PEMBERTON'S SURRENDER.
The artillery assault of June 20--McPherson springs a mine--Grant
decides to storm the city--Pemberton asks for an interview and
terms--The "unconditional surrender" note--At the meeting of Grant
and Pemberton between the lines--The ride into Vicksburg and the
Fourth of July celebration there.
Two days after McClernand's removal General Grant attempted to settle
the question whether he should make a further attempt to storm Vicksburg
or leave its reduction to the regular progress of siege operations. To
test what an assault would do, he began, at four o'clock on the morning
of June 20th, an artillery attack, in which about two hundred cannon
were engaged. During the attack no Confederates were visible, nor was
any reply made to our artillery. Their musketry fire also amounted to
nothing. Of course, some damage was done to the buildings of the town by
our concentrated cannonade, but we could not tell whether their mills,
foundry, or storehouses were destroyed. Their rifle-pits and defenses
were little injured. At ten o'clock the cannonade ceased. It was evident
that the probabilities of immediate success by assault would not
compensate for the sacrifices.
After the artillery attack on the 20th, the next exciting incident of
the siege was the springing of a mine by McPherson. Directly in front
of his position the enemy had a great fort which was regarded as the key
of their line. As soon as McPherson had got into position behind
Vicksburg he had begun to run trenches toward this fort, under which he
subsequently tunneled, hoping that by an explosion he would open it to
our occupation. The mine was sprung about four o'clock on the afternoon
of June 25th. It was charged with twelve hundred pounds of powder. The
explosion was terrific, forming a crater fully thirty-five feet in
diameter, but it did not open the fort. There still remained between the
new ground which we had gained by the explosion and the main works of
the fort an ascent so steep that an assault was practically impossible.
The enemy very soon opened a galling fire from within the fort with
shells with short fuses, thrown over the ridge by hand, like grenades,
and these did some execution. The wounds inflicted by these missiles
were frightful. To this we replied as actively as possible, and this
conflict between parties invisible to each other, not only on account of
the darkness, but also on account of the barrier between them, was kept
up with fury during the night and the next forenoon. Immediately on the
springing of the mine a tremendous cannonade was opened along our whole
line, accompanied by active firing from the rifle-pits. This fire was
continued with little relaxation during the night and the next day.
After several days of this kind of warfare, we had made no progress
whatever, not being able either to plant a battery or to open a
rifle-pit upon the new ground.
Eventually McPherson completed another mine, which he exploded on the
first day of July. Many Confederates were killed, and six were thrown
over into our lines by the explosion. They were all dead but one, a
negro, who got well and joined our army. McPherson did not, however, get
possession of the place through this mine, as he had hoped.
Little advancement was made in the siege after McPherson sprang his
first mine on the 25th of June, except in the matter of time and in the
holding of the lines of investment. Several things conspired to produce
inactivity and a sort of listlessness among the various commands--the
heat of the weather, the unexpected length of the siege, the endurance
of the defense, the absence of any thorough organization of the engineer
department, and, above all, the well-grounded general belief of our
officers and men that the town must presently fall through starvation,
without any special effort or sacrifice. This belief was founded on the
reports from within Vicksburg. Every new party of deserters which
reached us agreed that the provisions of the place were near the point
of total exhaustion, that rations had been reduced lower than ever, that
extreme dissatisfaction existed among the garrison, and it was generally
expected--indeed, there was a sort of conviction--on all hands that the
city would be surrendered on Saturday, July 4th, if, indeed, it could
hold out so long as that.
While apathy grew in our ranks, the Confederates displayed more activity
than ever. On the morning of June 27th they sprang a countermine on
Sherman's front, which destroyed the mines Sherman's engineers had
nearly finished, and threw the head of his sap into general confusion.
McPherson was prevented from taking possession of the fort, which had
been partially destroyed. Ord's (lately McClernand's) working parties,
which were now well up to the Confederate lines, were checked by hand
grenades. Lauman was almost nightly assailed by little sorties of the
enemy, and always lost a few men in them, killed, wounded, or captured.
The operations west of the Mississippi became more threatening, too. Our
scouts brought in word that Price and Kirby Smith were about to attempt
to provision Vicksburg by way of Milliken's Bend. There were rumors also
that some two thousand or more skiffs had been prepared within the town,
by which it was thought the garrison might escape.
The general indisposition of our troops to prosecute the siege
zealously, and the evident determination on the part of the enemy to
hold out until the last, caused General Grant to hold a council of war
on the morning of June 30th, to take judgment on the question of trying
another general assault, or leaving the result to the exhaustion of the
garrison. The conclusion of the council was in favor of the latter
policy, but two days later, July 2d, Grant told me that if the enemy did
not give up Vicksburg by the 6th he should storm it.
Happily, there was no need to wait until the 6th. The general
expectation that something would happen by July 4th was about to be
confirmed. On the morning of Friday, July 3d, a soldier appeared on the
Confederate line, in McPherson's front, bearing a flag of truce.
General A. J. Smith was sent to meet this man, who proved to be an
officer, General J. S. Bowen. He bore a letter from Pemberton addressed
to Grant. The letter was taken to headquarters, where it was read by the
general and its contents were made known to the staff. It was a request
for an armistice to arrange terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To
this end Pemberton asked that three commissioners be appointed to meet a
like number to be named by himself. Grant immediately wrote this reply:
The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course
can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional
surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much
endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always
challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be
treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to
arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than
those indicated above.
Bowen, the bearer of Pemberton's letter, who had been received by A. J.
Smith, expressed a strong desire to converse with General Grant. While
declining this, Grant requested Smith to say to Bowen that if General
Pemberton desired to see him an interview would be granted between the
lines in McPherson's front at any hour in the afternoon which Pemberton
might appoint. After Bowen's departure a message was soon sent back to
Smith, accepting the proposal for an interview, and appointing three
o'clock as the hour. Grant was there with his staff and with Generals
Ord, McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith. Sherman was not present, being
with his command watching Joe Johnston, and ready to spring upon the
latter as soon as Pemberton was captured. Pemberton came late, attended
by General Bowen and Colonel L. M. Montgomery.
It must have been a bitter moment for the Confederate chieftain.
Pemberton was a Northern man, a Pennsylvanian by birth, from which State
he was appointed to West Point, graduating in 1837. In the old army he
fell under the spell of the influence of Jefferson Davis, whose close
friend he was. Davis appears to have thought Pemberton was a military
genius, for he was jumped almost at a stroke, without much previous
service, to be a lieutenant general, and the defense of the Mississippi
River was given over to his charge. His dispositions throughout the
entire campaign, after Grant crossed at Bruinsburg, were weak, and he
was easily overcome, although his troops fought well. As Joe Johnston
truthfully remarks in his Narrative, Pemberton did not understand
Grant's warfare at all. Penned up and finally compelled to surrender a
vital post and a great army to his conqueror, an almost irremediable
disaster to his cause, Pemberton not only suffered the usual pangs of
defeat, but he was doubly humiliated by the knowledge that he would be
suspected and accused of treachery by his adopted brethren, and that the
result would be used by the enemies of Davis, whose favorite he was, to
undermine the Confederate administration. As the events proved, it was
indeed a great blow to Davis's hold upon the people of the South. These
things must have passed through Pemberton's mind as he faced Grant for
this final settlement of the fate of Vicksburg.
The conversation was held apart between Pemberton and his two officers
and Grant, McPherson, and A. J. Smith, the rest of us being seated on
the ground near by.
We could, however, see that Pemberton was much excited, and was
impatient in his answers to Grant. He insisted that his army be paroled
and allowed to march beyond our lines, officers and all, with eight
days' rations, drawn from their own stores, officers to retain their
private property and body servants. Grant heard what Pemberton had to
say, and left him at the end of an hour and a half, saying that he would
send in his ultimatum in writing before evening; to this Pemberton
promised to reply before night, hostilities to cease in the meantime.
Grant then conferred at his headquarters with his corps and division
commanders, all of whom, except Steele, who advised unconditional
surrender, favored a plan proposed by McPherson, and finally adopted by
Grant. The argument against the plan was one of feeling only. In its
favor it was urged that it would at once not only tend to the
demoralization of the enemy, but also release Grant's whole army for
offensive operations against Joe Johnston and Port Hudson, while to
guard and transport so many prisoners would require a great portion of
our army's strength. Keeping the prisoners would also absorb all our
steamboat transportation, while paroling them would leave it free to
move our troops. Paroling would also save us an enormous expenditure.
After long consideration, General Grant reluctantly gave way to these
reasons, and at six o'clock in the afternoon he sent a letter by the
hands of General Logan and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, in which he stated
as terms that, as soon as rolls could be made out and paroles signed by
officers and men, Pemberton would be allowed to march out of our lines,
the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the
field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file
were to retain all their clothing, but no other property. If these
conditions were accepted, any amount of rations deemed necessary was to
be taken from the stores they had, besides the necessary cooking
utensils. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as
one, were to be allowed to transport such articles as could not be
carried along. The same conditions were allowed to all sick and wounded
officers and soldiers as fast as they became able to travel.
The officer who received this letter stated that it would be impossible
to answer it by night, and it was not till a little before peep of day
that the reply was furnished. In the main the terms were accepted, but
Pemberton proposed as amendments:
At 10 A.M. to-morrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around
Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command
by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of
my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to
retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and
property of citizens to be respected.
General Grant immediately replied:
I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens
and their private property.... The property which officers will be
allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of
last evening.... If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to
march to the front of the line now occupied by it, and stack arms at
10 A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners
until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms
by 9 A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall
act accordingly.
The answer came back promptly, "The terms proposed by you are accepted."
We had a glorious celebration that day. Pemberton's note had been
received just after daylight, and at the appointed hour of ten o'clock
the surrender was consummated, the Confederate troops marching out and
stacking arms in front of their works, while Pemberton appeared for a
moment with his staff upon the parapet of the central fort. At eleven
o'clock Grant entered the city. He was received by Pemberton with more
marked impertinence than at their former interview. Grant bore it like a
philosopher, and in reply treated Pemberton with even gentler courtesy
and dignity than before.
I rode into Vicksburg at the side of the conqueror, and afterward
perambulated among the conquered. The Confederate soldiers were
generally more contented even than we were. Now they were going home,
they said. They had had enough of the war. The cause of the Confederacy
was lost. They wanted to take the oath of allegiance many of them. I
was not surprised to learn a month later that of the twenty-odd thousand
well men who were paroled at Vicksburg the greater part had since
dispersed, and I felt sure they could never be got to serve again. The
officers, on the other hand, all declared their determination never to
give in. They had mostly on that day the look of men who have been
crying all night. One major, who commanded a regiment from Missouri,
burst into tears as he followed his disarmed men back into their lines
after they had surrendered their colors and the guns in front of them.
I found the buildings of Vicksburg much less damaged than I had
expected. Still, there were a good many people living in caves dug in
the banks. Naturally the shells did less damage to these vaults than to
dwellings. There was a considerable supply of railroad cars in the town,
with one or two railroad locomotives in working condition. There was
also an unexpected quantity of military supplies. At the end of the
first week after our entrance sixty-six thousand stand of small arms had
been collected, mainly in good condition, and more were constantly being
discovered. They were concealed in caves, as well as in all sorts of
buildings. The siege and seacoast guns found exceeded sixty, and the
whole captured artillery was above two hundred pieces. The stores of
rebel ammunition also proved to be surprisingly heavy. As Grant
expressed it, there was enough to have kept up the defense for six years
at the rate they were using it. The stock of army clothing was
officially invoiced at five million dollars--Confederate prices. Of
sugar, molasses, and salt there was a large quantity, and sixty thousand
pounds of bacon were found in one place.
The way in which Grant handled his army at the capitulation of Vicksburg
was a splendid example of his energy. As soon as negotiations for
surrender began on the 3d, he sent word to Sherman, at his camp on Bear
Creek, to get ready to move against Johnston. Sherman always acted on
the instant, and that very afternoon he threw bridges across the Big
Black. He started his forces over the river on the 4th as soon as he
received word that Pemberton had accepted Grant's ultimatum.
In the meantime Grant had ordered part of Ord's corps, all of Steele's
division, and the two divisions of the Ninth Corps, which was at
Haynes's Bluff, to be ready to join Sherman as soon as the capitulation
was effected. Their movement was so prompt that by Sunday night, July
5th, part of Ord's force was across the Big Black and Steele was well up
to the river.
As Grant supposed that Banks needed help at Port Hudson, he had sent a
messenger to him on the 1st of the month telling him the surrender was
imminent, and offering aid if he needed it. A division--that of
Herron--was now made ready to march as soon as word came back. In the
city itself there was the greatest activity. The occupation of the place
by our forces was directed by General McPherson, who was appointed to
the command. Three divisions were detailed to garrison the line of
fortifications and to furnish the guards for the interior of the city.
By the night of the 5th no troops remained outside of Vicksburg.
The paroling of the Confederate troops began as soon as the occupation
was complete, and was pushed with all possible rapidity. At the same
time those parts of the fortifications which we were now to defend were
selected, and the men began to obliterate the siege approaches at which
they had worked so hard and so long. So busy was Grant with the
mobilization of his army for offensive field operations and the
garrisoning of Vicksburg that he did not take time even to write to
Washington. My telegram of July 5th to Mr. Stanton describing the
surrender and the condition of things in Vicksburg conveyed this request
from Grant for instructions from Washington:
General Grant, being himself intensely occupied, desires me to say
that he would like to receive from General Halleck as soon as
practicable either general or specific instructions as to the future
conduct of the war in his department. He has no idea of going into
summer quarters, nor does he doubt his ability to employ his army so
as to make its blows tell toward the great result; but he would like
to be informed whether the Government wishes him to follow his own
judgment or to co-operate in some particular scheme of operations.
With the fall of Vicksburg my mission was at an end. On the 6th of July
I left Grant for the North, stopping at Helena, Ark., on my way up the
river long enough to get news of Gen. Prentiss's recent operations.
Thence I went on to Cairo and Washington.