CO-OPERATION OF HORSE ARTILLERY WITH CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT
“Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry, because it
cannot reply to fire, but can fight only with the steel.”--NAPOLEON.
Of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry
against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the
battles of 1870. The training of cavalry and horse artillery and the
organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines,
as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books
such as Von Schmidt before that war, or in Prince Kraft’s _Letters on
Cavalry_ after it. The latter writer shows that the tendency was to
deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took
place, and put it with the corps artillery. It was claimed that by so
doing the horse artillery were practically of double use.
The batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. If the
cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. If a
battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in
reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps
artillery and considerably augments its fire. The horse artillery
of the Guards corps was thus employed in 1870.
For a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle _does not
require any horse artillery_. It is held at first in reserve.
If it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an
opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. There is thus
no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is,
besides, no time to do so.
Compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the German _Exerzier
Reglement für die Kavallerie 1895_, No. 375:
In a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to
the cavalry _will remain with them_, because they are indispensable
to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during,
and particularly after, the battle.
The cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general
position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in
co-operation with the rest of the artillery. The horse artillery
and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general
engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s
flanks and rear. Their sudden appearance from a flank or from the
rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy.
There could scarcely be a greater _volte face_ than is indicated by
these two extracts.
Further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present
date, in both the German and French manœuvres, leads us to the
conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together
in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both
shaken and unshaken infantry.
The reader should study some of the instances given in Colonel Maude’s
book, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, chaps. xi. and xii., of the
charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself
what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by
even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery,
say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles.
A conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the rôle of the
three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry
force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their
flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. But
battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where
natural obstacles cover our flank. Therefore, we must have sufficient
cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they
will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are
accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is
already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage
over us.
The latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is
furnished by Captain Spaits, who himself went through the retreat
with the Russians after Mukden, in his book, _With Cossacks through
Manchuria_.
He “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of
the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without
discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions,
energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could
have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.”
The above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made
on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.[55]
Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that
cavalry with horse artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield
against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the
attack is _à propos_, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery
and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against
infantry should take. _Cavalry Training_ indicates that it should
be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of
the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without
sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader
accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently
the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with
the infantry commander in that portion of the field.
That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press
in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the
troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two
points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best
position for the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In
these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as
a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it--and
we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A
flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable
of deciding victory in itself.”
The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered
at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry;
and “B,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the
general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “C,” when we
utilize surprise. It is usually in the return from such enterprises
after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. A good
instance is that of Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth; see page
203, Maude’s _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_.
Suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of Michel’s Brigade,
now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still
preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the
Prussians. The latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at
full gallop from the halt. Owing to the suddenness of the attack
there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to
gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the
French. There was a short mêlée, and then the Prussians, promptly
rallying, swept up the debris of the French, and brought in some
sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. The prompt resolution to
attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation.
Many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed
with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact,
of the De Bloch School, are under the impression that cavalry will not
charge infantry. It is probable that, never having ridden in a force of
cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much
simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much
less resolution is needed.
In the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion
which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop
almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for
a long way after being hit. As the enemy are reached, the desire for
slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught
to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding
their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point.
An example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile
infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in
General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p. 40:
The problem here presented is one of considerably more danger
and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops
and reaping the fruits of victory. The enemy’s infantry, far
from having lost their _moral_, are pressing victoriously to
the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained
heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in
reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness.
The responsibility for ordering an attack of this nature ...
rests with the commander-in-chief. Against such an objective it
is useless to send regiments at the gallop. It is necessary to
(1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring
a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the
objective; (2) make a definite plan. This must be based on what
can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the
most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the
execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their
objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment.
In the _Manual of Infantry Training_, 1905, under “Formations
Applicable to Savage Warfare,” is found S. No. 118, which contains an
instruction for “Meeting an Attack by Cavalry or Swordsmen.”
When a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in
force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened
flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander
giving the command, “Back, No. ----, up, No. ----.”
Such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would
favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed
at right angles to the attack as indicated above.
May, writing in 1896, _Guns and Cavalry_, says:
True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery
moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle,
may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or
prevent a telling flank movement. But for such occasions special
arrangements could no doubt be made as the exigencies of the
moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand.
It is evident from the German regulations quoted above that they have
no intention of trusting to the “Special arrangements” for “Exigencies.”
Their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows:
1st. Horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry.
2nd. Attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such
a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry.
3rd. In order to get freedom of manœuvre for our squadrons to a flank,
cavalry are bound to meet an enemy’s cavalry force, possibly belonging
to an enemy whose cavalry does not leave its horse artillery behind
with the corps artillery in a great general engagement.
On which side wins will depend the subsequent course of events on that
flank.
4th. A cavalry force of three regiments and one battery of horse
artillery is quite equal, or more than equal, to one of four regiments
without horse artillery.
Having in view the above consideration, cavalry should not be prepared
to forgo their horse artillery in a great general engagement, since
it foredooms them to the inaction of the French and German cavalry
divisions of the war of 1870, or perhaps to their comparative failure
and losses, when, unsupported by horse artillery fire, they attacked
infantry columns to cover the retreat of their own infantry.
Special arrangements of this kind are not made, and we know also, too
well, that “No man can serve two masters.”
The latest German regulations appear, therefore, to have been
formulated on sound reasoning.