HORSE ARTILLERY FIRE EFFECT COMPARED WITH RIFLE FIRE
Henderson in _Science of War_, written in 1893-1902, asked the
question, whether the necessary fire power should be found by the
cavalry itself or by a body of mounted riflemen attached to the brigade
or the division? and answered it by proposing trained mounted infantry.
To the view that this fire power had better be supplied by the horse
artillery he gives little or no consideration. Machine guns are also
more or less ignored, and yet these in common with horse artillery are
what the _cavalry attack_ requires most in support.
Those who have frequently had to rely on fire to cover a mounted
advance will agree that the fire of two hundred riflemen at eight
rounds a minute for five minutes is not to be compared in efficacy with
the shells of a Q.F. horse artillery battery. Their comparative value
would work out in projectiles as follows:
Guns. Rounds. Bullets. Minutes. Bullets.
6 × 10 × 236 × 5 = 70,800.
Rifles. Rounds. Minutes. Bullets.
200 × 8 ... × 5 = 8000.
That is, the riflemen fire less than 1/8 of the number of projectiles
fired by a battery, or 1770 riflemen shoot as many projectiles as a
battery in five minutes.
It is superfluous to remark on the range attained by the Q.F. gun
compared with the rifle, but it is to the point to bring to notice that
a Q.F. battery is controlled by one individual who is furnished with
good glasses, and that the guns have telescopic sights. At a mile he
will distinguish his own side. Again the battery’s front is 100 yards
compared to the mile of front required by 1770 riflemen. The battery is
in action within one minute and thirty seconds, whereas from the time
the order is given a brigade of mounted riflemen will not be in action
under five minutes at least, and will not be shooting with any degree
of accuracy under eight minutes. Further, the fire of a big line of one
mile in length cannot be directed, whereas a battery can be switched on
and off, or so many degrees to a flank, and so on, by a simple command.
It is obvious, then, that in the attack of infantry, whether unshaken
or shaken, the extended line of charging cavalry will find their most
reliable support in horse artillery and machine-gun fire and not in the
fire of dismounted men.
Henderson would therefore appear to have written at this time under the
influence of the then accepted theory that the horse artillery would
not be available to assist cavalry in a general engagement. He was
also much impressed by the view that mounted infantry should supply
the fire power for cavalry and prevent cavalry having recourse to fire
action as much as possible; since he considered that the _élan_ of the
cavalryman would soon disappear, if once accustomed to dismount and
fire as an alternative to shock action when the latter was feasible.
To sum up, present-day opinion is not in favour of mounted infantry
being attached to cavalry brigades, but on the other hand horse
artillery and machine guns will remain with cavalry in the general
engagement, ready for any opportunity.
In order once more to emphasize the opinion that these charges of
cavalry on infantry demand exceptional arrangements on the part of the
general commanding the cavalry and his artillery commander, the case
quoted by Prince Kraft in _Letters on Cavalry_, page 64, may be cited.
Speaking of a French cavalry charge on Prussian infantry at Woerth, a
Prussian infantry officer told him that:
At the moment our infantry were falling back down a slope from
an attack which had failed, a hail of Chassepot and Mitrailleuse
bullets followed them, and every one felt that he would never reach
the cover of the wood which lay below them.
Tired to death and resigned to their fate, the whole of the
infantry were slowly crawling towards the wood. Suddenly the
murderous fire ceased. Every one stopped, astonished, to see
what had saved them from the fate which seemed certain to
them. Then they saw the French cuirassiers who, as they pushed
forward, _masked the fire_ of their infantry and artillery. These
cuirassiers appeared to them like guardian angels. With the most
perfect calm every man halted on the spot where he stood and fired
at the cuirassiers, who were soon swept away by the rapid fire.
He adds at p. 67:
We see, moreover, that cavalry charges, if they break out from the
front of their own infantry and _mask the fire of the latter_,
enable the infantry which is charged to gain time, owing to the
cessation of this fire, to recover their formation.
The above is one more argument in favour of constantly training our
cavalry leaders till it is a second nature to apply shock at right
angles to fire effect, and on no account whatever to mask the fire of
their own artillery and infantry, and thus become the “guardian angels”
of the infantry whom they are attacking.
Von Bernardi appears to lose sight of this, when he says, p. 208,
_Cavalry in Peace and War_:
It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the
formation, for the attack, must take place beyond the effective
range of the enemy’s fire ... and nothing else can be done but to
gallop straight to the front. As, however, our infantry will have
to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case
to attack in close order.
This is what we consider should be avoided in the dispositions of the
cavalry leader.
Again, p. 200, Von Bernardi says: “The attack will best take place from
the flank.” To this there is the objection that there is not likely to
be a good rallying-point in the middle of the enemy’s line.
Our conclusion is that these attacks will be least costly if they break
out from our line in valleys running at right angles to it, or round
the contour of a hill, and sweep the enemy by a charge parallel to
our front, and that the rallying-point should be outside the flank or
within our own line.
On the occasions when our infantry or dismounted riflemen made one of
their regular attacks in extended order on the positions taken up by
the Boers, there were almost invariably not only critical moments, but
also opportunities afforded by the lie of the ground which invited a
leader at the head of three or four squadrons of lancers to issue from
cover in or near the Boer lines at a gallop in open order, and to sweep
over the widely extended men. Three to four minutes at most would have
covered the time during which these lancers would have been exposed to
fire; then they could have reached a rallying-point in their own lines.
There are good grounds for the belief that such an attack is extremely
demoralizing, especially if the troops have not been accustomed in
peace-time to undergo it.