The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus established,
we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant by _human nature_
when virtue is said to consist in following it, and vice in deviating
from it.
As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength,
various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme
authority--the different strength of each particular member of the
society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the
subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose
it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing in
different degrees of strength, is not _that_ idea or notion of _human
nature_; but _that nature_ consists in these several principles
considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several
passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of
reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a
natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the superior
faculty whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and
take in this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human
nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon
and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; so the
constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties
or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme
over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient writers that tortures
and death are not so contrary to human nature as injustice, by this, to
be sure, is not meant that the aversion to the former in mankind is less
strong and prevalent than their aversion to the latter, but that the
former is only contrary to our nature considered in a partial view, and
which takes in only the lowest part of it, that which we have in common
with the brutes; whereas the latter is contrary to our nature, considered
in a higher sense, as a system and constitution contrary to the whole
economy of man. {7}
And from all these things put together, nothing can be more evident than
that, exclusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a creature
left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to the extent of
his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him,
which is the condition brute creatures are in; but that _from his make_,
_constitution_, _or nature_, _he is in the strictest and most proper
sense a law to himself_. He hath the rule of right within: what is
wanting is only that he honestly attend to it.
The inquiries which have been made by men of leisure after some general
rule, the conformity to or disagreement from which should denominate our
actions good or evil, are in many respects of great service. Yet let any
plain, honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask
himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or
is it evil? I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be
answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man in almost
any circumstance. Neither do there appear any cases which look like
exceptions to this, but those of superstition, and of partiality to
ourselves. Superstition may perhaps be somewhat of an exception; but
partiality to ourselves is not, this being itself dishonesty. For a man
to judge that to be the equitable, the moderate, the right part for him
to act, which he would see to be hard, unjust, oppressive in another,
this is plain vice, and can proceed only from great unfairness of mind.
But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet it
may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and follow it?"
I answer: It has been proved that man by his nature is a law to himself,
without the particular distinct consideration of the positive sanctions
of that law: the rewards and punishments which we feel, and those which
from the light of reason we have ground to believe, are annexed to it.
The question, then, carries its own answer along within it. Your
obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That
your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action is
itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to
show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own
authority with it, that it is our natural guide; the guide assigned us by
the Author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of being;
it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without
looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with
impunity.
However, let us hear what is to be said against obeying this law of our
nature. And the sum is no more than this: "Why should we be concerned
about anything out of and beyond ourselves? If we do find within
ourselves regards to others, and restraints of we know not how many
different kinds, yet these being embarrassments, and hindering us from
going the nearest way to our own good, why should we not endeavour to
suppress and get over them?"
Thus people go on with words, which when applied to human nature, and the
condition in which it is placed in this world, have really no meaning.
For does not all this kind of talk go upon supposition, that our
happiness in this world consists in somewhat quite distinct from regard
to others, and that it is the privilege of vice to be without restraint
or confinement? Whereas, on the contrary, the enjoyments--in a manner
all the common enjoyments of life, even the pleasures of vice--depend
upon these regards of one kind or another to our fellow-creatures. Throw
off all regards to others, and we should be quite indifferent to infamy
and to honour; there could be no such thing at all as ambition; and
scarce any such thing as covetousness; for we should likewise be equally
indifferent to the disgrace of poverty, the several neglects and kinds of
contempt which accompany this state, and to the reputation of riches, the
regard and respect they usually procure. Neither is restraint by any
means peculiar to one course of life; but our very nature, exclusive of
conscience and our condition, lays us under an absolute necessity of it.
We cannot gain any end whatever without being confined to the proper
means, which is often the most painful and uneasy confinement. And in
numberless instances a present appetite cannot be gratified without such
apparent and immediate ruin and misery that the most dissolute man in the
world chooses to forego the pleasure rather than endure the pain.
Is the meaning, then, to indulge those regards to our fellow-creatures,
and submit to those restraints which upon the whole are attended with
more satisfaction than uneasiness, and get over only those which bring
more uneasiness and inconvenience than satisfaction? "Doubtless this was
our meaning." You have changed sides then. Keep to this; be consistent
with yourselves, and you and the men of virtue are _in general_ perfectly
agreed. But let us take care and avoid mistakes. Let it not be taken
for granted that the temper of envy, rage, resentment, yields greater
delight than meekness, forgiveness, compassion, and good-will; especially
when it is acknowledged that rage, envy, resentment, are in themselves
mere misery; and that satisfaction arising from the indulgence of them is
little more than relief from that misery; whereas the temper of
compassion and benevolence is itself delightful; and the indulgence of
it, by doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment. Let it
not be taken for granted that the satisfaction arising from the
reputation of riches and power, however obtained, and from the respect
paid to them, is greater than the satisfaction arising from the
reputation of justice, honesty, charity, and the esteem which is
universally acknowledged to be their due. And if it be doubtful which of
these satisfactions is the greatest, as there are persons who think
neither of them very considerable, yet there can be no doubt concerning
ambition and covetousness, virtue and a good mind, considered in
themselves, and as leading to different courses of life; there can, I
say, be no doubt, which temper and which course is attended with most
peace and tranquillity of mind, which with most perplexity, vexation, and
inconvenience. And both the virtues and vices which have been now
mentioned, do in a manner equally imply in them regards of one kind or
another to our fellow-creatures. And with respect to restraint and
confinement, whoever will consider the restraints from fear and shame,
the dissimulation, mean arts of concealment, servile compliances, one or
other of which belong to almost every course of vice, will soon be
convinced that the man of virtue is by no means upon a disadvantage in
this respect. How many instances are there in which men feel and own and
cry aloud under the chains of vice with which they are enthralled, and
which yet they will not shake off! How many instances, in which persons
manifestly go through more pains and self-denial to gratify a vicious
passion, than would have been necessary to the conquest of it! To this
is to be added, that when virtue is become habitual, when the temper of
it is acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so by becoming
choice and delight. Whatever restraint and guard upon ourselves may be
needful to unlearn any unnatural distortion or odd gesture, yet in all
propriety of speech, natural behaviour must be the most easy and
unrestrained. It is manifest that, in the common course of life, there
is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is _called_
interest: it is much seldomer that there is an inconsistency between duty
and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness
and satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of
the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue, and
leads us to one and the same course of life. But, whatever exceptions
there are to this, which are much fewer than they are commonly thought,
all shall be set right at the final distribution of things. It is a
manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing finally over good, under
the conduct and administration of a perfect mined.
The whole argument, which I have been now insisting upon, may be thus
summed up, and given you in one view. The nature of man is adapted to
some course of action or other. Upon comparing some actions with this
nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to it: from comparison of
other actions with the same nature, there arises to our view some
unsuitableness or disproportion. The correspondence of actions to the
nature of the agent renders them natural; their disproportion to it,
unnatural. That an action is correspondent to the nature of the agent
does not arise from its being agreeable to the principle which happens to
be the strongest: for it may be so and yet be quite disproportionate to
the nature of the agent. The correspondence therefore, or disproportion,
arises from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in
nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward
principles. Some then are in nature and kind superior to others. And
the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to the higher
principle; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary to it.
Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles
in the nature of man; because an action may be suitable to this nature,
though all other principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if either
of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true
happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly
coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every
instance if we take in the future and the whole; this being implied in
the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who
have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own
supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at
last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present
world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has
infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his owns interest and
happiness.