CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT
“It was thought that to engage the enemy to fight was our
business.”--CROMWELL at Preston.
“The part played varies according to the quality of the instrument
and the capabilities of the operator.”--CHERFILS.
In the last few years considerable prominence has been given to the
action of independent cavalry, and there is reason to believe that this
might lead to a large portion of the cavalry of an army being detached
when a general engagement was imminent. This tendency may well arise
where the general officer commanding has not a complete grasp[34]
or perhaps belief in the possibility of a rôle for cavalry on the
battlefield, nor entire reliance on them for that assistance, which, if
properly trained and directed, they are well able to give.[35]
The general officer commanding may, under the impression that the
combat can be carried through by the artillery and infantry without
much further assistance, order the cavalry commander to take the bulk
of his squadrons and make a detour, involving half the night spent in
the saddle, and thus place himself on the flank or rear of the enemy,
and there to attack or wait his opportunity in the event of the enemy’s
defeat.
Acting in accordance with these orders, we may picture the cavalry
arrived at a point some twelve or fifteen miles away, where the leader
may very well find it is by no means all plain sailing. His progress
may be blocked at some bridge or defile, and, whilst he is endeavouring
to push aside the opposition, reinforcements, including artillery, come
upon the scene, and he finds that to avoid heavy loss he must draw off
the larger portion of his force in order to make a still longer detour.
This wastes several hours and results in a drawn fight, or, if he does
get nearer to his objective, he finds that, with timely warning given,
the enemy are well able to hold him off.
Meanwhile the flank left open, or practically denuded of mobile
troops, has every chance of being turned; all the tendency of modern
fighting is towards extension and dispersion, whilst the desperate
counter-attack is the theme of every writer. We can imagine no more
galling occurrence than a counter-attack,[36] thrust in on one’s own
flank (more probably than not, the very flank from which the cavalry
have been sent), and, in their absence, carried through with decisive
results. These wide turning movements, or rather action against the
flank and rear of the enemy, are in the nature of putting all one’s
eggs in one basket, and not infrequently taking it for granted that the
enemy will not stand his ground.
It has been very well said that cavalry is an arm of opportunity, and
opportunities are most likely to occur where actual fighting is going
on. Against the Boers, who had no idea of counter-attack, these turning
movements came off; against well-led troops, suitably disposed in
depth,[37] and avoiding wide dispersion, their success is very doubtful.
Napoleon said:
Cavalry charges were good at the beginning, during the course
of, and at the end of a battle. They should always be made, if
possible, on the flanks of infantry, especially when this last is
engaged in front.--Napoleon’s Maxim, No. 50.
He would no doubt go further now and speak of the intervention of
cavalry with horse artillery and machine guns as likely to turn the
scale in the crisis of battle.
But Napoleon would recognize that it is by rapidly prolonging their own
flank against being turned, or by enveloping or enfilading the enemy’s
line by participation in the counter-attack, or by work such as that
done by the German horse artillery and cavalry at Loigny-Poupry on
December 2, 1870 (late in the war when the German cavalry had learnt
their lesson), that cavalry show to advantage. There 2150 German sabres
and 24 guns, acting in combination, first dashed aside the opposition
offered by the French in villages on the left flank of their line of
battle, and then, sweeping round, proceeded to threaten and shell the
left rear of the French infantry line--good work, and showing the value
of mobile forces boldly thrown at a flank, but lacking in the final
stage in that resolute determination which gives full value to such
a movement, and this, no doubt, because they had not been trained in
peace to act together.[38]
This leads one to consider what was the training of our own cavalry
subsequent to 1870. Was it not the general tendency of our authorities
and tactical experts to discredit the action of cavalry on the
battlefield, without considering whether the armament, organization,
and previous training of the cavalry of both France and Germany were
such as to lead to success?
These points all influenced the course of the actions in the first
months of the 1870 war in the most remarkable manner. Again, was the
leading, except for a few bright exceptions, satisfactory? French
and German writers on cavalry plainly intimate that the direction of
cavalry enterprise by the higher leaders, and the action of the cavalry
leaders, were distinctly disappointing.[39]
Meantime a belief gained from the American War that dismounted tactics
were the solution to the cavalry question obsessed some, as it always
will those who lack (i.) a practical knowledge of the arm, (ii.)
imagination, (iii.) an acquaintance with military history, though the
most acute thinker of that time, Henderson, lays down very concisely
in _Science of War_, p. 60, “that mounted infantry were absolutely
worthless against cavalry.”
In peace, as the value of the bullet rose, the use of cavalry fell in
the mind of the man of theory. Probably only the few, who with an open
mind thoroughly tested the two rival lines of action in the field,
and on every kind of ground, were able to give a correct appreciation.
But these never swerved from the opinion that mounted men relying only
on the rifle were hopeless in attack or in the open against cavalry,
but were, on the other hand, of great value in defence, or in broken
ground, or in retreat, and further, that many small opportunities, far
more than for shock action, would be offered to them, which cunning and
versatility would enable them to profit by.
But all this talk had not been without its effect, and the result was
that it was not considered ridiculous that a large force of mounted men
should be frittered away in ineffective dismounted action, sitting all
day on a hill or ridge, and firing at great distances at an equally
sticky enemy. Such action is a slur on cavalry for whom “Action and
again action” is the motto.
If both cavalries work on this principle, and this was often the case
both in the early portion of the South African War[40] and in the
Manchurian campaign, certainly no important combats will take place;
but, directly one side begins to “push,” mounted combats will result,
and as each side finds that the greatest number of squadrons, _ceteris
paribus_, wins, there will be great combats of masses, and a “fight
to a finish” amongst the cavalry on the flank of the great general
encounter.
As we have said, in the South African War during the first year, with
few exceptions, fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome tactics
were the rule; it was only in the last year of the war that the British
cavalry, colonials, and mounted infantry--their attack in some cases
supported by really effective and _à propos_ artillery and machine-gun
fire--began to push and gallop at the Boers at every opportunity. Then
the Boers always galloped away, but gradually they, too, learnt from us
the value of pushing, and Botha, Delarey, and others executed some good
charges with marked effect, but they never attempted, and wisely so, to
charge men armed with swords. That was too much for the cavalry soldier
to hope for.
In the Manchurian War the Japanese, with their small force of cavalry,
wisely played the defensive game; the Russians,[41] trained and
organized for twenty years on wrong principles, and led without much
attempt at reasoned dash or enterprise, seldom imposed their will on
the enemy, or made any effort to push in with their numerous squadrons
and sotnias on an open flank. If there was an exception it was when,
before the battle of Mukden, a force of Cossacks under General Liubarin
attacked the Japanese right flank in the mountains, and are stated
to have “rendered the situation critical” till driven off by mixed
forces of infantry and cavalry. This is given as one of the few cavalry
lessons of the Manchurian War. The Russian cavalry officer had not
received sufficient training in grand tactics, nor does the combined
action of their horse artillery with cavalry appear to have been in any
respect effective.
The lesson for our cavalry from these two wars appears to be, that
we should teach our officers to think about something bigger than
the tactics of a squadron or regiment, to learn _esprit d’armée_, to
remember that a few independent squadrons cut up rarely influence a
war, whereas in every big combat the result (and that result may be
affected largely by the leading of a few squadrons) is a national
matter. And there always recurs the most supreme question for the
cavalry leader of masses on the battlefield, whether, apart from the
cases in which a sacrifice is necessary, the anticipated results are
in any way proportionate with the stake. Even the riding down of an
infantry brigade will not always compensate for the expenditure of a
cavalry division.
Langlois pictures “cavalry with its light batteries in the decisive
attack moving by ways which are hidden from view and fire ... falling
on the enemy in mass and surprising him. Reconstructing his (the
enemy’s) defences, and keeping hostile troops at a distance, measures
which,” he says, “require a short dismounted fight, then part of the
cavalry advance and harass and prevent the enemy returning, whilst the
rest holds the position with fire. The infantry will follow the cavalry
as quickly as possible.”
There is no more important subject of training for the cavalry officer
than cavalry action on the battlefield of all arms. Theoretical study
is not enough, it is absolutely necessary to study in the field with
troops or flags representing troops. Since cavalry action is almost
invariably[42] on the flanks, staff rides, cavalry instructional rides,
manœuvres, and other exercises can commence by dealing with only one
flank, thus half the number of men, flags, etc., will suffice.
The director should never permit one side to know the strength in any
arm on the other side; this is desirable, if only to increase the
difficulty and value of gaining information by reconnaissance in these
exercises. For this purpose a proportion of cavalry-scouting parties
should be detailed. Too much stress can scarcely be laid on this
essential of training. Cavalry can now simulate infantry, smokeless
powder renders it impossible to judge the volume of fire, every bit
of information has to be fought for, and will cost the lives of both
horses and men. Even the boldest and most cunning scouting, without
fighting, will not lead to any certain information; it is “peacetime
talk” to imagine that it will be otherwise. Having this in view,
the director should lay the greatest stress on dash and enterprise
as opposed to stickiness and a desire to do nothing or await further
report. It is at these exercises that the director can go far to
establish a _doctrine_, that of the resolute offensive.
If officers cannot act with dash in field manœuvres, how can they be
expected to do so in war? Ground gained in peace manœuvres matters
little, but in war a position gained on the flank of an army by a
cavalry brigade may now mean the enfilading by horse artillery of
entrenched infantry for three miles in extent.
A very good plan is to take some well-known battle and lay out the
situation with flags at some portion of the day, and then work out the
cavalry action in theory and practice. This will admit of considerable
variation. To lay out fresh battlefields or inaugurate new general
ideas each time leads to waste of time in preliminary study of the
situation. There is not the slightest doubt that the want of this
very practical study has affected the leading of cavalry in the past
in a marked degree.[43] Want of determination comes from want of
knowledge of what to do in the situation. In the past, sticky leading
has been condoned because few knew any better. Long ago Lewal wrote
prophetically of the bad effect on cavalry of “being umpired out of
action at peace manœuvres, and told of smokeless powder and magazine
rifles” (Lewal, p. 62).
It is all very well to say that every hill should be regarded as being
held by the enemy till you know otherwise, but let us take care to know
one way or other without delay, and not to imagine that there is any
great value or safety in being on a hill. Hills may be well shelled by
the enemy’s horse artillery, whilst his cavalry gallop up to the dead
ground to be found in front and flank of nine hills out of ten, where,
if supported by horse artillery fire, it is better placed than the
dismounted men on the hill.
Finally our leaders, after preparing themselves, their staffs, and
subordinate leaders by constant practice, “must ever remember and
must impress on their subordinates that hesitation and delay handicap
operations far more heavily than do mere mistakes in choice of
methods.”--_German Cavalry Training_, para. 399.
That the risks which one side takes paralyses the action of the other
has been true of every battle. There is (and peace-time theorists on
the military art often neglect this fact) a first idea or instinct in
the minds of the majority of the human race, that the man or animal
dashing straight at them has some good reason to believe that he can,
and will, hurt them; this primary instinct leads them to subordinate
themselves to the initiative of the other. Watch the unreasoning
game of chase and check between a cat and a dog, and you have a
good example of much that happens, and will always happen, on a
battlefield.[44]
“Initiative is the greatest virtue in a leader; to avoid dissipation of
force is a well-proved means of victory.”--_German Cavalry Training_,
para. 407.
CONCLUSIONS
1. There are risks of doubtful value in action directed on wide lines
against the enemy’s flank and rear.
2. The 1870 and American Wars confused the issues and led in some cases
to sticky action by cavalry on South African battlefields.
3. In Manchuria the Japanese adopted correct tactics in view of Russian
want of enterprise and their own want of cavalry. The rôle of the
weaker cavalry was exemplified in some respects.
4. Push on the part of one side will compel the other to bring up more
squadrons and lead to the fight of cavalry masses.
5. It is only by special training that cavalry leaders can learn their
duties in a general engagement.
6. Much depends on the leader’s initiative, whilst this again depends
on his knowledge gained by previous practice in similar circumstances.
There are those who ask, “But where are the Ziethen and Seydlitz
cavalry charges nowadays?” Let them call to mind, for it is
instructive to do so, the combination of circumstances, and, be it
noted, circumstances which may well rise again, which conduced to the
success of the cavalry of Frederick the Great.
I. A king general, who had a taste for and knowledge of training
cavalry.
II. A training of all ranks suited to the war about to be undertaken.
III. A cavalry with picked leaders quite unencumbered by officers past
or unsuited to their work.
IV. Horses well conditioned under the eye of an autocrat, who had the
common sense to demand and see that he got, not fat, but fit horses.
V. A skilled direction of the cavalry on the battlefield by a cool
and intensely determined generalissimo, such as Frederick the Great
undoubtedly was.
Now let us, on the other hand, state the case in the South African
operations of 1899-1902. (In almost the same words as regards some
paragraphs as were used in 1897.)
I. An unskilled training and inspection of cavalry in the large
proportion of cases, often conducted by officers of other arms, and
such as tended to inspire all ranks with a desire for display and fine
appearance on parade, rather than with a whole-souled yearning for
efficiency for the war in hand.
II. The training of cavalry regiments in small, flat twelve-acre
drill-fields walled in from the slums of a city, in which cavalry were
still stationed for hopelessly out-of-date political reasons. What
real cavalry training was possible along the tram lines and between
rows of suburban villas?
III. A personnel too largely drawn from towns, and ignorant of the
exigencies of campaigning horse-management.
IV. Horses, three-quarters bred, of fair pace and condition, but the
latter necessary qualification for a campaign entirely spoiled in
most cases by, say, a thirty days’ voyage, followed by a five or six
days’ railway journey, then semi-starvation at the end of a line of
communication, then some quick work followed by two or three days’
total starvation, then more work, and so on. Constantly our strategy
outran our supply arrangements and the condition of our horses.
V. An enemy fighting in their own country, and each man owning two or
three hardy, well-conditioned country-breds.
VI. Tactics of the enemy; to hold on to a position with rifle fire, and
when seriously attacked or their flanks turned to disperse at a gallop.
Tactics all very well in their way, and just as disconcerting and
annoying to our squadrons as they were to Murat’s cavalry in the
advance into Russia; but these Parthian tactics are only suited to
a limited number of strategical phases, a point difficult to bring
home to the mind of those who have not studied strategy. They were
tactics which resulted in a loss to the Boers of about 5000 men,
generally foot people, at Paardeberg and, later, another 5000 in the
Wittebergen. Meanwhile the cavalry to which they were opposed was able,
by simple turning movements, to afford the main column, a practically
uninterrupted advance from the Orange River to the Portuguese border.
It is strange, indeed, how the lesson of those operations has in many
cases been read upside down by a nation which takes no steps to study
military history, and which, consequently, forgets that the spirit of
vigorous offensive, which did and must result in occasional heavy loss,
had been sternly discountenanced by the majority of their press, after
the experiences of Black Monday. “Conduct the operations without loss,
or, better, by diplomacy--and above all with kindness,” was then the
cry.
PURSUIT
One of the great fallacies, and one to which in England especially we
are victims, is that war can be conducted on haphazard principles by
the instinct of brave men.
Not only do these brave men “let us in,” on every possible occasion
(especially when they are so brave and foolish as to neglect proper
precautions), but they forget that the sole thing in war is to “get
there,” that is, to bring the enemy to his knees and win.
One of their failings, and it is a typical British failing, is the
neglect to pursue, or, if they pursue, they neglect to do so properly.
Again, and again, in the early part of the operations in South Africa
was this neglected. The first good instance of pursuit, conducted
on proper principles, was that carried out by General French, and
resulting in the ultimate surrender of Cronje. Why was this on the
right principle? The answer is, “Because it was conducted on the
principle of “the parallel pursuit,” and resulted in intercepting
Cronje at a crossing of the Modder River.”
It is in such matters that the professional has the advantage of the
amateur; the latter would, no doubt, see no reason why a pursuit should
do otherwise than follow in the tracks of the enemy, forgetting that
there he will find the best and freshest troops, with good supplies of
ammunition, and under the best leaders,[45] their orders may probably
be, “To stop and die.” Again, that along this line he will run his head
against positions, hastily prepared no doubt, but still positions,
which are meant to delay pursuit. The whole proceeding would be
analogous to trying to beat the enemy at chess by taking piece after
piece till only the king was left.
Compare with this the “parallel pursuit.” Sufficient troops are
pushing the enemy’s rearguard and lulling his main force to a fancied
security; then the cavalry leader moves several miles to the flank
of the direction taken by the enemy with as much speed as possible,
since there is nothing to delay him, and he goes on till there is some
obstacle, perhaps some defile, which the enemy must cross; here he
throws himself boldly in the way of the enemy, of whom those who have
led the stampede, the weakest and least courageous, will be in front.
Ten to one some of these will surrender, unable to bear up against this
fresh disaster, and may be used to assist to block the defile, and thus
affect the _moral_ of those who are following, and who are, perhaps, in
better order.
To the minds of leaders of the stamp of Napoleon’s marshals this form
of pursuit was ever present, and we come on instances of it.[46] It is
essentially a duty of cavalry and horse artillery.
That it often requires strong determination on the part of the leader
to urge tired men and horses to pursue is well known. After the
battle of Katzbach, Blücher had pressed his cavalry to pursue, but
these made a very weak attempt at pursuit, blaming the weather and
alleging extreme fatigue. Blücher summed up the situation of cavalry as
follows:--
The State can afford to lose a few hundred horses in order to make
a victory complete, or when it is a question of the annihilation of
the enemy’s entire army. To neglect to obtain the full results of a
victorious battle is inevitably to oblige yourself sooner or later
to gamble again.