THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG
Life behind Vicksburg--Grant's efforts to procure
reinforcements--The fruitless appeal to General Banks--Mr. Stanton
responds to Mr. Dana's representations--A steamboat trip with
Grant--Watching Joe Johnston--Visits to Sherman and Admiral
Porter--The negro troops win glory--Progress and incidents of the
siege--Vicksburg wakes up--McClernand's removal.
We had not been many days in the rear of Vicksburg before we settled
into regular habits. The men were detailed in reliefs for work in the
trenches, and being relieved at fixed hours everybody seemed to lead a
systematic life.
My chief duty throughout the siege was a daily round through the
trenches, generally with the corps commander or some one of his staff.
As the lines of investment were six or seven miles long, it occupied the
greater part of my day; sometimes I made a portion of my tour of
inspection in the night. One night in riding through the trenches I must
have passed twenty thousand men asleep on their guns. I still can see
the grotesque positions into which they had curled themselves. The
trenches were so protected that there was no danger in riding through
them. It was not so safe to venture on the hills overlooking Vicksburg.
I went on foot and alone one day to the top of a hill, and was looking
at the town, when I suddenly heard something go whizz, whizz, by my ear.
"What in the world is that?" I asked myself. The place was so desolate
that it was an instant before I could believe that these were bullets
intended for me. When I did realize it, I immediately started to lie
down. Then came the question, which was the best way to lie down. If I
lay at right angles to the enemy's line the bullets from the right and
left might strike me; if I lay parallel to it then those directly from
the front might hit me. So I concluded it made no difference which way I
lay. After remaining quiet for a time the bullets ceased, and I left the
hill-top. I was more cautious in the future in venturing beyond cover.
Through the entire siege I lived in General Grant's headquarters, which
were on a high bluff northeast of Sherman's extreme left. I had a tent
to myself, and on the whole was very comfortable. We never lacked an
abundance of provisions. There was good water, enough even for the bath,
and we suffered very little from excessive heat. The only serious
annoyance was the cannonade from our whole line, which from the first of
June went on steadily by night as well as by day. The following bit from
a letter I wrote on June 2d, to my little daughter, tells something of
my situation:
It is real summer weather here, and, after coming in at noon to-day
from my usual ride through the trenches, I was very glad to get a
cold bath in my tent before dinner. I like living in tents very
well, especially if you ride on horseback all day. Every night I
sleep with one side of the tent wide open and the walls put up all
around to get plenty of air. Sometimes I wake up in the night and
think it is raining, the wind roars so in the tops of the great oak
forest on the hillside where we are encamped, and I think it is
thundering till I look out and see the golden moonlight in all its
glory, and listen again and know that it is only the thunder of
General Sherman's great guns, that neither rest nor let others rest
by night or by day.
We were no sooner in position behind Vicksburg than Grant saw that he
must have reinforcements. Joe Johnston was hovering near, working with
energy to collect forces sufficient to warrant an attempt to relieve
Vicksburg. The Confederates were also known to be reorganizing at
Jackson. Johnston eventually gathered an army behind Grant of about
twenty-five thousand men.
Under these threatening circumstances it was necessary to keep a certain
number of troops in our rear, more than Grant could well spare from the
siege, and he therefore made every effort to secure reinforcements. He
ordered down from Tennessee, and elsewhere in his own department, all
available forces. He also sent to General Banks, who was then besieging
Port Hudson, a request to bring his forces up as promptly as
practicable, and assuring him that he (Grant) would gladly serve under
him as his senior in rank, or simply co-operate with him for the benefit
of the common cause, if Banks preferred that arrangement. To Halleck, on
May 29th, he telegraphed: "If Banks does not come to my assistance I
must be reinforced from elsewhere. I will avoid a surprise, and do the
best I can with the means at hand." This was about the extent of
Grant's personal appeals to his superiors for additional forces. No
doubt, however, he left a good deal to my representations.
As no reply came from Banks, I started myself on the 30th for Port
Hudson at Grant's desire, to urge that the reinforcements be furnished.
The route used for getting out from the rear of Vicksburg at that time
was through the Chickasaw Bayou into the Yazoo and thence into the
Mississippi. From the mouth of the Yazoo I crossed the Mississippi to
Young's Point, and from there went overland across the peninsula to get
a gunboat at a point south of Vicksburg. As we were going down the river
we met a steamer just above Grand Gulf bearing one of the previous
messengers whom Grant had sent to Banks. He was bringing word that Banks
could send no forces; on the other hand, he asked reinforcements from
Grant to aid in his siege of Port Hudson, which he had closely invested.
This news, of course, made my trip unnecessary, and I returned at once
to headquarters, having been gone not over twenty-four hours.
As soon as this news came from Banks, I sent an urgent appeal to Mr.
Stanton to hurry reinforcements sufficient to make success beyond all
peradventure. The Government was not slow to appreciate Grant's needs or
the great opportunity he had created. Early in June I received the
following dispatch from Mr. Stanton:
WAR DEPARTMENT, _June 5, 1863_.
Your telegrams up to the 30th have been received. Everything in the
power of this Government will be put forth to aid General Grant.
The emergency is not underrated here. Your telegrams are a great
obligation, and are looked for with deep interest. I can not thank
you as much as I feel for the service you are now rendering. You
have been appointed an assistant adjutant general, with rank of
major, with liberty to report to General Grant if he needs you. The
appointment may be a protection to you. I shall expect daily
reports if possible.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
_Secretary of War_.
C. A. DANA, Esq.,
Grant's Headquarters near Vicksburg.
My appointment as assistant adjutant general was Stanton's own idea. He
was by nature a very anxious man. When he perceived from my dispatches
that I was going every day on expeditions into dangerous territory, he
became alarmed lest I might be caught by the Confederates; for as I was
a private citizen it would have been difficult to exchange me. If I were
in the regular volunteer service as an assistant adjutant general,
however, there would be no trouble about an exchange, hence my
appointment.
The chief variations from my business of watching the siege behind
Vicksburg were these trips I made to inspect the operations against the
enemy, who was now trying to shut us in from the rear beyond the Big
Black. His heaviest force was to the northeast. On June 6th the reports
from Satartia, our advance up the Yazoo, were so unsatisfactory that
Grant decided to examine the situation there himself. That morning he
said to me at breakfast:
"Mr. Dana, I am going to Satartia to-day; would you like to go along?"
I said I would, and we were soon on horseback, riding with a cavalry
guard to Haynes's Bluff, where we took a small steamer reserved for
Grant's use and carrying his flag. Grant was ill and went to bed soon
after he started. We had gone up the river to within two miles of
Satartia, when we met two gunboats coming down. Seeing the general's
flag, the officers in charge of the gunboats came aboard our steamer and
asked where the general was going. I told them to Satartia.
"Why," said they, "it will not be safe. Kimball [our advance was under
the charge of Brigadier-General Nathan Kimball, Third Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps] has retreated from there, and is sending all his
supplies to Haynes's Bluff. The enemy is probably in the town now."
I told them Grant was sick and asleep, and that I did not want to waken
him. They insisted that it was unsafe to go on, and that I would better
call the general. Finally I did so, but he was too sick to decide.
"I will leave it with you," he said. I immediately said we would go back
to Haynes's Bluff, which we did.
The next morning Grant came out to breakfast fresh as a rose, clean
shirt and all, quite himself. "Well, Mr. Dana," he said, "I suppose we
are at Satartia now."
"No, general," I said, "we are at Haynes's Bluff." And I told him what
had happened.
He did not complain, but as he was short of officers at that point he
asked me to go with a party of cavalry toward Mechanicsburg to find if
it were true, as reported, that Joe Johnston was advancing from Canton
to the Big Black. We had a hard ride, not getting back to Vicksburg
until the morning of the eighth. The country was like all the rest
around Vicksburg, broken, wooded, unpopulous, with bad roads and few
streams. It still had many cattle, but the corn was pretty thoroughly
cleared out. We found that Johnston had not moved his main force as
rumored, and that he could not move it without bringing all his supplies
with him.
Throughout the siege an attack from Johnston continued to threaten Grant
and to keep a part of our army busy. Almost every one of my dispatches
to Mr. Stanton contained rumors of the movements of the Confederates,
and the information was so uncertain that often what I reported one day
had to be contradicted the next. About the 15th of June the movements of
the enemy were so threatening that Grant issued an order extending
Sherman's command so as to include Haynes's Bluff, and to send there the
two divisions of the Ninth Corps under General Parke. These troops had
just arrived from Kentucky, and Grant had intended to place them on the
extreme left of our besieging line.
Although our spies brought in daily reports of forces of the enemy at
different points between Yazoo City and Jackson, Johnston's plan did not
develop opportunity until the 22d, when he was said to be crossing the
Big Black north of Bridgeport. Sherman immediately started to meet him
with about thirty thousand troops, including cavalry. Five brigades more
were held in readiness to reinforce him if necessary. The country was
scoured by Sherman in efforts to beat Johnston, but no trace of an enemy
was found. It was, however, ascertained that he had not advanced, but
was still near Canton. As there was no design to attack Johnston until
Vicksburg was laid low, Sherman made his way to Bear Creek, northwest of
Canton, where he could watch the Confederates, and there went into camp.
I went up there several times to visit him, and always came away
enthusiastic over his qualities as a soldier. His amazing activity and
vigilance pervaded his entire force. The country where he had encamped
was exceedingly favorable for defense. He had occupied the commanding
points, opened rifle-pits wherever they would add to his advantage,
obstructed the cross-roads and most of the direct roads also, and
ascertained every point where the Big Black could be forded between the
line of Benton on the north and the line of railroads on the south. By
his rapid movements, also, and by widely deploying on all the ridges and
open headlands, Sherman produced the impression that his forces were ten
times as numerous as they really were. Sherman remained in his camp on
Bear Creek through the rest of the siege, in order to prevent any
possible attack by Joe Johnston, the reports about whose movements
continued to be contradictory and uncertain.
Another variation in my Vicksburg life was visiting Admiral Porter, who
commanded the fleet which hemmed in the city on the river-side. Porter
was a very active, courageous, fresh-minded man, and an experienced
naval officer, and I enjoyed the visits I made to his fleet. His boats
were pretty well scattered, for the Confederates west of the Mississippi
were pressing in, and unless watched might manage to cross somewhere.
Seven of the gunboats were south of Vicksburg, one at Haynes's Bluff,
one was at Chickasaw Bayou, one at Young's Point, one at Milliken's
Bend, one at Lake Providence, one at Greenell, one at Island Sixty-five,
two were at White River, and so on, and several were always in motion.
They guarded the river so completely that no hostile movement from the
west ever succeeded, or was likely to do so.
The most serious attack from the west during the siege was that on June
7th, when a force of some two thousand Confederates engaged about a
thousand negro troops defending Milliken's Bend. This engagement at
Milliken's Bend became famous from the conduct of the colored troops.
General E. S. Dennis, who saw the battle, told me that it was the
hardest fought engagement he had ever seen. It was fought mainly hand to
hand. After it was over many men were found dead with bayonet stabs, and
others with their skulls broken open by butts of muskets. "It is
impossible," said General Dennis, "for men to show greater gallantry
than the negro troops in that fight."
The bravery of the blacks in the battle at Milliken's Bend completely
revolutionized the sentiment of the army with regard to the employment
of negro troops. I heard prominent officers who formerly in private had
sneered at the idea of the negroes fighting express themselves after
that as heartily in favor of it. Among the Confederates, however, the
feeling was very different. All the reports which came to us showed that
both citizens and soldiers on the Confederate side manifested great
dismay at the idea of our arming negroes. They said that such a policy
was certain to be followed by insurrection with all its horrors.
Although the presence of Joe Johnston on the east, and the rumors of
invasion by Kirby Smith from the west, compelled constant attention, the
real work behind Vicksburg was always that of the siege. No amount of
outside alarm loosened Grant's hold on the rebel stronghold. The siege
went on steadily and effectively. By June 10th the expected
reinforcements began to report. Grant soon had eighty-five thousand men
around Vicksburg, and Pemberton's last hope was gone. The first troops
to arrive were eight regiments under General Herron. They came from
Missouri, down the Mississippi to Young's Point, where they were
debarked and marched across the peninsula, care being taken, of course,
that the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg should see the whole march.
The troops were then ferried across the Mississippi, and took a position
south of Vicksburg between Lauman's troops and the Mississippi River,
completely closing the lines, and thus finally rendering egress and
ingress absolutely impossible. Herron took this position on June 13th.
He went to work with so much energy that on the night of the 15th he was
able to throw forward his lines on his left, making an advance of five
hundred yards, and bringing his artillery and rifle-pits within two or
three hundred yards of the enemy's lines.
Herron was a first-rate officer, and the only consummate dandy I ever
saw in the army. He was always handsomely dressed; I believe he never
went out without patent-leather boots on, and you would see him in the
middle of a battle--well, I can not say exactly that he went into battle
with a lace pocket-handkerchief, but at all events he always displayed a
clean white one. But these little vanities appeared not to detract from
his usefulness. Herron had already proved his ability and fighting
qualities at the battle of Prairie Grove, December 7, 1862.
Just as our reinforcements arrived we began to receive encouraging
reports from within Vicksburg. Deserters said that the garrison was worn
out and hungry; besides, the defense had for several days been conducted
with extraordinary feebleness, which Grant thought was due to the
deficiency of ammunition or to exhaustion and depression in the
garrison, or to their retirement to an inner line of defense. The first
and third of these causes no doubt operated to some extent, but the
second we supposed to be the most influential. The deserters also said
that fully one third of the garrison were in hospital, and that
officers, as well as men, had begun to despair of relief from Johnston.
These reports from within the town, as well as the progress of the siege
and the arrival of reinforcements, pointed so strongly to the speedy
surrender of the place that I asked Mr. Stanton in my dispatch of June
14th to please inform me by telegram whether he wished me to go to
General Rosecrans after the fall of Vicksburg or whether he had other
orders for me.
The next day after this letter, however, the enemy laid aside his
long-standing inactivity and opened violently with both artillery and
musketry. Two mortars which the Confederates got into operation that day
in front of General A. J. Smith particularly interested our generals. I
remember going with a party of some twenty officers, including Sherman,
Ord, McPherson, and Wilson, to the brow of a hill on McPherson's front
to watch this battery with our field glasses. From where we were we
could study the whole operation. We saw the shell start from the mortar,
sail slowly through the air toward us, fall to the ground and explode,
digging out a hole which looked like a crater. I remember one of these
craters which must have been nine feet in diameter. As you watched a
shell coming you could not tell whether it would fall a thousand feet
away or by your side. Yet nobody budged. The men sat there on their
horses, their reins loose, studying and discussing the work of the
batteries, apparently indifferent to the danger. It was very interesting
as a study of human steadiness.
By the middle of June our lines were so near the enemy's on Sherman's
and McPherson's front that General Grant began to consider the project
of another general assault as soon as McClernand's, Lauman's, and
Herron's lines were brought up close. Accordingly, Sherman and McPherson
were directed to hold their work until the others were up to them.
Herron, of course, had not had time to advance, though since his arrival
he had worked with great energy. Lauman had done little in the way of
regular approaches. But the chief difficulty in the way was the
backwardness of McClernand. His trenches were mere rifle-pits, three or
four feet wide, and would allow neither the passage of artillery nor the
assemblage of any considerable number of troops. His batteries were,
with scarcely an exception, in the position they apparently had held
when the siege was opened.
This obstacle to success was soon removed. On the 18th of June
McClernand was relieved and General Ord was put into his place. The
immediate occasion of McClernand's removal was a congratulatory address
to the Thirteenth Corps which he had fulminated in May, and which first
reached the besieging army in a copy of the Missouri Democrat. In this
extraordinary address McClernand claimed for himself most of the glory
of the campaign, reaffirmed that on May 22d he had held two rebel forts
for several hours, and imputed to other officers and troops failure to
support him in their possession, which must have resulted in the capture
of the town, etc. Though this congratulatory address was the occasion of
McClernand's removal, the real causes of it dated farther back. These
causes, as I understood at the time, were his repeated disobedience of
important orders, his general unfortunate mental disposition, and his
palpable incompetence for the duties of his position. I learned in
private conversation that in General Grant's judgment it was necessary
that McClernand should be removed for the reason, above all, that his
bad relations with other corps commanders, especially Sherman and
McPherson, rendered it impossible that the chief command of the army
should devolve upon him, as it would have done were General Grant
disabled, without some pernicious consequence to the Union cause.