CHAPTER XXI

TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

‘Now mark me well—it is provided in the essence of things, that from

any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to

make a greater struggle necessary.’

WALT WHITMAN, _The Open Road_.

Britain and Turkey—My correspondence with Djavid, 1911—Effect of

requisitioning the Turkish battleships—Nominal transfer of the

_Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ to Turkey—General Situation in the

Balkans—Bulgaria the dominant factor—Venizelos offers a Greek

alliance—Reasons against acceptance—My letter to Mr. Noel

Buxton—Menacing attitude of Turkey—Possibilities of a Greek

military attack upon Gallipoli—Difficulties of Greek

intervention—Search for an army—Withdrawal of the British Naval

Mission in Constantinople—Letter to Sir Edward Grey of September

23—Alternative considerations—Secret Turco-German treaty of August

2—The Turco-German attack on Russia—Ultimatum to Turkey and

declaration of war—The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts of

November 3—Impending Turkish attack upon Egypt—Naval concentration

in the Canal—Repulse of the Turkish attack—Arrival of the

Australians in Egypt—The prelude to the Dardanelles—General Survey

of the War—The Great Strain—The Sudden Relief—The End of the

Beginning.

It is now necessary to describe the circumstances attending the entry of

Turkey into the war. In Turkey, as in Greece and all the Balkan States

except Serbia, there were two violently conflicting parties—pro-German

and pro-Entente. The assiduous courting of Turkey by Germany and the

condonation of her most atrocious actions had given the Germans great

advantages at Constantinople. In addition the profound instinct of the

Turk was to be on the opposite side to his historic and tremendous enemy

Russia. Britain, on the other hand, took no trouble to counteract these

formidable tendencies. Large sections of the British Press and public

denounced the Turk, often with justice, in unmeasured terms, and no

foreign policy based on special relations with Turkey could have stood

for a day in a Liberal House of Commons. Notwithstanding all this,

British influence in Turkey rested on foundations so deep and ancient,

and the impression produced upon the Turkish mind by her obviously

disinterested course of action was so strong, that at any rate up till

the beginning of 1914 she would have welcomed a British alliance. This

was the wish not only of the old Turks but of the young Turks. When in

the summer of 1909 I had visited Constantinople, I made the acquaintance

of the Young Turk leaders and passed several days in the company of

Djavid, Talaat and Halil. I also met at the German Manœuvres of 1910

Enver Pasha, with whom I established amicable relations. All these men

seemed animated by a sincere desire to help their country to reform and

revive, and I could not help feeling much sympathy for them in their

difficulties.

In 1911, when Turkey was attacked by Italy and her Tripoli Province

seized, I received the following letter from Djavid Bey written on

behalf of his friends on the then all-powerful Committee of Union and

Progress:—

_Djavid Bey to Mr. Churchill_

_October 29, 1911._

My belief in your sincere friendship for Turkey and the Young Turks

leads me to speak of a very important matter to-day.

After the Constitution in Turkey those that believed in the beginning

of a close friendship between England and Turkey saw with regret the

misunderstanding that prevented it. I need not speak of its different

causes here. Only the true friends of England in Turkey never ceased

from trying to remove it. The actual circumstances appear to be a good

occasion for success. The attack of one of the Triple Alliance Powers

on our territory has turned the public opinion greatly against the

Triplice. The pro-English statesmen in Turkey and pro-Turkish

statesmen in England could profit of this occasion.

Knowing and believing you to occupy an important and influential

position among our friends in England, I will beg you to join our

efforts using your influence in bringing out this friendship. Has the

time arrived for a permanent alliance between the two countries? On

what basis could it be attempted? Will you please write me your

personal views on the matter? They will be considered entirely

personal and unofficial. But I will consider myself happy if we can

prepare a possible ground for official purposes.

I commended this matter promptly to Sir Edward Grey, but the danger of

estranging Italy—apart from political considerations—made it impossible

for him to authorize me to say more than the following:—

_Mr. Churchill to Djavid Bey._

_Admiralty, November 19, 1911._

It is a great pleasure to me to receive your letter, the importance of

which I fully recognize. So far as the present lamentable struggle is

concerned, we have definitely declared our neutrality; and it is not

to be expected that we shall alter a policy so gravely decided. My

answer therefore to your question must be that at the present time we

cannot enter upon new political relations. In the future the enormous

interests which unite the two great Mussulman Powers should keep us in

touch. That is our wish; the feeling of British public opinion, as you

will have seen from recent manifestations of it, opposes no barrier to

that wish, if only the Turkish Government will not alienate it by

reverting to the oppressive methods of the old regime or seeking to

disturb the British status quo as it now exists; and you and your

friends, whom I remember to have met with so much pleasure, should

bear in mind that England, almost alone among European States, seeks

no territorial expansion, and that alone among them she retains the

supremacy of the sea. We earnestly desire to revive and maintain our

old friendship with Turkey, which while we retain that supremacy

should be a friendship of value.

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter, which was due

to the importance of its nature.

In the years which followed the Young Turks looked towards Germany, and

here they were very powerfully swayed by their military instincts and

training. They rightly regarded Germany as the leading military Power:

many of them had received their military education in Berlin, and they

were spellbound by the splendour and authority of Prussian organisation.

They saw the Russian giant ever growing to the east and to the north.

And if England stood aloof, where else could Turkey find protection

except through the German sword? I do not see what else we could have

expected. Therefore, from the very beginning of the war I hoped for

nothing from Turkey and apprehended much.

The first events of the war obviously added to the tension between the

two countries. We had found it necessary, as has been described, to

requisition the two Turkish battleships which were building in British

yards. The money for these ships had been largely raised by public

subscription in Turkey, and their sequestration angered not only the

Turkish Government but large numbers of patriotic Turks throughout the

country. Moreover, in the struggles which ensued in Constantinople and

in the Turkish Cabinet between the Turkish war party and those who

favoured neutrality, this episode seemed to have weight.

I did my best, with the approval of the Cabinet, to allay the legitimate

heartburnings of the Turkish Ministry of Marine. These efforts were

seconded by Admiral Limpus, the Head of the British Naval Mission to

Turkey, whose relations with the Turks were extremely good and whose

mission had won much esteem. But with the arrival at the Dardanelles of

the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, a new and formidable complication arose.

These two ships, which had presented themselves at the entrance to the

Straits about 5 o’clock on the afternoon of August 10, were received by

the Turkish authorities. They were piloted through a passage in the

minefield and proceeded to Constantinople. The British Government had a

right to assume that they would be interned and disarmed. In view of the

delicacy of the situation, however, it was thought prudent to accept a

less drastic solution. The following minutes tell their own tale.—

_August 12, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

“_Goeben_” and “_Breslau_”

In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale or

transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be allowed,

provided that the transference is _bona fide_ and permanent. The

essential condition to insist on is that all the German officers and

men of the crews of both ships must, without exception, be at once

repatriated to Germany under parole not to serve again during the war.

We cannot agree to any exceptions being made, whether of officers or

skilled ratings, or of the ordinary crew. The British Embassy,

assisted if necessary by the English Naval Mission, should assure

themselves that all the Germans leave at once, and that the ships are

definitely handed over to the Turkish Navy. In these circumstances,

the Admiralty would allow the [British] Naval Mission to remain, as

requested by the Grand Vizier. The Turks could also be informed that

after the war is over, we should be quite ready in principle, and as

far as we can now foresee, to transfer one or both of the two ships we

have requisitioned to their flag, and that we are quite ready to

negotiate with them at the present time in regard to payment of the

sums due to Turkey.

W. S. C.

_August 17, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

The situation about _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ is extremely

unsatisfactory. Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of

neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the German

complements down to the last man has not taken place; probably the

whole of the German crews are still on board, and it is admitted that

‘experts are to be retained.’ Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has

been banished from the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and

forbidden to go on board the two ex-Germans. As long as the _Goeben_

and _Breslau_ remain in this condition, and until we know that the

whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have to keep

two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed elsewhere,

waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles. This is a

situation which cannot continue indefinitely.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

The Turkish position could only be judged in relation to the general

situation in the Balkans; and this could not be understood unless the

dominant facts of pre-war Balkan history were continually borne in mind.

The first Balkan war saw Bulgaria triumphantly bearing the brunt of the

attack on Turkey. While her armies were advancing on Constantinople

against the best troops of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks and Serbians

were overrunning the comparatively weakly-held regions of Thrace and

Macedonia. The Bulgarians, having fought the greatest battles and

sustained by far the heaviest losses, found themselves finally checked

before Constantinople, and, turning round, beheld almost the whole of

the conquered territory in the hands of their Allies. The destination of

this territory had been regulated before the war by treaty between the

four belligerent minor States. Adrianople had not however surrendered,

and in obedience to the treaty the Serbians came to the aid of the

Bulgarian forces, and played a prominent part in the capture of that

fortress. Both the Serbians and the Greeks utilised the argument that

the war had been prolonged through the need of reducing Adrianople as a

ground for claiming to repudiate in important particulars the pre-war

treaty, and meanwhile they retained occupation of all the conquered

districts in their possession. The Bulgarians were quick to repay this

claim with violence. They attacked the Greeks and Serbians, were

defeated by the more numerous armies of these two Powers, and in the

moment of extreme weakness and defeat were invaded from the other side

by Roumania, who, having taken no part in the conflict, had intact

armies to strike with. At the same time the Turks advanced in Thrace,

and led by Enver Pasha recaptured Adrianople. Thus the end of the second

Balkan war saw Bulgaria stripped not only of almost all her share of the

territory conquered from the Turks (and this entirely divided between

Greece and Serbia), but even her native province of the Dobroudja had

been wrested from her by Roumania. The terrible cruelties and atrocities

which had been perpetrated on both sides in the internecine struggle

that followed the expulsion of the Turks had left a river of blood

between the Greeks and Serbians on the one hand and the Bulgarians on

the other.

It is possible that no nation ever contemplated its fortunes with more

profound and desperate resolve than the Bulgarians at this juncture. All

their sacrifices had been useless and worse than useless. All the fruits

of their conquests had gone to aggrandise their rivals. They had been,

as they considered, stabbed in the back and blackmailed by Roumania, to

whom they had given no provocation of any kind. They saw the great

Powers, England in the van, forbid the return of the Turk to Adrianople

without offering the slightest attempt to make their words good. They

saw not only Salonika, but even Kavala, seized by the Greeks. They saw

large districts inhabited largely by the Bulgarian race newly liberated

from the Turks pass under the yoke—to them scarcely less odious—of

Serbians and Greeks. It was in these circumstances that the Bulgarian

army, in the words of King Ferdinand, ‘furled its standards’ and retired

to wait for better days.

This warlike and powerful Bulgaria, with its scheming King and its

valiant peasant armies brooding over what seemed to them intolerable

wrongs, was the dominant factor in the Balkans in 1914 and 1915.

* * * * *

On August 19, 1914, Monsieur Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Greece,

with the approval which he had, astonishing to relate, obtained, of King

Constantine, formally placed at the disposal of the Entente powers all

the naval and military resources of Greece from the moment when they

might be required. He added that this offer was made in a special sense

to Great Britain with whose interests those of Greece were indissolubly

bound. The resources of Greece, he said, were small, but she could

dispose of 250,000 troops, and her navy and her ports might be of some

use. This magnanimous offer, made as it was while all was so uncertain,

and even before the main battle in France had been joined, greatly

attracted me. No doubt on the one hand it was a serious thing to run the

risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On the other hand, the Greek Army

and Navy were solid factors; and a combination of the Greek armies and

fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of

settling the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and

effective manner. The Gallipoli Peninsula was then only weakly occupied

by Turkish troops, and the Greek General Staff were known to be ready

with well-thought-out plans for its seizure. Moreover, it seemed to me

that anyhow Turkey was drifting into war with us. Her conduct in regard

to the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ continued openly fraudulent. The presence

of these two vessels themselves in German hands in the Sea of Marmora

offered a means of putting decisive pressure on the neutrality party in

Constantinople. If we were not going to secure honest Turkish

neutrality, then let us, in the alternative, get the Christian States of

the Balkans on our side. Could we not get them on our side? Could we not

make a Balkan confederation of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania?

Whatever happened, we ought not to fall between two stools.

Sir Edward Grey, however, after very anxious consideration, moved the

Cabinet to decline Monsieur Venizelos’ proposal, as he feared, no doubt

with weighty reasons, that an alliance with Greece meant immediate war

with Turkey and possibly Bulgaria. He feared that it might jeopardise

Greece without our being able to protect her. He was anxious above all

things not to foster a Greek enterprise against Constantinople in such a

way as to give offence to Russia. And, lastly, he hoped that Sir Louis

Mallet, who was in close and intimate relations with the Grand Vizier

and the leaders of the Turkish neutrality party in Constantinople, would

after all be able to keep the peace. Certainly nothing could exceed the

skill and perseverance with which the British Ambassador laboured. It

followed from this that we should maintain the very handsome offer we

had made in common with France and Russia at the outbreak of the war to

guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire in return for her faithful

neutrality. I naturally conformed to the Cabinet decision, but with

increasing misgivings. I still continued to work and hope for a Balkan

confederation. I gave the following letter, of which the Foreign

Secretary approved, to Mr. Noel Buxton, who was starting for a

propaganda tour in the Balkans. Of course in view of our decision about

Turkey, it could refer only to the common interests of these States

against Austria.

_August 31, 1914._

It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of the Balkan

States that they should act together. This is the hour when the metal

can be cast into the mould. It is only by reclaiming from Austria

territories which belong naturally to the Balkan races that the means

can be provided to satisfy the legitimate needs and aspirations of all

the Balkan States. Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way

by which any Balkan State can expand except by internecine war. But

the application of the principle of nationality to the Southern

Provinces of Austria will produce results so advantageous to the

Balkan States that the memory and the consequences of former quarrels

could be assuaged for ever.

The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia,

Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong enough to play an effective

part in the destinies of Europe, must be the common dream of all their

peoples. The result of this war is not doubtful. Sooner or later,

Germany will be starved and beaten. Austria will be resolved into its

component parts. England has always won in the end; and Russia is

unconquerable. England has been the friend of every Christian State in

the Balkans during all their years of struggle and suffering. She has

no interests of her own to seek in the Balkan Peninsula. But with her

wealth and power she will promote and aid every step which is taken to

build up a strong union of the Christian peoples, like that which

triumphed in the first Balkan War. By acting together in unity and

good faith the Balkan States can now play a decisive part, and gain

advantages which may never again be offered. By disunion they will

simply condemn themselves to tear each other’s throats without profit

or reward, and left to themselves will play an utterly futile part in

the destinies of the world.

I want you to make your friends in Greece and in Bulgaria realise the

brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now presents itself, and to

assure them that England’s might and perseverance will not be withheld

from any righteous effort to secure the strength and union of the

Balkan peoples.

In the early days of September it seemed highly probable that Turkey,

under the influence of the German advance on Paris, would make war upon

us and upon Greece whatever we did. I began immediately to prepare for

the event.

_Mr. Churchill to General Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial

General Staff._

_September 1, 1914._

_Secret._

I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers from

Admiralty should meet two officers from the Director of Military

Operations Department of the War Office to-day to examine and work out

a plan for the seizure by means of a Greek army of adequate strength

of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet

to the Sea of Marmora.

In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary directions, as

the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war on us at any moment.

The meeting can take place either here or at the War Office as soon as

you can arrange with our Chief of Staff. I will myself explain

verbally to the Committee the subject on which his Majesty’s

Government desire information.

The Director of Military Operations, General Callwell, replied on the

3rd, on behalf of the General Staff, that the operation of seizing the

Gallipoli Peninsula would be an extremely difficult one. Sixty thousand

men would be required, thirty thousand of whom should be landed in the

first instance, should gain as much ground as possible, should prepare

landing stages, and hold their own for a week while the transports

returned to Greece for the second thirty thousand. On this basis the

operation was considered feasible. These estimates were not excessive,

and the Greeks could certainly provide a considerably larger force if

necessary.

Thereupon I telegraphed, with the approval of the Foreign Office, to

Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of our naval mission to Greece, as

follows:—

_September 4._

In event of war with Turkey, with England and Greece as Allies,

Admiralty consider it essential, as a Staff precaution, that the

question of the right war policy to be followed should be examined, in

consultation with Greek General and Naval Staff, leaving political

probabilities to be decided by respective Governments.

Admiralty give you permission to do this, should you be approached by

the Greek Government. In principle, the Admiralty views are as

follows:

In order to provide unquestionable and decisive superiority over the

German and Turkish vessels, the Greek Fleet would be offered, as

reinforcements, a squadron and flotilla, and the whole of the combined

Fleets would be placed under your command, with the _Indomitable_ as

your Flagship. Should circumstances demand it, you would be reinforced

with any class of vessel necessary and to any extent.

In order that the right and obvious method of attack upon Turkey (viz.

by striking immediately at the heart) may be carried out, the Greek

Army would, under superiority of sea predominance, have to seize the

Gallipoli Peninsula, thus opening the Dardanelles and enabling the

Anglo-Greek Fleet, in the Sea of Marmora, to fight and sink the

Turco-German ships, and from there the whole situation can be

dominated, in combination with the Black Sea Fleet of the Russians and

their military forces.

The Admiralty desire that, in consultation with you, the Greek Naval

and Military Experts should immediately examine this enterprise, and

that you should report fully by telegraph to the Admiralty what are

the general views of the Greek Government upon it, and what, in their

opinion, would be the force required to carry it out, assuming that

safe transportation is assured. Should we provide the necessary

transports, or in what time and to what extent could Greece do so?

Have they any alternative suggestions?

The Rear-Admiral’s reply reached me through the Foreign Office on the

9th.

The Greek General Staff have been consulted on the subject of your

telegram, and I agree with them in their opinion that, if Bulgaria

does not attack Greece, the latter can take Gallipoli with force at

their disposal. Greece will not trust Bulgaria unless she at the same

time attacks Turkey with all her force. They will not accept

Bulgaria’s guarantee to remain neutral.

Subject to above conditions, plan for taking Dardanelles Straits is

ready.

Greece can provide necessary transports for troops. A British squadron

of two battle cruisers, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers and

flotilla of destroyers will be needed to assist. General Staff and

myself originally formulated this plan, but operation has become

greater since Turkey has mobilised and obtained German ships.

He mentioned as an alternative the region of Alexandretta.

On September 6 Monsieur Venizelos told our Minister in Athens that he

was not afraid of a single-handed attack from Turkey by land as the

Greek General Staff were confident of being able to deal with it. The

Greek Government had received from Sofia positive assurances of definite

neutrality, but did not trust them. They would, however, be satisfied

with a formal protest by the Bulgarian Government against a violation of

Bulgarian territory by Turkish troops proceeding to attack Greece. If,

however, Bulgaria joined Turkey while Serbia was occupied with Austria,

the situation would be critical. On this I pointed out to the Foreign

Secretary on the same date that a Russian Army Corps could easily be

brought from Archangel, from Vladivostok, or with Japanese consent from

Port Arthur to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula. ‘The price to be paid in

taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy, but there would be no more war

with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 men and sea power—that is the end of

the Turkish menace.’

But it was easier to look for armies than to find them. Sir Edward Grey

replied by sending me a telegram that had been received that very

morning from Petrograd stating that in view of the very large number of

German troops which were being transferred from the Western to the

Eastern theatre, Russia was calling up every available man from Asia and

the Caucasus, and was only leaving one Army Corps in the latter. Greece

would therefore, according to the Petrograd telegram, have to bear the

brunt of the war single-handed unless she could placate Bulgaria by

territorial concessions. He added on the back of my note, ‘You will see

from the telegram from St. Petersburg that Russia can give no help

against Turkey. I do not like the prospect in the Mediterranean at all,

unless there is some turn of the tide in France.’

It is only by faithful study of this problem that its immense

difficulties are portrayed. Lest it should be thought that I underrated

the gravity of a war with Turkey, it must be remembered that I had

convinced myself that Turkey would attack us sooner or later, and that I

was also proceeding on the belief that the German invasion of France

would be brought to a standstill. Both these assumptions proved true. I

do not claim that my view was the wisest, but only to expose it to

historical judgment. The policy emerging from such a view would of

course at this juncture have offered Cyprus to Greece in compensation

for her offering Kavala to Bulgaria. It would have put the most extreme

pressure on Serbia to make concessions to Bulgaria in Monastir. Whether

these measures would have succeeded at this time I do not pronounce.

By September 9 the behaviour of the Turks about the _Goeben_ and the

_Breslau_ had become so openly defiant that it became necessary to

withdraw the British Naval Mission, who were exposed to daily insolences

at the hands of the Germans and of the Turkish war party. It was my

intention to appoint the head of the mission, Rear-Admiral Limpus, to

command the squadron watching the Dardanelles, and orders were sent

definitely to that effect. This project was not, however, pursued, it

being thought that it would be unduly provocative to employ on this

station the very officer who had just ceased to be the teacher of the

Turkish Fleet. No doubt this was a weighty argument, but in bowing to it

we lost the advantages of having at this fateful spot the Admiral who of

all others knew the Turks, and knew the Dardanelles with all its

possibilities. It was a small link in a long chain. Delay was caused and

I had to make fresh arrangements.

On September 21, I telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Carden, who was in charge

of the Malta Dockyard:—

Assume command of the squadron off Dardanelles. Your sole duty is to

sink _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, no matter what flag they fly, if they

come out of Dardanelles. We are not at war with Turkey but the German

Admiral Souchon is now Commander-in-Chief Turkish Navy and Germans are

controlling and largely manning it. Turks have been told that any

Turkish ships which come out with _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ will be

equally attacked by us. You are authorised to act accordingly without

further declaration or parley. You must deal at your discretion with

any minor Turkish war vessel which may come out alone from

Dardanelles, either ordering her back or allowing her to proceed as

you may think fit, remembering that we do not want to pick a quarrel

with Turkey unless her hostile intention is clear.

_Indomitable_ will be diverted from convoy off Crete and ordered to

join your squadron. French Commander-in-Chief has been requested to

send 2 battle ships of _Patrie_ class to reinforce your flag.

The victory of the Marne, although afterwards discounted by adverse

events, checked the developments in the Near East. Turkey was steadied

for the moment, and her attitude towards Greece became less menacing.

This however produced a corresponding cooling at Athens about joining in

the European war. From the middle of September the conditions throughout

the Balkans had declined again from crisis into suspense. They remained

however fundamentally vicious.

I continued increasingly to press as opportunity served for a policy of

uniting the Balkan States without reference to what might happen in

Turkey.

On September 23 I wrote to Sir Edward Grey as follows:—

_September 23, 1914._

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey._

I must write you a line about Turkey.... We are suffering very

seriously from Turkish hostility. Our whole Mediterranean Fleet is

tied to the Dardanelles. We are daily trying to buy Turkish neutrality

by promises and concessions. Meanwhile the German grip on Turkey

tightens, and all preparations for war go steadily forward. But all

this would in itself be of minor consequence but for the fact that in

our attempt to placate Turkey we are crippling our policy in the

Balkans. I am not suggesting that we should take aggressive action

against Turkey or declare war on her ourselves, but we ought from now

to make our arrangements with the Balkan States, particularly

Bulgaria, without regard to the interests or integrity of Turkey. The

Bulgarians ought to regain the Turkish territory they lost in the

second Balkan War, and we ought to tell them that if they join with

Roumania, Greece, and Serbia in the attack upon Austria and Germany,

the Allied Powers will see that they get this territory at the peace.

We always said that Adrianople should never fall back into Turkish

hands, and the strongest possible remonstrances were addressed to the

Porte by you at the time. There is therefore nothing wrong or

inconsistent in our adopting this position. If we win the war, we

shall be quite strong enough to secure this territory for Bulgaria,

and Turkey’s conduct to us with repeated breaches of neutrality would

release us from any need of considering her European interests. Like

you, I sympathise deeply with Mallet in the futile and thankless task

on which he is engaged. I do not know what the result will be, but I

am sure it is not worth while sacrificing the bold and decisive

alternative of throwing in our lot frankly with the Christian States

of the Balkans to get the kind of neutrality which the Turks have been

giving us, and for which we are even asked to pay and be grateful. The

whole tone of the telegrams from Roumania and Bulgaria is hopeful. I

do most earnestly beg you not to be diverted from the highway of sound

policy in this part of the world, both during the war and at the

settlement, by wanderings into the labyrinth of Turkish duplicity and

intrigue. All I am asking is that the interests and integrity of

Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are

made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.

Judged in afterlight these views can hardly be contested. I have never

swerved from them; but the reader should understand the other arguments

by which the Cabinet was ruled. The loyal desire not to spread the war

to regions still uncursed; the dangers in India of a British quarrel

with Turkey; our awful military weakness in 1914; Lord Kitchener’s

expressed wish to keep the East as quiet as possible till the two Indian

Divisions were safely through the Suez Canal; the difficulties of

winning the support of Greece, and particularly of King Constantine,

without exciting the suspicion and jealousies of Russia about

Constantinople; and, lastly, the doubts—admittedly substantial—whether

Bulgaria and King Ferdinand could ever, in the absence of substantial

military successes in the main theatres or strong local intervention by

Allied forces in the Balkans, be detached from the Teutonic system.

When I talked these questions over at the time with Sir Edward Grey it

was upon this last argument that he was most inclined to dwell. ‘Until

Bulgaria believes that Germany is not going to win the war, she will not

be moved by any promises of other people’s territory which we may make

her.’ The swift overrunning of Northern France by the German armies, the

withdrawal of the French Government to Bordeaux, the fall of Antwerp,

the tremendous victories of Hindenburg over the Russians, were events

all of which dominated the Bulgarian equally with the Turkish mind.

England, without an army, with not a soldier to spare, without even a

rifle to send, with only her Navy and her money, counted for little in

the Near East. Russian claims to Constantinople directly crossed the

ambitions both of King Ferdinand and of King Constantine. In all the

Balkans only one clairvoyant eye, only the genius of Venizelos,

discerned the fundamental moral issues of the struggle, measured justly

the relative powers of the mighty combatants, and appraised at their

true value both the victories of the German Army, and the Sea Power

under which were slowly gathering the latent but inexhaustible resources

of the British Empire.

So the Allies continued to wait and hope at Constantinople, and the days

slipped swiftly by.

Not till long after did we learn the blasting secret which would have

destroyed all British and Russian doubts. Already in the crisis of July

the leaders of the Young Turk party had been in vital negotiation with

the Germans, and on August 2 an alliance had been signed between Germany

and Turkey. Thus all this time we were deceived. Whether anything that

it was in our power to do could have averted the evils must always

remain a disputed question; but that the evils were not averted is

certain. In the end we had all the evils of both courses and the

advantages of no course. We were forced into a war with Turkey which

ultimately became of enormous magnitude. Greece was thrown into

inextricable confusion. Serbia was overrun. Bulgaria, joining hands with

her recent enemies the Turks, became our foe. And Roumania, when she

finally came in isolated upon the allied side, suffered the direst

vengeance at German hands. A more fearful series of tragedies has

scarcely ever darkened the melancholy page of history.

It must not be thought that the action of Turkey was inspired solely by

treachery and duplicity. Two parties were struggling for mastery in the

capital, but in view of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on

August 2, there could have been no doubt about the final outcome.

Moreover, in the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, to say nothing of the Turkish

Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force the Turkish

Government to adhere to the covenants which they had entered into on her

behalf. By the middle of October we learnt that Turkish preparations to

invade Egypt were actually being made. We learned also from a secret

source, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had received

solemn assurances from Enver that Turkey would enter the war against the

Entente at an early date. At the end of October, our outposts beyond the

Suez Canal had to be withdrawn in face of gathering Turkish forces; and

finally, about October 27, the _Breslau_, with the Turkish cruiser

_Hamidieh_ and a division of destroyers, followed by the _Goeben_,

steamed into the Black Sea, and on the 29th and 30th bombarded the

Russian fortress of Sevastopol, sank a Russian transport, raided the

harbour of Odessa, torpedoed a gunboat, and, lastly, practically

destroyed Novorossisk, its oil tanks and all the shipping in the port.

On this the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople immediately demanded

his passports; and the British Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m. on October

30, after reciting its many griefs against the Turks, especially their

invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and their misconduct about the Goeben,

sent an ultimatum requiring repudiation of these acts and the dismissal

of the German Military and Naval Missions within 12 hours. The Admiralty

conformed to this decision by telegraphing to all Admirals concerned as

follows:—

(_October 31, 1914._ 12.35 a.m.)

Orders sent Ambassador Constantinople 8.15 p.m. 30th October to

present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of 12 hours. Do not

yourself commence hostilities without further orders.

_Add to Vice-Admiral Carden (Indefatigable)._

You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very shortly.

Russia declared war on Turkey at the expiry of the ultimatum; and the

British and French Ambassadors, in company with their Russian colleague,

left Constantinople on November 1—the same day on which at the other end

of the world the battle of Coronel was being fought. Naval orders to

commence hostilities were sent, in concert with the Foreign Office, in

conformity with the expiry of the ultimatum.

_Admiralty to all ships._

_October 31, 1914_ (sent 5.5 p.m.)

‘Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowledge.’

On November 1 two of our destroyers, entering the Gulf of Smyrna,

destroyed a large armed Turkish yacht which was lying by the jetty

carrying mines; and late that same day Admiral Carden was instructed to

bombard the outer Dardanelles forts at long range on the earliest

suitable occasion. This bombardment was carried out on the morning of

November 3. The two British battle-cruisers, firing from a range beyond

that of the Turkish guns, shelled the batteries on the European side at

Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles. The French battleships fired at the

Asiatic batteries at Kum Kali and Orkanieh. About eighty rounds were

fired altogether, resulting in considerable damage to the Turkish forts,

and in several hundred casualties to the Turks and Germans who manned

them.

The reasons for this demonstration have been greatly canvassed. They

were simple though not important. A British squadron had for months been

waiting outside the Dardanelles. War had been declared with Turkey. It

was natural that fire should be opened upon the enemy as it would be on

the fronts of hostile armies. It was necessary to know accurately the

effective ranges of the Turkish guns and the conditions under which the

entrance to the blockaded port could be approached. It has been stated

that this bombardment was an imprudent act, as it was bound to put the

Turks on their guard and lead them to strengthen their defences at the

Dardanelles. At the Admiralty we did not think it would have this

effect: nor were we wrong. When, three and a half months later (February

19, 1915), Admiral Carden again bombarded these same forts, the

Gallipoli Peninsula was totally unprepared for defence, and was still

weakly occupied; and small parties of Marines were able to make their

way unopposed into the shattered forts and a considerable distance

beyond them. That no harm was done can therefore be plainly proved. On

the other hand, valuable data were obtained.

We had now to provide against the impending Turkish attack upon Egypt.

The First Cruiser Squadron, comprising the _Black Prince_, _Duke of

Edinburgh_ and _Warrior_, had been either employed on escort duties at

sea or on guard at Alexandria or Port Said. Even before the news of

Coronel had reached us, the increasing strain upon our resources had

made it necessary to replace these fine ships by older smaller vessels.

They were now urgently required to form a combat squadron near the Cap

de Verde Islands as part of the second general combination against von

Spee. They were also promised to the Commander-in-Chief for the Grand

Fleet at the earliest possible moment thereafter. We should have been

hard pressed in these circumstances to find a new and satisfactory naval

force for the defence of the Canal against the now imminent Turkish

attack. The discovery and blocking in of the _Königsberg_ on 31st

October liberated two out of the three vessels searching for her. But

this was not enough. The destruction of the _Emden_ on the 9th November

was an event of a very different order. It afforded us immediate relief,

and relief exactly where we required it. The Indian Ocean was now clear.

The battleship _Swiftsure_ from the East Indian station was at once

ordered to the Canal. Of the fast cruisers that had been searching for

the _Emden_, the _Gloucester_, _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, _Hampshire_ and

_Yarmouth_ were immediately brought homewards through the Red Sea into

the Mediterranean. I felt that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies

must come himself to the new scene of danger.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies._

_November 14, 1914._

Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from

India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should rejoin your

flagship _Swiftsure_ at Port Said by the quickest route at once.

_Gloucester_ can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph

what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult

with General Officer Commanding, Egypt, and work hand in hand with him

and with the British authorities.... The following ships will be at

your disposal in the Red Sea: _Swiftsure_, _Minerva_, _Doris_,

_Proserpine_ ... and eight torpedo-boats from Malta. Measures are also

being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use

in the Canal. Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other

duties of your command, namely convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at

the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your

absence in Egyptian waters.

A few days earlier I had minuted:—

_November 18, 1914._

First Sea Lord.

Chief of Staff.

I cannot agree to this. It would be a great waste of a valuable ship.

Considerably more than a week has passed since I minuted that _Askold_

should be ordered to the Mediterranean. There or in Egyptian waters

this Russian ship will have a chance of fighting against Turkey. To

send her off to Hong-Kong is an altogether purposeless errand. Her

stores should go on with the mines or in another vessel which keeps

company with the mines from Vladivostok. No convoy is necessary; but

if it were, the _Clio_ or _Cadmus_, or some little vessel like them,

could be used. The whole Japanese Navy is in the Pacific and Indian

Oceans. They would quite willingly find a convoy for the mines and the

_Askold_ stores. The whole area of the sea, from the coast of Chili to

the coast of Mozambique, has been cleared of the enemy. But for vague

rumours of a possible armed merchantman at large, there is not the

slightest menace. We must profit from this situation to the full while

it lasts, and this can only be done by moving every ship that is of

any use promptly into waters where they are required. No one knows how

many ships we shall want in Egypt when the Turkish invasion begins.

There may also be massacres of Christians in the coast towns of Levant

which will require vessels for immediate action there. All the ships

out of the Indian Ocean that can play an effective part ought to be

hurried home. The cruisers ought to steam at least 18 knots. Nearly

all these ships have lost three or four precious days since the

destruction of the _Emden_ was known.

W. S. C.

These directions were complied with. I searched the oceans for every

available ship. During the second and third weeks of November the

_Swiftsure_ and the squadron and flotilla mentioned above, together with

the French _Requin_ and the Russian _Askold_, entered the Canal for the

defence of Egypt. The Turkish attack proved however to be only of a

tentative character. Finding themselves confronted with troops and

ships, they withdrew after feeble efforts into the Eastern deserts to

gather further strength.

All this time the great Australasian convoy, carrying the Australian and

New Zealand Army Corps, ‘A.N.Z.A.C.,’ has been steaming steadily towards

France across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Preparations had been made

if necessary to divert them to Cape Town. But before the convoy reached

Colombo General Botha and General Smuts had suppressed the rebellion in

South Africa. The Australians and New Zealanders therefore continued

their voyage to Europe under the escort of the _Ibuki_ and the

_Hampshire_. By the end of November their transports were entering the

Canal. As the Turkish invasion of Egypt was still threatening, the need

of resolute and trustworthy troops in Egypt was great, and on the first

day of December Lord Kitchener, in the fateful unfolding of events,

began to disembark the whole Australian and New Zealand Force at Suez

for the double purpose of completing their training and defending the

line of the Canal.

* * * * *

At this point we may leave the Turkish situation for a time. The German

grip was strengthening every day on Turkey. The distresses of her

peoples and the improvement of her military organisation were advancing

together. Under the guns of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, doubt, division

and scarcity dwelt in Constantinople. Outside the Straits the British

squadron maintained its silent watch. Greece, perplexed at the attitude

of Britain, distracted by the quarrels of Venizelos and King

Constantine, had fallen far from the high resolve of August. Serbia

stoutly contended with the Austrian armies. Roumania and Bulgaria

brooded on the past and watched each other with intent regard. In Egypt

the training of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps perfected

itself week by week.

Thus, as this act in the stupendous world drama comes to its close, we

see already the scene being set and the actors assembling for the next.

From the uttermost ends of the earth ships and soldiers are approaching

or gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean in fulfilment of a destiny as

yet not understood by mortal man. The clearance of the Germans from the

oceans liberated the Fleets, the arrival of the Anzacs in Egypt created

the nucleus of the Army, needed to attack the heart of the Turkish

Empire. The deadlock on the Western Front, where all was now frozen into

winter trenches, afforded at once a breathing space and large

possibility of further troops. While Australian battalions trampled the

crisp sand of the Egyptian desert in tireless evolutions, and Commander

Holbrook in his valiant submarine dived under the minefields of Chanak

and sank a Turkish transport in the throat of the Dardanelles, far away

in the basins of Portsmouth the dockyard men were toiling night and day

to mount the fifteen-inch guns and turrets of the _Queen Elizabeth_. As

yet all was unconscious, inchoate, purposeless, uncombined. Any one of a

score of chances might have given, might still give, an entirely

different direction to the event. No plan has been made, no resolve

taken. But new ideas are astir, new possibilities are coming into view,

new forces are at hand, and with them there marches towards us a new

peril of the first magnitude. Russia, mighty steam-roller, hope of

suffering France and prostrate Belgium—Russia is failing. Her armies are

grappling with Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and behind their brave battle

fronts already the awful signs of weakness, of deficiency, of

disorganisation, are apparent to anxious Cabinets and Councils. Winter

has come and locked all Russia in its grip. No contact with her Allies,

no help from them, is possible. The ice blocks the White Sea. The

Germans hold the Baltic. The Turks have barred the Dardanelles. It needs

but a cry from Russia for help, to make vital what is now void, and to

make purposeful what is now meaningless. But as yet no cry has come.

* * * * *

I cannot close without taking a more general survey of the naval war.

The reader has now followed through six chapters the steady increase of

strain upon Admiralty resources which marked in every theatre the months

of September, October and November, 1914. He must understand that,

although for the purposes of the narrative it is necessary to deal in

separate chapters with each separate set of strains and crises, many of

the events were proceeding simultaneously in all theatres at once, and

the consequent strains were cumulative and reciprocally reacting on one

another, with the result that during November an extraordinary pitch of

intensity was reached which could not well be prolonged and could not

possibly have been exceeded.

It is worth while to review the whole situation. First, the transport of

troops and supplies to France was unceasing and vital to our Army. On

the top of all this came the operations on the Belgian Coast, the

approach of the enemy to the Channel ports, and the long-drawn crisis of

the great battle of Ypres-Yser. Secondly, all the enemy’s cruisers were

still alive, and a number of hostile armed merchantmen were free in the

outer seas, each threatening an indefinite number of points and areas

and requiring from five to ten times their numbers to search for them

and protect traffic while they were at large. At the same time the great

convoys of troops from India, from Canada, from Australia, and the

collection of the British regular garrisons from all parts of the world

were proceeding; and no less than six separate expeditions, viz., Samoa,

New Guinea, German East Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons and German

South-West Africa, were in progress or at a critical stage. Upon this

was thrust the outbreak of war with Turkey, the attack upon the Suez

Canal, and the operations in the Persian Gulf.

To meet these fierce obligations we had to draw no less than three

decisive units from the Grand Fleet. This Fleet, which at the outset of

the war was in perfect order, was already requiring refits by rotation,

with consequent reduction of available strength. Meanwhile, the

submarine menace had declared itself in a serious form, and was moreover

exaggerated in our minds. Although the most vehement efforts were being

made to give security to our fleets in their Northern harbours, these

measures took many weeks, during which anxiety was continual. Behind all

stood the German Fleet, aware, as we must suppose, of the strain to

which we were being subjected, and potentially ready at any moment to

challenge the supreme decision. With the long nights of winter, the

absence of all regular troops from the country, the then inadequate

training of the Territorial Force and the embryonic condition of the new

Kitchener armies, the fear of invasion revived; and, although we

rejected it in theory, nevertheless we were bound to take in practice a

whole series of precautionary measures. It was a formidable time. More

than once the thought occurred that the Admiralty would be forced to

contract their responsibilities and abandon to their fate for a time

some important interests, in order that those which were vital might be

secured. In the event we just got through. It may be claimed that during

these months we met every single call that was made upon us, guarded

every sea, carried every expedition, brought every convoy safely in,

discharged all our obligations both to the Army in France and to the

Belgians, and all the time maintained such a disposition of our main

forces that we should never have declined battle had the enemy ventured

to offer it.

Then suddenly all over the world the tension was relaxed. One after

another the German cruisers and commerce destroyers were blocked in or

hunted down. The great convoys arrived. The Expeditions were safely

landed. Ocean after ocean became clear. The boom defences of our

harbours were completed. A score of measures for coping with the

submarine were set on foot. Large reinforcements of new ships of the

highest quality and of every class began to join the Fleet. The attack

on the Suez Canal was stemmed. The rebellion in South Africa was

quelled. The dangers of invasion, if such there were, diminished every

day with the increasing efficiency of the Territorials and the New

Armies. The great battle for the Channel ports ended in decisive and

ever glorious victory. And finally with the Battle of the Falkland

Islands the clearance of the oceans was complete, and soon, except in

the land-locked Baltic and Black Seas and in the defended area of the

Heligoland Bight, the German flag had ceased to fly on any vessel in any

quarter of the world.[102]

As December passed, a sense of indescribable relief stole over the

Admiralty. We had made the great transition from peace to war without

disaster, almost without mishap. All the perils which had haunted us

before the war, and against which we had prepared, had been warded off

or surmounted or had never come to pass. There had been no surprise. The

Fleet was ready. The Army had reached the decisive battlefield in time

and was satisfactorily maintained. The Mine danger had been overcome. We

thought we had the measure of the submarine, and so indeed we had for

nearly two years to come. All the enemy’s plans for commerce destruction

and all our alarms about them had come to nought. British and allied

commerce proceeded without hesitation throughout the world; the trade

and food of Britain were secured; the war insurance dropped to one per

cent. A feeling of profound thankfulness filled our hearts as this first

Christmas of the war approached; and of absolute confidence in final

victory.

The mighty enemy, with all the advantages of preparation and design, had

delivered his onslaught and had everywhere been brought to a standstill.

It was our turn now. The initiative had passed to the Great Amphibian.

The time and the means were at our command. It was for us to say where

we would strike and when. The strength of the Grand Fleet was, as we

believed, ample; and in addition the whole of those numerous squadrons

which hitherto had been spread over the outer seas now formed a surplus

fleet capable of intervening in the supreme struggle without in any way

compromising the foundation of our naval power.

But these realisations were only permissible as the prelude to fresh and

still more intense exertions. It would indeed be shameful, so it seemed

at least to me, for the Admiralty to rest contented with the

accomplishment of the first and most hazardous stage of its task and to

relax into a supine contemplation of regained securities and dangers

overcome. Now was the time to make our weight tell, perhaps decisively,

but certainly most heavily, in the struggle of the armies. Now was the

time to fasten an offensive upon the Germans, unexpected and

unforeseeable, to present them with a succession of surprising

situations leading on from crisis to crisis and from blow to blow till

their downfall was achieved.

Moreover, these same Germans were, of all the enemies in the world, the

most to be dreaded when pursuing their own plans; the most easily

disconcerted when forced to conform to the plans of their antagonist. To

leave a German leisure to evolve his vast, patient, accurate designs, to

make his slow, thorough, infinitely far-seeing preparations, was to

court a terrible danger. To throw him out of his stride, to baffle his

studious mind, to break his self-confidence, to cow his spirit, to

rupture his schemes by unexpected action, was surely the path not only

of glory but of prudence.

* * * * *

Here then ends the first phase of the naval war, and with it this

volume. The first part of the British task is done both by land and sea.

Paris and the Channel Ports are saved, and the oceans are cleared. It is

certain that the whole strength of the British Empire can be turned into

war power and brought to bear upon the enemy. There is no chance of

France being struck down, before the British Empire is ready; there is

no chance of the British Empire itself being paralysed, before its full

force can be applied to the struggle. The supreme initiative passes from

the Teutonic Powers to the Allies. Resources, almost measureless and of

indescribable variety in ships, in men, in munitions and devices of war,

will now flow month by month steadily into our hands. What shall we do

with them? Strategic alternatives on the greatest scale and of the

highest order present themselves to our choice. Which shall we choose?

Shall we use our reinforced fleets and great new armies of 1915, either

to turn the Teutonic right in the Baltic or their left in the Black Sea

and the Balkans? Or shall we hurl our manhood against sandbags, wire and

concrete in frontal attack upon the German fortified lines in France?

Shall we by a supreme effort make direct contact with our Russian ally

or leave her in a dangerous isolation? Shall we by decisive action, in

hopes of shortening the conflict, marshal and draw in the small nations

in the North and in the South who now stand outside it? Or shall we plod

steadily forward at what lies immediately in our front? Shall our armies

toil only in the mud of Flanders, or shall we break new ground? Shall

our fleets remain contented with the grand and solid results they have

won, or shall they ward off future perils by a new inexhaustible

audacity?

The answers to these momentous questions will appear as this tale is

carried forward to a further stage.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

APPENDIX A

MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON NAVAL STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

(A.)—_Military Education and War Staff Training._

1. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required

to secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers

and the definite processes by which Staff Officers are to be trained.

The first may be called ‘Military Education,’ and the second ‘War Staff

Training.’ They require to be treated separately, and not mixed together

as in the report of the Committee. Both must again be distinguished from

all questions of administration, of material, and of non-military

education and training. The _application_ of fighting power can thus be

separated from its _development_. We are not now concerned with the

forging of the weapon, but only with its use.

_Military Education._

2. As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer

must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His

interest must be awakened. He must be put in touch with the right books,

and must be made to feel the importance of the military aspect of his

profession. The existing curriculum at Dartmouth and on the cruiser is

already too full. And until the officer has reached the rank of

Lieutenant I see no immediate opportunity of adding to his instruction.

But thereafter his ‘Military Education’ should be provided for in two

ways. First: Every Lieutenant should go through a military course of

(say) two months during the first four years of his service. The course

to be prepared by the Training Division of the War Staff; aim,

thoroughness in a simple and strictly limited sphere. The course to

conclude by a standard examination to test only what the pupil remembers

of his instruction. It would be preferable to hold the courses at

Greenwich continuously. Thus a good scheme of instruction adapted to the

class of officers and the limits of time will develop and uniformity

will be established; and young officers will be accustomed to associate

Greenwich with the study of war.

All specialist officers, submarine and air service officers included,

must go through this course.

In exceptional circumstances, where exigencies of service do not allow,

extension to within the first six years may be granted.

The course will be obligatory on officers now under two years’ service

as Lieutenant. There should be four courses a year; the first to begin

October, 1914. It should be voluntary for officers now over two years’

service as Lieutenant.

(Let me have calculations about numbers which can be handled during the

first five courses; and make proposals for giving effect to the above

scheme in detail.)

No grading as Assistant War Staff Officers will result from this course,

and no certificate will be given or letters printed after an officer’s

name. It is a pure matter of routine, and a necessary qualification of

all future naval officers. The college authorities will, however, keep a

register of officers, and report upon their general aptitudes for staff

work and tactical subjects. This will be of use later in considering

claims to compete for entry into the War College.

Secondly, as soon as practicable (if possible, next time) an examination

should be held for entry into the War College for the War Staff Course.

This examination should be competitive. It will be open to all

Commanders and Lieutenant-Commanders, or Lieutenants who will be

Lieutenant-Commanders before the course is completed, whose names are

submitted by the Flag officers under whom they are serving and who are

approved as candidates by the Admiralty. A proportion of vacancies will

be assigned to each rank. The results will be published. The object of

this examination will be to test ability for staff work. In the first

instance the tests will have to be of a simple character, but gradually,

as the military education of the naval officer develops, they can be

stiffened and extended. The examination will be conducted by the War

College according to principles prescribed by the War Training Division.

Intending candidates will be notified three months in advance of the

subjects in which they should prepare themselves.

When an officer is successful in the competition, but owing to foreign

service or other exigency cannot at once attend the War Course, he may

be allowed to take a vacancy next time.

Captains of ships and War Staff Officers afloat will aid officers to

prepare themselves for this examination.

_War Staff Training._

3. The successful candidates will enter the War College at Greenwich as

residents for War Staff training. This course must for the present be

limited to one year, but later it should be extended to eighteen months.

As an examination will be held every six months, there will at the

beginning be two batches under instruction, rising later to three. This

will give the necessary numbers at the College. The period of this

course, provided the officer gives satisfaction, should, in my opinion,

count as sea service.

On completing the course, the officers who have qualified may be placed

upon the War Staff List, with the approval of the Admiralty, as at

present, and will then be available for staff employment.

(B.)—_Development of the Admiralty War Staff._

1. Two years have passed since this body was instituted, and both the

progress made in the Admiralty and the acceptance of the idea by the

Fleet justify a further advance.

Three main questions have arisen:—

(1.) The creation of a Trade Division.

(2.) The preparation of Manuals and direction of training generally.

(3.) The detachment of the Mobilisation Department from the War Staff.

I have come to the conclusion that the first essential is the creation

of a War Training Division, under a Director, and equal in importance to

the Operation and Intelligence Divisions. This division will be charged

with the theoretical direction and co-ordination of all tactical and

strategical exercises and instruction whether in the Fleets or at the

Colleges. It will, of course, have nothing to do with the education

which fits a cadet to become a naval officer, or with the training of

Specialists of any kind, or with the training which fits a boy to become

an able seaman. All this is in the Administrative sphere and belongs to

the Second Sea Lord. The War Training Division is concerned only with

what the naval officer learns about war, what tactical use the gunnery

and torpedo experts make of their weapons, and what exercises are

prescribed for the Fleets and Squadrons.

2. Nothing in the work of this division will relieve Flag Officers from

their present duties and responsibilities in the training of their

commands. But henceforward they will work on regularly explored and

considered lines, and within limits which are the result of collective

thought and experience; and henceforward continuity and uniformity will

be preserved by a central direction and co-ordination, which gathers up

and authorises the established conclusions, without restricting

reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the advocates of such a

Division, to say that war training is given by the Commanders-in-Chief

at sea, and that war training is in the department of the First Sea

Lord. The Commanders-in-Chief change repeatedly, and with them their

personal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace behind.

The First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical and

strategic instruction. This work can only be done by a regular

department permanently at work.

3. I propose, therefore, in principle to constitute without delay a War

Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff. This division will be

organised under a Director (D.T.D., short for D.N.T.D.) in three

sections, denominated respectively X, Y, and Z.

The following will be the main distribution of duties:—

(X). _Manuals and Exercises._

Preparation and revision of all Training Books and Manuals (other than

technical or administrative) including Signal Books in their tactical

aspect.

Preparation of manœuvre schemes.

Report and criticism of manœuvres.

Record and criticism of tactical and strategic exercises.

Advice upon the initiation of experiments (other than technical or

administrative), upon the organisation of units, upon War

Establishments, and upon the tactical aspects of New Construction.

Distribution of War Staff publications.

(Y). _War Colleges: Examinations and Courses._

Supervision of War Colleges and all war educational arrangements.

Examinations and courses in tactical and strategic subjects.

Libraries.

(Z). _Historical._

The staff of this new division will be formed in part by reductions from

the Mobilisation and Operations Divisions (some of which latter’s work

is taken over); and in part by an addition to the Estimates for which

Treasury sanction will be required. As a set-off against this there is

the economy of reducing an Admiral by bringing the War College to

Greenwich.

Nine or ten officers (some of whom can be retired officers) should

suffice with the necessary clerks and writers.

Let me have proposals on these lines with estimates.

4. _The Operations Division_ will have been to some extent relieved by

the formation of the War Training Division. It must, however, be

augmented by the addition of a new section (the Manning Department)

dealing with War Mobilisation, which will be explained later; and,

secondly, by the new Trade Defence Section. This latter is clearly only

a part of the Operations sphere. It is grouped with Operations because

the defence of trade is essentially an offensive operation against the

enemy’s armed ships.

The Operations Division will, therefore, be organised in four

sections—(_a_), (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_)—as follows:—

(_a_) _War Plans._

Distribution of the Fleet.

Schemes of attack of all kinds.

Joint naval and military action.

C.I.D. work.

War Room.

(_b_) _Coast Defence._

Plans for the employment of

Patrol Flotillas.

Air Craft at the Naval Stations.

Coastal submarines.

Organisation of Signal and Wireless Stations.

Examination Service.

Distribution of Intelligence along the coast.

Joint naval and military action in coast defence.

Home Ports Defence Committee.

Overseas Defence Committee.

(_c_) _Trade Defence._

All arrangements for the direction of trade in time of war.

All naval questions connected with food supply.

Armed merchantmen.

Distribution of warships for the control of the trade routes.

International law.

All relations with the Mercantile Marine.

(_d_) _War Mobilisation._

Supervision of the arrangements of the Manning Department for the

mobilisation of the Fleet.

Advice upon the complements of ships.

Attention is drawn to the minute of the Secretary on the proposed issue

of charts and returns to the Trade Division. This necessity is not

proved. The staff of the new section must be reconsidered accordingly.

5. _The Intelligence Division_ requires little change, but should, in

principle, be divided into three sections, as follows:—

(_l_) Potentially hostile countries.

(_m_) Friendly countries.

(_n_) Neutral countries.

Section (_l_) is to be charged with the new duty of preparing war plans

for the hostile countries separately or in combination against us alone

or allied, showing both—

(1.) What they will probably do against us.

(2.) What would be the worst they could do against us. From time to time

war games will be played between the Intelligence and Operations

Divisions.

Section (_m_) will likewise report on the needs and dangers of the

friendly countries and study the measures best adapted to strengthen

them in peace and war.

These new duties open to the Intelligence Division a large creative and

imaginative sphere, and offer opportunities for the highest tactical and

strategic ability.

6. _The Mobilisation Division_ is not well named. Mobilisation is a

small and infrequent part of the duties of this division. Mobilisation

is, indeed, a comparatively unimportant feature in our naval system, all

the more powerful vessels being constantly in full commission, and the

Second Fleet requiring only to be ‘completed.’ The day-to-day provision

of complements for ships commissioning, and the intricate arrangements

connected therewith, constitute the staple of the work of this

Department.

Further, its duties are almost entirely administrative, and

administration is foreign to the sphere of the War Staff.

I therefore propose that the Mobilisation Division shall be separated

from the War Staff, and shall be called the ‘_Manning Department_.’

A section of the Manning Department will, however, be formed to deal

with War Mobilisation, and this section will work under the D.M.D., but

in close association with the new Training Division of the War Staff.

Thus the whole administrative work connected with the manning of the

Fleet will be left intact under the Second Sea Lord, while, at the same

time, the War Staff will have included in its circle everything

necessary to its reflective and organising duties. I await definite

proposals to give effect to this.

7. It is important that every officer serving in the War Staff should

look for recommendation for advancement from the C.O.S. I propose,

therefore, that C.O.S. should be allotted a proportion of

recommendations as if he were a Flag Officer in independent command, and

should make them to my Naval Secretary in the usual way for the

half-yearly promotions. C.O.S. will also initiate all recommendations

for War Staff appointments and appointments to the Naval War College,

and all lists of officers for war courses of all kinds will be proposed

by him and submitted through the First Sea Lord to me.

The record books in the Private Office will be sufficient for general

purposes, but a _Staff Register_ should be formed for recording the War

Staff capacities and services of officers whether at the Admiralty, the

Colleges, or afloat, and a copy of this register will be kept written up

to date in the Private Office.

It may be found necessary to add an officer to the personal staff of

C.O.S.

8. I attach a skeleton chart of the new organisation.

9. I add the following general observations. The divisions of the War

Staff though separate are parts of one united organisation. Each

discharges its own functions in association with the others. They are

not to do each other’s work. The Operations Division is not, for

instance, to collect its own data. It is to accept them from the

Intelligence Division. The Training Division is to accept the

conclusions of the Operations Division and propose the Fleet for their

execution. But there must also be unity and free intercourse between the

three Directors. In order to promote and ensure this, C.O.S. will be

enjoined to hold every month a formal Staff meeting with his three

Directors and any of their subordinates who may be required for the

discussion of Staff questions, and the agenda and minutes of these

meetings will be submitted through the First Sea Lord to the First Lord.

(C.)—_The Operations Staff Afloat._

I agree with the proposals of the Second Sea Lord as concurred in and

amended by the First Sea Lord. This organisation observes the principle

of a clear division between the thinking and administrative branches.

The Captain for administration should bear the title of Flag Captain.

The Captain of the ship should simply be styled ‘The Captain.’

The extra officers for the Intelligence and Operations ‘Groups’

(Divisions is too large a word and already taken) can be found from the

War Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff which will cease to

exist on mobilisation. They should go afloat whenever large manœuvres

are in progress, and should be appropriated by name to their posts in

war. The Commander-in-Chief should have no one on his staff in war that

he does not know and has not worked with.

It is desirable that the Commander-in-Chief’s staff when formed should

work out strategic and tactical exercises together at the War College,

Portsmouth, or if possible at Greenwich, at least once a year, apart

from actual manœuvres afloat, in order that each may know his exact

function.

The approved form of the Fleet Flagship Staff is as follows:—

Secretary and clerks.-------C.-in-C.--------Captain of the Flagship.

|

Captain of the Fleet.

(C.O.F.)

|

+--+-----------------+

| |

| Flag Captain for Administration.

| |

| +-----------+------------+

| | | |

| Engineer Fuelling Victualling

| Assistant. Assistant. Assistant

| (Paymaster

| of Flagship).

+------------------+---+-------------------------+

| | |

Operations Intelligence Communications

Group. Group. Group.

[103]2 Staff Officers. [103]1 Staff Officer. [103]2 Staff Officers.

[104]3 Staff Officers. [104]2 Staff Officers. [104]4 Staff Officers.

I approve also the Second Sea Lord’s proposals for the staffs of

Squadron Flagships.

SKELETON CHART OF ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF ORGANISATION.

New additions in heavy type.

+-(a.) War Plans.

|

+--D.O.D.--+-(b.) Coast Defence.

| |

| +-(=c.=) =Trade Defence.=

| |

=Captain for War Staff= | +-(=d.=) =War=

=appointments.= | =Mobilisation.=

| |

| | +-(l.) Hostile countries.

| | |

| +---D.I.D.-+-(m.) Friendly countries.

| | |

First Sea Lord.------Chief of Staff--+ +-(n.) Neutral countries.

The Secretary. | |

| | |

| | | +-(=x.=) =Manuals and=

+------+---------+ | | | =Exercises.=

| | | War Staff | |

A.C.R. A.O.P. C.-in-Cs. Secretariat. +-=D.T.D.=-+-(=y.=) =War Colleges.=

| =Examinations=

| =and Courses.=

|

+-(=z.=) =Historical.=

W. S. C.

_May 1, 1914._

APPENDIX B

BRITISH DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BATTLESHIPS

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

Consec-│ Ship. │Launch-│Displace-│ Speed │Armour│ Armament │Weight

utive │ │ ed. │ ment. │(design-│ belt │(excluding│ of

No. │ │ │ │ ed). │(max.)│guns below│broad-

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12 prs.) │side,

│ │ │ │ │ │ │ pri-

│ │ │ │ │ │ │ mary

│ │ │ │ │ │ │guns.

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

│ │ │ tons. │ knots. │ in. │ │ lb.

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

1│Lord Nelson │ 1906 │ 16,500 │ 18·5 │ 12│4–12 in., │ 5,300

│ │ │ │ │ │ 10–9·2 │

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 24–12│

│ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │

2│Agamemnon │ 1906 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

3│Dreadnought │ 1906 │ 17,900 │ 20·9 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │24–12 prs.│

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

4│Superb │ 1907 │ 18,600 │ 20·75 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

5│Temeraire │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │

6│Bellerophon │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

7│St. Vincent │ 1908 │ 19,250 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │ 20–4 in. │

8│Vanguard │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │

9│Collingwood │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

10│Neptune │ 1909 │ 19,900 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 8,500

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

11│Colossus │ 1910 │ 20,000 │ 21·0 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 8,500

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

12│Hercules │ 1910 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

13│Orion │ 1910 │ 22,500 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 2,500

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

14│Thunderer │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

15│Monarch │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

16│Conqueror │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

17│King George V│ 1911 │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

18│Centurion │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

19│Ajax │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │

20│Audacious │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

21│Iron Duke │ 1912 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

22│Marlborough │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BUILDING

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

23│Benbow │ 1913 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

24│Emperor of │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │

│ India │ │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

25│Queen │ 1913 │ 27,500 │ 25 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360

│ Elizabeth │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │

26│Warspite │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │

27│Valiant │ │ │ │ │ │

28│Barham │ │ │ │ │ │

29│Malaya │ │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

30│Resolution │ │ 25,750 │ 21 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360

│ │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 4–3 in. │

31│Ramillies │ │ │ │ │ │

32│Revenge │ │ │ │ │ │

33│Royal │ │ │ │ │ │

│ Sovereign │ │ │ │ │ │

34│Royal Oak │ │ │ │ │ │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

SHIPS BUILDING IN GREAT BRITAIN FOR FOREIGN POWERS AND REQUISITIONED FOR

THE ROYAL NAVY

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

35│Agincourt │ │ 27,500 │ 22 │ 9│14–12 in.,│12,900

│ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │

│ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │

36│Erin │ │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │14,800

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–6 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 8–3 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │

│ │ │ │ │ │in. A.A.C.│

37│Canada │ │ 28,000 │ 23 │ 9│10–14 in.,│16,560

│ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │

│ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BATTLE CRUISERS

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

1│Invincible │ 1907 │ 17,250 │ 26 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

2│Inflexible │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │

3│Indomitable │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

4│Indefatigable│ 1909 │ 18,750 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

5│Lion │ 1910 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │10,000

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

6│Australia │ 1911 │ 18,800 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800

│ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │

7│New Zealand │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

8│Princess │ 1911 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200

│ Royal │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

9│Queen Mary │ 1912 │ 27,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BUILDING

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

10│Tiger │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in. │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

GERMAN DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BATTLESHIPS

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

Consec-│ Ship. │Launch-│Displace-│ Speed │Armour│ Armament │Weight

utive │ │ ed. │ ment. │(design-│ belt │(excluding│ of

No. │ │ │ │ ed). │(max.)│guns below│broad-

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12 prs.) │side,

│ │ │ │ │ │ │prim-

│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ary

│ │ │ │ │ │ │guns.

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

│ │ │ tons. │ knots. │ in. │ │ lb.

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

1│Nassau │ 1908 │ 18,600 │ 19 │ 11·81│12—11 in.,│ 5,376

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│

2│Westfalen │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │

3│Rheinland │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │

4│Posen │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

5│Ostfriesland │ 1909 │ 22,400 │ 20·5 │ 11·81│12—12 in.,│ 7,232

│ │ │ │ │ │ 14—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │14—3·4 in.│

6│Heligoland │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │

7│Thuringen │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │

8│Oldenburg │ 1910 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

9│Kaiser │ 1911 │ 24,310 │ 21 │ 13·78│10—12 in.,│ 9,040

│ │ │ │ │ │ 14—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │

10│Friedrich der│ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

│ Grosse │ │ │ │ │ │

11│Kaiserin │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

12│Prinzregent │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │

│ Luitpold │ │ │ │ │ │

13│König Albert │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

14│Grosser │ 1913 │ 25,390 │ 22 │ ?│10—12 in.,│ 9,040

│ Kurfürst │ │ │ ? │ │ 14—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │

15│König │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │

16│Markgraf │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BUILDING

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

17│Kronprinz │ 1914 │ 25,390 │ 22 │ ?│10—12 in.,│ 9,040

│ │ │ │ ? │ │ 14—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

18│Ersatz Wörth │ │ 28,050 │ 22 │ ?│8—15 in., │15,360

│ │ │ ? │ ? │ │16—5·9 in.│ ?

19│T │ │ │ │ │ │

20│Ersatz Kaiser│ │ │ │ │ │

│ Friedrich │ │ │ │ │ │

│ III │ │ │ │ │ │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BATTLE CRUISERS

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

1│Blücher │ 1908 │ 15,550 │ 25 │ 6│ 12—8·2 │ 2,204

│ │ │ │ │ │in., 8—5·9│

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│

2│von der Tann │ 1909 │ 18,700 │ 25 │ 6│8—11 in., │ 5,376

│ │ │ │ │ │ 10—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

3│Moltke │ 1910 │ 22,640 │ 27 │ 11│10—11 in.,│ 6,720

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│

4│Goëben │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │

───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼──────

5│Seydlitz │ 1912 │ 24,640 │ 27 │ 11│10—11 in.,│ 6,720

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│

6│Derfflinger │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 27 │ 7│8—12 in., │ 7,232

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BUILDING

───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬──────

7│Lützow │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 27 │ 7│8—12 in., │ 7,232

│ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │

│ │ │ │ │ │ in., │

│ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│

8│Ersatz Hertha│ Bdg. │ │ │ │ │

───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

BRITISH. │ GERMAN.

_Grand Fleet._ │ _High Seas Fleet._

Iron Duke (10–3·5 inch), Fleet │Friedrich der Grosse (10–12 inch),

Flagship. │ Fleet Flagship.

│

_1st Battle Squadron._ │ _1st Battle Squadron._

1 Iron Duke (10–13·5 inch). │

2 Colossus │10–12 inch. │4 Heligolands (12–12 inch).

1 Neptune │ │4 Nassaus (12–11 inch).

3 St. Vincents │ │

1 Bellerophon │ │

│

_2nd Battle Squadron._ │ _2nd Battle Squadron._

4 King George V │10–13·5 inch.│10 Preussens (4–11 inch).

4 Orions │ │

│

_3rd Battle Squadron._ │ _3rd Battle Squadron._

8 King Edward VII (4–12 inch; 4–9·2│4 Kaisers (10–12 inch).

inch). │

│

_4th Battle Squadron._ │

1 Dreadnought │10–12 inch. │

2 Bellerophons │ │

1 Agincourt (14–12 inch). │

(One Light Cruiser attached to each│

Battle Squadron). │

│

_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruiser Squadron._

3 Lions (8–13·5 inch). │ _Battle Cruisers._

1 New Zealand (8–12 inch). │2 Moltke (10–11 inch).

│1 von der Tann (8–11 inch).

_2nd Cruiser Squadron._ │1 Derfflinger (8–12 inch).

1 Shannon (4–9·2 inch; 10–7·5 │1 Blücher (12–8·2 inch).

inch). │

3 Achilles (6–9·2 inch; 4–7·5 │

inch). │

│

_3rd Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Light Cruisers._

4 Antrims (4–7·5 inch; 6–6 inch). │1 Rostock │12–4·1 inch.

│2 Strassburgs │

_1st Light Cruiser Squadron._ │3 Mainz. │

3 Birminghams (9–6 inch). │

1 Southampton │8–6 inch. │

1 Falmouth │ │

1 Bristol (2–6 inch; 10–4 inch). │

│

_Destroyer Flotillas._ │ _Destroyer Flotillas._

2 Flotillas, each of 20 vessels, │

with Light Cruiser Active and │7 Flotillas, each of 11 vessels.

Flotilla Leader Swift. │

│

_Harwich Force._ │

1 Amethyst (12–4 inch). │

2 Amphions (10–4 inch). │

35 Destroyers. │

│

_Channel Fleet._ │ _Other Vessels in Home Waters._

│

_5th Battle Squadron._ │ _Battleships._

8 Formidables (4–12 inch). │5 Wittelsbachs.

│5 Kaiser Class (old) (5–9·4 inch).

_6th Battle Squadron._ │2 Brandenburgs (6–11 inch).

2 Lord Nelsons (4–12 inch; 10–9·2 │

inch). │

5 Duncans │4–12 inch. │

1 Glory │ │

│

_7th Battle Squadron._ │

4 Majestics (4–12 inch). │

│

_8th Battle Squadron._ │

1 Majestic (4–12 inch). │

5 Glory. │

4 Light Cruisers were attached to │

the Battle Squadrons. │

│

_7th Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruisers._

5 Cressys (2–9·2 inch; 12–6 inch). │2 Roons (4–8·2 inch; 10–5·9 inch).

│2 Prinz Adalbert (4–8·2 inch;

│ 10–5·9 inch).

_12th Cruiser Squadron._ │

3 Talbots (11–6 inch). │1 Prinz Heinrich (2–9·4 inch;

│ 10–5·9 inch).

1 Charybdis (2–6 inch; 8–4·7 inch) │

(patrolling west end of Channel).│

│

_Dover Patrol._ │ _Light Cruisers._

2 Light Cruisers. │12 Vessels, with armaments of 10 or

│ 12–4·1 inch guns.

22 Destroyers. │

│

_11th Cruiser Squadron._ │

5 Talbots (11–6 inch) (on the coast│

of Ireland). │

│

_10th Cruiser Squadron._ │

8 Crescents (Northern Patrol). │

│

_Patrol Flotillas on East Coast._ │ _Destroyers._

3 Light Cruisers. │67 available for coast patrol,

│ service in Baltic, etc.

48 Destroyers. │

24 Torpedo Boats. │

│

_Submarines._ │ _Submarines._

65, organised in 8 Flotillas, 7 │

Flotillas for Coast Defence, 1 │27 serviceable.

for Overseas operations. │

APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE

OUTBREAK OF WAR

_Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914_

1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority

of the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt

down and bring to battle in war, every enemy’s warship which attempts to

keep the seas. A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy’s warships

wherever stationed, will give immediately far greater protection to

British traders than large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about

in an attitude of weak and defensive expectancy. This should be enjoined

as the first duty of all British warships. Enemy’s cruisers cannot live

in the oceans for any length of time. They cannot coal at sea with any

certainty. They cannot make many prizes without much steaming; and in

these days of W. T. their whereabouts will be constantly reported. If

British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot do much

harm before they are brought to action. Very few German Town Class

cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are

detached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to

detach a larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have

been hitherto opposing them there. They cannot afford to send away many

without crippling their battle fleet.

2. As for enemy’s armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into

cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an

equal number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes

armed and commissioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this

threat is very shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on

board is extremely doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been

forthcoming during the last year and a half in spite of every effort to

procure it. How are they to be converted on the high seas? Where are

they to get rid of their passengers? Are they to take hundreds of

non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval Power may well treat

as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To say that we have

to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger appears

extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a

similar number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make

arrangements to commission these for their own defence and that of other

British ships in their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of

these vessels plying always in considerable numbers along the regular

trade routes will from the very outset of the war, and however suddenly

it may begin, provide a constant and immediate counter to enemy armed

merchantmen, and probably deter them from any injurious action.

3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is

the large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense

number of harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean

routes. This makes any serious interruption by enemy’s commerce

destroyers impossible. We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided

that we can induce all these ships to put to sea and carry on their

business boldly, and provided that they are warned in time and

encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel wide of them,

very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.

4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean

spaces. To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds

of cruisers. The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognise

that we cannot specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect

confluences. The only safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy

has not discovered and those upon which he has been exterminated. There

are areas where the trade necessarily converges and narrow channels

through which it must pass; and these defiles or terminals of the trade

routes should be made too dangerous for enemy’s commerce destroyers to

approach, by employing our older cruisers in adequate force so as to

create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for our trading

ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband our

resources, and not with a view to finding employment for as many old

cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy’s armed

merchantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach

the area where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old

cruisers steam 19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam

more is not large. As for the enemy’s warships and his few exceptionally

fast vessels, they must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels

which are concerned with nothing else but to bring them to action.

5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant

feature in our operations, and British cruisers should not engage in

them to the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on

Germany by the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her

trade, both export and import, as a whole. If this is effectively done

it is of very little consequence to us whether individual German vessels

are captured as prizes, or whether they take refuge in neutral harbours

till the end of the war. It is reasonable to suppose that German

merchant ships, other than those armed and commissioned for warlike

purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks out, and

that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home running

the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.

6. Protection will be afforded to British seaborne trade in time of war

by the following measures:—

A. Hunting down of enemy’s warships and armed vessels.

Every German cruiser stationed abroad should be covered in peace and

brought to action in war by a superior vessel of superior speed, or

alternatively by two equal vessels having speed advantage.

B. Organised warning of British merchant vessels.

All British armed merchantmen plying on the routes will, on receiving

the warning telegram by wireless, open their secret instructions which

direct them to steam along their regular route warning all unarmed

British vessels met with to leave the trade route, and steam without

lights at night, keeping well away from their usual course, avoiding

company, and making their own way to their port of destination.

7. Similar warnings and directions adapted to each case and each route

will be issued by British Consuls at all ports. These should be prepared

beforehand in the fullest detail and according to a general scheme. For

instance, the British Consul at Buenos Ayres should have separate

instructions all ready prepared for every British ship leaving the port

for the United Kingdom. These instructions will be regularly kept up to

date by the Trade Division of the Admiralty War Staff. They will

prescribe for each ship the general course she is to follow, the

portions of the voyage she should endeavour to cover in darkness, and

the areas within which she will find safety. A good wireless

organisation can, of course, deal at once with all vessels so fitted.

Thus the unarmed trade will, in the first week of the war, be

effectively scattered over immense areas of ocean.

The control and guidance of merchant traffic must, of course, vary with

circumstances. There are two quite different situations to consider. The

first is that which occurs at the moment of a sudden outbreak of war. We

must assume that hostilities begin by surprise, and that the enemy’s

commerce destroyers, whether warships or armed merchantmen, will begin

their attacks within a very few hours of the first warning being given.

None of our Third Fleet cruisers will be on their stations. The only

vessels available will be the ordinary foreign squadrons and the fast

cruisers shadowing individual German warships, and these will probably

not be in positions which have any special relation to the trade routes.

None of the British converted auxiliary merchant cruisers will be on the

routes: the only thing that will be there and that can be there are the

defensive armed merchantmen. In these circumstances it seems probable

that the best course would be to scatter the trade; and it is in any

case essential that we should have the power to do so, and that all

arrangements should be made to that end.

8. When, however, the war has been in progress for some time, and in

proportion as our available force increases and we pass from a peace to

a war organisation, it may well be that the scattering of the trade will

no longer be necessary or even desirable, except perhaps locally between

special points. Trading vessels would then be told to return to their

regular trade routes; and this might easily lead to drawing such

commerce destroyers as then remain into areas where they could be

reported, located, and destroyed, by the British cruisers.

9. The organisation for the control and guidance of the trade should

therefore be of so complete a character that the trade may be either

dispersed about the ocean or concentrated along particular routes; or in

some places dispersed and in other concentrated; and that changes from

one policy to the other can be made when necessary at any time.

10. The British armed merchantman will only be employed on a strictly

limited service, namely, that of carrying food supplies to the United

Kingdom. They will be forbidden to engage enemy’s warships and are to

surrender if overtaken by them. They will not molest or pursue unarmed

ships of the enemy. They will only fire on enemy’s armed merchantmen if

they are themselves attacked or pursued by them.

The result of these arrangements will be that the enemy’s armed

merchantmen will either have to scatter in haphazard search for prizes,

or run into a succession of armed British vessels plying the usual

route, finding prizes few and far between on the first course, and

nothing but kicks on the other.

11. C. As soon as possible after the outbreak of war a sufficient number

of British merchant ships or liners of high speed, selected and prepared

beforehand, will be converted into auxiliary cruisers and commissioned

for the further policing of the trade routes, and incidentally or if

desired to prey on enemy’s commerce. These vessels will be taken over on

the same or similar basis as the Cunarders. They will differ from the

armed merchantmen in ‘B,’ in that their duties will not be limited to

self-defence and warning; they will be directly employed in hunting down

enemy’s armed merchantmen; they may be used offensively against enemy’s

trade; they will not carry on their ordinary business; they will be

wholly taken over by and maintained by the Admiralty; they will be

officered and manned by the Royal Navy, will fly the White Ensign, and

execute the orders of the Admiralty.

12. D. While we have a large supply of older cruisers, they may be

employed in protecting the approaches to the principal trade terminals,

and at certain special points. These cruisers will be additional to any

fast modern British vessels employed on the general service of hunting

down individual German cruisers. They will neglect no opportunity of

engaging enemy’s warships or armed merchantmen. They may be at any time

withdrawn from their areas by the Admiralty for such a purpose. Only the

older ships will be employed on this service; and as they wear out,

control will be maintained by a smaller number of new, fast vessels

employed on the general and primary service of hunting down the enemy’s

warships.

13. E. The last but indispensable condition of maintaining British food

supplies and British trade in time of war, is that British traders

should send their ships to sea, and from the very beginning of the war

press forward boldly on their regular business. The question of

encouraging them to do this by means of a system of State Insurance

under certain restrictions to guard against fraud, is now being

considered by a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. We have expressed on behalf

of the Board of Admiralty the strongest opinion in favour of the

adoption of such a system, it being essential to all our arrangements

that very large numbers of British vessels, undeterred by a small

proportion of captures, should continue to traverse the seas under the

British flag.

In exceptional cases convoys will, if necessary, be organised under

escort of Third Fleet vessels. It is hoped, however, that this cumbrous

and inconvenient measure will not be required.

W. S. C.

_April, 1914._

APPENDIX D

MINING

In order to combat the many unwise proposals which were pressed upon me

at this time to squander our small stock of mines, I drew up the

following paper with which I endeavoured to repel the demands from the

Cabinet, the Admiralty and the Fleet. I am aware that these views will

be disputed, and I shall no doubt be told that the experience of the

later stages of the war has disproved them. I still believe, however,

that they were sound and truly applicable to the circumstances of 1914.

But I go further and declare that the reasoning held good all through

1915, and 1916. If I am reminded that as part of the life and death

struggle against the German submarines in 1917, we were led into a

mining policy on a scale so gigantic as dwarfed every previous scheme,

and if as the result of this huge diversion of our resources a certain

number of German submarines were destroyed, still I assert that these

conditions would never have arisen if a proper offensive had been

developed by the Royal Navy, as would have been possible at far less

cost. All being said, I take my stand as I wrote to Fisher on the

_dictum_ ‘Mine in Haste and Sweep at Leisure.’

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD

Mining is mainly of two kinds, ambush mining and blockade mining.

_Ambush Mining._

Ambush mining depends on the whereabouts of the field remaining unknown.

These mines may be scattered about in patches, or short lines in the

neighbourhood of the enemy’s ports or of the approaches to your own

ports or landing places on the chance of enemy ships running into them.

This chance is not great. The seas are very large; the area mined, even

if on a great scale, very small. The chances of preserving secrecy long

are not great, and most ambush minefields are soon discovered by

merchant ships, or other craft of no military value, being blown up by

them. On the other hand, every patch of mines soon hampers the movement

of the stronger fleet. The position of the minefields cannot be

accurately known. There is very often a tendency for them to drag with

their anchors in tide and sea. Also ships cannot always be sure of their

positions, and very often when out of sight of land, in weather unsuited

to taking observations of the sun, 15, 20, or 30 miles’ error in

position may easily arise. The fact that you know generally where your

own mines are and when you are getting near their area, but do not

exactly know where they are, or exactly where you are, tends to paralyse

your own movements, and might easily prevent effective action against or

the interception of the enemy’s fleet should it put to sea. The

conclusion to be drawn is that ambush mines should be very sparingly

used, chiefly in sight of land, and that not very much is to be expected

from them. The general failure, so far as our present experience goes,

of the German policy of ambush mining with which they opened the war

illustrates the truth of these conclusions. The only British warship,

apart from the gunboat _Speedy_ (which was actually engaged in fishing

up mines), lost by this agency has been the _Amphion_, and she was

drifted out of her course on to the very minefield whose position she

knew and which she was endeavouring to avoid.

This is not by any means to decry the use of ambush mines as an

immediate part of a concerted tactical combination. It is for this

purpose mainly that the British Fleet mine-layers are organised. To lay

mines in the course of an enemy before or during a battle, or across his

homeward path if he has put to sea, may be operations of the greatest

consequence and value, and it would be most unwise to deplete them of

their not too extensive store of mines, which should be reserved for

this purpose, and not squandered on promiscuous and haphazard uses.

One more class of ambush mines deserves to be noted. A few scattered

about on trade routes and off enemy or neutral ports, if well advertised

and enforced by a few ships actually blown up, may exercise a very

effective deterrent on neutral commerce which may be of use to the

enemy.

_Blockade Mining._

It is not possible to blockade a modern fleet by mining, even on a very

large scale, unless superior force is maintained in the neighbourhood of

the minefield to prevent or oppose the mines being removed. In the days

when Admiral Togo mined the debouches from Port Arthur the submarine did

not exist, and it was possible to maintain a close and constant watch on

the minefields, so that even if he was unable to stop the enemy removing

the mines he knew when they were doing so, and this perhaps gave some

clue to their future intentions. Even so, the Russian Fleet put to sea

whenever they wanted to. It would not be possible to keep such a watch

now without exposing the vessels so engaged to almost certain

destruction from the enemy’s submarines. Further, blockade mining is

more effective the closer in it is to the enemy’s ports, and therefore

the watching vessels would be continually exposed not only to the

attacks of the submarines, but to a greatly superior force of enemy

destroyers and light cruisers. In order to maintain them against this,

appropriate supports would have to be kept close at hand in proper

tactical relation and brought up as the need arose, with the result that

more and more ships of greater value would be drawn into the most

dangerous area of the enemy’s submarine activities, and considerable

operations would develop in waters less suited to us and most favourable

to the enemy.

But if the minefield is not watched, the enemy has no difficulty in

proceeding to sea at any time he chooses. He will soon learn the

existence of the minefield, because one or two small craft will be blown

up on it. In the British Fleet the regular mine-sweepers can sweep a

clear channel ahead of the Fleet at a rate of 12 knots an hour through

any minefield. The Germans have not used, as we have, old gunboats

converted as mine-sweepers, but have built a special class of good, fast

vessels. It must therefore be assumed that they could sweep a channel at

least as quickly as, and probably quicker than, we could. They could

therefore proceed to sea at any time if they wished to do so, and with

scarcely any delay. Also, if they did not wish immediately to proceed to

sea, they could sweep a channel through the minefield of which they

would know the existence, and which, being in close contact with land

where actual bearings could be obtained, they could follow exactly, and

so have continued means of ingress and egress. We, on the other hand,

would not know where this channel was, and would be prevented from

approaching by the known existence of our own field. The conclusion is

that it is not possible by blockade mines to stop a fleet from putting

to sea, even if that were what we wanted to do.

Still less is it possible to stop the enemy’s submarines from putting to

sea, either by ambush mines or blockade mines. The rise and fall of the

tide between high and low water makes a minefield ineffective against

shallow-draft craft for half the twenty-four hours. The distance of 50

yards, which is the usual interval between mines, is five times the

breadth of a submarine. By diving to 50 feet, the chance of contact with

the mine is removed, and only the lesser danger of fouling the moorings

remains. It is perfectly easy to sweep a channel for submarines, as for

other vessels, at any time. Where there is any uncertainty about the

whereabouts of a minefield, trawlers, or small merchant ships with a

very few people on board, can go ahead of the submarines and pilot them

out. If necessary, vessels could be specially prepared as mine-bumpers,

with a kind of cow-catcher apparatus in front of them. We are

experimenting with five different methods of fitting ships for

mine-bumping, and shall very soon have a number of vessels which can go

almost with impunity into a minefield. British submarines have

frequently traversed, wittingly and unwittingly, the German minefields

around Heligoland, and German submarines are probably traversing our

southern mined area with indifference, and impunity, at the present

time.

On the other hand, it is a curious truth that your own minefield is a

greater deterrent to your own operations than to those of the enemy. You

have put it down yourself, so you do not want to sweep it up. You know

where it is, though not very accurately. You instinctively try to avoid

the waters you have yourself fouled. Nothing has been more valuable than

the searching and relentless watching maintained in the Heligoland Bight

by our submarines since the beginning of the war. Its vigilance and

efficiency have defeated themselves by forcing the Germans to retire

actually inside their basins and canal, and thus depriving our

submarines of any targets. It would be a great pity to hamper them in

their work and expose them to additional dangers for the sake of such

vain and illusory precautions. The weak passive defence of mines cannot

for a moment be compared as a military measure with the enterprising

offensive of submarines.

The above considerations also apply to suggested schemes for shutting

submarines in by a network of mines fastened together by wire.

Mine-sweepers or mine-bumpers would force a channel through this as

easily as through ordinary lines of mines, the only difference being

that several being dragged along by the string would be exploded at the

same time. Also it is evident that the limitations of this form of

defence cannot be carried very far on account of the enormous quantities

of material and explosives required. It would be very difficult and

dangerous to lay in close proximity to the enemy’s ports and fleets. The

process would be slow; the losses certain, and it could in any case

block only a very small portion of the 100–mile broad mouth of the

Heligoland Bight. Devices of this character may, however, be useful in

defending one’s own harbours, and making anchorages submarine-proof,

where we can, by our superior strength, prevent our arrangements from

being interfered with. A variety of these methods are at present in use,

and are being rapidly extended and developed. The following seven

principal expedients are being applied:—

(1) Sinking ships with cement or stone in such a way as to form an

absolute breakwater and barrier like the mole of a harbour.

(2) Electrical contact mines strung very closely together, and capable

of being made dangerous or safe by the current being switched on or off.

(3) Barges or piles, with torpedo nets attached to them.

(4) Loose wire nets of very large mesh, not fastened at either end,

which clog round a submarine and entangle it.

(5) Network arrangement, with explosives attached.

(6) Network arrangements, with upright floating spars, which also

entangle the submarine.

(7) Long lengths of fishing nets, particularly Portuguese tunny nets,

which operate in the same way.

As the war progresses, we shall gradually improvise the torpedo-proof

harbours, of which, except on our southern coast, we are now entirely

destitute.

I explained to the Cabinet the quantities of mines which we had in

store, and which were available in the future. The experience of the

last three months seems to justify the partial and limited reliance put

by the Admiralty upon mining as a method of warfare.

W. S. C.

_October, 1914._

APPENDIX E

FIRST LORD’S MINUTES

_Formation of the Royal Naval Division_

Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

Second Sea Lord.

In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists

of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of

one marine and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been

partially formed in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service

men. To this will be added an approximately equal number of

reservists, making the total strength of the brigade 3,900, organised

in four battalions of four double companies of approximately 250 men.

The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions, each, if

possible, of 880 men, organised in sixteen double companies of 220.

The composition of each battalion should be as follows:—

R.N.V.R. 375

R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age) 313

R.N.R. 190

The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore

be:—

R.N.V.R. 3,000

R.F.R. 2,500

R.N.R. 1,500

The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion

by a Lieutenant-Colonel; each company by a Major and a Captain. The

means of remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with

separately. About fifty new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either

permanently or on a three years’ or till the war stops engagement.

Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N.; five of the

battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and

three by R.N.V.R. Commanders; each company will be commanded by a

Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not

forthcoming, by a Major, R.M. The question of making good deficiencies

in these and in the marine brigade will be dealt with separately.

There are, however, available 50 R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66

Sub-Lieutenants, and 12 Midshipmen; total, 128. About 50 more officers

would be required.

The use of these brigades need not be considered until the

organisation has advanced sufficiently to allow of their military

value to be judged.

The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as

resources allow in the present week. The officers commanding the

companies and battalions must be appointed forthwith. The first

essential is to get the men drilling together in brigades; and the

deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions can be filled up

later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the war to

build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army

strength of 1,070, and the organisation will readily adapt itself to

this. All the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the

three brigades will be available if required for service afloat, and

it must be distinctly understood that this is the paramount claim upon

them; but in the meanwhile they will be left to be organised for land

service.

W. S. C.

_August 16, 1914._

ACTION OF AUGUST 28

Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

Third Sea Lord.

Director of Naval Ordnance.

1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for

service in every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action.

Careful attention should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the

officers who fought them, in order that everything possible can be

done to increase their fighting efficiency.

2. The failure of the 4–inch guns in the _Arethusa_ is most serious,

and must be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both

from the breaking of the ejector catches, of which there were no

spares, and secondly from the coating of the cartridge cases, which

gradually fouled the gun. At one critical moment only one 4–inch gun

could fire, and but for her 6–inch guns the Arethusa would have been

destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an effective

remedy has been provided.

3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give

the officers and men a few days’ leave. The nervous strain of a modern

action is considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore

poise and resiliency.

W. S. C.

_August 30, 1914._

Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

Chief of Staff.

(1) Selections might be made from all the reports of this action,

beginning with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports which the

Prime Minister has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting

matter which can be made public without detriment to the future should

be collected, circulated to the Fleet, and published in the

newspapers.

(2) The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief’s report and various

references to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in

Commodore S’s and other statements must all be kept absolutely secret.

Mistakes are always made in war, but there is no need to weaken

confidence by dwelling on them after success has been obtained. The

Senior Officers concerned in the manœuvre should, however, all have

the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every

effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this

profoundly secret circle no whisper must go.

(3) I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and

rewards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished

themselves in this fortunate and skilful enterprise.

W. S. C.

_September 6, 1914._

SEPARATION ALLOWANCES FOR THE NAVY

Financial Secretary.

I have to-day obtained the assent of the Cabinet in principle to the

granting of a separation allowance to the whole Navy at once. The

scale should be the full Army scale less any deductions which should

be made on account of higher pay and allowances the sailor may receive

as compared with the soldier. These details are to be settled between

the Admiralty and the Treasury. I regard the matter as one of prime

importance and urgency.

It is, of course, understood that the present decision only authorises

the payment of a separation allowance during the period of active

service, and that the question of what is to happen in time of peace

is not prejudiced.

I wish you to take up this question in conjunction with the

Accountant-General and the Naval Branch and make me your proposals in

the course of to-morrow. It will be a great fillip to our sailors when

this great boon to them is announced to the Fleet, as I hope it may

be, in the next few days. Pray press it forward by every means in your

power, acting with the Treasury and calling me in where there is a

hitch or difficulty.

W. S. C.

_September 4, 1914._

Financial Secretary.

The Cabinet decided that evidence of allotment regularly made should

decide whether the Separation Allowance should be paid or not, and

that legal marriage is not indispensable. Where it is clear that the

woman has been dependent on the man, and the man has recognised this

tie by a regular allotment, the legality of the marriage will be

assumed.

W. S. C.

_September 19, 1914._

ENEMY RESERVISTS

Secretary.

Please inquire who was responsible for allowing a merchant ship from

Buenos Ayres with 400 German reservists on board, to pass Gibraltar

and to convey them to Italian ports, whence they left to join their

units. How was it that these men were not arrested and made prisoners

of war when passing the Straits?

W. S. C.

_September 5, 1914._

LIFE-BELTS

Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

Fourth Sea Lord.

Chief of Staff.

The sinking of the _Pathfinder_ shows how important it is that there

should be more life-belts or life-buoys available on our ships. Many

lives would have been saved in this case if such steps had been taken.

I don’t like the German system of going into action with life-belts

on, but there certainly ought to be in the boats and on the deck of

British ships something like 100 life-belts or life-buoys which could

be seized and would float overboard if the vessel foundered.

Pray let me have a proposal.

W. S. C.

_September 10, 1914._

SUBMARINE HONOURS

Secretary.

Naval Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

Since it is difficult to choose which man in a submarine has done

specially well, it is necessary that the decoration should be given to

the boat, and that the men should ballot among themselves to decide

who is to have it.

W. S. C.

_September 17, 1914._

BLOCKADE

Secretary.

First Sea Lord.

A.C.L.

C.O.S. and others.

A standing Admiralty Committee will be formed under the presidency of

the Additional Civil Lord, to be called ‘The Restriction of Enemies’

Supplies Committee,’ composed as follows:—

One representative of the Trade Division of the War Staff.

One representative of the Foreign Office.

One representative of the Board of Trade.

Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P.

Mr. C. Money, M.P.

The duties of this Committee will be to examine and watch continually

all means or routes by which supplies of food or raw material may

reach Germany and Austria; to report weekly all importations or

exportations to and from these countries coming to their knowledge;

and to recommend by what methods, financial, commercial, diplomatic,

and military, they may be hampered, restricted, and, if possible,

stopped. Measures should, in the first instance, be recommended to

secure full and accurate information from day to day of all vessels

unloading cargoes which may ultimately reach Germany or Austria at

neutral ports, and the port of Rotterdam especially, as well as the

possibility of supplies coming through a northern part of Sweden or

from Sweden itself across the Baltic, or through Norway and Denmark.

Holland must be the subject of the closest study, it being clearly

impossible for the British Government to allow the neutral port of

Rotterdam to serve as a base of supplies to the enemy. Trustworthy

agents in Holland must be obtained or dispatched thither for this

purpose. Any possible importation overland through Italy or up the

Adriatic must be included in the survey.

Funds will be forthcoming for any special action required.

The Committee should hold its first meeting on Friday, the 14th, using

a committee room at the Admiralty.

A.C.L. to nominate his own Secretary, and make all further

arrangements to carry this minute into effect.

W. S. C.

_August 13, 1914._

MUNITIONS

Lord Kitchener.

Captain Hankey, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has been to me

with what seems rather a good idea. He suggests that Girouard should

be put at the head of an emergency armament multiplication committee

or department, to set on foot and develop the maximum possible output

of guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. I am sure, myself, that more could

be done by the firms than is being done at present. For instance,

after you told me of the pressure you had put upon them and that their

complete limits had been reached, our people went round and obtained

undertakings from the trade to produce 700 rifles a week more,

additional to all that had been ordered by you.

This is only a half-formed idea, and I pass it on to you not as a

recommendation, but simply for what it is worth.

W. S. C.

_September 3, 1914._

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY

Sir Edward Grey.

Please see attached.

I should be so glad if you could see your way to making a strong stand

against this. Even if we ultimately have to give way, the fact that

they will have overruled our protest will, in the existing balance of

public opinion in the United States, make them desirous of being

helpful, or at any rate not unfriendly, on other points at issue.

Our case is clear. The Germans have announced their intention, have

endeavoured on a large scale, and have partially begun, to arm

merchant ships as commerce destroyers, and they even claim to carry

out this process of arming and equipping in neutral harbours or on the

high seas. We have been forced in consequence of this to arm a number

of our ships in self-defence. In doing this we follow the undoubted

law of the seas as it was practised in all the great wars of the past.

We claim that by international law a merchant ship armed in her own

defence, so long as she takes no aggressive action, is entitled to the

full status of a peaceful trading ship. We ask that our ships so armed

for this purpose shall be accorded that status in the neutral ports of

the world. We are quite willing to agree that German merchant ships

similarly armed in self-defence shall be similarly treated. It is only

when merchant ships are armed and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers,

not for purposes of self-defence, but for those of commerce

destruction, that we claim they should be treated as ships of war. And

here again we ask no better treatment for ourselves than for the

enemy.

We recognise the natural difficulty to a neutral State, anxious to

preserve a strict impartiality, of discerning whether ships carrying

the same armament are intended for offensive or defensive action. We

offer that this question should be decided by a simple and practical

test. If the armed merchant ship is engaged in ordinary commerce,

discharging and taking a regular cargo, and embarking passengers in

the usual way, she should be counted as a trader in spite of her

armament. If, on the other hand, she is not engaged in commerce, is

not doing the ordinary things she would do and has done in times of

peace, but is either carrying special cargoes of coal and stores to

belligerent cruisers on the high seas, or is travelling in ballast, or

is not trafficking in her cargo in the natural way, then we say she

should be treated as a ship of war, even if the Government of the

State whose flag she flies declares that she is only armed and will

only fight in self-defence. We must therefore hold a neutral

Government impeccable if she allows a German armed merchantman, which

takes a regular cargo in the ordinary way, to arm in her ports or

leave them for the high seas, even if subsequently that vessel engages

not merely in self-defence, but in actual aggressive attack. Neutrals

who deal with ships according to the ‘Cargo Test’ must be held

blameless by us whatever the subsequent careers of the vessels may be.

The issues which remain open after these ships have put to sea can

only be decided between the belligerents.