_Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved
inland, supplies and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers,
began to litter the beach._]
Japanese bombers did penetrate the American fighter screen on 8 August.
Dropping their bombs from 20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
fire, the enemy planes were not very accurate. They concentrated on the
ships in the channel, hitting and damaging a number of them and sinking
the destroyer _Jarvis_ (DD 393). In their battles to turn back the
attacking planes, the carrier fighter squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7-8
August.
The primary Japanese targets were the Allied ships. At this time,
and for a thankfully and unbelievably long time to come, the
Japanese commanders at Rabaul grossly underestimated the strength of
Vandegrift’s forces. They thought the Marine landings constituted a
reconnaissance in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on Guadalcanal. By the
evening of 8 August, Vandegrift had 10,900 troops ashore on Guadalcanal
and another 6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments had landed and
each had a supporting 75mm pack howitzer battalion--the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and the 3d Battalion, 10th
Marines on Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 105mm howitzers
were in general support.
That night a cruiser-destroyer force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
reacted to the American invasion with a stinging response. Admiral
Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer groups to bar the
Tulagi-Guadalcanal approaches. At the Battle of Savo, the Japanese
demonstrated their superiority in night fighting at this stage of
the war, shattering two of Turners covering forces without loss to
themselves. Four heavy cruisers went to the bottom--three American, one
Australian--and another lost her bow. As the sun came up over what soon
would be called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines watched grimly as Higgins
boats swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately 1,300 sailors
died that night and another 700 suffered wounds or were badly burned.
Japanese casualties numbered less than 200 men.
The Japanese suffered damage to only one ship in the encounter, the
cruiser _Chokai_. The American cruisers _Vincennes_ (CA 44), _Astoria_
(CA 34), and _Quincy_ (CA 39) went to the bottom, as did the Australian
Navy’s HMAS _Canberra_, so critically damaged that she had to be sunk
by American torpedoes. Both the cruiser _Chicago_ (CA 29) and destroyer
_Talbot_ (DD 114) were badly damaged. Fortunately for the Marines
ashore, the Japanese force--five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,
and a destroyer--departed before dawn without attempting to disrupt the
landing further.
[Illustration: U.S. 105mm Howitzer]
When the attack-force leader, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned to
Rabaul, he expected to receive the accolades of his superiors. He did
get those, but he also found himself the subject of criticism. Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander, chided his subordinate
for failing to attack the transports. Mikawa could only reply, somewhat
lamely, that he did not know Fletcher’s aircraft carriers were so far
away from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance to the Marines on the
beach, the Japanese naval victory caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
to allow the event to overshadow the importance of the amphibious
operation.
The disaster prompted the American admirals to reconsider Navy support
for operations ashore. Fletcher feared for the safety of his carriers;
he had already lost about a quarter of his fighter aircraft. The
commander of the expeditionary force had lost a carrier at Coral Sea
and another at Midway. He felt he could not risk the loss of a third,
even if it meant leaving the Marines on their own. Before the Japanese
cruiser attack, he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s permission to withdraw
from the area.
[Illustration: _When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools
needed ashore were forced to leave the Guadalcanal area because of
enemy air and surface threats, Marines had to prepare such hasty field
expedients as this_ _cheval de frise_ _of sharpened stakes._
Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157
]
At a conference on board Turner’s flagship transport, the _McCawley_,
on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that
Fletcher’s impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out
the amphibious force’s ships. The Battle of Savo Island reinforced
the decision to get away before enemy aircraft, unchecked by American
interceptors, struck. On 9 August, the transports withdrew to Noumea.
The unloading of supplies ended abruptly, and ships still half-full
steamed away. The forces ashore had 17 days’ rations--after counting
captured Japanese food--and only four days’ supply of ammunition for
all weapons. Not only did the ships take away the rest of the supplies,
they also took the Marines still on board, including the 2d Marines’
headquarters element. Dropped off at the island of Espiritu Santo in
the New Hebrides, the infantry Marines and their commander, Colonel
Arthur, were most unhappy and remained so until they finally reached
Guadalcanal on 29 October.
Ashore in the Marine beachheads, General Vandegrift ordered rations
reduced to two meals a day. The reduced food intake would last for
six weeks, and the Marines would become very familiar with Japanese
canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines smoked and they were soon
disgustedly smoking Japanese-issue brands. They found that the separate
paper filters that came with the cigarettes were necessary to keep the
fast-burning tobacco from scorching their lips. The retreating ships
had also hauled away empty sand bags and valuable engineer tools. So
the Marines used Japanese shovels to fill Japanese rice bags with sand
to strengthen their defensive positions.
[Illustration: U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun]
The Marines dug in along the beaches between the Tenaru and the ridges
west of Kukum. A Japanese counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
Inland of the beaches, defensive gun pits and foxholes lined the west
bank of the Tenaru and crowned the hills that faced west toward the
Matanikau River and Point Cruz. South of the airfield where densely
jungled ridges and ravines abounded, the beachhead perimeter was
guarded by outposts and these were manned in large part by combat
support troops. The engineer, pioneer, and amphibious tractor battalion
all had their positions on the front line. In fact, any Marine with a
rifle, and that was virtually every Marine, stood night defensive duty.
There was no place within the perimeter that could be counted safe from
enemy infiltration.
[Illustration: