In recent months, the so-called exchange program has become an
increasingly prominent feature of American foreign policy. The program
began modestly enough in 1955 at the Geneva Summit Meeting, when we
agreed with the Soviets to promote “cultural exchanges” between the two
countries. Since then we have exchanged everything from opera companies
and basketball teams to trade exhibitions and heads of governments. We
are told that these exchanges are our best hope of peace--that if only
the American and Russian peoples can learn to “understand” each other,
they will be able to reconcile their differences.
The claim that the conflict between the Soviets and ourselves stems
from a “lack of understanding” is one of the great political fables of
our time. _Whose_ lack of understanding?
Are the American people ill-informed as to the nature of Communism
and of the Soviet state? True, some Americans fail to grasp how evil
the Soviet system really is. But a performance by the Bolshoi Ballet,
or a tour of the United States by Nikita Khrushchev, is certainly not
calculated to correct _that_ deficiency.
What of the Soviet leaders? Are _they_ misled? All of the evidence is
that the men in the Kremlin have a greater knowledge of America than
many of our own leaders. They know about our political system, our
industrial capacity, our way of life--and would like to destroy it all.
What about the Russian people? We are repeatedly told that the Russian
man-on-the-street is woefully ignorant of the American way, and that
our trade exhibition in Moscow, for example, contributed vastly to his
knowledge and thus to his appreciation of America. Assume this is true.
Is it relevant? As long as the Russian people do not control their
government, it makes little difference whether they think well of us
or ill. It is high time that our leaders stopped treating the Russian
people and the Soviet government as one and the same thing. The Russian
people, we may safely assume, are basically on our side (whether or not
they have the opportunity to listen to American musicians); but their
sympathy will not help us win the Cold War as long as all power is
held firmly in the hands of the Communist ruling class.
The exchange program, in Soviet eyes, is simply another operation in
Communist political warfare. The people the Kremlin sends over here
are, to a man, trained agents of Soviet policy. Some of them are spies,
seeking information; all of them are trusted carriers of Communist
propaganda. Their mission is not cultural, but political. Their aim is
not to inform, but to mislead. Their assignment is not to convey a true
image of the Soviet Union, but a false image. The Kremlin’s hope is
that they will persuade the American people to forget the ugly aspects
of Soviet life, and the danger that the Soviet system poses to American
freedom.
It is a mistake to measure the success of this Communist operation
by the extent to which it converts Americans to Communism. By that
test, of course, the operation is almost a complete failure. But the
Kremlin’s aim is not to make Americans _approve_ of Communism, much as
they would like that; it is to make us _tolerant_ of Communism. The
Kremlin knows that our willingness to make sacrifices to halt Communist
expansion varies in direct ratio as we are _hostile_ to Communism.
They know that if Americans regard the Soviet Union as a dangerous,
implacable enemy, Communism will not be able to conquer the world. The
Communists’ purpose, then, is to show that Khrushchev does not have
horns,--that he is fundamentally a nice fellow; that the Soviet people
are--“ordinary people” just like ourselves; that Communism is just
another political system.
It would not have made sense, midway in the Second World War, to
promote a Nazi-American exchange program or to invite Hitler to
make a state visit to the United States. Unless we cherish victory
less today than we did then, we will be equally reluctant to treat
Communist agents as friends and welcome guests. The exchange program
is a Communist confidence game. Let us not be taken in by it. Let us
remember that American confidence in the Soviet government is the very
last thing we want.
Many people contend that a “normalization” of Soviet-American
relations, as envisaged by the exchange program, is only a logical
extension of granting diplomatic recognition to Communist governments.
I agree. Accordingly, I think it would be wise for the United
States to re-examine the question of its diplomatic relations with
Communist regimes. We often hear that recognition permits us to
gather information in Communist countries. I am unaware, however, of
any advantage that our diplomatic mission in Moscow confers along
these lines that does not doubly accrue to the Soviet Union from its
diplomatic spy corps in Washington and other American cities. Espionage
possibilities aside, I am quite certain that our entire approach to
the Cold War would change for the better the moment we announced that
the United States does not regard Mr. Khrushchev’s murderous claque
as the legitimate rulers of the Russian people or of any other people.
Not only would withdrawal of recognition stiffen the American people’s
attitude toward Communism; it would also give heart to the enslaved
peoples and help them to overthrow their captors. Our present policy
of not recognizing Red China is eminently right, and the reasons
behind that policy apply equally to the Soviet Union and its European
satellites. If our objective is to win the Cold War, we will start now
by denying our moral support to the very regimes we mean to defeat.