MATTHEW xxii. 37.
_Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart_, _and with all
thy soul_, _and with all thy mind_.
Everybody knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that there
is such a thing as having so great horror of one extreme as to run
insensibly and of course into the contrary; and that a doctrine's having
been a shelter for enthusiasm, or made to serve the purposes of
superstition, is no proof of the falsity of it: truth or right being
somewhat real in itself, and so not to be judged of by its liableness to
abuse, or by its supposed distance from or nearness to error. It may be
sufficient to have mentioned this in general, without taking notice of
the particular extravagances which have been vented under the pretence or
endeavour of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly we are got
into the contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion; so
very reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections,
if these words signify anything but the faculty by which we discern
speculative truth.
By the love of God I would understand all those regards, all those
affections of mind which are due immediately to Him from such a creature
as man, and which rest in Him as their end. As this does not include
servile fear, so neither will any other regards, how reasonable soever,
which respect anything out of or besides the perfection of the Divine
nature, come into consideration here. But all fear is not excluded,
because His displeasure is itself the natural proper object of fear.
Reverence, ambition of His love and approbation, delight in the hope or
consciousness of it, come likewise into this definition of the love of
God, because He is the natural object of all those affections or
movements of mind as really as He is the object of the affection, which
is in the strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in
Him as their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these
words of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them: for He is
speaking of the love of God and our neighbour as containing the whole of
piety and virtue.
It is plain that the nature of man is so constituted as to feel certain
affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain objects. Now the
very notion of affection implies resting in its object as an end. And
the particular affection to good characters, reverence and moral love of
them, is natural to all those who have any degree of real goodness in
themselves. This will be illustrated by the description of a perfect
character in a creature; and by considering the manner in which a good
man in his presence would be affected towards such a character. He would
of course feel the affections of love, reverence, desire of his
approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it. And surely all
this is applicable, and may be brought up to that Being, who is
infinitely more than an adequate object of all those affections; whom we
are commanded to _love with all our heart_, _with all our soul_, _and
with all our mind_. And of these regards towards Almighty God some are
more particularly suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as
man, in this mortal state we are passing through; and some of them, and
perhaps other exercises of the mind, will be the employment and happiness
of good men in a state of perfection.
This is a general view of what the following discourse will contain. And
it is manifest the subject is a real one: there is nothing in it
enthusiastical or unreasonable. And if it be indeed at all a subject, it
is one of the utmost importance.
As mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth, so we
have various affections towards external objects. Understanding and
temper, reason and affection, are as distinct ideas as reason and hunger,
and one would think could no more be confounded. It is by reason that we
get the ideas of several objects of our affections; but in these cases
reason and affection are no more the same than sight of a particular
object, and the pleasure or uneasiness consequent thereupon, are the
same. Now as reason tends to and rests in the discernment of truth, the
object of it, so the very nature of affection consists in tending
towards, and resting in, its objects as an end. We do indeed often in
common language say that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for
themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond them;
yet, in these cases, whoever will attend will see that these things are
not in reality the objects of the affections, _i.e._ are not loved,
desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further and beyond them. If we have
no affections which rest in what are called their objects, then what is
called affection, love, desire, hope, in human nature, is only an
uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet disposition to action, progress,
pursuit, without end or meaning. But if there be any such thing as
delight in the company of one person, rather than of another; whether in
the way of friendship, or mirth and entertainment, it is all one, if it
be without respect to fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of
knowledge, or anything beyond the present time; here is an instance of an
affection absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being
gratified in the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with
food. Yet nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a
man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or
in any other; nothing, I say, is more common than to hear such a question
put in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or interest, but as a
means to somewhat further: and if so, then there is no such thing at all
as real interest, gain, or advantage. This is the same absurdity with
respect to life as an infinite series of effects without a cause is in
speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest consists in the delight
itself, arising from such a faculty's having its object: neither is there
any such thing as happiness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The
pleasures of hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being
only this happiness anticipated; the latter the same happiness enjoyed
over again after its time. And even the general expectation of future
happiness can afford satisfaction only as it is a present object to the
principle of self-love.
It was doubtless intended that life should be very much a pursuit to the
gross of mankind. But this is carried so much further than is reasonable
that what gives immediate satisfaction, _i.e._ our present interest, is
scarce considered as our interest at all. It is inventions which have
only a remote tendency towards enjoyment, perhaps but a remote tendency
towards gaining the means only of enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of
as useful to the world. And though this way of thinking were just with
respect to the imperfect state we are now in, where we know so little of
satisfaction without satiety, yet it must be guarded against when we are
considering the happiness of a state of perfection; which happiness being
enjoyment and not hope, must necessarily consist in this, that our
affections have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end,
_i.e._ be satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of
this discourse.
Of the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular objects
excite in man, there are some, the having of which implies the love of
them, when they are reflected upon. {29} This cannot be said of all our
affections, principles, and motives of action. It were ridiculous to
assert that a man upon reflection hath the same kind of approbation of
the appetite of hunger or the passion of fear as he hath of goodwill to
his fellow-creatures. To be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly
carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness,
righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation.
Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in and
for itself, incidental things allowed for, it will be the same whether he
views it in his own mind or in another; in himself or in his neighbour.
This is the account of our approbation of, or moral love and affection to
good characters; which cannot but be in those who have any degrees of
real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take notice of the same
principle in others.
From observation of what passes within ourselves, our own actions, and
the behaviour of others, the mind may carry on its reflections as far as
it pleases; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, or discern in
our fellow creatures. It may go on and consider goodness as become a
uniform continued principle of action, as conducted by reason, and
forming a temper and character absolutely good and perfect, which is in a
higher sense excellent, and proportionably the object of love and
approbation.
Let us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created
nature--let his form be human, and his capacities no more than equal to
those of the chief of men--goodness shall be his proper character, with
wisdom to direct it, and power within some certain determined sphere of
action to exert it: but goodness must be the simple actuating principle
within him; this being the moral quality which is amiable, or the
immediate object of love as distinct from other affections of
approbation. Here then is a finite object for our mind to tend towards,
to exercise itself upon: a creature, perfect according to his capacity,
fixed, steady, equally unmoved by weak pity or more weak fury and
resentment; forming the justest scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed
in the execution of it, through the several methods of severity and
reward, towards his end, namely, the general happiness of all with whom
he hath to do, as in itself right and valuable. This character, though
uniform in itself, in its principle, yet exerting itself in different
ways, or considered in different views, may by its appearing variety move
different affections. Thus, the severity of justice would not affect us
in the same way as an act of mercy. The adventitious qualities of wisdom
and power may be considered in themselves; and even the strength of mind
which this immovable goodness supposes may likewise be viewed as an
object of contemplation distinct from the goodness itself. Superior
excellence of any kind, as well as superior wisdom and power, is the
object of awe and reverence to all creatures, whatever their moral
character be; but so far as creatures of the lowest rank were good, so
far the view of this character, as simply good, must appear amiable to
them, be the object of, or beget love. Further suppose we were conscious
that this superior person so far approved of us that we had nothing
servilely to fear from him; that he was really our friend, and kind and
good to us in particular, as he had occasionally intercourse with us: we
must be other creatures than we are, or we could not but feel the same
kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would be the degree of it)
from this higher acquaintance and friendship as we feel from common ones,
the intercourse being real and the persons equally present in both cases.
We should have a more ardent desire to be approved by his better
judgment, and a satisfaction in that approbation of the same sort with
what would be felt in respect to common persons, or be wrought in us by
their presence.
Let us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we are
still going on with the supposition of a creature, our proper guardian
and governor; that we were in a progress of being towards somewhat
further; and that his scheme of government was too vast for our
capacities to comprehend: remembering still that he is perfectly good,
and our friend as well as our governor. Wisdom, power, goodness,
accidentally viewed anywhere, would inspire reverence, awe, love; and as
these affections would be raised in higher or lower degrees in proportion
as we had occasionally more or less intercourse with the creature endued
with those qualities, so this further consideration and knowledge that he
was our proper guardian and governor would much more bring these objects
and qualities home to ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to
us in particular, that we had a higher interest in that wisdom and power
and goodness. We should, with joy, gratitude, reverence, love, trust,
and dependence, appropriate the character, as what we had a right in, and
make our boast in such our relation to it. And the conclusion of the
whole would be that we should refer ourselves implicitly to him, and cast
ourselves entirely upon him. As the whole attention of life should be to
obey his commands, so the highest enjoyment of it must arise from the
contemplation of this character, and our relation to it, from a
consciousness of his favour and approbation, and from the exercise of
those affections towards him which could not but be raised from his
presence. A Being who hath these attributes, who stands in this
relation, and is thus sensibly present to the mind, must necessarily be
the object of these affections: there is as real a correspondence between
them as between the lowest appetite of sense and its object.
That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that He is of
infinite power and wisdom and goodness, does not render Him less the
object of reverence and love than He would be if He had those attributes
only in a limited degree. The Being who made us, and upon whom we
entirely depend, is the object of some regards. He hath given us certain
affections of mind, which correspond to wisdom, power, goodness, _i.e._
which are raised upon view of those qualities. If then He be really
wise, powerful, good, He is the natural object of those affections which
He hath endued us with, and which correspond to those attributes. That
He is infinite in power, perfect in wisdom and goodness, makes no
alteration, but only that He is the object of those affections raised to
the highest pitch. He is not, indeed, to be discerned by any of our
senses. _I go forward_, _but He is not there_; _and backward_, _but I
cannot perceive Him_: _on the left hand where He doth work_, _but I
cannot behold Him_: _He hideth Himself on the right hand_, _that I cannot
see Him_, _Oh that I knew where I might find Him_! _that I might come
even to His seat_! {30} But is He then afar off? does He not fill heaven
and earth with His presence? The presence of our fellow-creatures
affects our senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their
presence; which hath different kinds of influence upon us--love, joy,
sorrow, restraint, encouragement, reverence. However, this influence is
not immediately from our senses, but from that knowledge. Thus suppose a
person neither to see nor hear another, not to know by any of his senses,
but yet certainly to know, that another was with him; this knowledge
might, and in many cases would, have one or more of the effects before
mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but also natural, to be
affected with a presence, though it be not the object of our senses;
whether it be, or be not, is merely an accidental circumstance, which
needs not come into consideration: it is the certainty that he is with
us, and we with him, which hath the influence. We consider persons then
as present, not only when they are within reach of our senses, but also
when we are assured by any other means that they are within such a
nearness; nay, if they are not, we can recall them to our mind, and be
moved towards them as present; and must He, who is so much more
intimately with us, that _in Him we live and move and have our being_, be
thought too distant to be the object of our affections? We own and feel
the force of amiable and worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and
can we be insensible to the contemplation of perfect goodness? Do we
reverence the shadows of greatness here below, are we solicitous about
honour and esteem and the opinion of the world, and shall we not feel the
same with respect to Him whose are wisdom and power in the original, who
_is the God of judgment by whom actions are weighed_? Thus love,
reverence, desire of esteem, every faculty, every affection, tends
towards and is employed about its respective object in common cases: and
must the exercise of them be suspended with regard to Him alone who is an
object, an infinitely more than adequate object, to our most exalted
faculties; Him, _of whom_, _and through whom_, _and to whom are all
things_?
As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business on
it, so neither can we alter our real nature. Therefore no exercise of
the mind can be recommended, but only the exercise of those faculties you
are conscious of. Religion does not demand new affections, but only
claims the direction of those you already have, those affections you
daily feel; though unhappily confined to objects not altogether
unsuitable but altogether unequal to them. We only represent to you the
higher, the adequate objects of those very faculties and affections. Let
the man of ambition go on still to consider disgrace as the greatest
evil, honour as his chief good. But disgrace in whose estimation? Honour
in whose judgment? This is the only question. If shame, and delight in
esteem, be spoken of as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure,
both these must be in proportion to the supposed wisdom, and worth of him
by whom we are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought
enthusiastical to speak of a sensibility of this sort which shall have
respect to an unerring judgment, to infinite wisdom, when we are assured
this unerring judgment, this infinite wisdom does observe upon our
actions?
It is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and most
confined sense. We only offer and represent the highest object of an
affection supposed already in your mind. Some degree of goodness must be
previously supposed; this always implies the love of itself, an affection
to goodness: the highest, the adequate object of this affection, is
perfect goodness; which therefore we are to _love with all our heart_,
_with all our soul_, _and with all our strength_. "Must we then,
forgetting our own interest, as it were go out of ourselves, and love God
for His own sake?" No more forget your own interest, no more go out of
yourselves, than when you prefer one place, one prospect, the
conversation of one man to that of another. Does not every affection
necessarily imply that the object of it be itself loved? If it be not it
is not the object of the affection. You may, and ought if you can, but
it is a great mistake to think you can love or fear or hate anything,
from consideration that such love or fear or hatred may be a means of
obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the question whether we ought to
love God for His sake or for our own being a mere mistake in language,
the real question which this is mistaken for will, I suppose, be answered
by observing that the goodness of God already exercised towards us, our
present dependence upon Him, and our expectation of future benefits,
ought, and have a natural tendency, to beget in us the affection of
gratitude, and greater love towards Him, than the same goodness exercised
towards others; were it only for this reason, that every affection is
moved in proportion to the sense we have of the object of it; and we
cannot but have a more lively sense of goodness when exercised towards
ourselves than when exercised towards others. I added expectation of
future benefits because the ground of that expectation is present
goodness.
Thus Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, love,
reverence, fear, desire of approbation. For though He is simply one, yet
we cannot but consider Him in partial and different views. He is in
himself one uniform Being, and for ever the same without _variableness or
shadow of turning_; but His infinite greatness, His goodness, His wisdom,
are different objects to our mind. To which is to be added, that from
the changes in our own characters, together with His unchangeableness, we
cannot but consider ourselves as more or less the objects of His
approbation, and really be so. For if He approves what is good, He
cannot, merely from the unchangeableness of His nature, approve what is
evil. Hence must arise more various movements of mind, more different
kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is just and
reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects a Being simply
one, good and perfect. As some of these actions are most particularly
suitable to so imperfect a creature as man in this mortal state we are
passing through, so there may be other exercises of mind, or some of
these in higher degrees, our employment and happiness in a state of
perfection.