_After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their
foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy
emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious
obstacles for attacking Marines._]
Throughout the night, the Japanese swarmed from hillside caves in four
separate attacks, trying to penetrate the raider lines. They were
unsuccessful and most died in the attempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
2d Marines, landed to reinforce the attackers and by the afternoon of 8
August, the mop-up was completed and the battle for Tulagi was over.
The fight for tiny Gavutu and Tanambogo, both little more than small
hills rising out of the sea, connected by a hundred-yard causeway, was
every bit as intense as that on Tulagi. The area of combat was much
smaller and the opportunities for fire support from offshore ships
and carrier planes was severely limited once the Marines had landed.
After naval gunfire from the light cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54) and two
destroyers, and a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from the _Wasp_, the
1st Parachute Battalion landed near noon in three waves, 395 men in
all, on Gavutu. The Japanese, secure in cave positions, opened fire on
the second and third waves, pinning down the first Marines ashore on
the beach. Major Williams took a bullet in the lungs and was evacuated;
32 Marines were killed in the withering enemy fire. This time, 2d
Marines reinforcements were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s Company
B landed on Gavutu and attempted to take Tanambogo; the attackers were
driven to ground and had to pull back to Gavutu.
After a rough night of close-in fighting with the defenders of both
islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced the men already
ashore and mopped up on each island. The toll of Marines dead on the
three islands was 144; the wounded numbered 194. The few Japanese who
survived the battles fled to Florida Island, which had been scouted by
the 2d Marines on D-Day and found clear of the enemy.
The Marines’ landings and the concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
waters acted as a magnet to the Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio was heard on D-Day “frantically
calling for [the] dispatch of surface forces to the scene” and
designating transports and carriers as targets for heavy bombing.
The messages were sent in plain language, emphasizing the plight
of the threatened garrison. And the enemy response was prompt and
characteristic of the months of naval air and surface attacks to come.
At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian coastwatcher hidden in the hills of
the islands north of Guadalcanal signalled that a Japanese air strike
composed of heavy bombers, light bombers, and fighters was headed for
the island. Fletcher’s pilots, whose carriers were positioned 100 miles
south of Guadalcanal, jumped the approaching planes 20 miles northwest
of the landing areas before they could disrupt the operation. But the
Japanese were not daunted by the setback; other planes and ships were
enroute to the inviting target.
On 8 August, the Marines consolidated their positions ashore, seizing
the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing a beachhead. Supplies were
being unloaded as fast as landing craft could make the turnaround from
ship to shore, but the shore party was woefully inadequate to handle
the influx of ammunition, rations, tents, aviation gas, vehicles--all
gear necessary to sustain the Marines. The beach itself became a
dumpsite. And almost as soon as the initial supplies were landed, they
had to be moved to positions nearer Kukum village and Lunga Point
within the planned perimeter. Fortunately, the lack of Japanese ground
opposition enabled Vandegrift to shift the supply beaches west to a new
beachhead.
[Illustration: