diminish the effectiveness of
offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken,
which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies
in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily
expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material,
while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and
can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions
explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have
assumed during the period under review.
[Illustration: Map illustrating the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of
Ypres, and the terrain of the frustrated German efforts to reach Dunkirk
and Calais.]
Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the
same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our
opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking
anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of
Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable
results.
[The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses
between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter
campaign. The result he sums up as follows:]