CAMBRAI
1917
The general situation on the British Western Front in November 1917,
though fairly universally known to-day, may now be outlined, and the
hopes and aims which led to the Cambrai offensive be touched on
shortly. The prolonged and hard-fought attacks in Flanders by the
British, and in other portions of the front by the French, had caused
the enemy to concentrate his forces in the threatened sectors,
denuding those portions of the line which appeared reasonably safe and
quiet. The Cambrai sector was included among the latter, for not only
was the ground very open, forbidding to us the unseen concentration of
the large forces and masses of heavy artillery which at that period
were deemed essential, but also the Hindenburg Line was immensely
strong and the trenches so wide that the tanks in use by us could not
cross them.
This enemy sector was, therefore, particularly suitable for surprise
by us, as it was deemed by the enemy to be unassailable.
The Hindenburg Line ran north-west for six miles from the St. Quentin
Canal at Banteux to Havrincourt on the Canal du Nord, where it bent
sharply north for four miles to Moeuvres, thus making a pronounced
salient. The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to smash the salient, to
occupy the high ground overlooking Cambrai--notably the Bourlon Wood
Ridge--push cavalry through the gap in order to disorganise
communications and the arrival of reinforcements, and to roll up the
enemy's defences to the north-west.
The French held considerable forces in the immediate vicinity
to exploit successes. It was reckoned that the enemy could not
reinforce his front under forty-eight hours. Everything depended in
the first instance on successful surprise, and in the second on
securing within forty-eight hours the important tactical points within
the salient. The difficulties of surprise, which were many and
serious, were most successfully overcome, but the enterprise failed
eventually because the key points were not seized.
The principal factors operating against success were the limited hours
of daylight and the long distances to be traversed both by men and by
tanks, which, though vastly improved since 1916, were still very slow.
There was also, in the case of securing the high ground west of
Cambrai, the canal to be crossed by tanks. While smashing in the
enemy's salient we ourselves were making a salient, extending our
front, as far as the Third Army was concerned, from a straight 7,000
yards to a curving 15,000 yards, thus affording the enemy a chance of
a blow at the sides and hinges of the salient, of which he availed
himself to good purpose ten days after our initial attack.
To ensure success the troops which were to undertake operations
practised with tanks in back areas, and officers and men went through
the operation on a carefully made ground model without being aware
what ground it represented. Units were brought up just before the 20th
of November, the day of the attack, marching by night and hiding in
villages and woods by day. In some cases battalions were quartered in
flat canvas erections, looking like ammunition or supply dumps. The
6th Division were fortunate in being in woods and destroyed villages.
No unusual activity on ground or in the air was allowed, no guns
registered as had been usual, even the Home mails were stopped for a
short period, and a screen of the troops which had held the line for
some time was kept in front trenches to the last. Under General Byng's
initiative the difficulty of tanks crossing the wide Hindenburg
Line trenches was overcome by each tank carrying on its brow a huge
faggot which it deposited in the trench at its selected crossing-place,
and which gave its tail a purchase to enable it to climb the opposite
side of the trench. The ground was very suitable for tanks, as it was
moderately hard grass land, and the first portion of the attack on
much of the front was downhill.
The III Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Pulteney) was on the right, and
consisted of the 12th, 20th, and 6th Divisions, which attacked in the
order named. The left corps (IV) consisted of the 51st and 62nd
Divisions. These covered the six miles with an average frontage of one
and a half miles. The 6th Division attacked on the front Villers
Plouich-Beaucamps, with the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. P. W.
Brown) on the left next to the 51st Division, the 16th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker) on the right next to the 20th
Division. These two brigades were to advance about 3,000 yards to the
first objective (Ribecourt and spur to south-east of it), and another
1,000 yards to the second objective (support system). The 18th
Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. G. S. G. Craufurd) was ordered to advance
through the 71st Infantry Brigade and secure the third objective about
a mile farther on (Premy Chapel Ridge), throwing back a defensive
flank towards Flesquieres for the further operations of the 51st
Division on its left and securing the flank of the 29th Division on
its right. The latter division passing through the right of the 6th
Division and the left of the 20th Division, was charged with securing
the crossings of the St. Quentin Canal at Marcoing and Masnieres and
seizing the high ground at Rumilly, thus facilitating exploitation to
the south-east, preventing a concentration against the widely
stretched defensive flanks of the III Corps and threatening Cambrai.
The Divisional Artillery was reinforced during the first part of the
operations by the 17th Brigade of the 29th Division and the 181st
Brigade of the 40th Division, as well as by two R.H.A. Brigades.
Batteries moved into position and camouflaged their guns. No
registration could, of course, take place, but long practice enabled
the gunners to put down a very accurate barrage without this
desideratum.
Opposite the Division the Hindenburg Line commenced with an outpost
line 750 yards distant on the left and 250 yards on the right. This
was out of sight of our front trenches by reason of the curve of the
ground. Half a mile behind this came the main system, consisting of
two trenches 200 yards apart, the whole guarded by most formidable
belts of wire about 150 yards in depth. The interval between outpost
and main systems was sown with well-sighted and concealed machine gun
positions. A mile farther on, and on the opposite side of the valley
for the most part, ran the support system, similar to the main system.
One and a half miles farther back again was the reserve system, of
which only machine-gun dug-outs were completed, and a small amount of
wire had been erected.
Two battalions of tanks, each of thirty-six tanks, were allotted to
the Division. "B" Battalion (Lt.-Col. E. D. Bryce, D.S.O.) operated
with the 16th Infantry Brigade, and "H" Battalion (Lt.-Col. Hon. C.
Willoughby) with the 71st Infantry Brigade. The 18th Infantry Brigade
advanced without tanks. The only points which caused anxiety, provided
that the tanks functioned satisfactorily, were Couillet Wood on the
right of the 16th Infantry Brigade front, in which tanks could not
operate, and Ribecourt Village on the left of the 71st Infantry
Brigade front.
The former was successfully cleared by the Buffs, and the latter
gallantly captured by the 9th Norfolk Regiment; the 11th Essex
clearing and securing it for the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade,
while the 71st Infantry Brigade attacked the second objective.
The 18th Infantry Brigade pushed through the 71st Infantry Brigade
and secured Premy Chapel Ridge in good time, and rendered great
assistance to the 51st Division on our left, who were held up at
Flesquieres by guns in the valley picking off the tanks one by one as
they breasted the ridge. The West Yorks and the 2nd D.L.I. each
charged over the Premy Ridge spur and captured a battery at the point
of the bayonet.
At 3.15 p.m. the cavalry, who would have been of the greatest
assistance in capturing the enemy guns holding up the 51st Division,
reported that they could not advance owing to snipers in Ribecourt.
The village had been in our possession since 10 a.m., and the 18th
Infantry Brigade had passed through it at 11.30, and were now two
miles beyond it. However, the cavalry pushed through patrols before
nightfall to Nine Wood.
A company of the 9th Suffolk Regiment successfully carried out its
mission of advancing without artillery or tank support, and capturing
the bridge at Marcoing. The Division had a most successful day, with
very light casualties (about 650), capturing 28 officers and 1,227
other ranks prisoners, 23 guns, and between 40 and 50 machine-guns and
many trench-mortars, and receiving the congratulations of the Corps
Commander. Everything had gone like clockwork: the artillery had
pushed forward to advanced positions to cover the new front before
darkness came on; the machine-guns, under Major Muller, D.M.G.O., were
likewise established in their new forward positions, thanks to careful
arrangements and the use of pack animals; and the 11th Leicesters,
under Major Radford, were repairing and clearing the roads before the
third objective had been secured. The tanks, which had made surprise
possible, were most gallantly handled, and all arrangements most
carefully thought out by Col. A. Courage, D.S.O.
The next morning the 51st Division captured Flesquieres from the
north, and three companies of the 14th D.L.I., moving forward
slightly in advance of them and operating with a squadron of the
Queen's Bays, entered Cantaing ahead of the 51st Division, handing
over subsequently to the 4th Gordons.
The Buffs, with the assistance of the tanks, completed the clearing of
Noyelles (a village some 2,500 yards north-east of Premy Chapel),
which had been entered the previous day by the 29th Division, and
relieved the latter there. On the night of the 26/27th November the
18th Infantry Brigade extended its left up to the south-east edge of
Cantaing.
About half a mile of the original front had been handed over to the
29th Division, and the 6th Division now held a rectangular strip 2,500
yards by 7,000 yards, with the head at Cantaing and Noyelles, and the
rear in the Hindenburg Main Line. The 29th Division had a precarious
hold of the ground across the canal on the right, and the Guards
Division was having hard fighting at Fontaine on the left.
Comparing the position with the back of a man's left hand, the 6th
Division occupied the third finger, the 29th Division the main finger,
the 20th Division the index finger, the 12th Division the portion
below the index finger down to the lower portion of the thumb when
fully extended, the 55th Division occupied the thumb. Such was the
situation when the enemy delivered a heavy counter-attack, on the
morning of the 30th November, on the 29th, 20th and 12th Divisions of
the III Corps and the 55th Division of the VII Corps, driving the 20th
and 12th Divisions on to the main finger except for a few posts, and
occupying the thumb.
The Germans reached Gouzeaucourt at about 9 a.m., but were stoutly
opposed by transport details of the 18th Infantry Brigade, who most
gallantly led by Lieut. and Quartermaster J. P. L. Shea, 2nd D.L.I.,
and Capt. and Adjutant W. Paul, 1st West Yorks, checked the enemy in a
portion of the village until it was retaken by the Guards about
midday. These two brave officers, whose initiative and sound military
action probably saved the situation from becoming much worse, were
both wounded, and subsequently died of their wounds, a great loss to
their battalions and to the Division.
A Staff-Officer arrived from the 29th Division about 9 a.m., and
reported their Divisional Headquarters just north-east of Gouzeaucourt
to have been captured and the Germans entering the village, which was
about two miles to the right rear of 6th Divisional Headquarters. The
16th Infantry Brigade, which was in Divisional Reserve in the
Hindenburg Main Line some two miles away, was ordered up to the ridge
between Beaucamps and Gouzeaucourt. Brig.-Gen. Walker, commanding 16th
Infantry Brigade, who was ordered to report to G.O.C., 29th Division,
at Gouzeaucourt, narrowly escaped capture, together with his
Brigade-Major, the enemy now being in possession of the village.
G.O.C., 29th Division, had in the meantime passed through 6th
Divisional Headquarters, and gone forward to his line.
The situation was now very confused, as all wires to corps had been
cut, but it was evident that there was a gap between 12th and 20th
Divisions, the latter still holding on to La Vacquerie, a strong point
on the ridge two miles east of Beaucamps. The 16th Infantry Brigade
was ordered to retake Gouzeaucourt, aided by some tanks which were at
Beaucamps, and advanced about 3 p.m., but found the Guards already in
the village. It therefore took up a position in the road between
Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich, to the left of the Guards, and
prepared to attack Cemetery Ridge between Gonnelieu and La Vacquerie,
so as to re-establish the line. Patrols reported no enemy activity,
and as there were no guns available (all in this sector having been
captured or out of action) the Divisional Commander (Gen. Marden)
thought a surprise attack by moonlight might succeed in capturing this
important ridge before the enemy could reinforce it. An attack
was launched at 1 a.m. hand in hand with 20th Division, but though
most gallantly pushed, failed owing to loss of direction and heavy
enemy machine gun fire. The ridge was captured by a Guards Brigade the
next morning at 6.30 a.m., by the aid of tanks and artillery.
In the meantime the Reserve Battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade
(14th D.L.I.), and a battalion lent by the 57th Division, took up a
position on Highland Ridge facing east, thus completely securing the
flank.
On 2nd December the 16th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn and ordered to
relieve 87th Infantry Brigade (29th Division), which had been having
stiff fighting across and astride the canal east of Marcoing. The 14th
D.L.I. (18th Infantry Brigade) were lent to 16th Infantry Brigade and
on the night of 2nd/3rd December occupied the south portion of the
loop across the canal, the K.S.L.I. taking over the north half. The
88th Infantry Brigade (29th Division) held the ground south of the
canal. The whole position was a salient subject to shell, rifle and
machine-gun fire from north, south and east. The 14th D.L.I. position
had no wire, and only hastily dug trenches. At 10.30 a.m., after a
heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the 14th D.L.I. and the
battalion of the 29th Division south of the canal, penetrating the
trenches, but was counter-attacked and driven out. At 11.30 a.m. he
attacked again with similar results. At 12.15 p.m. he attacked both
D.L.I. and K.S.L.I. and penetrated the right of the D.L.I., but was
again driven out. With a final attack at 12.45 p.m. the enemy
succeeded in forcing both battalions across the canal by sheer weight
of numbers.
Two companies of the 8th Bedfords now reinforced the 14th D.L.I., and
this force again counter-attacked and recovered the bridge-head at
dusk; the 88th Infantry Brigade, assisted by 2nd Y. and L., having
also counter-attacked successfully south of the canal. Losses were,
however, heavy, and the line was gradually withdrawn under Corps
orders during the next two days to the Hindenburg support system,
which became our front line. The 14th D.L.I. fought magnificently,
losing 15 officers and 262 other ranks, more than half being killed.
Capt. Lascelles, who led two of the counter-attacks and was twice
wounded, here gained his V.C. The 16th M.G.C., both north and south of
the canal, had very heavy losses, but put up a splendid resistance.
The only other incidents of note were the repulse by the 18th Infantry
Brigade of a half-hearted enemy attack on Cantaing on the 1st
December, and D.H.Q. being three times shelled out of its Headquarters
between 30th November and 9th December.
During the whole period--20th November to 6th December--the Divisional
Artillery were constantly changing position in order to support the
infantry, either in advance or retirement, as closely as possible. It
was a welcome change to them after the many weary months of position
warfare, and it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that both
brigades and batteries were extremely ably handled, and that the
D.A.C. never left a battery short of ammunition, in spite of very long
distances and rough going.
On 10th December the Division (less artillery) was withdrawn to rest
in the Basseux area south-west of Arras, after a strenuous three
weeks.
The Divisional Artillery remained in action, covering the 18th
Division. A little later the 2nd Brigade, R.F.A., was withdrawn to
rest, but the 24th Brigade, R.F.A., continued in the line.