ROM. xiii. 9.
_And if there be any other commandment_, _it is briefly comprehended
in this saying_, _namely_, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_.
Having already removed the prejudices against public spirit, or the love
of our neighbour, on the side of private interest and self-love, I
proceed to the particular explanation of the precept before us, by
showing, _Who is our neighbour_: _In what sense we are required to love
him as ourselves_; _The influence such love would have upon our behaviour
in life_; and lastly, _How this commandment comprehends in it all
others_.
I. The objects and due extent of this affection will be understood by
attending to the nature of it, and to the nature and circumstances of
mankind in this world. The love of our neighbour is the same with
charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it is an affection to the good and
happiness of our fellow-creatures. This implies in it a disposition to
produce happiness, and this is the simple notion of goodness, which
appears so amiable wherever we meet with it. From hence it is easy to
see that the perfection of goodness consists in love to the whole
universe. This is the perfection of Almighty God.
But as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of the
Creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not used to
consider things in so general a way, it is not to be thought of that the
universe should be the object of benevolence to such creatures as we are.
Thus in that precept of our Saviour, _Be ye perfect_, _even as your
Father_, _which is in heaven_, _is perfect_, {26} the perfection of the
divine goodness is proposed to our imitation as it is promiscuous, and
extends to the evil as well as the good; not as it is absolutely
universal, imitation of it in this respect being plainly beyond us. The
object is too vast. For this reason moral writers also have substituted
a less general object for our benevolence, mankind. But this likewise is
an object too general, and very much out of our view. Therefore persons
more practical have, instead of mankind, put our country, and made the
principle of virtue, of human virtue, to consist in the entire uniform
love of our country: and this is what we call a public spirit, which in
men of public stations is the character of a patriot. But this is
speaking to the upper part of the world. Kingdoms and governments are
large, and the sphere of action of far the greatest part of mankind is
much narrower than the government they live under: or however, common men
do not consider their actions as affecting the whole community of which
they are members. There plainly is wanting a less general and nearer
object of benevolence for the bulk of men than that of their country.
Therefore the Scripture, not being a book of theory and speculation, but
a plain rule of life for mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety
put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that
part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country,
which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and
with which we have to do.
This is plainly the true account or reason why our Saviour places the
principle of virtue in the love of our _neighbour_, and the account
itself shows who are comprehended under that relation.
II. Let us now consider in what sense we are commanded to love our
neighbour _as ourselves_.
This precept, in its first delivery by our Saviour, is thus
introduced:--_Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart_,
_with all thy soul_, _and with all thy strength_; _and thy neighbour as
thyself_. These very different manners of expression do not lead our
thoughts to the same measure or degree of love, common to both objects,
but to one peculiar to each. Supposing, then, which is to be supposed, a
distinct meaning and propriety in the words, _as thyself_; the precept we
are considering will admit of any of these senses: that we bear the _same
kind_ of affection to our neighbour as we do to ourselves, or, that the
love we bear to our neighbour should have _some certain proportion or
other_ to self-love: or, lastly, that it should bear the particular
proportion of _equality_, that _it be in the same degree_.
First, The precept may be understood as requiring only that we have the
_same kind_ of affection to our fellow-creatures as to ourselves; that,
as every man has the principle of self-love, which disposes him to avoid
misery, and consult his own happiness, so we should cultivate the
affection of goodwill to our neighbour, and that it should influence us
to have the same kind of regard to him. This at least must be commanded,
and this will not only prevent our being injurious to him, but will also
put us upon promoting his good. There are blessings in life, which we
share in common with others, peace, plenty, freedom, healthful seasons.
But real benevolence to our fellow-creatures would give us the notion of
a common interest in a stricter sense, for in the degree we love another,
his interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own. It is from self-love
that we form the notion of private good, and consider it is our own: love
of our neighbour would teach us thus to appropriate to ourselves his good
and welfare; to consider ourselves as having a real share in his
happiness. Thus the principle of benevolence would be an advocate within
our own breasts, to take care of the interests of our fellow-creatures in
all the interfering and competitions which cannot but be, from the
imperfection of our nature, and the state we are in. It would likewise,
in some measure, lessen that interfering, and hinder men from forming so
strong a notion of private good, exclusive of the good of others, as we
commonly do. Thus, as the private affection makes us in a peculiar
manner sensible of humanity, justice or injustice, when exercised towards
ourselves, love of our neighbour would give us the same kind of
sensibility in his behalf. This would be the greatest security of our
uniform obedience to that most equitable rule. _Whatsoever ye would that
men should do unto you_, _do ye even so unto them_.
All this is indeed no more than that we should have a real love to our
neighbour; but then, which is to be observed, the words _as thyself_
express this in the most distinct manner, and determine the precept to
relate to the affection itself. The advantage which this principle of
benevolence has over other remote considerations is, that it is itself
the temper of virtue, and likewise that it is the chief, nay, the only
effectual security of our performing the several offices of kindness we
owe to our fellow-creatures. When from distant considerations men
resolve upon any thing to which they have no liking, or perhaps an
averseness, they are perpetually finding out evasions and excuses, which
need never be wanting, if people look for them: and they equivocate with
themselves in the plainest cases in the world. This may be in respect to
single determinate acts of virtue, but it comes in much more, where the
obligation is to a general course of behaviour, and most of all, if it be
such as cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. This observation
may account for the diversity of the expression in that known passage of
the prophet Micah, _to do justly_, _and to love mercy_. A man's heart
must be formed to humanity and benevolence, he must _love mercy_,
otherwise he will not act mercifully in any settled course of behaviour.
As consideration of the future sanctions of religion is our only security
of preserving in our duty, in cases of great temptation: so to get our
heart and temper formed to a love and liking of what is good is
absolutely necessary in order to our behaving rightly in the familiar and
daily intercourses amongst mankind.
Secondly, The precept before us may be understood to require that we love
our neighbour in some certain _proportion_ or other, _according as_ we
love ourselves. And indeed a man's character cannot be determined by the
love he bears to his neighbour, considered absolutely, but the proportion
which this bears to self-love, whether it be attended to or not, is the
chief thing which forms the character and influences the actions. For,
as the form of the body is a composition of various parts, so likewise
our inward structure is not simple or uniform, but a composition of
various passions, appetites, affections, together with rationality,
including in this last both the discernment of what is right, and a
disposition to regulate ourselves by it. There is greater variety of
parts in what we call a character than there are features in a face, and
the morality of that is no more determined by one part than the beauty or
deformity of this is by one single feature: each is to be judged of by
all the parts or features, not taken singly, but together. In the inward
frame the various passions, appetites, affections, stand in different
respects to each other. The principles in our mind may be contradictory,
or checks and allays only, or incentives and assistants to each other.
And principles, which in their nature have no kind of contrariety or
affinity, may yet accidentally be each other's allays or incentives.
From hence it comes to pass, that though we were able to look into the
inward contexture of the heart, and see with the greatest exactness in
what degree any one principle is in a particular man, we could not from
thence determine how far that principle would go towards forming the
character, or what influence it would have upon the actions, unless we
could likewise discern what other principles prevailed in him, and see
the proportion which that one bears to the others. Thus, though two men
should have the affection of compassion in the same degree exactly, yet
one may have the principle of resentment or of ambition so strong in him
as to prevail over that of compassion, and prevent its having any
influence upon his actions, so that he may deserve the character of a
hard or cruel man, whereas the other having compassion in just the same
degree only, yet having resentment or ambition in a lower degree, his
compassion may prevail over them, so as to influence his actions, and to
denominate his temper compassionate. So that, how strange soever it may
appear to people who do not attend to the thing, yet it is quite manifest
that, when we say one man is more resenting or compassionate than
another, this does not necessarily imply that one has the principle of
resentment or of compassion stronger than the other. For if the
proportion which resentment or compassion bears to other inward
principles is greater in one than in the other, this is itself sufficient
to denominate one more resenting or compassionate than the other.
Further, the whole system, as I may speak, of affections (including
rationality), which constitute the heart, as this word is used in
Scripture and on moral subjects, are each and all of them stronger in
some than in others. Now the proportion which the two general
affections, benevolence and self-love, bear to each other, according to
this interpretation of the text, demonstrates men's character as to
virtue. Suppose, then, one man to have the principle of benevolence in a
higher degree than another; it will not follow from hence that his
general temper or character or actions will be more benevolent than the
other's. For he may have self-love in such a degree as quite to prevail
over benevolence, so that it may have no influence at all upon his
action, whereas benevolence in the other person, though in a lower
degree, may yet be the strongest principle in his heart, and strong
enough to be the guide of his actions, so as to denominate him a good and
virtuous man. The case is here as in scales: it is not one weight
considered in itself, which determines whether the scale shall ascend or
descend, but this depends upon the proportion which that one weight hath
to the other.
It being thus manifest that the influence which benevolence has upon our
actions, and how far it goes towards forming our character, is not
determined by the degree itself of this principle in our mind, but by the
proportion it has to self-love and other principles: a comparison also
being made in the text between self-love and the love of our neighbour;
these joint considerations afforded sufficient occasion for treating here
of that proportion. It plainly is implied in the precept, though it
should be questioned, whether it be the exact meaning of the words, as
_thyself_.
Love of our neighbour, then, must bear some proportion to self-love, and
virtue, to be sure, consists in the due proportion. What this due
proportion is, whether as a principle in the mind, or as exerted in
actions, can be judged of only from our nature and condition in this
world. Of the degree in which affections and the principles of action,
considered in themselves, prevail, we have no measure: let us, then,
proceed to the course of behaviour, the actions they produce.
Both our nature and condition require that each particular man should
make particular provision for himself: and the inquiry, what proportion
benevolence should have to self-love, when brought down to practice, will
be, what is a competent care and provision for ourselves? And how
certain soever it be that each man must determine this for himself, and
how ridiculous soever it would be for any to attempt to determine it for
another, yet it is to be observed that the proportion is real, and that a
competent provision has a bound, and that it cannot be all which we can
possibly get and keep within our grasp, without legal injustice. Mankind
almost universally bring in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of
pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority over others,
to determine this question: but every one who desires to act a proper
part in society would do well to consider how far any of them come in to
determine it, in the way of moral consideration. All that can be said
is, supposing what, as the world goes, is so much to be supposed that it
is scarce to be mentioned, that persons do not neglect what they really
owe to themselves; the more of their care and thought and of their
fortune they employ in doing good to their fellow-creatures the nearer
they come up to the law of perfection, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself_.
Thirdly, if the words _as thyself_ were to be understood of an equality
of affection, it would not be attended with those consequences which
perhaps may be thought to follow from it. Suppose a person to have the
same settled regard to others as to himself; that in every deliberate
scheme or pursuit he took their interest into the account in the same
degree as his own, so far as an equality of affection would produce this:
yet he would, in fact, and ought to be, much more taken up and employed
about himself, and his own concerns, than about others, and their
interests. For, besides the one common affection toward himself and his
neighbour he would have several other particular affections, passions,
appetites, which he could not possibly feel in common both for himself
and others. Now these sensations themselves very much employ us, and
have perhaps as great influence as self-love. So far indeed as
self-love, and cool reflection upon what is for our interest, would set
us on work to gain a supply of our own several wants, so far the love of
our neighbour would make us do the same for him: but the degree in which
we are put upon seeking and making use of the means of gratification, by
the feeling of those affections, appetites, and passions, must
necessarily be peculiar to ourselves.
That there are particular passions (suppose shame, resentment) which men
seem to have, and feel in common, both for themselves and others, makes
no alteration in respect to those passions and appetites which cannot
possibly be thus felt in common. From hence (and perhaps more things of
the like kind might be mentioned) it follows, that though there were an
equality of affection to both, yet regards to ourselves would be more
prevalent than attention to the concerns of others.
And from moral considerations it ought to be so, supposing still the
equality of affection commanded, because we are in a peculiar manner, as
I may speak, intrusted with ourselves, and therefore care of our own
interests, as well as of our conduct, particularly belongs to us.
To these things must be added, that moral obligations can extend no
further than to natural possibilities. Now we have a perception of our
own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we always
carry about with us, and which, in its continuation, kind, and degree,
seems impossible to be felt in respect to the interests of others.
From all these things it fully appears that though we were to love our
neighbour in the same degree as we love ourselves, so far as this is
possible, yet the care of ourselves, of the individual, would not be
neglected, the apprehended danger of which seems to be the only objection
against understanding the precept in this strict sense.
III. The general temper of mind which the due love of our neighbour
would form us to, and the influence it would have upon our behaviour in
life, is now to be considered.
The temper and behaviour of charity is explained at large in that known
passage of St. Paul: {27} _Charity suffereth long_, _and is kind_;
_charity envieth not_, _doth not behave itself unseemly_, _seeketh not
her own_, _thinketh no evil_, _beareth all things_, _believeth all
things_, _hopeth all things_. As to the meaning of the expressions,
_seeketh not her own_, _thinketh no evil_, _believeth all things_;
however those expressions may be explained away, this meekness, and in
some degree easiness of temper, readiness to forego our right for the
sake of peace, as well as in the way of compassion, freedom from
mistrust, and disposition to believe well of our neighbour, this general
temper, I say, accompanies, and is plainly the effect of love and
goodwill. And, though such is the world in which we live, that
experience and knowledge of it not only may, but must beget, in as
greater regard to ourselves, and doubtfulness of the characters of
others, than is natural to mankind, yet these ought not to be carried
further than the nature and course of things make necessary. It is still
true, even in the present state of things, bad as it is, that a real good
man had rather be deceived than be suspicious; had rather forego his
known right, than run the venture of doing even a hard thing. This is
the general temper of that charity, of which the apostle asserts, that if
he had it not, giving his _body to be burned would avail him nothing_;
and which he says _shall never fail_.
The happy influence of this temper extends to every different relation
and circumstance in human life. It plainly renders a man better, more to
be desired, as to all the respects and relations we can stand in to each
other. The benevolent man is disposed to make use of all external
advantages in such a manner as shall contribute to the good of others, as
well as to his own satisfaction. His own satisfaction consists in this.
He will be easy and kind to his dependents, compassionate to the poor and
distressed, friendly to all with whom he has to do. This includes the
good neighbour, parent, master, magistrate: and such a behaviour would
plainly make dependence, inferiority, and even servitude easy. So that a
good or charitable man of superior rank in wisdom, fortune, authority, is
a common blessing to the place he lives in: happiness grows under his
influence. This good principle in inferiors would discover itself in
paying respect, gratitude, obedience, as due. It were therefore,
methinks, one just way of trying one's own character to ask ourselves, am
I in reality a better master or servant, a better friend, a better
neighbour, than such and such persons, whom, perhaps, I may think not to
deserve the character of virtue and religion so much as myself?
And as to the spirit of party, which unhappily prevails amongst mankind,
whatever are the distinctions which serve for a supply to it, some or
other of which have obtained in all ages and countries, one who is thus
friendly to his kind will immediately make due allowances for it, as what
cannot but be amongst such creatures as men, in such a world as this. And
as wrath and fury and overbearing upon these occasions proceed, as I may
speak, from men's feeling only on their own side, so a common feeling,
for others as well as for ourselves, would render us sensible to this
truth, which it is strange can have so little influence, that we
ourselves differ from others, just as much as they do from us. I put the
matter in this way, because it can scarce be expected that the generality
of men should see that those things which are made the occasions of
dissension and fomenting the party-spirit are really nothing at all: but
it may be expected from all people, how much soever they are in earnest
about their respective peculiarities, that humanity and common goodwill
to their fellow-creatures should moderate and restrain that wretched
spirit.
This good temper of charity likewise would prevent strife and enmity
arising from other occasions: it would prevent our giving just cause of
offence, and our taking it without cause. And in cases of real injury, a
good man will make all the allowances which are to be made, and, without
any attempts of retaliation, he will only consult his own and other men's
security for the future against injustice and wrong.
IV. I proceed to consider, lastly, what is affirmed of the precept now
explained, that it comprehends in it all others, _i.e._, that to love our
neighbour as ourselves includes in it all virtues.
Now the way in which every maxim of conduct, or general speculative
assertion, when it is to be explained at large should be treated, is, to
show what are the particular truths which were designed to be
comprehended under such a general observation, how far it is strictly
true, and then the limitations, restrictions, and exceptions, if there be
exceptions, with which it is to be understood. But it is only the former
of these, namely, how far the assertion in the text holds, and the ground
of the pre-eminence assigned to the precept of it, which in strictness
comes into our present consideration.
However, in almost everything that is said, there is somewhat to be
understood beyond what is explicitly laid down, and which we of course
supply, somewhat, I mean, which would not be commonly called a
restriction or limitation. Thus, when benevolence is said to be the sum
of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but a principle in
reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason, for reason
and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will
lead us to consider distant consequences, as well as the immediate
tendency of an action. It will teach us that the care of some persons,
suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by
Nature and Providence, as also that there are other circumstances,
suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good
to some, preferably to others. Reason, considered merely as subservient
to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us
to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, because
it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be regarded. And
as there are numberless cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we
are not competent judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole
do good or harm, reason in the same way will teach us to be cautious how
we act in these cases of uncertainty. It will suggest to our
consideration which is the safer side; how liable we are to be led wrong
by passion and private interest; and what regard is due to laws, and the
judgment of mankind. All these things must come into consideration, were
it only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce
the greatest good. Thus, upon supposition that it were in the strictest
sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes in it all
virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and director, in order to
attain its own end, the end of benevolence, the greatest public good.
Reason, then, being thus included, let us now consider the truth of the
assertion itself.
First, It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or
any creature but happiness. This, then, is all which any person can, in
strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can therefore
_owe no man anything_, but only to farther and promote his happiness,
according to our abilities. And therefore a disposition and endeavour to
do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which
the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of
all the obligations we are under to them.
As human nature is not one simple uniform thing but a composition of
various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions, and
affections, for each of which reasonable self-love would lead men to have
due regard, and make suitable provision, so society consists of various
parts to which we stand in different respects and relations, and just
benevolence would as surely lead us to have due regard to each of these
and behave as the respective relations require. Reasonable goodwill and
right behaviour towards our fellow-creatures are in a manner the same,
only that the former expresseth the principle as it is in the mind; the
latter, the principle as it were become external, _i.e._, exerted in
actions.
And so far as temperance, sobriety, and moderation in sensual pleasures,
and the contrary vices, have any respect to our fellow-creatures, any
influence upon their quiet, welfare, and happiness, as they always have a
real, and often a near influence upon it, so far it is manifest those
virtues may be produced by the love of our neighbour, and that the
contrary vices would be prevented by it. Indeed, if men's regard to
themselves will not restrain them from excess, it may be thought little
probable that their love to others will be sufficient: but the reason is,
that their love to others is not, any more than their regard to
themselves, just, and in its due degree. There are, however, manifest
instances of persons kept sober and temperate from regard to their
affairs, and the welfare of those who depend upon them. And it is
obvious to every one that habitual excess, a dissolute course of life,
implies a general neglect of the duties we owe towards our friends, our
families, and our country.
From hence it is manifest that the common virtues and the common vices of
mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it. And this
entitles the precept, _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself_, to the
pre-eminence given to it, and is a justification of the apostle's
assertion, that all other commandments are comprehended in it, whatever
cautions and restrictions {28} there are, which might require to be
considered, if we were to state particularly and at length what is virtue
and right behaviour in mankind. But,
Secondly, It might be added, that in a higher and more general way of
consideration, leaving out the particular nature of creatures, and the
particular circumstances in which they are placed, benevolence seems in
the strictest sense to include in it all that is good and worthy, all
that is good, which we have any distinct particular notion of. We have
no clear conception of any position moral attribute in the Supreme Being,
but what may be resolved up into goodness. And, if we consider a
reasonable creature or moral agent, without regard to the particular
relations and circumstances in which he is placed, we cannot conceive
anything else to come in towards determining whether he is to be ranked
in a higher or lower class of virtuous beings, but the higher or lower
degree in which that principle, and what is manifestly connected with it,
prevail in him.
That which we more strictly call piety, or the love of God, and which is
an essential part of a right temper, some may perhaps imagine no way
connected with benevolence: yet surely they must be connected, if there
be indeed in being an object infinitely good. Human nature is so
constituted that every good affection implies the love of itself, _i.e._,
becomes the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to be
righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the
love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this
righteousness, benevolence, or goodness be viewed as in our own mind or
another's, and the love of God as a being perfectly good is the love of
perfect goodness contemplated in a being or person. Thus morality and
religion, virtue and piety, will at last necessarily coincide, run up
into one and the same point, and _love_ will be in all senses _the end of
the commandment_.
* * * * *
_O Almighty God_, _inspire us with this divine principle_; _kill in us
all the seeds of envy and ill-will_; _and help us_, _by cultivating
within ourselves the love of our neighbour_, _to improve in the love of
Thee_. _Thou hast placed us in various kindreds_, _friendships_, _and
relations_, _as the school of discipline for our affections_: _help us_,
_by the due exercise of them_, _to improve to perfection_; _till all
partial affection be lost in that entire universal one_, _and thou_, _O
God_, _shalt_ be all in all.