THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.
Knoxville is situated on the northern bank of the Holston river. For
the most part the town is built on a table-land, which is nearly a
mile square, and about one hundred and fifty feet above the river.
On the north-east the town is bounded by a small creek. Beyond this
creek is an elevation known as Temperance Hill. Still further to the
east is Mayberry's Hill. On the north-west this table-land descends
to a broad valley; on the south-west the town is bounded by a second
creek. Beyond this is College Hill; and still further to the south-west
is a high ridge, running nearly parallel with the road which enters
Knoxville at this point. Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries occupied
the unfinished bastion-work on the ridge just mentioned. This work
was afterwards known as Fort Sanders. Roemer's battery was placed in
position on College Hill. These batteries were supported by Ferrero's
division of the Ninth Corps, his line extending from the Holston river
on the left to the point where the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad
crosses the creek mentioned above as second creek. Hartranft connected
with Ferrero's right, supporting Getting's and the Fifteenth Indiana
batteries. His lines extended as far as first creek. The divisions
of White and Hascall, of the Twenty-third Corps, occupied the ground
between this point and the Holston river, on the north-east side of the
town, with their artillery in position on Temperance and Mayberry's
hills.
Knoxville at this time was by no means in a defensible condition. The
bastion-work, occupied by Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries, was
not only unfinished, but was little more than begun. It required two
hundred negroes four hours to clear places for the guns. There was also
a fort in process of construction on Temperance Hill. Nothing more had
been done. But the work was now carried forward in earnest. As fast as
the troops were placed in position they commenced the construction of
rifle-pits in their front. Though wearied by three days of constant
marching and fighting, they gave themselves to the work with all the
energy of fresh men. Citizens and contrabands, also, were pressed into
the service. Many of the former were loyal men, and devoted themselves
to their tasks with a zeal which evinced the interest they felt in
making good the defence of the town; but some of them were bitter
rebels, and, as Captain Poe well remarked, "worked with a very poor
grace, which blistered hands did not tend to improve." The contrabands
engaged in the work with that heartiness which, during the war,
characterized their labors in our service.
It was not till after his arrival in Knoxville that General Burnside
received a despatch from General Grant, dated November 15th, two
days before. It evinced the great anxiety which the General felt in
reference to events transpiring in the vicinity of Knoxville. He
said, "I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding
on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. It would seem that you
should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville, and that portion
of the valley you will necessarily possess, holding to that point.
Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an
effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it
sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army.... I should not think it
advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee to resist
the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture; but I would harass
and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact
that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward
progress of the enemy." On the same day this despatch was received,
November 17th, General Grant sent another to General Burnside. He said,
"I have not heard from you since the 14th. What progress is Longstreet
making, and what are your chances for defending yourself?" Later, on
the same day, Grant wrote, "Your despatch received. You are doing
exactly what appears to me to be right. I want the enemy's progress
retarded at every point, all it can be, only giving up each place when
it becomes evident that it cannot longer be held without endangering
your force to capture." At ten o'clock that night Grant learned of
Burnside's return to Knoxville, and telegraphed to Halleck, "Burnside
speaks hopefully." On that day Grant issued orders to Sherman and
Thomas for the battle of Chattanooga.
Longstreet followed our troops very cautiously. At noon his advance was
a mile or two from our lines, and four companies of the Thirty-sixth
Massachusetts--A, B, D, G--were thrown out as skirmishers, the line
extending from the Holston river to the Kingston road. But the enemy
was held in check at some little distance from the town by Sanders'
division of cavalry. The hours thus gained for our work in the trenches
were precious hours indeed. There was a lack of intrenching tools, and
much remained to be done; but all day and all night the men continued
their labor undisturbed, and on the morning of the 18th our line of
works around the town presented a formidable appearance.
Throughout the forenoon of that day there was heavy skirmishing on the
Kingston road; but our men--dismounted cavalry--still maintained their
position. Later in the day, however, the enemy brought up a battery,
which, opening a heavy fire, soon compelled our men to fall back. The
rebels, now pressing forward, gained the ridge for which they had been
contending, and established their lines within rifle range of our
works. It was while endeavoring to check this advance that General
Sanders was mortally wounded. Our picket line was now advanced so as
to make our position as strong as possible. There was some firing on
both sides for a short time, and then all was quiet. The night that
followed was cold, but clear.
The enemy did not seem inclined to attack our position, but proceeded
to invest the town on the north bank of the Holston. He then commenced
the construction of a line of works.
On the morning of the 19th the four companies of the Thirty-sixth
Massachusetts, which had been detailed for picket duty on the morning
of the 17th, were relieved by the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania. The
companies relieved were ordered to College Hill to support Roemer's
battery. While on this duty the officers and men were quartered in the
buildings of East Tennessee College. Prior to our occupation of East
Tennessee these buildings had been used by the rebels as a hospital;
but, after a vigorous use of the ordinary means of purification, they
afforded us pleasant and comfortable quarters.
The other companies of the Thirty-sixth--C, E, F, H, I, K--took
possession of the rifle-pits in front of the Powell house, a short
distance to the left of the Kingston road. This was an elegant
residence, built of brick, and when the siege commenced fresco-painters
were at work ornamenting its parlors and halls. Throwing open its
doors, Mr. Powell, a true Union man, invited Colonel Morrison and Major
Draper to make it their head-quarters. He also designated a chamber for
the sick of our regiment. Early during the siege the south-western and
north-western fronts were loopholed by order of General Burnside, and
instructions were given to post in the house, in case of an attack,
two companies of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts. When the order was
announced to Mr. Powell, he said, "All right. Lay this house level with
the ground, if it is necessary." A few feet from the south-western
front of the house a small earthwork was thrown up by our men, in which
was placed a section of Buckley's battery. This work was afterwards
known as Battery Noble.
Throughout the siege both officers and men were on picket duty every
third day. During this twenty-four hours of duty no one slept. The
rest of the time we were on duty in the trenches, where one-third, and
sometimes one-fourth, of the men were kept awake. The utmost vigilance
was enjoined upon all.
Meanwhile, day by day, and night by night, with unflagging zeal,
the troops gave themselves to the labor of strengthening the works.
Immediately in front of the rifle-pits a _chevaux de frise_ was
constructed. This was formed of pointed stakes, thickly and firmly set
in the ground, and inclining outwards at an angle of about forty-five
degrees. The stakes were bound together with wire, so that they could
not easily be torn apart by an assaulting party. They were nearly five
feet in height. In front of Colonel Haskins' position, on the north
side of the town, the _chevaux de frise_ was constructed with the two
thousand pikes which were captured at Cumberland Gap early in the fall.
A few rods in front of the _chevaux de frise_ was the _abatis_, formed
of thick branches of trees, which likewise were firmly set in the
ground. Still further to the front were wire entanglements, stretched a
few inches above the ground, and fastened here and there to stakes and
stumps. In front of a portion of our lines another obstacle was formed
by constructing dams across first and second creeks, so called, and
throwing back the water. The whole constituted a series of obstacles
which could not be passed, in face of a heavy fire, without great
difficulty and fearful loss.
Morrison's brigade held the line of defences from the Holston
river--the extreme left of our line--to Fort Sanders. The following was
the position of the several regiments of the brigade. The Forty-fifth
Pennsylvania was on the left, its left on the river. On its right was
the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts. Then came the Eighth Michigan. The
Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders) formed the garrison of Fort
Sanders. Between the Eighth Michigan and Fort Sanders was the One
Hundredth Pennsylvania (Roundheads).
On the evening of November 20th the Seventeenth Michigan made a sortie
and drove the rebels from a house and out-buildings on the Kingston
road, a short distance from Fort Sanders. It was a brick house, and
afforded a near and safe position for the enemy's sharp-shooters,
who of late had become somewhat annoying to the working parties at
the fort. The movement was a hazardous one, but was successfully
accomplished, with the loss of two men killed. This sortie waked up the
rebel batteries, and a few shells were thrown into our lines; but soon
all was quiet, and at length the light of the burning buildings went
out.
In the afternoon of the 21st the four right companies of the
Thirty-sixth Massachusetts,--A, B, D, G,--on duty at the East
Tennessee College, moved out to the rifle-pits. The siege had now
continued several days. The rebels had constructed works, offensive
and defensive, in our front; but the greater part of their force
seemed to have moved to the right. On the 22d of November, however,
they returned, not having found evidently the weak place in our lines
which they sought. It was now thought they might attack our front that
night, and orders were given to the men on duty in the outer works to
exercise the utmost vigilance. But the night--a beautiful moonlight
night--passed quietly.[5]
[5] In his official report General Longstreet says: "On the 22d General
McLaws seemed to think his line near enough for an assault, and he was
ordered to make it at dark on that night. General Jenkins was ordered
to be prepared to coöperate. After night General McLaws reported
against the assault, saying that his officers would prefer to attack at
daylight."
With each day our confidence in the strength of our position increased,
and we soon felt able to repel an assault from any quarter. But the
question of supplies was a serious one. When the siege commenced there
was in the Commissary Department at Knoxville little more than a day's
ration for the whole army. Should the enemy gain possession of the
south bank of the Holston our only means of subsistence would be cut
off. Thus far his attempts in this direction had failed, and the whole
country from the French Broad to the Holston, was open to our foraging
parties. In this way a considerable quantity of corn and wheat was
soon collected in Knoxville. Bread, made from a mixture of meal and
flour, was issued to the men, but only in half and quarter rations.
Occasionally a small quantity of fresh pork was also issued. Neither
sugar nor coffee was issued after the first days of the siege.
The enemy, foiled in his attempts to seize the south bank of the
Holston, now commenced the construction of a raft at Boyd's Ferry,
above Knoxville. Floating this down the swift current of the stream,
he hoped to carry away our pontoon, and thus cut off our communication
with the country beyond. To thwart this plan an iron cable, one
thousand feet in length, was stretched across the river above the
bridge. This was done under the direction of Captain Poe. Afterwards
a boom of logs, fastened end to end by chains, was constructed still
farther up the river. The boom was fifteen hundred feet in length.
On the 23d the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts moved a little to the left,
in order to make room for another regiment in the pits to our right.
In the evening the rebels made an attack on our pickets in front of
the left of the Second Division, Ninth Corps. In falling back our men
fired the buildings on the ground abandoned, lest they should become
a shelter for the enemy's sharp-shooters. Among the buildings thus
destroyed were the arsenal and machine-shops near the depot. The light
of the blazing buildings illuminated the whole town.
The next day, November 24th, the Twenty-first Massachusetts
and the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, the whole under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkes of the Twenty-first, drove back the rebels at
this point, and reoccupied our old position.
Early in the morning of the same day, an attack was made by the Second
Michigan--one hundred and ninety-seven men--on the advanced parallel,
which the enemy had so constructed as to envelop the north-west bastion
of Fort Sanders. The works were gallantly carried; but, before the
supporting columns could come up, our men were repulsed by fresh
troops which the enemy had at hand. Our loss was severe, amounting to
sixty-seven, including Major Byington, commanding the Second Michigan,
who was left on the field mortally wounded.
That night we had orders that neither officers nor men should sleep.
It was a long night of watching. There was a total eclipse of the moon
during the night, and we were in shadow from two o'clock until four.
On the 25th of November the enemy, having on the day previous crossed
the Holston at a point below us, made another unsuccessful attempt
to occupy the heights opposite Knoxville. He succeeded, however, in
planting a battery on a knob about one hundred and fifty feet above
the river, and twenty-five hundred yards south of Fort Sanders. This
position commanded Fort Sanders, so that it now became necessary to
defilade the fort.
November 26th was our national Thanksgiving day, and General Burnside
issued an order, in which he expressed the hope that the day would be
observed by all, as far as military operations would allow. He knew
that the rations were short, and that the day would be unlike the
joyous festival we were wont to celebrate in our distant New England
homes; and so he reminded us of the circumstances of trial under which
our fathers first observed the day. He also reminded us of the debt
of gratitude which we owed to Him who during the year had not only
prospered our arms, but had kindly preserved our lives. Accordingly
we ate our corn bread with thanksgiving; and, forgetting our own
privations, thought only of the loved ones at home, who, uncertain of
our fate, would that day find little cheer at the table and by the
fireside.
Allusion has already been made to the bastion-work known as Fort
Sanders, which was named for the gallant commander of the cavalry who
laid down his life in front of Knoxville at the beginning of the siege.
A more particular description of this fort is now needed. The main
line, held by our troops, made almost a right angle at the fort, the
north-west bastion being the salient of the angle. The ground in front
of the fort, from which the wood had been cleared, sloped gradually
for a distance of eighty yards, and then abruptly descended to a wide
ravine. Under the direction of Lieutenant Benjamin, Second United
States Artillery, and Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Ohio, the
fort had now been made as strong as the means at his disposal and the
rules of military art admitted. Eighty and thirty yards in front of
the fort rifle-pits were constructed. These were to be used in case
our men were driven in from the outer line. Between these pits and
the fort were wire entanglements, running from stump to stump, and
also an _abatis_. Sand-bags and barrels were arranged so as to cover
the embrasures. Traverses, also, were built for the protection of
the guns, and in passing from one position to another. In the fort
were four twenty-pounder Parrotts (Benjamin's battery), four light
twelve-pounders (of Buckley's battery), and two three-inch steel
rifle-guns.
November 27th all was quiet along the lines, except an occasional shot
from the rebel pickets, until evening, when cheers and strains of
music enlivened the enemy's camp. We now know that the arrival of two
brigades of Buckner's command, reinforcements from Bragg's army, was
the occasion of their rejoicing; but at the time we could not solve
the mystery. Was it possible that Grant had met with a reverse? we
hesitatingly asked. Or had the enemy received reinforcements? While on
picket that night our men could distinctly hear the rebels chopping on
the knob that they had so recently occupied on the opposite bank of the
river. They were clearing away the trees in front of the earthwork
which they had constructed the day before. Would they attack at
daybreak? So we thought, connecting the fact with the cheers and music
of the earlier part of the night; but the morning opened as quietly
as any of its predecessors. Late in the afternoon the enemy seemed to
be placing his troops in position in our front, and our men stood in
the trenches awaiting an attack; yet the day wore away without further
demonstrations.
A little after eleven o'clock P.M., November 28th, we were called to
our places in the trenches by heavy musketry to the right. It was
a cloudy, dark night, and at a distance of only a few feet it was
impossible to distinguish any object. The firing soon ceased, with
the exception of an occasional shot on the picket line. An attack had
evidently been made on our rifle-pits; but at what precise point, or
with what success, was as yet unknown. Reports soon came in. The enemy
had first driven in the pickets in front of Fort Sanders, and had then
attacked our line, which was also obliged to fall back. The rebels in
front of the Thirty-sixth, however, did not advance beyond the pits
which our men had just vacated, and a new line was at once established
by Captain Buffum, of Company D, our brigade officer of the day. We
afterwards learned that the enemy had advanced along the whole line and
established themselves as near as possible to our works.
It was now evident that the enemy intended an attack; but where
would it be made? All that long, cold night--our men were without
overcoats--we stood in the trenches pondering that question. Might not
this demonstration in our front be only a feint to draw our attention
from other parts of the line, where the chief blow was to be struck? So
some thought. Gradually the night wore away.
A little after six o'clock the next morning the enemy suddenly opened
a furious cannonade. This was mostly directed against Fort Sanders;
but several shells struck the Powell House, in rear of Battery
Noble. Roemer immediately responded from College Hill. In about
twenty minutes the enemy's fire slackened, and in its stead rose the
well-known rebel yell in the direction of the fort. Then followed the
rattle of musketry, the roar of cannon, and the bursting of shells.
The yells died away, and then rose again. Now the roar of musketry
and artillery was redoubled. It was a moment of the deepest anxiety.
Our straining eyes were fixed on the fort. The rebels had reached the
ditch, and were now endeavoring to scale the parapet. Whose will be the
victory,--oh, whose? The yells again died away, and then followed three
loud Union cheers,--"Hurrah! hurrah! hurrah!" How those cheers thrilled
our hearts, as we stood almost breathless at our posts in the trenches!
They told us that the enemy had been repulsed, and that the victory was
ours. Peering through the rising fog toward the fort, not a hundred
yards away,--oh, glorious sight!--we dimly saw that our flag was still
there.
Let us now go back a little. Longstreet had learned of the defeat of
Bragg, and, in opposition to the advice of his generals, determined
to make an assault on General Burnside's lines. "Our only safety," he
said to them, "is in making the assault on the enemy's position." Port
Sanders was made the point of attack, as it was evidently the key of
the defences. Accordingly, having seized our rifle-pits, Longstreet,
under the cover of the ridge on which Fort Sanders was built, formed
his columns for the assault. The men were picked men,--the flower of
his corps. "The force which was to attempt an enterprise which ranks
with the most famous charges in military history," says Pollard, in
his "Third Year of the War," pages 161, 162, "should be mentioned in
detail. It consisted of three brigades of McLaws' division: that of
General Wolford, the Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-fourth Georgia
Regiments, and Cobb's and Phillip's Georgia Legions; that of General
Humphrey, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second,
and Twenty-third Mississippi Regiments; and a brigade composed of
General Anderson's and Bryant's brigades, embracing, among others,
the Palmetto State Guard, the Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment, and
the Fifty-first, Fifty-third, and Fifty-ninth Georgia Regiments."
One brigade was to make the assault, two brigades were to support
it, and two brigades were to watch our lines and keep up a constant
fire. Five regiments formed the brigade selected for the assaulting
column. These were placed in position "in column by division, closed
in mass." When the fire of their artillery slackened, the order for
the charge was given. The salient of the north-west bastion was the
point of attack. The rebel lines were much broken in passing the
_abatis_. But the wire entanglements proved a greater obstacle. Whole
companies were prostrated. Benjamin now opened his triple-shotted guns.
Nevertheless, the weight of their column carried the rebels forward,
and in two minutes from the time the charge was commenced they had
reached the ditch around the fort, and were endeavoring to scale the
parapet. The guns, which had been trained to sweep the ditch, now
opened a most destructive fire. Lieutenant Benjamin also took shells
in his hand, and, lighting the fuse, tossed them over the parapet into
the crowded ditch. "It stilled them down," he said. One of the rebel
brigades in reserve, with added yells, now came up in support, and the
slaughter was renewed. The ditch was filled, and several rebel flags
were planted on the parapet. But the Highlanders and the Twenty-ninth
Massachusetts Volunteers in the fort swept off with their muskets those
who attempted to scale the parapet. The men in the ditch, satisfied of
the hopelessness of the task they had undertaken, now surrendered. They
represented eleven regiments, and numbered nearly three hundred. Among
them were seventeen commissioned officers. Over two hundred dead and
wounded, including three colonels, lay in the ditch alone. The body of
General Humphrey was found near the ditch, while the ground in front of
the fort was strewn with the bodies of the dead and wounded. Over one
thousand stands of arms fell into our hands, and the battle-flags of
the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Mississippi and Sixteenth Georgia. Our
loss was eight men killed and five wounded.[6] Never was a victory more
complete, and achieved at so slight a cost. Never, too, were brighter
laurels won than were laid that morning on the brow of the hero of Fort
Sanders, Lieutenant Benjamin, Second United States Artillery.[7]
[6] Longstreet gives his total loss from November 14th to December 4th
as 198 officers and men killed, 850 wounded, 248 missing; total 1,296.
His loss in the assault on Fort Sanders, November 29th, he gives as 129
killed, 448 wounded, and 226 missing; total, 803.
[7] The following account of this assault is taken from a history of
the Sixtieth Alabama Regiment, published at Montgomery, Ala., in 1867:--
"At about three or four o'clock in the morning the regiment was gotten
under arms. The atmosphere was damp and penetratingly cold; the men
were thinly clad, and numbers of them barefoot. Their sufferings while
standing under arms, clasping with numbed hands the cold barrels of
their muskets, can be appreciated by those alone who have experienced
similar hardships. But, despite of cold, hunger, nakedness, and
approaching peril, the brave fellows were full of spirit, and stout
hearts beat hopefully beneath each ragged gray jacket. General Gracie,
while riding through his brigade on the day before, had pointed
significantly towards Knoxville, and remarked, 'There are shoes over
there, boys,' and visions of comfortable brogans were floating through
the minds of those barefoot Confederates.
"There was no noise, save the low hum of subdued voices, the rumbling
of moving artillery, and the steady tramp of different bodies of troops
advancing to their allotted positions. The night was dark; but the
enemy, anticipating our movement, filled the heavens with streams of
artificial light, which threw the shadow of our columns far to the
rear, and was reflected back by many an unsheathed sword and burnished
barrel.
"At length, the ominous silence was broken by the discharge of a single
piece of artillery from the brow of a hill to our right. Artillery had
been planted on each of the hill-tops in the vicinity,--some being
occupied by the enemy, and some by ourselves,--and now, in a few
moments after the discharge of this pioneer piece, a brisk fire was
opened from them all. Thunder peals burst forth and answered each other
in quick succession; and, like destroying angels, the huge missiles
flew through the dense atmosphere with an unearthly shrieking. Under
the exhilaration of this stirring martial serenade, and the animating
words of the colonel of the regiment (who seemed everywhere present),
the line was put in motion, and, encountering a creek, plunged through,
regardless of the cold.
"After ascending a hill, and advancing a few hundred yards in the
open field beyond, the command was suddenly ordered to fall back,
and accordingly faced about and moved in retreat to the brow of the
hill just passed, where it occupied a line of rifle-pits located at
that point. This retrograde movement, suggestive of ill, and at first
inexplicable, was soon accounted for in a manner that filled every
heart with sorrow, and shrouded every countenance in gloom. We had been
in the rifle-pits but a short time when day began to dawn. The firing
ceased for the most part; only a stray shell now and then ricocheted
through our line, or burst above our heads. While thus waiting in the
rifle-pits, expecting, with much solicitude, the denouement, a solitary
litter was seen advancing toward us over the field in our front; then
another and another, and anon a sad procession was silently threading
its way to the rear. No words were required to convey the sad tidings.
The blood dripping from the litters, and the occasional groans of their
mangled occupants, who had led in the charge, as they passed through
our line on their way to the rear, apprised us, more unmistakably than
language could have done, of the woful fact of the morning's disaster.
The charge, though gallant, was unsuccessful, and five hundred noble
Mississippians lay dead or dying in the moat that surrounded the fort
upon which the attack had been made. A truce had been early secured,
and all day long the sad procession moved on, silently and mournfully,
in the discharge of its duty.
"Among the many inexpressibly sad days of our military career, no
member of the regiment will, I am sure, fail to recognize this, the
29th day of November, 1863, as one of the most sad. All through that
dismal day the words were ever recurring--'These are they who have
passed through great tribulation.'"--pp. 24-27.
Our only loss in the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts was private Haven, of
Company G, who died of wounds received from a shell.
Longstreet had promised his men that they should dine that day in
Knoxville. But, in order that he might bury his dead, General Burnside
now tendered him an armistice until five o'clock P.M. It was accepted,
and our ambulances were sent to assist the rebels in removing the
bodies to the enemy's lines. At five o'clock two additional hours
were asked, as the work was not yet completed. At seven o'clock a gun
was fired from Fort Sanders, the rebels responded from an earthwork
opposite, and the truce was at an end.
General Longstreet, in his official report, says: "On the 26th and 27th
we had various rumors of a battle having been fought at Chattanooga,
the most authentic being from telegraph operators. There seemed to
be so many reports leading to the same conclusion that I determined
that I must attack, and, if possible, get possession of Knoxville.
The attack upon the fort was ordered on the 28th, but, in order to
get our troops nearer the works, the assault was postponed until
daylight of the 29th. The line of sharp-shooters along our entire
front were ordered to be advanced at dark to within good rifle-range
of the enemy's lines, and to sink rifle-pits during the night in their
advanced positions, so that the sharp-shooters along our whole line
might engage the enemy upon an equal footing, whilst our columns
made the assault against the fort. Our advance at night was very
successful, capturing sixty or seventy prisoners without any loss. The
assault was ordered to be made by three of General McLaws' brigades,
his fourth being held in readiness for further operations. General
Jenkins was ordered to advance a brigade a little later than the
assaulting columns, and to pass the enemy's lines east of the fort, and
to continue the attack along the enemy's rear and flank. Two brigades
of Major-General Buckner's division, under Brigadier-General B. R.
Johnson, having arrived the day before, were ordered to move in rear
of General McLaws, and, at a convenient distance, to be thrown in, as
circumstances might require. On the night of the 28th General McLaws'
letter of that date was received. General McLaws' letter was shown to
General Leadbetter, and my answer was read to him. General Leadbetter
then suggested the postscript which I added to the answer. The assault
was made, at the appointed time, by Generals Wofford's, Humphrey's,
and Byron's brigades. The troops were not formed as well to the front
as they should have been. Their lines should have been formed close
upon our line of rifle-pits, which would have given them about two
hundred yards to advance under fire. Instead of this, the lines were
formed several hundred yards in rear of the pits. My orders were that
the advance should be made quietly until they entered the works, which
was to be announced by a shout. The troops moved up in gallant style.
As I approached the troops they seemed to be in good order at the edge
of the ditch, and some of the colors appeared to be on the works.
When in about five hundred yards of the fort I saw some of our men
straggling back, and heard that the troops could not pass the ditch
for want of ladders or other means. Almost at the same moment I saw
that the men were beginning to retire in considerable numbers, and
very soon the column broke up entirely and fell back in confusion. I
ordered Buckner's brigades halted and retired, and sent the order for
Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, to be halted and retired; but
the troops of the latter brigade had become excited, and rushed up to
the same point from which the others had been repulsed, and were soon
driven back. Officers were sent to rally the men, and good order was
soon restored."[8]
[8] Rev. J. William Jones, D.D., Secretary of the Southern Historical
Society, kindly permitted the writer, when in Richmond, Va., in April,
1880, to copy from General Longstreet's letter-book two letters, which
are of interest in this connection. The first is as follows:--
"HEAD-QUARTERS, Nov. 28, 1863.
"GENERAL,--Your letter is received. I am not at all confident that
General Bragg has had a serious battle at Chattanooga; but there is
a report that he has, and fallen back to Tunnel Hill. Under this
report I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making
the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight; and it
is the more important that I should have the entire support, and
all the force that you may be possessed of, in the execution of my
views. It is a great mistake to suppose that there is any safety
for us in going to Virginia, if General Bragg has been defeated,
for we leave him at the mercy of his victors; and with his army
destroyed, our own had better be also, for we must not only be
destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor honor in any
other course than the one that I have already chosen and ordered.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. LONGSTREET, _Lieutenant-General_.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MCLAWS, _Commanding_.
"The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be made
with a determination which will ensure success. J. L."
The second letter is as follows:--
"HEAD-QUARTERS, Nov. 28, 1863.
"GENERAL,--Your letter is received. The work of the enemy is not
enclosed. The ditch is probably at some points not more than three
feet deep, and five or six feet wide. At least, we so judged it
yesterday in looking at a man walk down the parapet and over the
ditch. I thought that you saw the man, as you had been with us. I
have no apprehension of the result of the attack, if we go at it
with a determination to accomplish it. We should avail ourselves of
everything, however, that may aid or relieve us.
"After our first brigade has gained the enemy's lines, I desire
that it should wheel to the left, and pursue the attack to the left
along the enemy's rear, and on to his right, and your other brigade
should conform to this movement. Johnson's division will be ordered
to follow it.
"Keep your men well at their work, and don't listen to the idea of
failing, and we shall not fail. If we go in with the idea that we
shall fail, we will be sure to do so. But no men who are determined
to succeed can fail.
"Let me urge you not to entertain such feelings for a moment. Don't
let any one fail, or anything.
"Most respectfully,
"J. LONGSTREET, _Lieutenant-General_.
"GENERAL M. JENKINS, _Commanding Division_."
We spent the day following the attack on Fort Sanders in strengthening
our rifle-pits. The lines were now much nearer to those of the enemy.
In some places not more than one hundred yards separated them. Our
shells troubled the rebels when they relieved their picket in the
forenoon. In the afternoon we received official notice of Bragg's
defeat at Chattanooga. The night that followed was bitter cold, and our
thinly clad men suffered much.
The next day, December 1st, General Burnside issued an order thanking
his troops for their endurance and bravery, and congratulating them on
their recent successes, and the success of Grant at Chattanooga. At
noon, by order, a single gun--we were short of ammunition--was fired
from Battery Noble, and the troops, standing in the trenches, gave
three cheers for the victories we had won. They were hearty cheers, as
the rebels across the ravine could testify. And they knew, too, what
those cheers meant. Having defeated Bragg, General Grant was hurrying
troops forward to relieve the besieged in Knoxville. Finding General
Granger, whom he had selected for that task, lacking in energy, he
turned the command over to General Sherman, November 29th, with orders
to push on as rapidly as possible.[9] At the same time he sent a
despatch to General Burnside congratulating him on the tenacity with
which he had held out against vastly superior forces, and informing
him of the movements in progress for his relief. By order of General
Grant a copy of this despatch was suffered to fall into the enemy's
hands, and from it, December 1st, Longstreet learned of Sherman's
advance. Burnside did not receive the despatch till the following day.
Longstreet now saw that the siege must be raised at once, and he made
his preparations accordingly.[10]
[9]
HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Nov. 29, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:--
News was received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At
that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was
not vigorous. Longstreet is evidently determined to starve the
garrison out; Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but
I have lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage an
expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think,
therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can to
the Tennessee, and determine for yourself what force to take with
you from that point; Granger has his corps with him, from which you
will select in conjunction with the force now with you. In plain
words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the
Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force
organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send
back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded with provisions,
which you can issue, and return the boat; I will have another
loaded to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly as possible from
the rations taken with you, and subsist off the country all you can.
It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from Cumberland
Gap, on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have with him,
but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to five
thousand. I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do
better acting upon your discretion than you could trammelled with
instructions. I will only add, that the last advices from Burnside
himself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only to
about the 3d of December.
Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT, _Major General Commanding_.
[10] In his report, General Longstreet says: "As our position at
Knoxville was somewhat complicated, I determined to abandon the siege,
and to draw off in the direction of Virginia, with an idea that we
might find an opportunity to strike that column of the enemy's forces
reported to be advancing by Cumberland Gap. The orders to move in
accordance with this view were issued on the 2d of December."
December 2d it was rumored that General Burnside's resignation of his
command had been accepted at Washington, and that he was to be relieved
by General Foster, who was said to be at Tazewell,--a rumor by no means
pleasing to the Ninth Corps. At nine o'clock in the evening there was
an alarm, and we stood in our places in the trenches expecting an
attack.
On the following day the enemy were very quiet, and we thought there
were some indications that they were preparing to raise the siege. The
number of their pickets was manifestly less than usual. The fact was
that their wagon-trains were that day put in motion, and on the night
of December 4th the rebels withdrew from their lines around Knoxville,
crossed the Holston, and moved up the north bank of the river. The
retreat was discovered early in the morning by the pickets of the
Thirty-sixth Massachusetts, under Captain Ames, of Company B, who had
the honor of first reporting that the siege of Knoxville was raised.
Sherman was then at Marysville, and December 5th sent the following
note to Burnside: "I am here, and can bring twenty-five thousand men
into Knoxville to-morrow; but Longstreet having retreated, I feel
disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one. But I will do all
that is possible. Without you specify that you want troops, I will
let mine rest to-morrow, and ride in to see you." Accordingly Sherman
halted his troops, except two of Granger's divisions, and December 6th
he entered Knoxville, and reported in person to General Burnside.
In his official report General Sherman says: "On the morning of
December 6th I rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and met General
Burnside. General Granger arrived later in the day. We examined his
lines of fortifications, which were a wonderful production for the
short time allowed in their selection of ground and construction of
work. It seemed to me that they were nearly impregnable. We examined
the redoubt named 'Sanders,' where, on the Sunday previous, three
brigades of the enemy had assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all
was peaceful and quiet; but a few hours before the deadly bullet sought
its victims all round about that hilly barrier."[11]
[11] _Memoirs of W. T. Sherman_, Vol. I., pp. 382, 383.
The emergency having passed, General Burnside was of the opinion that
General Sherman should return to Grant, leaving Granger's command. The
necessary orders were given, and General Sherman put his columns in
motion southward again. Too much praise cannot be awarded to General
Sherman for the promptness with which he came to our relief; as General
Burnside said, it was Sherman's approach that raised the siege.
In his official report of this campaign General Grant said: "The armies
of the Cumberland and Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed
bravery in the three days' battle of Chattanooga, their patient
endurance in marching to the relief of Knoxville, and the army of the
Ohio, for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of
Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the gratitude
of their country." That gratitude they received. Thanks to Grant and
his officers and men were voted by Congress, and a gold medal was
struck, to be presented by the President to General Grant "in the name
of the people of the United States of America." It was also voted
that "The thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to
Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and through him to the officers
and men who have fought under his command, for their gallantry, good
conduct, and soldier-like endurance." On the 7th of December President
Lincoln issued a proclamation referring to the raising of the siege of
Knoxville, "under circumstances rendering it probable that the Union
forces cannot hereafter be dislodged from that important position," and
recommending that "all loyal people do, on receipt of this information,
assemble at their places of worship, and render special homage and
gratitude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the national
cause."
The noble bearing of General Burnside throughout the siege won the
admiration of all his troops. December 11th he transferred the command
of the Department of the Ohio to General Foster, the announcement of
which was made in the following order:--
HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
KNOXVILLE, TENN., Dec. 11, 1863.
GENERAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 38.
In obedience to orders from the War Department, the Commanding
General this day resigns to Major-General John G. Foster the
command of the Army of the Ohio.
On severing the tie which has united him to this gallant army
he cannot express his deep personal feeling in parting from men
brought near to him by their mutual experiences in the eventful
scenes of the past campaign, and who have always, regardless of
every privation and of every danger, cheerfully and faithfully
performed their duty. Associated with many of their number from
the earliest days of the war, he takes leave of the army not only
as soldiers, to whose heroism many a victorious battle-field bears
witness, but as well-tried friends, who in the darkest hours
have never failed him. With the sincerest regret he leaves the
department without the opportunity of personally bidding them
farewell.
To the citizen soldiers of East Tennessee, who proved their loyalty
in the trenches of Knoxville, he tenders his warmest thanks.
With the highest confidence in the patriotism and skill of the
distinguished officer who succeeds him, with whom he has been long
and intimately connected in the field, and who will be welcome as
their leader by those who served with him in the memorable campaign
in North Carolina, and by all as one identified with some of the
most brilliant events of the war, he transfers to him the command,
assured that under his guidance the bright record of the Army of
the Ohio will never grow dim.
By command of Major-General BURNSIDE,
LEWIS RICHMOND, _A.A.G._
In a speech at Cincinnati, a few days after, with that modesty which
characterizes the true soldier, Burnside said that the honors bestowed
on him belonged to his under-officers and the men in the ranks. Those
kindly words his officers and men will ever cherish; and in all their
added years, as they recall the widely separated battle-fields, made
forever sacred by the blood of their fallen comrades, and forever
glorious by the victories there won, it will be their pride to say,
"We fought with Burnside at Campbell's Station and in the trenches at
Knoxville."
The following general orders are inserted as a fitting conclusion to
this chapter:--
HEAD-QUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,
KNOXVILLE, TENN., Dec. 4, 1863.
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 82.
The General Commanding has again the proud pleasure of
congratulating the officers and men of this division upon their
splendid behavior. During the campaign of the last three weeks
they have endured privations and fatigue that soldiers are seldom
called upon to experience.
Leaving their comfortable quarters at Lenoir's at a moment's notice
and seeking the enemy in his own camp; the return to Lenoir's, and
checking him at that place; the rapid march to Campbell's Station,
at which place they repulsed with heavy loss a superior force;
the wearying night march, after a hard day's march and fight, to
this place, where, hemmed in for nearly three weeks by a large
army full of determination to drive us from East Tennessee or
capture us,--they have borne the brunt of nearly all the fighting,
and endured days and nights of labor and watching, on a scanty
allowance of provisions, without complaint.
The conduct of those who were fortunate enough to be of the small
number that repulsed the determined assault on Fort Sanders, on
the 29th, ult. cannot be too highly praised. They drove back two
brigades of the enemy with terrible slaughter, captured three
stands of colors, and maintained the high reputation of their
division. Fortunate is the country that can produce such soldiers,
and proud of his position is the general commanding them.
Our work is not yet done. We will be called on to fight more
battles and probably to endure more hardships. Let us go forward
with strong hearts and willing hands, and we cannot fail.
By command of Brigadier-General FERRERO,
GEO. A. HICKS, _Captain and A.A.G._
HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
KNOXVILLE, TENN., Dec. 6, 1863.
GENERAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 36.
The Army of the Ohio will commemorate the series of victories, all
culminating in the redemption of a loyal district, by inscribing on
their colors and guidons the comprehensive words, expressive of the
grand result,
"EAST TENNESSEE."
By command of Major-General BURNSIDE,
LEWIS RICHMOND, _A.A.G._