GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 1918
1918
After a month's rest in the Basseux area, during the first few days of
which the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades were placed at the disposal
of the 3rd Division to relieve two of their brigades on the Bullecourt
front, the Division moved up, commencing on the 17th January to
relieve the 51st Division in the front line between Hermies and
Boursies. A month later it side-stepped northwards, relieving the 25th
Division in the Lagnicourt sector. The period up to the 21st March was
one of steady work on defences, but without special incident, except a
gas-shell attack on the 71st Brigade, which caused a certain amount of
casualties.
During this period Infantry Brigades were reduced to three battalions
each--the 9th Suffolk Regiment, 8th Bedford Regiment, and 14th Durham
Light Infantry being disbanded between 1st and 16th February. Shortly
afterwards the three Machine-gun Companies and the Divisional
Machine-gun Company were organized into the 6th Machine-gun Battalion,
under the command of Lt.-Col. Rosher, D.S.O., late commanding 14th
D.L.I.
Some description of the ground and defensive organization of the
Division will not be out of place here. The front held by the Division
was generally on a forward slope opposite the villages of Queant and
Pronville.
No Man's Land averaged three-quarters of a mile in width. The whole
area was downland, and very suitable for the action of tanks. The
position lay astride a succession of well-defined broad spurs and
narrow valleys (like the fingers of a partially opened hand), merging
into the broad transverse valley which separated the British line
from the two villages above-mentioned. All the advantages of ground
lay with the defence, and it seemed as if no attack could succeed,
unless by the aid of tanks. A large portion of the front line--notably
the valleys--was sown with 2-in. trench-mortar bombs with instantaneous
fuses, which would detonate under the pressure of a wagon but not of a
man's foot. In addition five anti-tank 18-pounder guns were placed in
positions of vantage. The wire was very broad and thick. The position
would, indeed, have been almost impregnable had there been sufficient
time to complete it, and had there been separate troops for
counter-attack.
The ground was a portion of that wrested from the enemy in the Cambrai
offensive of November-December 1917, but had only improvised trenches.
A month's hard frost in January had militated against digging, and
though there were a complete front trench and reserve trench, the
support trenches hardly existed, and dug outs were noticeable by their
absence. The front was 4,500 yards in extent, the three brigades in
line--18th on right, 71st in centre, 16th on left--on approximately
equal frontages. The depth from front or outpost zone to reserve or
battle zone was about 2,000 yards. With only three battalions in a
brigade, there was no option but to assign one battalion in each
brigade to the defence of the outpost zones, and keep two battalions
in depth in the battle zone. With battalions at just over
half-strength, and with the undulating nature of the ground, the
defence resolved itself everywhere into a succession of posts with a
very limited field of fire.
A good corps line called the Vaux-Morchies Line had been dug, the
nearest portion a mile behind the reserve line, and this was held by
the Pioneers and R.E., owing to scarcity of numbers.
The Right Group, R.F.A. (Lt.-Col. H. Weber), consisting of 2nd Brigade
(less 21st Battery), supported the 18th Infantry Brigade; the Left
Group (Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth), consisting of 24th Brigade, 21st
Battery, and 93rd (Army) Brigade, supported the 16th and 17th Infantry
Brigades.
Reports from deserters that we were to be heavily attacked were
persistent, and the Division stood to arms twice before 21st March. On
20th March aeroplane photos disclosed ammunition pits for seventy
extra batteries opposite the divisional front, and when at 5 a.m. on
21st March the bombardment commenced, there was no doubt but that a
real offensive had begun. Warning had been given overnight for all
troops to be in battle positions by 5 a.m., but it came too late to
stop working parties, and the reserve battalions of all brigades had
marched ten miles before the battle commenced.
Fog favoured the Germans in that it prevented us seeing when the
attack was launched, but every credit must be given them for the skill
they evinced and the dash with which they pushed forward and brought
up successive waves of attackers. By concentrating their efforts on
the three main valleys, i.e. Noreuil Valley on our extreme left,
Lagnicourt Valley in the centre and Morchies Valley on our extreme
right, they avoided much of the fire which they would have encountered
on the broad spurs, and thus worked round and isolated the garrisons
of the latter. For five hours the bombardment continued with
tremendous force, first with gas and H.E. on back areas to cut
communications and disorganize reinforcements, later about 7 to 8 a.m.
with smoke and H.E. on the forward system. The intensity of it may be
gauged by the fact that four out of five concealed anti-tank guns were
knocked out by direct hits.
This bombardment annihilated the garrisons of the forward system, and
few survivors came back to the reserve line.
The only authenticated accounts of a successful resistance in the
front system were from the 71st Infantry Brigade, where both 9th
Norfolks and 2nd Sherwood Foresters repulsed the first attack. By
10.30 a.m. the enemy had nearly reached Noreuil and had driven back
the 59th Division on our left, leaving the left flank of the 16th
Infantry Brigade in the air, while its right flank went shortly
afterwards, as the enemy captured Lagnicourt, driving in the Sherwood
Foresters in the valley. The 16th Infantry Brigade was gradually
squeezed out towards the corps line, where at 4 p.m. parties from the
Divisional Bombing School counter-attacked and drove the enemy out of
trenches on the immediate left. The 71st Infantry Brigade, with its
right flank secure, threw back a defensive flank south-west of
Lagnicourt, and successfully prevented issue from that village to the
high ground. The enemy broke into Skipton Reserve Strong Point, but
were thrown out again by a counter-attack of Norfolks and Leicesters.
Coming up a subsidiary valley the enemy nearly drove a wedge between
71st and 18th Infantry Brigades, but the 2nd D.L.I. counter-attacked
gallantly and kept them out till dusk. On the right of the 18th
Infantry Brigade, however, the enemy advanced up the Morchies Valley,
capturing the left trenches of the 51st Division on our right at about
10 a.m.
The 2nd West Yorks, reinforced by two companies 11th Essex, gallantly
led by Lt.-Col. Boyall, D.S.O., who was subsequently wounded and
captured, drove back three attacks issuing from our support line. The
18th Infantry Brigade held on till 7 p.m. when, in trying to withdraw,
it suffered heavy casualties. The last company was not overwhelmed
till 8.30 p.m. The 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades, therefore,
maintained their hold on the ground Lagnicourt and the Morchies Valley
all day, though the enemy had penetrated far in rear on both flanks.
When darkness fell the remnants of the Division were back in the corps
line, together with three battalions of the 75th Infantry Brigade
(25th Division), the remaining troops of the Division not being
strong enough to hold the line unaided. The 11th Cheshires were with
18th Infantry Brigade, 2nd South Lancs with 71st Infantry Brigade, and
8th Border Regiment with 16th Infantry Brigade.
The night was quiet, both sides preparing for the next day's struggle.
At 7.30 a.m. on 22nd March the 16th Infantry Brigade repulsed an
attack, but the enemy renewed his efforts with great persistence, and
with much heavy bombardment and trench-mortaring, at 9.30 a.m. and
onwards in the vicinity of Vaux and Mericourt Woods. Though frequent
counter-attacks were made, the troops were forced back little by
little from the corps line towards some improvised trenches hastily
dug under the C.R.E.'s (Col. Goldney) direction some 1,000 yards in
rear, and manned partially by men from the Corps Reinforcement Camp
under Major Jones of the 2nd D.L.I. As an example of the tenacious
fighting, a sunken road which contained the Headquarters of the 16th
and 71st Infantry Brigades changed hands three times. Throughout the
day Lt.-Col. Latham, D.S.O., commanding 1st Leicesters, and Lt.-Col.
Dumbell, D.S.O., commanding 11th Battalion Essex Regiment,
distinguished themselves greatly in the defence of their sectors of
the line. On the right of the Division the control had passed by dusk
to the G.O.C., 75th Infantry Brigade (29th Division)--the 18th
Infantry Brigade having only about 100 of all ranks left. On the left
there was a large gap between the 16th Infantry Brigade and the 40th
Division, which had been pushed up towards Vaux Vraucourt, and this
the 6th Division had no troops with which to fill it. The enemy's
pressure on the flanks of the 16th Infantry Brigade and in the centre
on the 71st Infantry Brigade caused the line to fall back on the new
Army line which was being dug and wired. This was done in good order,
and at nightfall the weary remnants of the Division were relieved by
the 41st Division and concentrated in the vicinity of Achiet, the
artillery remaining behind and fighting in the subsequent
withdrawal up to 26th March.
The Division had put up a resistance of which it had every reason to
be proud, and which won for it the following letter from the G.O.C.,
Third Army (General Sir J. Byng):--
"I cannot allow the 6th Division to leave the Third Army without
expressing my appreciation of their splendid conduct during the first
stages of the great battle now in progress.
"By their devotion and courage they have broken up overwhelming
attacks and prevented the enemy gaining his object, namely a decisive
victory.
"I wish them every possible good luck."
To this magnificent result all ranks and all arms had contributed, and
it is perhaps invidious to single out special instances for mention.
The gallant stand of the 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades in the
reserve line throughout the whole of the first day has already been
referred to. Other outstanding incidents are the counter-attack by
part of the 2nd D.L.I. against the enemy advancing from our support
line, which relieved the pressure on the reserve line and captured
four machine-guns; the holding out of a post of the West Yorks on the
east side of the Morchies Valley from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. though
completely commanded and surrounded; the counter-attacks by companies
of the 1st Leicestershire Regiment and 9th Norfolk Regiment, which
restored the situation in the Skipton Strong Point just east of
Lagnicourt; that of a company of the 11th Leicestershire Regiment
which drove the enemy out of the corps line when he had established a
footing in it on the afternoon of the 21st; and that of the two
platoons formed from the 16th Infantry Brigade School which regained
posts on the extreme left of the corps line in the Divisional area on
the evening of the 21st.
Another gallant deed must be mentioned. Sergt. Shales, R.E., and
another signaller went from 18th Infantry Brigade Headquarters to
a distributor station 400 yards distant during the full force of the
bombardment, sorted out and tested wires in the open, and thus
established communication between the front trenches and Battalion
Headquarters. The burying and connecting up of the cable was to have
been completed the day of the attack.
The casualties in the infantry were extremely heavy, amounting in the
two days to some 3,900 out of a total for the Division of somewhat
over 5,000 engaged, and out of a total trench strength of less than
5,000 infantry. The 18th Infantry Brigade suffered particularly
heavily, being only able to muster in its three battalions 8 officers
and 110 other ranks of those who had been through the fight, including
32 at Battalion Headquarters.
The Machine-gun Battalion did excellent service and great execution,
many guns remaining in action until the enemy were within a few yards
of them. Its losses were heavy--14 officers and 280 other ranks.
The field companies suffered heavily, and rendered good service as
infantry. Special mention may be made of the action of 12th Field
Company under Capt. Langley, who rallied some 300 stragglers of
various units and filled a gap between the 18th Infantry Brigade and
troops on its left.
The 11th Leicesters, under the gallant leading of Major Radford,
fought splendidly, losing 14 officers and over 200 other ranks.
The artillery performed magnificent services, particularly on the 21st
March. All guns that were not destroyed by the enemy's bombardment
were fought until all the ammunition was expended or the enemy's
infantry reached their position. The gunners enjoyed the novel
experience of firing over open sights and seeing the effect of their
fire, and not only with their guns but with rifles and Lewis guns did
they inflict very heavy casualties on the enemy. The 42nd Battery,
having kept their three forward guns in action after our infantry had
fallen back behind them, succeeded in bringing the two that were not
destroyed away, under the very noses of the enemy and through a heavy
barrage and machine-gun fire. The forward section of the 53rd Battery
had one gun destroyed. Lieut. Reeves got the other into the open, and,
after firing 850 rounds with it over open sights and having exhausted
his ammunition, brought back his detachment and the breech-block. The
forward section of the 87th Battery continued firing until rushed by
the enemy's infantry. Sergt. Pengelly of the 112th Battery, who was in
command of a 15-pounder in an anti-tank position, having had his gun
destroyed in the preliminary bombardment, fought for two days with the
infantry, in command of a platoon, and did great execution himself
with a pickaxe. A forward gun of the 110th Battery was fought until
all its ammunition was expended, and the breech-block was then removed
with the enemy almost on the top of the gun. For over seven hours the
main battery fired on the enemy at ranges from 1,200 to 600 yards,
expending over 2,400 rounds. The forward gun of the 111th Battery,
after expending all its ammunition (500 rounds), largely over open
sights, was withdrawn and brought into action again in the main
position, a team coming up in full view of the enemy, and under very
heavy shelling and a hail of bullets, for the purpose. The 112th
Battery had two guns in action in advance of the corps line. These
remained in action until all their ammunition was expended, and the
detachments then withdrew with all their wounded and the breech-blocks
of their guns, the enemy being by this time actually on the wire of
the corps line.
The instances quoted are only typical of the conduct of the whole of
the artillery of the Division, which fully justified the very high
reputation it has always enjoyed, and the confidence which the
infantry of the Division has always felt in its own artillery.
The morning of the 23rd March found the remnants of the Division,
less artillery, assembled about Achiet-le-Grand and Bihucourt. The
survivors of the 18th Infantry Brigade numbered 8 officers and 110
other ranks; those of the 71st Infantry Brigade 11 officers and 279
other ranks. Each of these brigades had had a trench strength on the
morning of the 21st of just over 1,800 all ranks. Figures for the 16th
Infantry Brigade are not available. The Division was most fortunate in
having very few senior officers killed, though many were wounded. The
most noticeable casualties among the killed were Major Lyon, 2nd
Brigade, R.F.A., Majors Williamson and Wingate, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.,
and Capt. Harbottle, M.C., 1st Leicesters.
Even after relief the Division was not able to enjoy the rest it had
so richly deserved, and of which it stood so much in need. The further
progress of the enemy's attack and constant alarms necessitated its
preparing and taking up a position of readiness covering Achiet,
throughout the 23rd and the 24th.
On the 25th March it entrained for the north, to join the Second Army
in its old haunts in the Ypres Salient.