THE RETREAT FROM LENOIR'S AND THE BATTLE OF CAMPBELL'S STATION.
From October 22d to October 28th the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts was
encamped at Loudon, but the enemy failed to appear. At half-past two
o'clock, on the morning of the 28th, the baggage was sent across the
river, the regiment followed, and the pontoons were taken up. The
regiment then marched to Lenoir's, about twenty-three miles south-west
of Knoxville, and halted for the night. On the following day orders
were received to establish a permanent camp for the winter. Never was
such an order more welcome. A year of varied and arduous toil was to be
followed, it was supposed, by a season of grateful rest.
The place selected for the winter-quarters of the regiment was a
thrifty young oak grove, nearly a quarter of a mile east of the little
village of Lenoir's. The camp was laid out with unusual care. In
order to secure uniformity throughout the regiment, the size of the
log-houses--they were to be ten feet by six--was announced in orders
from regimental head-quarters. The work of construction was at once
commenced. Unfortunately we were so far from our base of supplies--Camp
Nelson, Kentucky--that nearly all our transportation was required
by the Commissary Department for the conveyance of its stores.
Consequently the Quartermaster's Department was poorly supplied,
and the only axes that could be obtained were those the pioneers
and company cooks had brought with them for their own use. These,
accordingly, were pressed into the service, and their merry ringing,
as the men cheerfully engaged in the work, could be heard from early
morning until evening. Small oaks, four and five inches in diameter,
were chiefly used in building these houses. The logs were laid one
above another, to the height of four feet, intersecting at the corners
of the houses like the rails of a Virginia fence. The interstices were
filled with mud. Shelter tents, buttoned together to the size required,
formed the roof, and afforded ample protection from the weather, except
in very heavy rains. Each house had its fireplace, table, and bunk.
On the 13th of November the houses were nearly completed throughout
the camp; and as we sat by our cheerful fires that evening, and looked
forward to the leisure and rest of the winter before us, we considered
ourselves the happiest of soldiers. Unless something unforeseen should
happen, we thought we were sure of a quiet and pleasant winter at
Lenoir's.
That something unforeseen, however, was at hand, and our pleasant
dreams were destined to fade away like an unsubstantial pageant,
leaving not a rack behind. At four o'clock, on the morning of the
14th, the sergeant-major hurried to the officers' quarters with the
order, "Be ready to march at daybreak." The order was at once repeated
to the orderly sergeants of the several companies. Forthwith the camp
was astir. Lights flashed here and there through the trees. "Pack up!
pack up!" passed from lip to lip. "Shall we take everything?" was the
eager inquiry on every hand. "Yes, everything," was the reply from
head-quarters. Reluctantly the shelter-tents were stripped from the
well-built houses, which were justly the pride of both officers and
men. Knapsacks and trunks were packed. The wagon for the officers'
baggage came, was hurriedly loaded, and driven away. A hasty breakfast
followed; then, forming our line, we stacked arms, and awaited further
orders.
The meaning of all this is not so dark now as it was then.
Lieutenant-General Longstreet, who was in command of the best corps
in Bragg's army at Chattanooga, received instructions, November
3d, at a counsel of war, to move his command against Burnside.
Bragg's formal letter of instructions was dated November 4th, and
on that day Longstreet put his troops in motion, with orders "to
drive Burnside out of East Tennessee first; or, better, to capture
or destroy him." He had with him more than fifteen thousand men,
besides Wheeler's cavalry,--"portions of five brigades" (perhaps five
thousand more),--and eighty pieces of artillery. General Grant, who
at that time was mustering his forces for an assault on Bragg, at
once was informed of the movement. As early as October 26th he had
thought of the possibility of such a movement, and had telegraphed to
Burnside, "Do you hear of any of Bragg's army threatening you from the
south-west?" He now, November 5th, announced to Burnside the departure
of Longstreet, saying, "I will endeavor, from here, to bring the enemy
back from your right flank, as soon as possible." Accordingly, two
days later, he ordered Thomas to attack Bragg. "The news is of such a
nature," he said, in his order, "that it becomes an imperative duty for
your force to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own
front." But Thomas had no horses with which to move his artillery, and
the attack was necessarily delayed. November 12th Burnside telegraphed
to Grant: "We will endeavor to hold in check any force that comes
against us, until Thomas is ready."
This force, under Longstreet, was close upon us. The next day,
November 13th, Burnside ascertained that Longstreet had reached the
Tennessee river at Hough's Ferry, a few miles below Loudon. He at
once informed Grant, and proposed to concentrate his forces and fall
back on Knoxville, so as to draw Longstreet as far from Bragg as
possible. And this was the reason why we were so suddenly called to
leave our comfortable winter-quarters at Lenoir's. Longstreet had
thrown a pontoon across the river, and was moving across his entire
command, except the cavalry under Wheeler, which he had sent by way
of Marysville, with orders to seize the heights on the south bank of
the Holston river, opposite Knoxville. Knoxville was Longstreet's
objective. It was the key of East Tennessee. Should it fall into
the enemy's hands we should be obliged to retire to Cumberland Gap.
Lenoir's did not lie in Longstreet's path. If we remained there
he would push his columns past our right, and get between us and
Knoxville. It was evident, therefore, that the place must be abandoned,
and there was need of haste. The mills and factories in the village
were accordingly destroyed, and the wagon-train started north.
The morning had opened heavily with clouds, and as the day advanced the
rain came down in torrents. A little before noon our division, then
under the command of General Ferrero, moved out of the woods, but,
instead of taking the road to Knoxville, as we had anticipated, the
column marched down the Loudon road. Grant had telegraphed Burnside:
"If you can hold Longstreet in check until Sherman gets up, or, by
skirmishing and falling back, can avoid serious loss to yourself,
and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here, and
place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make
the former take to the mountain passes by every available road, to
get to his supplies." We, then, were to watch the enemy, and so not
only secure the safety of our trains and material, then on the way
to Knoxville, but also to have a part in the great work Grant had
undertaken in the campaign upon which he had just entered.
A few miles from Lenoir's, while we were halting for rest in a
drenching rain, General Burnside passed us on his way to the front;
under his slouched hat there was a sterner face than there was wont to
be. "There is trouble ahead," said the men; but the cheers which rose
from regiment after regiment, as with his staff and battle-flag he
swept past us, told the confidence which we all felt in Old "Burnie."
One incident of that march is still fresh in memory. Captain Buffum's
mess had secured several goodly turkeys, which were still fattening for
the approaching Thanksgiving. They were entrusted that morning to Jim,
the captain's colored servant, with many injunctions to faithfulness.
Late in the afternoon Jim was discovered empty-handed. "Where are those
turkeys?" thundered the captain. "I don't know, sah," replied Jim; "I
was tired, and lef' 'em by the road." "O Jim," added the captain, "I
knew you would yet ruin me!"
Chapin's brigade of White's command (Twenty-third Army Corps), was in
the advance; and, about four o'clock, his skirmishers met those of the
enemy, and drove them back a mile and a half. The country became hilly
as we advanced, and our artillery moved with difficulty. At dark we
were in front of the enemy's position, having marched nearly fourteen
miles. Our line was formed in a heavy timber, and we there stacked
arms, awaiting orders. It still rained hard; but here and there, we
hardly know how, fires were made, to prepare the ever-welcome cup of
coffee; and then, weary and wet, we laid down on the well-soaked ground.
During the evening a circular was received, notifying us of an intended
attack on the enemy's lines, at nine o'clock P.M., by the troops of
White's command; but, with the exception of an occasional shot, the
night was a quiet one. The rain ceased about ten.
Two additional despatches had been sent by Grant that day. The first
asked, "Can you hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton for seven
days?" And again, at ten o'clock, he added, "It is of the most vital
importance that East Tennessee should be held. Take immediate steps to
that end."
The next morning, at daybreak, our line was noiselessly formed, and we
marched out of the woods into the road. But it was not an advance as we
anticipated. During the night Burnside had issued orders for his troops
to return to Lenoir's. Such was the state of the roads, however, on
account of the heavy rainfall of the day before, that it was almost
impossible to move our artillery. At one time our whole regiment was
detailed to assist Roemer's battery. Near Loudon we passed the Second
Division of our corps, which, during the night, had moved down from
Lenoir's, in order to be within supporting distance. But the enemy did
not seem to be disposed to press us. We reached Lenoir's about noon.
Sigfried, with the Second Division, followed later in the day. Our
brigade (Morrison's) was now drawn up in line of battle on the Kingston
road, to check any movement the enemy might make in that direction. A
small force appeared in our front about three o'clock, and drove in the
pickets. The Eighth Michigan was at once deployed as skirmishers. The
Thirty-sixth Massachusetts and Forty-fifth Pennsylvania at the same
time moved forward to support the skirmishers, and took a position in
the woods, on the left of the road. Just at dark, to feel our position,
the enemy made a dash, and pressed our skirmishers back nearly to our
line, but declined to advance any further.
Burnside now made preparations to withdraw from Lenoir's, and fall back
on Knoxville. About the station nearly one hundred wagons were drawn
up, and as the mules were needed in order to move the artillery, the
spokes of the wheels were cut, and the stores and baggage in the wagons
were destroyed. At the same time a portion of the Ninth Corps, under
Colonel Hartranft, and a body of mounted infantry, were sent toward
Knoxville, with orders to hold the junction of the road from Lenoir's
with the Knoxville and Kingston roads, near the village of Campbell's
Station. The distance was only eight miles; but the progress of the
columns was much retarded. Such was still the condition of the roads
that the artillery could be moved only with the greatest difficulty.
Colonel Biddle dismounted some of his men and hitched their horses to
the guns. In order to lighten the caissons, some of the ammunition was
removed from the boxes and destroyed; but as little as possible, for
who could say it would not be needed on the morrow? Throughout the long
night officers and men faltered not in their efforts to help forward
the batteries. In the light of subsequent events, as it will be seen,
they could not have performed any more important service. Colonel
Hartranft that night displayed the same spirit and energy which he
infused into his gallant Pennsylvanians at Fort Steadman in the last
agonies of the rebellion, when, rolling back the fiercest assaults
of the enemy, he gained the first real success in the trenches at
Petersburg, and won for himself the double star of a major-general.
Meanwhile the Thirty-sixth and the other regiments of Morrison's
brigade remained on the Kingston road in front of Lenoir's. The
enemy, anticipating an evacuation of the place, made an attack on our
lines about ten o'clock P.M.; but a few shots from our pickets were
sufficient to satisfy him that we still held the ground. Additional
pickets, however, were sent out to extend the line held by the Eighth
Michigan. The Thirty-sixth Massachusetts and Forty-fifth Pennsylvania
still remained in line of battle in the woods. Neither officers nor men
slept that night. It was bitter cold, and the usual fires were denied
us, lest they should betray our weakness to the enemy. The men were
ordered to put their canteens and tin cups in their haversacks, and
remain quietly in their places, ready for any movement at a moment's
notice. It was a long, tedious, anxious night; what would the morrow
bring? It was Sunday night. The day had brought us no rest, only
weariness and care. No one could speak to his fellow; and in the thick
darkness, through the long, long night, we lay on our arms, waiting for
the morning. How many hearts there were among us which, overleaping
the boundaries of States, found their way to Pennsylvania and New
England homes; how many which, on the morrow, among the hills of East
Tennessee, were to pour out their life's blood even unto death!
At length the morning came. It was cloudy as the day before. White's
division of the Twenty-third Corps was now on the road to Knoxville;
and, besides our own brigade, only Humphrey's brigade of our division
remained at Lenoir's. About daybreak, as silently as possible, we
withdrew from our position on the Kingston road, and, falling back
through the village of Lenoir's took the Knoxville road, Humphrey's
brigade, consisting of the Second, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Michigan
regiments, covering the retreat. The enemy, Hood's division, at once
discovered this movement, but, lingering around the burning baggage
and stores, did not press us till we were within about two miles of
Campbell's Station. Humphrey, however, held them in check with the loss
of a few killed and wounded,--among the former Colonel Smith, of the
Twentieth Michigan,--and Morrison moved rapidly on to the point where
the road from Lenoir's unites with the road from Kingston to Knoxville.
It was evidently Longstreet's purpose to cut off our retreat at this
place. For this reason he had not pressed us at Lenoir's, the afternoon
previous, but had moved the main body of the force under his command to
our right. But the mounted infantry, which had been sent to this point
during the night, and which had moved out on this road, were able to
hold his advance in check till Hartranft came up.
On reaching the junction of the roads Morrison ordered us into an
open field on our left, and the Thirty-sixth was directed to take
position in rear of a rail-fence, with our right resting on the
Kingston road. The Eighth Michigan was on our left. The Forty-fifth
Pennsylvania was deployed as skirmishers. Meanwhile the rest of the
troops on the road from Lenoir's, and those which had preceded us,
were moving to a position selected by Burnside, a little way beyond
the village of Campbell's Station; and we were left to cover the
movement. Unfurling our colors we awaited the advance of the enemy.
There was little delay. In our front there was an occasional shot,
and also to our right; but it was soon evident that the enemy were
moving to our left, in order to gain the cover of the woods and obtain
a more favorable position for attack. Moving off by the left flank,
therefore, we took a second position in an adjoining field. Finding now
the enemy moving rapidly through the woods, and threatening our rear
with increasing numbers,--Hood's division, that had followed us from
Lenoir's, being now up,--we executed a left half-wheel, and, advancing
on the double-quick to the rail-fence which ran along the edge of
the woods, we opened a heavy fire. The manner in which Major Draper
handled the regiment in these trying circumstances was worthy of the
highest praise. From this new position the enemy at once endeavored
to force us. His fire was well directed, but the fence afforded us a
slight protection. Lieutenant J. B. Fairbank and a few of the men were
here wounded. For a while we held the enemy in check, but at length
the skirmishers of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, who were watching
our right, discovered a body of rebel infantry pushing toward our
rear from the Kingston road. Colonel Morrison, our brigade commander,
at once ordered the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts and Eighth Michigan
to face about, and establish a new line in rear of the rail-fence on
the opposite side of the field. We advanced on the double-quick, and,
reaching the fence, our men, with a shout, poured a volley into the
rebel line of battle, which not only checked its advance, but drove
it back in confusion. Meanwhile the enemy in our rear moved up to the
edge of the woods, which we had just left, and now opened a brisk fire.
We at once crossed the fence, in order to place it between us and his
fire, and were about to devote our attention again to him when orders
came for us to withdraw, it being no longer necessary for us to hold
the junction of the roads, as all our troops and wagons had now passed.
The enemy, too, was closing in upon us, and his fire was the hottest.
We moved off in good order; but our loss in killed and wounded was
quite heavy, considering the time we were under fire.
Among the killed was Lieutenant P. Marion Holmes (Co. B), of
Charlestown, Massachusetts, of whom it might well be said,
"He died as fathers wish their sons to die."
Lieutenant Holmes had been wounded in the foot at the battle of Blue
Springs, October 10th, and, as the wound was not fully healed, had
made the march from Lenoir's that morning with great difficulty. But
he would not leave his men. On his breast he wore the badge of the
Bunker Hill Club, on which was engraved the familiar line from Horace,
which Warren quoted just before the battle of Bunker Hill: "_Dulce et
decorum est pro patria mori_,"--It is sweet and glorious to die for
one's country. In the death of Lieutenant Holmes the regiment sustained
a great loss. Frank, courteous, manly, brave, he had won all hearts;
and his sudden removal from our companionship, at that moment, will
ever remind us of the great price with which that morning's success was
bought. His men made a noble endeavor to bear the body from the field;
but the enemy were pressing us so hard that they were reluctantly
compelled to leave it near the spot where the lieutenant fell. There he
was buried, and his grave marked, so that, a few weeks after, friends
from home found the spot, and took up the remains, and brought them to
Charlestown, Mass., where funeral services were held January 18, 1864.
As we left the open field, and entered the woods between us and
Campbell's Station, the enemy manœuvred to cut us off from the
road, so that we were obliged to oblique to the left. Moving on the
double-quick, receiving an occasional volley, and barely escaping
capture, we at length emerged from the woods on the outskirts of the
village. Our formation by fours was well preserved in this movement,
and Major Draper afterwards learned from a rebel officer, that the
order and steadiness displayed by the Thirty-sixth under these trying
circumstances, prevented an attack upon us which might have led to
a serious disaster to our brigade. He said they thought there was a
"Regular" regiment among the rest, upon which the others might form.
Passing through the village of Campbell's Station, we were soon under
cover of our artillery, which General Potter, under the direction of
General Burnside, had placed in position on high ground, just beyond
the village. Campbell's Station is situated between two low ranges of
hills, which are nearly a mile apart. Across the intervening space our
infantry was drawn up in a single line of battle. Ferrero's division of
the Ninth Corps held the right; White's division of the Twenty-third
Corps held the centre; and Hartranft's division of the Ninth Corps held
the left. Benjamin's, Buckley's, Getting's, and Von Schlein's batteries
were on the right of the road. Roemer's battery was on the left. The
Thirty-sixth Massachusetts supported Roemer.
Longstreet, meanwhile, had disposed his forces for an attack on our
position, but was delayed on account of the difficulty experienced in
moving his artillery. At noon the rebels came out of the woods just
beyond the village, in two lines of battle, with a line of skirmishers
in front. The whole field was open to our view. Benjamin and Roemer
opened fire at once; and so accurate was their range that the rebel
lines were immediately broken, and they fell back into the woods
in confusion. The enemy, under cover of the woods on the slope of
the ridge, now advanced against our right. Christ's brigade, of our
division, at once changed front. Buckley executed the same movement
with his battery, and, by a well-directed fire, checked the enemy's
progress in that direction. The enemy next manœuvred to turn our left.
Falling back, however, to a stronger position in our rear, selected
by General Burnside, we established a new line about four o'clock
in the afternoon. This was done under a heavy fire from the enemy's
batteries. Ferrero was now on the right of the road. Morrison's brigade
was placed in rear of a rail fence, at the foot of the ridge on which
Benjamin's battery had been planted. Several of the Thirty-sixth were
wounded by the packing of the shells fired by Benjamin; and by a piece
of a shell from the same battery, that burst prematurely, Sergeant
Gallup, of Company A, was so severely wounded that he died in a short
time. The position for the regiment was a very trying one. The enemy,
however, did not seem inclined to attack us in front, but pushed along
the ridge, on our left, aiming to strike Hartranft in flank and rear.
He was discovered in this attempt; and, just as he was moving over
ground recently cleared, Roemer, changing front at the same time with
Hartranft, opened his three-inch guns on the rebel line, and drove it
back in disorder, followed by the skirmishers. Longstreet, foiled in
all these attempts to force us from our position, now withdrew beyond
the range of our guns, and made no further demonstrations that day.
Our troops were justly proud of their success; for, with a force not
exceeding five thousand men, they had held in check, for an entire day,
three times their own number, and with a comparatively small loss.[4]
In the Ninth Corps there were twenty-six killed, one hundred and
sixty-six wounded, and fifty-seven missing. Of these the Thirty-sixth
Massachusetts had one officer and three enlisted men killed, three
officers and fourteen enlisted men wounded, and three enlisted men
missing.
[4] General Longstreet, in his official report of this action, says:
"As soon as McLaws got up he was ordered to deploy three of his
brigades in front of the enemy, and to put the other brigade upon a
ridge on our left, so as to threaten the enemy's right. At the same
time, Colonel Alexander put his artillery in position, and General
Jenkins was ordered with Hood's division around the enemy's left, and,
upon arriving opposite the enemy's position, to make an attack upon
their flank, while General McLaws was advancing against the enemy's
front to follow General Jenkins' attack. The flank movement and the
fire of our batteries caused the enemy to retire in some haste. McLaws'
division advanced promptly, and brought the enemy to a stand about a
mile further toward his rear, in a more commanding position. If General
Jenkins could have made his attack during this movement, or if he
could have made it after the enemy had taken his second position, we
must have destroyed this force, recovered East Tennessee, and in all
probability captured the greater portion of the enemy's forces. He
attributes his failure to do so to some mismanagement of General Law.
Before I could get a staff officer to him to ascertain the occasion of
the delay, night came on and our efforts ceased."
At six o'clock P.M. Ferrero's division, followed by Hartranft's,
moved to the rear, taking the road to Knoxville. White's division of
the Twenty-third Corps covered the retreat. Campbell's Station is a
little more than sixteen miles from Knoxville; but the night was so
dark, and the road so muddy, that our progress was much retarded, and
we did not reach Knoxville till about four o'clock the next morning.
We had now been without sleep forty-eight hours. Moreover, since the
previous morning, we had marched twenty-four miles and fought a battle.
Halting just outside the town, weary and worn, we threw ourselves on
the ground, and snatched a couple hours of sleep. Captain O. M. Poe,
Burnside's engineer, had been sent from Campbell's Station to select
the lines of defence at Knoxville. This, from his familiarity with the
ground, he was enabled readily to do; and early in the day--it was the
17th of November--General Burnside assigned the batteries and regiments
of his command to the positions they were to occupy in the defence of
the place.