RIVAL CLAIMS TO THE ST. JOHN RIVER.
The St. John river region may be said to have been in dispute from the
moment the treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713 until the taking of
Quebec in 1759. By the treaty of Utrecht all Nova Scotia, or Acadia,
comprehended within its ancient boundaries, was ceded to Great
Britain, and the English at once claimed possession of the territory
bordering on the St. John. To this the French offered strong
objection, claiming that Nova Scotia, or Acadia, comprised merely the
peninsula south of the Bay of Fundy--a claim which, as already stated
in these pages, was strangely at variance with their former contention
that the western boundary of Acadia was the River Kennebec.[24] For
many years the dispute was confined to remonstrances on the side of
either party, the French meanwhile using their savage allies to repel
the advance of any English adventurers who might feel disposed to make
settlements on the St. John, and encouraging the Acadians to settle
there, while the English authorities endeavored, with but indifferent
success, to gain the friendship of the Indians and compel the Acadians
to take the oath of allegiance to the British crown. The dispute over
the limits of Acadia at times waxed warm. There were protests and
counter-protests. Letters frequently passed between the English
government at Annapolis and the missionaries on the St. John--Loyard,
Danielou, and Germain, who were in close touch with the civil
authorities of their nation, and were in some measure the political
agents of the Marquise de Vaudreuil and other French governors of
Canada.
[24] In a letter to the French minister, written in 1698, Villebon
observes "J'ai recu par mons'r de Bonaventure qui est arrive
ici le 20 Juillet la lettre de votre Grandeur et le traite de
Paix fait avec l'Angleterre [the treaty of Ryswick]. * * Comme
vous me marquez, Monseigneur, que les bornes de l'Acadie sont
a la Riviere de Quenebequi." [Kennebec]. etc.
It is possible that the Marquis de Vaudreuil felt special interest in
the St. John river country, owing to the fact that his wife Louise
Elizabeth Joibert, was born at Fort Jemseg while her father, the Sieur
de Soulanges, was governor of Acadia. At any rate the marquis stoutly
asserted the right of the French to the sovereignty of that region and
he wrote to the Lieut. Governor of Nova Scotia in 1718, "I pray you
not to permit your English vessels to go into the river St. John,
which is always of the French dominion." He also encouraged the
Acadians of the peninsula to withdraw to the river St. John so as not
to be under British domination, pledging them his support and stating
that Father Loyard, the Jesuit missionary, should have authority to
grant them lands agreeably to their wishes.
Lieut. Governor Doucett, of Nova Scotia, complained of the aggressive
policy of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, asserting that he was entirely
mistaken as to the ownership of the St. John river, for it was "about
the centre of Nova Scotia;" he was satisfied, nevertheless, that the
Acadians believed it would never be taken possession of by the
British, and if the proceedings of the French were not stopped they
would presently claim everything within cannon short of his fort at
Annapolis.
The policy of the French in employing their Indian allies to deter the
English from any advance towards the St. John region was attended with
such success that the infant colony of Nova Scotia was kept in a
constant state of alarm by the threats and unfriendly attitude of the
Micmacs and Maliseets. There were, however, occasional periods in
which there were no actual hostilities, and it may be said that the
peace made at Boston in 1725, and ratified by the St. John river tribe
in May, 1728, was fairly observed by the Indians until war was
declared between England and France in 1744.
During this war the St. John river was much used as a means of
communication between Quebec and the French settlements of Acadia,
smart young Indians with light birch canoes being employed to carry
express messages, and on various occasions large parties of French and
Indians travelled by this route from the St. Lawrence to the Bay of
Fundy. The Indian villages of Medoctec and Aukpaque afforded
convenient stopping places.
In the year 1746 a great war party, including the Abenakis of Quebec
as well as their kinsmen of the upper St. John, arrived at Aukpaque.
Thence they took their way in company with the missionary Germain to
Chignecto. They had choice of two routes of travel, one by way of the
Kennebecasis and Anagance to the Petitcodiac, the other by way of the
Washademoak lake and the Canaan to the same river. As the war
proceeded the Maliseets actively supported their old allies the
French. Some of them took part in the midwinter night attack, under
Coulon de Villiers, on Colonel Noble's post at Grand Pre. The English
on this occasion were taken utterly by surprise; Noble himself fell
fighting in his shirt, and his entire party were killed, wounded or
made prisoners. From the military point of view this was one of the
most brilliant exploits in the annals of Acadia, and, what is better,
the victors behaved with great humanity to the vanquished.
The missionaries le Loutre and Germain were naturally very desirous of
seeing French supremacy restored in Acadia and the latter proposed an
expedition against Annapolis. With that end in view he proceeded to
Quebec and returned with a supply of powder, lead and ball for his
Maliseet warriors. However, in October, 1748, the peace of Aix la
Chapelle put a stop to open hostilities.
Immediately after the declaration of peace, Captain Gorham, with his
rangers and a detachment of auxiliaries, proceeded in two ships to the
River St. John and ordered the French inhabitants to send deputies to
Annapolis to give an account of their conduct during the war.
Count de la Galissonniere strongly protested against Gorham's
interference with the Acadians on the St. John, which he described as
"a river situated on the Continent of Canada, and much on this side of
the Kennebec, where by common consent the bounds of New England have
been placed." This utterance of the French governor marks another
stage in the controversy concerning the limits of Acadia. He stoutly
contended that Gorham and all other British officers must be forbidden
to interfere with the French on the St. John river, or to engage them
to make submissions contrary to the allegiance due to the King of
France "who," he says, "is their master as well as mine, and has not
ceded this territory by any treaty."
The governors of Massachusetts and of Nova Scotia replied at some
length to the communication of Count de la Galissonniere, claiming the
territory in dispute for the king of Great Britain, and showing that
the French living on the St. John had some years before taken the oath
of allegiance to the English monarch.
The Acadians on the St. John, whose allegiance was in dispute, were a
mere handful of settlers. The Abbe le Loutre wrote in 1748: "There are
fifteen or twenty French families on this river, the rest of the
inhabitants are savages called Marichites (Maliseets) who have for
their missionary the Jesuit father Germain." His statement as to the
number of Acadian settlers is corroborated by Mascarene, who notified
the British authorities that thirty leagues up the river were seated
twenty families of French inhabitants, sprung originally from the Nova
Scotia side of the bay, most of them since his memory, who, many years
ago, came to Annapolis and took the oath of fidelity. He adds, "the
whole river up to its head, with all the northern coast of the Bay of
Fundy, was always reckoned dependent on this government."
Both Mascarene and Shirley strongly urged upon the British ministry
the necessity of settling the limits of Acadia, and a little later
commissioners were appointed, two on each side, to determine the
matter. They spent four fruitless years over the question, and it
remained undecided until settled by the arbitrament of the sword.
Shirley was one of the commissioners, as was also the Marquis de la
Galissonniere, and it is not to be wondered at that with two such
determined men on opposite sides and differing so widely in their
views, there should have been no solution of the difficulty.
The period now under consideration is really a very extraordinary one.
Ostensibly it was a time of peace. By the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in
1748 England gave back Cape Breton (or Isle Royale) to France and
France restored Madras to England, but there remained no clear
understanding as to the boundaries between the possessions of the
rival powers in America.
So far as the French and English colonies were concerned the treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle scarcely deserved the name of a truce. It was merely a
breathing time in which preparations were being made for the final
struggle. The treaty was so indefinite that a vast amount of territory
was claimed by both parties. The English were naturally the most
aggressive for the population of the English colonies was 1,200,000
while Canada had but 60,000 people.
Count de la Galissonniere, the governor-general of Canada, though
diminutive in stature and slightly deformed, was resolute and
energetic; moreover he was a statesman, and had his policy been
followed it might have been better for France. He advised the
government to send out ten thousand peasants from the rural districts
and settle them along the frontiers of the disputed territory, but the
French court thought it unadvisable to depopulate France in order to
people the wilds of Canada. Failing in this design, the Count
determined vigorously to assert the sovereignty of France over the
immense territory in dispute. Accordingly he claimed for his royal
master the country north of the Bay of Fundy and west to the Kennebec,
and his officers established fortified posts on the River St. John and
at the Isthmus of Chignecto. He at the same time stirred up the
Indians to hostilities in order to render the position of the English
in Nova Scotia and New England as uncomfortable as possible, and
further to strengthen his hands he endeavored to get the Acadians in
the peninsula of Nova Scotia to remove to the St. John river and other
parts of "the debatable territory." His policy led to a counter policy
on the part of Shirley and Lawrence (governors respectively of
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia) namely, that the Acadians should not be
allowed to go where they liked and to do as they pleased but must
remain on their lands and take the oath of allegiance to the English
sovereign or be removed to situations where they could do no harm to
the interests of the British colonies in the then critical condition
of affairs.
Ostensibly there was peace from the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle until
war was declared between the rival powers in 1756. But in the meantime
there was a collision between them on the Ohio river, where the French
built Fort Duquesne on the site now occupied by Pittsburg. The
governors of the English colonies held a conference and decided on
rather a startling programme for a time of peace. Gen. Braddock was to
march on Fort Duquesne and drive the French from the Ohio valley;
Shirley, of Massachusetts, was to lead an expedition against Niagara;
William Johnson, was to take Crown Point and secure control of Lake
Champlain; while, in Acadia, Colonel Monckton was to attack the French
position at Fort Beausejour. In every instance the English were the
aggressors but they justified their action on the ground that the
places to be attacked were on British territory. This the French as
emphatically denied. Braddock's attempt resulted in a most disastrous
failure, Shirley's expedition was abandoned, William Johnson won a
brilliant victory at Lake George and Colonel Monckton captured
Beausejour.
The course of events on the River St. John and in other parts of
Acadia harmonizes with the general situation of affairs in America at
this time.
As the period under consideration is one of which comparatively little
has been written, it may be well to make use of the information
contained in the voluminous correspondence of the French ministers and
their subordinates in America.
Early in the summer of 1749 the Count de la Galissonniere sent the
Sieur de Boishebert to the lower part of the River St. John with a
small detachment to secure the French inhabitants against the threats
of Capt. Gorham, who had been sent by the Governor of Nova Scotia to
make the inhabitants renew the oath of allegiance to the English
sovereign, which de la Galissonniere says "they ought never to have
taken." The Count expresses his views on the situation with terseness
and vigor: "The River St. John is not the only place the English wish
to invade. They claim the entire coast, from that river to Beaubassin,
and from Canso to Gaspe, in order to render themselves sovereigns of
all the territory of the Abenakis, Catholics and subjects of the king,
a nation that has never acknowledged nor wishes to acknowledge their
domination and which is the most faithful to us in Canada. If we
abandon to England this land, which comprises more than 180 leagues of
seacoast, that is to say almost as much as from Bayonne to Dunkirk, we
must renounce all communication by land from Canada with Acadia and
Isle Royal, together with the means of succoring the one and retaking
the other." The Count further argues that to renounce the territory
in dispute will deprive the Acadians of all hope of a place of refuge
on French soil and reduce them to despair, and he apprehends that the
English, having no reason to care for them, will suffer them to have
no missionaries and will destroy at their leisure their religion. "It
is very easy," he adds, "to hinder the English establishing themselves
on these lands. They will have to proceed through the woods and along
narrow rivers, and as long as the French are masters of the Abenakis
and the Acadians are provided with arms and supplies from France the
English will not expose themselves to their attacks."
Both sides began to consider the advisability of taking forcible
possession of the disputed territory, but the French were the first to
take action. In June, 1749, Mascarene reported two French officers
with twenty or thirty men from Canada and a number of Indians had come
to erect a fort and make a settlement at the mouth of the river, and
that two vessels with stores and materials were coming to them from
Quebec. On receipt of this information, Cornwallis, who had just
arrived at Halifax, sent Captain Rous in the sloop "Albany" to St.
John to ascertain what works were in course of erection by the French,
and to demand the authority for their action. He also issued a
proclamation in French prohibiting the Acadians from making a
settlement on the St. John.
When the "Albany" arrived no one was found at the old fort and for
some time no inhabitants, either French or Indian, were seen. At last
a French schooner entered the harbor, laden with provisions. Captain
Rous took her, but offered to release her provided the master would go
up the river and bring down the French officers. The master
accordingly went up the river in a canoe, and the next day a French
officer with thirty men and 150 Indians came down and took position,
with their colors flying, at a point on the shore within musket shot
of the "Albany." The commander of the French was Pierre Boishebert. He
had fixed his headquarters ten miles up the river at the place now
known as Woodman's Point, just above the mouth of the Nerepis, where
in Governor Villebon's time there had been an Indian fortress.
Captain Rous ordered the French to strike their colors; their
commander demurred, and asked to be allowed to march back with his
colors flying, promising to return the next day without them. Rous
ordered the colors to be struck immediately, which being done, the
officers were invited on board the "Albany." They showed their
instructions from the governor of Canada, Count de la Galissonniere,
by which it appeared they had at first been ordered to establish a
fortified post, but afterwards the order had been countermanded and
they were required merely to prevent the English from establishing
themselves till the right of possession should be settled between the
two crowns.
The letter of Captain Rous to Boishebert, upon the arrival of the
former at St. John harbor, is rather quaint reading. The original is
in French.
From the River St. John, 3 July, 1749.
Sir,--I am directed by the King, my master, to look into and
examine the various ports, harbors and rivers of His Majesty's
province of Nova Scotia, and am now here for that intent. Being
informed that you are upon this river with a detachment of
soldiers of the King of France. I should be pleased to know by
what authority and with what intention your are engaged in a
similar procedure. It would afford me much pleasure if I could
have the honor of a personal interview in order to convince you of
the rights of the King, my master.
I shall be delighted to see some of the Indian chiefs in order to
inform them of the peace and of the harmony that prevails between
the two crowns, also to confer with them.
Until I shall have the honor, as I hope, of seeing you,
I am very truly, etc.
In the subsequent interview with the savages, Father Germain and
Captain Edward How acted as interpreters, and the missionary wrote an
account of the interview to the governor of Quebec, in which he
mentions the fact that Cornwallis, the governor of Nova Scotia,
claimed jurisdiction over the St. John river region and beyond it to
Passamaquoddy, deeming it a part of Acadia according to its ancient
limits. Boishebert, in his letter to the Count de la Galissonniere,
says that one of the best reasons the English had for laying claim to
the territory north of the Bay of Fundy was that the commission of
Subercase, the last French governor who resided at Annapolis Royal,
fixed his jurisdiction as far west as the River Kennebec. In the
spirit of a true soldier, Boishebert wishes that war might speedily
recommence, and that France might be more fortunate as to the conquest
of Acadia than in the last war. Meanwhile he had arranged with Capt.
Rous to remain undisturbed on the River St. John until the next
spring, on the understanding that he was to erect no fortification.
The St. John Indians having made peace with the governor of Nova
Scotia at Halifax, it was decided that a present of 1,000 bushels of
corn should be sent "to confirm their allegiance"; and it seems their
allegiance needed confirmation, for a little later Father Germain
warned Captain How that an Indian attack was impending. Nor was it by
any means a false alarm, for on the 8th of December about 300 Micmacs
and Maliseets surprised and captured an English officer and eighteen
men and attacked the fort at Minas.
Father Germain evidently was a warrior priest and had used his powers
of observation to some purpose; he strongly recommended the erection
of a fort for the defence of the river at the narrows ("detroit")
about a league and a half above where the river enters the sea. The
English, he says, could not pass it with 600 men if there were but 60
or 80 men to oppose them.
The Marquis de la Jonquiere, who succeeded as governor general this
year, at once displayed anxiety in regard to the St. John river
region--"Being the key of this country," he says, "it is essential to
retain it." He confides his policy to the minister at Versailles, in
his letter of October 9, 1749. "It is desirable," he writes, "that the
savages should unite in opposing the English even at Chibuctou
(Halifax).... The savages must act alone without co-operation of
soldier or inhabitant and without it appearing that I have knowledge
of it. It is very necessary also, as I wrote the Sieur de Boishebert,
to observe much caution in his proceedings and to act very secretly in
order that the English may not be able to perceive we are supplying
the needs of the said savages. It will be the missionaries who will
attend to all the negotiations and who will direct the proceedings of
the said savages. They are in very good hands, the Rev. Father
Germain and the Abbe Le Loutre being well aware how to act to the best
advantage and to draw out all the assistance they can give on our
side. They will manage the intrigue in such a way that it will not be
known. They will concert in every instance with the Sieurs de la Corne
and de Boishebert. If all turns out as I hope it will follow,--first
that we will hold our lands and the English will not be able to
establish any settlements before the boundaries have been determined
by the two crowns, and second that we shall be able to assist and
gradually to withdraw from the hands of the English the French of
Acadia."
It is not necessary for us to criticize too harshly the policy of the
French governor and his subordinates, but we need not be surprised
that in the end it provoked resentment on the part of the governors of
Nova Scotia and Massachusetts and was one of the causes of the Acadian
expulsion. That it was in a measure successful is proved by the reply
of Lawrence a few years later to the suggestion of the Lords of Trade,
who had been urging upon him the importance of making settlements:
"What can I do to encourage people to settle on frontier lands, where
they run the risk of having their throats cut by inveterate enemies,
who easily effect their escape from their knowledge of every creek and
corner?"
Boishebert, prevented from immediately establishing a fortified post,
seems to have moved freely up and down the river. At one time he
writes from "Menacouche" at the mouth of the river, at another
from "Ecoubac"--the Indian village of Aukpaque--at another he is at
"Medoctec," the upper Indian village. He organized the few Acadians
on the river into a militia corps, the officers of which were
commissioned by Count de la Galissonniere.
Meanwhile the Abbe Le Loutre was employing his energies to get the
Acadians to leave their lands in the Nova Scotian peninsula and repair
to the St. John river and other places north of the isthmus. To such a
proceeding Cornwallis objected and Le Loutre then wrote to the French
authorities an earnest letter in behalf of the Acadians, in which he
says, "Justice pleads for them and as France is the resource of the
unfortunate, I hope, Monseigneur, that you will try to take under your
protection this forsaken people and obtain for them through his
majesty liberty to depart from Acadia and the means to settle upon
French soil and to transport their effects to the River St. John or
some other territory that the authorities of Canada may take
possession of."
The French still cherished the project of establishing a fortified
post at the mouth of the St. John and, as they had opportunity, sent
thither munitions of war and garrison supplies. In the summer of the
year 1750, the British warship "Hound," Capt. Dove, was ordered to
proceed to St. John in quest of a brigantine laden with provisions
and stores from Quebec, and said to have on board 100 French
soldiers. Before the arrival of the "Hound," however, Capt. Cobb in
the provincial sloop "York" got to St. John, where he found the
brigantine anchored near the shore at the head of the harbor. She
fired an alarm gun on sight of the "York." The English captain
brought his vessel to anchor under the lee of Partridge Island and
sent a detachment of men in a whale boat to reconnoitre. They were
fired upon by the French and Indians, and the French commander,
Boishebert, insisted that Cobb should quit the harbor, as it belonged
to the French king, and threatened to send his Indians to destroy
him and his crew. Nothing daunted, Cobb proceeded up the harbor in
his sloop until he discovered "a small fortification by a little
hill," where the French were assembled and had their colors hoisted.
Boishebert's forces included fifty-six soldiers and 200 Indians. He
summoned to his aid the inhabitants living on the river and they
responded to the number of fifty or sixty. The governor of Canada
had lately commissioned Joseph Bellefontaine, an old resident, to be
"major of all the militia of the River St. John,"[25] and it is to
the presumed he was active on this occasion. Cobb allowed himself to
be enticed on shore under a flag of truce, and was made a prisoner
and compelled to send an order to his vessel not to molest the French
brigantine. His mate, however, pluckily declined to receive the
order, and announced his determination to hold the French officers
who had come with the message until Cobb should be released. This
Boishebert was obliged to do and the commander of the "York," by way
of retaliation, took six prisoners from the French brigantine and
brought them to Halifax.
[25] The date of Joseph Bellefontaine's commission was April 10,
1749.
Capt. Dove did not reach St. John with the "Hound" until after the
"York" had left. He did not enter the harbor but sent his lieutenant
in a whale boat to investigate the state of affairs. The lieutenant's
experience was similar to that of Cobb. He was induced by Boishebert
to come on shore, was made a prisoner and only released on promising
that the six prisoners carried off by Cobb should be set at liberty.
In the autumn of the year 1750 Captain Rous, while cruising in the
"Albany," fell in with a French man-of-war and a schooner off Cape
Sable. The schooner had been sent from Quebec with provisions and
warlike stores for the Indians on the River St. John. Rous fired
several guns to bring the enemy to, but in response the ship cleared
for action and when the "Albany" ran up alongside of her, poured in a
broadside. A spirited engagement ensued, which resulted in the capture
of the French ship, but the schooner got safely into St. John. One
midshipman and two sailors were killed on board the "Albany," and five
men on board the Frenchman.
Governor Cornwallis reported this as the second instance in which the
governor of Canada had sent a vessel into a British port with arms,
etc., for the Indian enemy. The governor of Canada, the Marquis de la
Jonquiere, however, viewed the matter from a different standpoint and
demanded of Cornwallis an explanation in regard to the vessel
captured. He again asserted the right of the French king to the lands
occupied by his troops, and by his orders four Boston schooners were
seized at Louisbourg as a reprisal for the brigantine taken by the
"Albany."
The correspondence between the Governor of Quebec and the French
colonial minister supplies some interesting details of the sea-fight
in the Bay of Fundy in the autumn of 1750. It seems that Boishebert
and the missionary Germain had sent an urgent request to the Quebec
authorities for provisions for the women and children of the Indian
families, during the absence of the men in their winter hunting, and
for supplies needed by the French garrison on the St. John.
Accordingly Bigot, the intendant, fitted out the St. Francis, a
brigantine of 130 to 140 tons, to escort a schooner laden with the
required articles to the mouth of the St. John river. The St. Francis
carried 10 guns and had a crew or 70 men, including 32 soldiers, under
command of the sieur de Vergor.
On the 16th of October, as the brigantine and schooner were entering
the Bay of Fundy, Captain Vergor noticed, at 11 in the morning, an
English frigate, which put on all sail and came after him. A quarter
of an hour afterwards the frigate fired a cannon shot and displayed
her flag. Vergor immediately hoisted his own flag and responded with a
cannon shot, continuing on his way. The English frigate continued the
chase and a half hour later fired a second shot followed by a third,
which went through the little top-mast of the St. Francis. Vergor then
made preparations for the combat, the frigate continuing to approach
and firing four cannon shots at his sails. When within speaking
distance Vergor called through his trumpet that he was in command of a
ship of the King of France carrying provisions and munitions to the
troops of his majesty. The English captain in reply ordered him to lay
to or he would sink him. Vergor repeated his announcement in English,
but, for answer the frigate discharged a volley of all her guns
damaging the ship and killing two of his men. He in turn now fell upon
the frigate, discharging all his guns and musketry. The fight lasted
nearly five hours, at the expiration of which the St. Francis was so
crippled by the loss of her mainmast and injuries to her sails and
rigging that Vergor was obliged to surrender. His long boat having
been rendered unserviceable, the English captain sent his own to
convey him on board. Vergor found the frigate to be the Albany, of 14
guns and 28 swivel guns and a crew of 120 men, commanded by Captain
Rous. The Albany did not pursue the schooner, which proceeded to St.
John, but sailed for Halifax with her prize, where she arrived three
days later.
Vergor was sent on shore and confined to a room in the house of
Governor Cornwallis. The governor treated him courteously, heard his
version of the affair and called a council meeting the next day to
inquire into the circumstances of the case.
Vergor's official report conveys the idea that Cornwallis was rather
doubtful as to whether Rous had acted in a legitimate manner. The
council held five or six meetings without coming to any decision.
Meanwhile, with the governor's approval, Vergor had a new main-mast
cut and drawn from the woods by the crew of the St. Francis and
arrangements were made to repair the damaged sails and shrouds.
However the matter was soon afterwards taken out of Cornwallis' hands
by Captain Rous, who brought the case before the Admiralty Court,
where the St. Francis was confiscated for engaging in illicit commerce
in the province of his Britannic Majesty.
The French authorities took up the matter and sent a spirited
remonstrance to the British ambassador, claiming that the transaction
was opposed to every kind of law and demanding the restoration of the
captured vessel with exemplary punishment of Captain Rous and the
admiralty officers at Halifax, as well as orders on the part of his
Britannic Majesty to all officers in his ships and colonies to observe
the peace and to undertake nothing contrary thereto. A demand was also
made that the English should in no way hinder the migration of the
Acadians from the peninsula of Nova Scotia to the mainland or
elsewhere. It is needless to say that the British government did not
comply with these demands and here was one of the many grievances that
led to a renewal of the war a little later.
The Sieur de Vergor and the crew of the St. Francis were sent to
Louisbourg, and the brigantine retained at Halifax as a prize on the
ground that she was engaged in furnishing warlike munitions to the
Indian enemy and interfering with British rights on the River St.
John.
Cornwallis evidently felt the difficulties of his position very
keenly. Halifax was yet in its infancy and in a comparatively
defenceless state; Louisbourg and Quebec were supporting the French on
the St. John and he had neither the men nor the money to oppose their
proceedings. It seems, too, that he had been called to account for the
large expenditure he had made in Nova Scotia. In his letters to the
Lords of Trade he expresses himself as distracted between his desire
to lessen expenses and his fears of losing the province. He was
doubtful if, with the forces at his disposal, he could prevent the
French from fortifying St. John and Beausejour, and he observes, with
some irritation, that it has been said, "What has he to contend with?
Three or four hundred Indians: it is a time of peace and no other
enemy to fear." So far from this being an adequate representation of
the situation, he claimed the facts were that the French had taken
possession of all Nova Scotia north of the Bay of Fundy, and had
obliged many of the Acadians of the peninsula to remove thither and
swear allegiance to the king of France; that the governor of Canada,
through his emissary le Loutre, had offered a premium for every
prisoner, head, or scalp of an Englishman; that the French had sent a
ship of thirty-six guns and 300 men to the Bay of Fundy and had not
only incited the Indians to hostilities but had behaved as if there
were open war.
The French at Quebec, in view of the difficulty of keeping in touch
with their posts on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, endeavored to
improve the route of communication via the River St. John. During the
previous war they had made a road from Riviere du Loup to Lake
Temisquata, but the woods were growing up again and deep holes began
to render it impracticable. Bigot, the intendant, therefore spent
600 or 700 livres in improving it, and in consequence couriers were
able to come to Quebec in ten or twelve days from Shediac, and in
eight from the River St. John. For the convenience of travelers
three magazines of supplies were established, one at Riviere du Loup,
one at Temisquata and one at the head of Madawaska river. The Marquis
de la Jonquiere anticipated great advantages from the overland route
of communication. He says in a letter to France, dated May 1, 1751:
"We have made a road and are going to make some flat-bottomed
conveyances so that in winter we will be able to transport by hauling
over the snow the things most needed for the River St. John, and in
summer we shall be able to make the transport by means of carts and
flat-bottomed batteaux. These arrangements will be very useful
supposing that the English continue to stop the vessels we send
there."
"As the English have boasted that they are going to establish
themselves at the River St. John," continues the Marquis, "I have
given orders to the Sieur de Boishebert, who commands there, to repair
the old fort named Menacoche (Menagoueche) at the mouth of the river
and to make there a barrack for the officers and 100 men in garrison
with necessary magazines. The whole will be built of logs and I have
very expressly recommended Boishebert, to have it done without expense
to the King, or at least very little, and to that end he is to employ
the soldiers and militia."
This fort stood in Carleton opposite Navy Island on the point at the
foot of King street, still called "Old Fort." The Marquis la Jonquiere
says the terraces of the fort were about twenty-five feet high outside
and twelve inside and the defences were such as would enable the
garrison to withstand a lively attack.
It was intended to place four cannons of 8 L. to cannonade any ships
that might attack it. The chief difficulty of the situation was the
scarcity of water. The fort was quite indispensable for if the French
were to abandon the lower part of the St. John river the English would
immediately take possession. The savages were instructed to annoy the
English on all occasions and to plunder any of their ships that landed
on their shores. The Marquis even went so far as to suggest that some
of the Acadians, dressed and painted like the savages, should join in
the attacks upon the English in order that the savages might act with
greater courage. He says he cannot avoid consenting to what the
savages do in keeping the English busy and frustrating their advance
since the French were restrained from open hostilities by the peace.
"I beg you to be assured, Monseigneur," the Marquis continues, "that I
will manage everything so as not to compromise myself and that I will
not give up an inch of land that belongs to the king. It is time the
limits should be settled and that we should know positively what we
are to hold, so as to put an end to all hostilities and to avoid the
immense expense that is occasioned."
La Jonquiere, in the month of February, sent on the ice a detachment
of fifty Canadians to strengthen the garrison at the mouth of the
River St. John, and as the services of Boishebert were required
elsewhere, the Sieur de Gaspe,[26] lieutenant of infantry, was sent to
replace him and remained two years and a half in command.
[26] Ignace Philippe Aubert, Sieur de Gaspe, was born at St. Antoine
de Tilly near Quebec in 1714. He was an ensign in Acadia under
de Ramezay in 1745 and was with Colombier de Villiers in the
attack on Minas the following winter. He died at St. Jean,
Port Joly, in 1787. He was grandfather of the author of the
"Anciens Canadiens."
The situation of the Acadians on the St. John at this time was a very
unenviable one. Fort Boishebert, at the Nerepis, was a frail
defence, and they were beginning to be straitened for supplies on
account of the vigilance of the English cruisers. Father Germain
wrote to the commandant at Annapolis Royal for leave to buy
provisions there for the French living on the river, but the
governor and council objected on the ground that French troops
occupied the place and the Indians there were hostile. We gather
some interesting information from a letter written at this time to
the French minister by the Sieur de Gaspe, who was in command of
the fort at the mouth of the Nerepis.[27]
[27] I am indebted to Placide P. Gaudet for a copy of the original
letter of which a translation is given on next page. It is one
of the many interesting documents that have never yet been
published.--W. O. R.
Fort de Nerepice, 16th June, 1751.
Monseigneur: On my arrival at this post on the River St. John, to
which I am sent by my general, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, to
relieve M. de Boishebert, the commandant of the place, I found at
anchor the frigate "Fidele," commanded by M. Maccarti, who was
landing the provisions and other supplies sent for this post. The
coming of this ship, Monseigneur, convinces me that you wish to
hold possession of this post.
I have only just arrived here. I learn that the English threaten
to come and build a fort at the mouth of the river near that which
the Marquis de la Jonquiere has caused to be begun and has ordered
me to continue. I will do my best to carry out his orders so far
as circumstances permit, and the governor will furnish you with an
account of his intentions.
In order to fix ourselves here we must keep up communication by
way of La Baie Francaise [the Bay of Fundy] so as to furnish
provisions; for the place cannot be supplied by land, especially
if we must afford subsistence to those families of Acadians who
are obliged to seek refuge on the river, as has been stated to me.
I will receive them, Monseigneur, in order to settle the country,
which at present has only twenty-eight French inhabitants,[28] who
can give no assistance in providing for the support of others,
not having as yet enough cultivated land for themselves.
M. Maccarti, commander of the frigate, has taken note of the
harbor [at St. John] on the other side of the fort, and of the
other advantages, or disadvantages, we must encounter in this
place, where I will endeavor to maintain the rights that we have
and to oppose the Englishman if he attempts to build here.
I am with very profound respect, Monseigneur,
Your humble and very obedient servant,
GASPE.
[28] This refers, I imagine, to the Acadians on the lower St. John
and does not include the colony at Ste. Annes.--W. O. R.
[Illustration: WOODMAN'S POINT. (The Star shows the site of Fort
Boishebert.)]
Resolute attempts continued to be made to withdraw the Acadians from
the peninsula of Nova Scotia, both by threats and persuasions, and the
Marquis de la Jonquiere issued a proclamation to those living within
the bounds of what is now New Brunswick, declaring that all who did
not within eight days take the oath of allegiance in the militia
companies would be considered as rebels and driven from their lands.
The companies of militia were ordered to drill on Sundays and Feast
days and to hold themselves in readiness to defend themselves at any
moment. A few months later the governor of Canada was able to report
that all the Acadian inhabitants who were upon the lands of the king
had taken the oath of fidelity. Twelve blank commissions were sent
from Quebec to be issued to those most capable of fulfilling the
duties of officers in the militia.
At Fort Menagoueche the work did not progress as fast as anticipated.
The workmen had no tools except axes, and the Sieur de Gaspe
complained that he had not been able to make the soldiers of the
garrison work. He says "they are very bad subjects" and he dared not
compel them to work apprehending their desertion. The fort was
surrounded by four bastions and, in addition to the barracks and
magazines, it was proposed to construct a building of logs, squared
with the axe, to accommodate the chaplain and surgeon and to serve as
a guard house.
Fort Boishebert, at Woodman's Point on the Nerepis, was a difficult
post to maintain owing to the insufficiency of the troops at de
Gaspe's disposal. He complains that the savages had broken in the door
of the cellar and he thought it advisable to abandon it altogether.
The Marquis de la Jonquiere ordered him to consult with Father Germain
on the subject and meanwhile to double the guard. The missionary wrote
he was of the same opinion as the Sieur de Gaspe, and permission was
accordingly given to abandon the fort and to transport the supplies
wherever they might be needed.
The Jesuit missionary at Penobscot, Father Gounon, proposed to spend
the winter at "Nerepisse" with his Indians, but the governor of Canada
did not at all approve of it, fearing that if the savages were to
abandon their village the English would advance from the westward
towards the River St. John. He apprehended that if only a small number
of Indians remained at Penobscot, and these without a missionary, the
enemy would win them to their side and, as a direful result, the
English would presently establish themselves at Matsipigouattons,
advancing to Peskadamokkanti (or Passamaquoddy) and so by degrees to
the River St. John.