THE DISPOSITION OF CAVALRY IN A CAMPAIGN
FIRST PART
It is related that its owner tried as an experiment to find out what
was the smallest amount on which a horse could work. When he had
reduced the animal to one straw per diem, the experiment ceased, as the
horse died.
The reader, constantly bearing in mind the above anecdote (since, if
great generals have overlooked in the past the moral of the tale, there
is no reason why others should not do so in future), may proceed to the
subject of this chapter, but not without the recurrent thought, that,
however dashing the conception of the use of cavalry in a campaign,
this one point must be foremost. What will the cavalry horses live
on? Horses cannot live on nothing. Few survive if put for a prolonged
period on ½-grain rations and no hay or grazing, if such is followed by
work.
How far motor vehicles carrying supplies have changed the aspect
of affairs in regard to this question is at present a moot point.
Undoubtedly the effect of the domination of the air by man has
materially affected the question of obtaining information.
The principle, “that an army should place in its front the whole of
its available cavalry forces from the very beginning of a campaign,”
to some extent arises from the desirability of an undisturbed
concentration for one’s own army, and also the advantage of checking
that of the enemy.
Next in order will be the desire of the commander-in-chief of the
army to have definite information of the enemy’s movements whilst at
the same time his own movements are covered. This will enable him to
direct the movements of his army, whilst still at a distance from the
enemy’s advanced guards, and effect concentration for battle neither
too soon nor too late (since both of these contingencies entail grave
inconveniences), but at the right moment.
But when it comes to practical politics, it is plain, and must be
regarded as a principle, that a cavalry brigade, division or corps
cannot be relied upon to perform efficiently the duties of policeman
and detective at one and the same time. The duty of the latter would
carry the former away from his beat.
The French cavalry in 1870, though they possessed what Ardant du Picq
describes as the true “Casse cou”[47] readiness to charge (and by the
bye, that _is_ a portion of the _cavalry spirit_), almost entirely
lacked skilled direction by the higher leaders. This fault was no
doubt due, in some degree, to the three arms training each in separate
water-tight compartments, and not on a large and comprehensive scale
in peace, precisely as Langlois says of us in reference to our army’s
work in South Africa: “The English took no steps in peace to create and
strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them.”
Direction by the higher leaders will always be lacking, where those
leaders, in peace time, are unable to divorce themselves from the
surroundings and prejudices of their own particular arm, whatever it
may be, and to enter whole-heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit
of the Napoleonic maxim (No. 47): “Infantry, cavalry, and artillery
_are nothing without each other_.”
Be that as it may, after the 1870-71 war the French cavalry had a
moving spirit in General Galliffet, and he was well supported by some
of the cleverest French military writers. They dissected French and
German cavalry action in 1870-71 (and that of cavalry in other wars),
laying bare the mistakes and failures of the cavalry of both armies.
They saw what was wanted, higher direction and co-ordination of the
work of cavalry, so that the two functions of cavalry, information and
security (prior to its rôle on the battlefield), might be realized to
their full extent. Their deduction from the campaigns of the Napoleonic
period was, that that great leader and organizer had discerned the
impossibility of co-ordinating these duties; that in his earlier
campaigns there were two great units of war, the cavalry of army corps
and a corps of reserve cavalry;[48] the latter was composed of numerous
light cavalry, acting about a day in front of the columns of the main
body. Again, that in 1812, corresponding with the formation of groups
of armies, the corps of cavalry was created to act independently, in
advance of the general movement of the armies, making a third great
unit. They arrived at the conclusion that war brings into play three
great units, each of which requires its special cavalry.
1. In front of armies under the generalissimo an independent cavalry,
in one or more bodies, to insure liberty of offensive action to the
generalissimo.
2. In each army a division of cavalry to ensure to it the liberty of
defensive action by giving time to concentrate and take up favourable
positions.
3. In each army corps a regiment or half-regiment to ensure
tranquillity and freedom from surprise.
Nor did they fail to bring to notice that Napoleon’s system was to find
a cavalry leader, and let him organize his cavalry to help the plan of
campaign, and not to waste his cavalry in a sort of insurance policy.
The essence of cavalry is offence, “offensive résolue, offensive quand
même offensive à outrance, qui fut le plus souvent la seule règle de
tactique,” not defence and shepherding infantry divisions;[49] this
latter work does not demand the most highly trained cavalry.
By these steps gradually the principle, which is clearly stated in our
F.S. Regulations, was arrived at, viz.:
The main force of cavalry will usually be organized in one
or more cavalry divisions, and retained as the instrument of
strategical reconnaissance under the immediate orders of the
commander-in-chief.--Part II., British F.S.R., 1909, p. 25.
At the present date the French, German, and Austrian organization is
practically identical in this respect. All recognize that “we must
fight to reconnoitre, and fight to screen.”[50]
The rôle of cavalry, as defined at p. 182 of the French _Service de la
Cavalerie_, 1909, is as follows:
1. _The Cavalry of Exploration_ (answering to our own independent
cavalry), the personal agent of the generalissimo, is sent where he
wishes, in quest of the news he desires. This news the leader of
this cavalry must send in good time; his independence is limited to
the means he employs to get news. The cavalry of exploration may
also be sent on special missions against the columns or convoys
of the enemy, and ought, _whilst observing its instructions and
carrying out its_ important rôle, to seize any opportunity of
destroying the enemy’s cavalry.
Cavalry is the arm, above all, of surprise, and consequently may
often obtain the greatest results by a sudden attack on the wings
or rear of the adversary.
2. _The Cavalry of the Army Corps_ (answering to our protective
cavalry) and the divisional cavalry find out and inform their
commander what is happening in the zone allotted to them.
They must keep off the enemy’s cavalry, guard the columns against
surprise, cover their deployment, and seek every opportunity of
intervening with effect in the combat.
3. _The Divisional Cavalry_ may, in the combat, be the only troops
on whom the divisional general can depend for safety from surprise:
their commander must, accordingly, not only seek opportunities to
use the bulk of his troops opportunely in the combat, but also give
information and guard the division against surprise on its flanks
and rear.
What use, then, does the generalissimo make of his independent cavalry?
He sends it forward to tear the veil from his adversary’s armies;
whilst thus engaged it may, in fact almost certainly will, meet the
enemy’s independent cavalry similarly employed, when, with a view to
carrying out its orders, it will probably be compelled to fight--to
fight for information.
Let us suppose it successful and the squadrons of the enemy’s
independent cavalry dispersed, unable to face their adversary. Our
independent cavalry push on to the enemy and meet the screen of
cavalry, the service of security which covers his army. This again
they must tear aside, and lay bare the heads of the enemy’s infantry
columns. Even then their mission is not complete; they must direct
their energies against the flanks of the enemy’s columns and
demoralize them. It is plain, then, that on the successful action of
the independent cavalry great issues may depend.
With regard to the movement of these forces, whenever cavalry are
moving in the direction of an enemy (whether they are the independent
cavalry or the protective cavalry), it is obvious that they will
endeavour to pass quickly through ground which is for any reason
unfavourable to them and advantageous to the enemy for attack, whilst
they will dwell in positions which present obvious advantages to them.
The result is, that from large forces of cavalry down to the smallest
unit there is a tendency to move forward in bounds.
The protective cavalry will further be influenced by the desire to
forestall the enemy in gaining positions for the infantry columns
following them, and in taking up for the night a line of outposts on
some natural obstacle, which will give them some security whilst they
are halted.
It is quite a debatable question whether the evolution of cavalry into
three classes as at present is not largely due to the arming of cavalry
with a good rifle, and to rendering them consequently able to protect
themselves, and able to turn out small parties of the enemy who hold
defiles, railway stations, etc., against them. The new German Cavalry
Regulations, para. 391, state: “Thus cavalry, owing to its great
adaptability, is capable of independent action in practically every
eventuality of the battlefield.”
In any case horse artillery, machine guns, and the rifle have added
enormously to the defensive power of cavalry; when, therefore, the
protective cavalry are thrown back on the infantry, by the enterprise
of the enemy’s independent squadrons, the latter may lightly, and
without warning, find themselves attacking infantry in position, by
mistake for dismounted cavalry, and consequently suffer very severely.
Not only that, but the mixed detachments of all arms likely to be met
with at this juncture, possess a power and length of resistance, which
our cavalry may perhaps successfully simulate, and thus hold back and
delay the advance of the enemy’s cavalry.
SECOND PART
“A writer upon strategy and tactics ought to treat his subjects as
national strategy and tactics; for only such teaching can be of
real service to his country.”--VON DER GOLTZ, _Nation in Arms_, p.
143.
Instead of labouring the point as to the rôle of cavalry under these
circumstances, perhaps one may be permitted to recall to the reader’s
mind that, unless we go back to Napoleonic precedent, there are no
actual experiences in modern times of the effect to be obtained by
using cavalry in the manner prescribed at present. The whole is pure
theory, but we can say from our own experience that the protective
cavalry may fail if they attempt to be strong everywhere on the old
“pepper-box” system.
The drives in South Africa, in which we were strong nowhere and
weak everywhere, proved, as indeed was expected, that a strong and
determined enemy can always break through the long weak line unless the
latter follows the line of some serious obstacle.
It is also a matter of easy demonstration and universal agreement that
the cavalry which dominates in the first great cavalry struggle has
already gained an enormous advantage for its side.
What is the logical outcome? It is, that unless (1) our cavalry force
is redundant, or (2) there are difficulties in feeding our independent
cavalry, or (3) the enemy’s cavalry is very weak, or (4) our cavalry
comprises squadrons, which we cannot, from reasons of want of training
or armament, oppose to the enemy’s cavalry, we shall see every
available squadron taken from the protective cavalry and handed over
to the independent cavalry. Intelligence comes before security.[51]
Meanwhile the protective rôle will be carried out by divisional mounted
troops, cyclists, and infantry detachments (see sec. 92, F.S.R.).
_Ceteris paribus_, the first advantage will be with the side which can
put the greatest number of squadrons into the corps of independent
cavalry, and, in view of this, a fact plainly spoken of and counted
upon in all strategical conceptions of future campaigns on the
Continent, the preponderance of well-trained squadrons is clearly the
object to be aimed at.
Generally speaking, the ideas which are promulgated as to the rôle
for the weaker cavalry, by which a cavalry, worse trained, worse
armed, and proportionately less in numbers will compensate for these
shortcomings by superior tactics, are purely Utopian. This “fond thing
vainly invented” may interest or beguile the mind of the unfortunate
tax-payer, but does not belong to the regions of plain military common
sense, which, in its preparation for war, has no place for chance work,
and must have no weak link in the chain.
Let those with whom the wish is master of the thought read General von
Bernardi’s most recent statement in _Cavalry in Peace and War_, p. 356,
where speaking of the German force of trained cavalry, enormous as it
already is, he says:
I have repeatedly stated that I consider our cavalry to be of
itself too weak. The more I study modern warfare, the more
convinced do I feel that the value of the arm, when handled
according to modern ideas, has increased.
Let us remember that cavalry cannot be improvised, and that even
squadrons of the best class of mounted rifles, formed entirely of
natural horsemen and fairly good shots, are very heavily penalized,
apart from their armament and training, unless they have professional
brigade, regimental, and squadron leaders, and know how to work with
horse artillery. They cannot be expected to face trained and properly
organized cavalry brigades on anything like equal terms. At the same
time, if reliance is placed on numbers, one is at once faced (i.) by
the forage supply and its carriage, (ii.) by the enormous item of
expense in remounting, already referred to in the chapter on “The
horse.”
The outcome is that one arrives at this plain and simple
proposition.[52] Only the most highly trained cavalry soldier is worth
a horse and food for his horse when a nation is engaged against an
enemy of modern continental type. This point is undoubtedly grasped
on the Continent, where the proposal to use cyclists as a reserve of
riflemen with cavalry is generally accepted.
Every one, practically, can now ride and look after a bicycle, and
given passable roads, cyclists can travel farther and faster than
horses, and carry more days’ reserve rations. In war in a civilized and
well-roaded country they cannot fail to be a most useful adjunct to
cavalry: (1) as a reserve of rifles, (2) as despatch-riders, (3) as an
accessory in outpost and reconnoitring duty.
It is not the scheme of this book to enter into the question of
training other than regular cavalry, nor to enter into any discussion
as to the precise value in war of hastily raised mounted troops;
since in doing so one might say something which had the appearance
of discouraging the volunteer; whereas there is no question that the
spirit, which animated for instance those yeomanry and colonial troops
who came out early in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902, is a
great national and imperial asset.
At the same time it is right to make it perfectly plain that the
non-professional cavalry soldier has an exceedingly hard task before
him, and one requiring very exceptional qualities such as are not
usually found in those who do not possess the initial asset of being
constantly in the saddle and out in the open. Even these must find
it extremely difficult to train to anything but a very mediocre
standard, unless they possess (i.) sufficient leisure to prepare
themselves amidst the surroundings of regular troops, and (ii.) the
large amount of patriotism and right feeling which induces a man
voluntarily to place himself under and endure the irksome restraints of
discipline.[53] Ten times more does this apply to the officer; purely
amateur officers are poison (the virus being in direct proportion to
their rank), and entirely out of place in war. To imagine that it is
patriotism to wait till war begins, and then aspire to lead others, is
an idea that should be crushed once for all. It is not patriotism, it
is murder.
Few amateurs would aspire to conduct the operations in a London
hospital, and the operations of war are, in their way, no less
intricate, and perhaps entail more loss of life and limb when conducted
by the unskilled. The amateur who comes out to the war, with the
courage of ignorance, and finds how helpless he is, how useless are his
best efforts, how complete the disillusionment of those under him as to
his power to keep or get them out of trouble, let alone hurt the enemy,
will, if he survives, have learnt a very useful and painful lesson, but
no nation can afford to give lessons on the field of battle.
The cavalry of an army are a part of a machine, in which reliance must
be placed, and in which every nut or screw of doubtful metal is a
danger. Cherfils rightly says: “Three-quarters of the strategy of war
lies in the method of employment of the cavalry.” Why? Because of the
supreme importance to the generalissimo of _Liberty of Manœuvre_. But
this liberty can only be gained by a thrusting forward of masses of
cavalry, _which must go on_ and get the greatest share of the terrain
intervening between the two armies. As an instance of this, in the
Ulm Campaign on the 4th October Napoleon in his orders to Murat makes
it plain that he wants him to push aside the enemy’s patrols and make
plenty of prisoners; he tells him to take _three_ divisions of cavalry
and do so, leaving _one_ division only to watch his left flank, that
on which Napoleon was making his main infantry advance. He left the
initiative to Murat.
Does any one imagine that these cavalry masses could, solely by means
of musketry fire, drive the enemy out of the positions which they will
take up, on finding a stronger force of cavalry in front of them? We
believe certain people do reckon on this, though it has never occurred
in actual combat, and (in the opinion of those who have witnessed
attempts at it) will not do so in the immediate future. Across the open
plains the weaker, worse armed and equipped cavalry will keep falling
back rapidly to the next defensive line. If this is a river or range of
hills, experience shows that the stronger cavalry will soon cross it
and move forward.
Too much emphasis can hardly be laid on the value of success in the
first great cavalry combat, in “initial ascendancy.”[54] Let those who
doubt this inquire of any who have been on stricken fields and have
learnt the great lessons only taught by defeat.
But these lessons are not to be confused with the tendency to say “A”
nation beat “B” nation, therefore “A” nation’s methods are right, and
forthwith slavishly follow their methods, even carrying this so far as
to follow the fashion of some pelisse or _pickelhaube_ as well.
Occasionally the Boers read us a lesson, and, as Kipling says, “a
jolly good lesson too”; at once there is a great rush to imitate their
methods, by those impressed by them, as though these were applicable
to every possible case. To take one case--they are certainly not
suitable for mounted troops who wish to advance. In that case we want
the resolute offensive, with a thorough understanding in all ranks that
they must be prepared to fight for information and liberty of manœuvre.
Now spectators of any large fight in South Africa cannot claim to have
seen this resolute offensive on the part of the Boers. They never
pushed us back, partly, no doubt, from difficulties of command, but
chiefly from defective armament and training, and consequent inability
to bring the combat to a hand-to-hand fight. On the other hand, they
fell back fighting whenever we attacked resolutely. Exactly what a
generalissimo could not permit his cavalry to do. Why? Because he, by
doing so, surrenders his share of liberty of manœuvre, of which there
is a limited amount between the armies, to his adversary.
Our conclusion is that _the trained cavalry masses which have a
personal weapon and good support from horse artillery will push back
any improvised or worse-armed cavalry with the utmost rapidity across
all open ground, and that the moral ascendancy thus established will
render the enemy’s defeat in rough ground an easy task_.