ROMANS ii. 14.
_For when the Gentiles_, _which have not the law_, _do by nature the
things contained in the law_, _these_, _having not the law_, _are a
law unto themselves_.
As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise
moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature
of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only,
or more than to any other, this is a reason to believe the Author of that
nature intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the eye
was intended for us to see with. And the more complex any constitution
is, and the greater variety of parts there are which thus tend to some
one end, the stronger is the proof that such end was designed. However,
when the inward frame of man is considered as any guide in morals, the
utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in their own
temper, or anything which is the effect of particular customs, though
observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and
above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to
which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements
and affections; which principle will of course have some influence, but
which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, ought to preside
over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the
two former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity
amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with respect to their
natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to
survey with any exactness what passes within, have occasioned that it is
not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man as
of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we
understand one another when we speak of the shape of a human body: so
likewise we do when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far
soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is
therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing
them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and
would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the
practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be
considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural
conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of
things cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward feelings, and the
perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real, to
argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to
exception as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A
man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given him to see with as he
can doubt of the truth of the science of _optics_, deduced from ocular
experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame, a man can as little
doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing shameful actions as
he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as
to these inward feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in
his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that
he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken,
though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter.
There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several
principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to contribute
to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward
principle leads him to evil. These principles, propensions, or instincts
which lead him to do good are approved of by a certain faculty within,
quite distinct from these propensions themselves. All this hath been
fully made out in the foregoing discourse.
But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose of
virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to others
when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection happening to be
stronger than other principles, passions, or appetites, but likewise that
the _whole_ character be formed upon thought and reflection; that _every_
action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the
strength and prevalency of any principle or passion. What sign is there
in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from
thence) that this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and
fickle a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be
absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, without
regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call conscience,
because this does belong to our nature. For as there never was a man but
who approved one place, prospect, building, before another, so it does
not appear that there ever was a man who would not have approved an
action of humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being
quite out of the case. But interest and passion do come in, and are
often too strong for and prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as
brutes have various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end
the Author of their nature intended them for, is not man in the same
condition--with this difference only, that to his instincts (_i.e._,
appetites and passion) is added the principle of reflection or
conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following
that principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest
in them, does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey the
law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or
conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus
different men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue honour
or riches or pleasure; there are also persons whose temper leads them in
an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their fellow-
creatures, as there are others who are given to suspend their judgment,
to weigh and consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. Let
every one, then, quietly follow his nature, as passion, reflection,
appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be strongest; but let not
the man of virtue take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, the
dissolute, since these equally with him obey and follow their nature.
Thus, as in some cases we follow our nature in doing the works _contained
in the law_, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary."
Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition that men
follow their nature in the same sense, in violating the known rules of
justice and honesty for the sake of a present gratification, as they do
in following those rules when they have no temptation to the contrary.
And if this were true, that could not be so which St. Paul asserts, that
men are _by nature a law to themselves_. If by following nature were
meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be ridiculous to speak of
nature as any guide in morals; nay, the very mention of deviating from
nature would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when spoken by
way of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For did ever any
one act otherwise than as he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of
deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a
distinction, that according to them the perfection of virtue consists
therein. So that language itself should teach people another sense to
the words _following nature_ than barely acting as we please. Let it,
however, be observed that though the words _human nature_ are to be
explained, yet the real question of this discourse is not concerning the
meaning of words, any other than as the explanation of them may be
needful to make out and explain the assertion, that _every man is
naturally a law to himself_, that _every one may find within himself the
rule of right_, _and obligations to follow it_. This St. Paul affirms in
the words of the text, and this the foregoing objection really denies by
seeming to allow it. And the objection will be fully answered, and the
text before us explained, by observing that _nature_ is considered in
different views, and the word used in different senses; and by showing in
what view it is considered, and in what sense the word is used, when
intended to express and signify that which is the guide of life, that by
which men are a law to themselves. I say, the explanation of the term
will be sufficient, because from thence it will appear that in some
senses of the word _nature_ cannot be, but that in another sense it
manifestly is, a law to us.
I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle in man, without
regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus the passion of anger,
and the affection of parents to their children, would be called equally
_natural_. And as the same person hath often contrary principles, which
at the same time draw contrary ways, he may by the same action both
follow and contradict his nature in this sense of the word; he may follow
one passion and contradict another.
II. _Nature_ is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions
which are strongest, and most influence the actions; which being vicious
ones, mankind is in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious by nature.
Thus St. Paul says of the Gentiles, _who were dead in trespasses and
sins_, _and walked according to the spirit of disobedience_, _that they
were by nature the children of wrath_. {6} They could be no otherwise
_children of wrath_ by nature than they were vicious by nature.
Here, then, are two different senses of the word _nature_, in neither of
which men can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are
mentioned only to be excluded, to prevent their being confounded, as the
latter is in the objection, with another sense of it, which is now to be
inquired after and explained.
III. The apostle asserts that the Gentiles _do by NATURE the things
contained in the law_. Nature is indeed here put by way of distinction
from revelation, but yet it is not a mere negative. He intends to
express more than that by which they _did not_, that by which they _did_,
the works of the law; namely, by _nature_. It is plain the meaning of
the word is not the same in this passage as in the former, where it is
spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is spoken of as good--as that by
which they acted, or might have acted, virtuously. What that is in man
by which he is _naturally a law to himself_ is explained in the following
words: _Which show the work of the law written in their hearts_, _their
consciences also bearing witness_, _and their thoughts the meanwhile
accusing or else excusing one another_. If there be a distinction to be
made between the _works written in their hearts_, and the _witness of
conscience_, by the former must be meant the natural disposition to
kindness and compassion to do what is of good report, to which this
apostle often refers: that part of the nature of man, treated of in the
foregoing discourse, which with very little reflection and of course
leads him to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and
good part in it, unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet
since other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us
(though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a degree
equally natural, and often most prevalent, and since we have no method of
seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other is placed in us
by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely as natural, good and
right as they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter. But there
is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which
distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as
his external actions; which passes judgement upon himself and them,
pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right,
good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without
being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself,
and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly: and which, if
not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to
anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter
second and affirm its own. But this part of the office of conscience is
beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It is by this faculty,
natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself,
but this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in
his heart, which is to have some influence as well as others, but
considered as a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others,
and which bears its own authority of being so.
This _prerogative_, this _natural supremacy_, of the faculty which
surveys, approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind and
actions of our lives, being that by which men _are a law to themselves_,
their conformity or disobedience to which law of our nature renders their
actions, in the highest and most proper sense, natural or unnatural, it
is fit it be further explained to you; and I hope it will be so, if you
will attend to the following reflections.
Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the
present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way disproportionate
to, and violate his real proper nature. Suppose a brute creature by any
bait to be allured into a snare, by which he is destroyed. He plainly
followed the bent of his nature, leading him to gratify his appetite:
there is an entire correspondence between his whole nature and such an
action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose a man, foreseeing
the same danger of certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of a
present gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest
desire, as did the brute creature; but there would be as manifest a
disproportion between the nature of a man and such an action as between
the meanest work of art and the skill of the greatest master in that art;
which disproportion arises, not from considering the action singly in
_itself_, or in its _consequences_, but from _comparison_ of it with the
nature of the agent. And since such an action is utterly
disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the strictest and most
proper sense unnatural; this word expressing that disproportion.
Therefore, instead of the words _disproportionate to his nature_, the
word _unnatural_ may now be put; this being more familiar to us: but let
it be observed that it stands for the same thing precisely.
Now what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he
went against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered
_merely_ as a part of his nature? No; for if he had acted the contrary
way, he would equally have gone against a principle, or part of his
nature--namely, passion or appetite. But to deny a present appetite,
from foresight that the gratification of it would end in immediate ruin
or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural action: whereas to
contradict or go against cool self-love for the sake of such
gratification is so in the instance before us. Such an action then being
unnatural, and its being so not arising from a man's going against a
principle or desire barely, nor in going against that principle or desire
which happens for the present to be strongest, it necessarily follows
that there must be some other difference or distinction to be made
between these two principles, passion and cool self-love, than what I
have yet taken notice of. And this difference, not being a difference in
strength or degree, I call a difference in _nature_ and in _kind_. And
since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails over self-
love the consequent action is unnatural, but if self-love prevails over
passion the action is natural, it is manifest that self-love is in human
nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without
violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act
conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must
govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may
have a clear conception of the _superior nature_ of one inward principle
to another, and see that there really is this natural superiority, quite
distinct from degrees of strength and prevalency.
Let us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of
various appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle of
reflection or conscience, leaving quite out all consideration of the
different degrees of strength in which either of them prevails, and it
will further appear that there is this natural superiority of one inward
principle to another, and that it is even part of the idea of reflection
or conscience.
Passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such and
such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are to be
obtained. Consequently it will often happen there will be a desire of
particular objects, in cases where they cannot be obtained without
manifest injury to others. Reflection or conscience comes in, need
disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances; but the desire
remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? Cannot this
question be answered, from the economy and constitution of human nature
merely, without saying which is strongest? Or need this at all come into
consideration? Would not the question be _intelligibly_ and fully
answered by saying that the principle of reflection or conscience being
compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the
former is manifestly superior and chief, without regard to strength? And
how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it is mere _usurpation_:
the former remains in nature and in kind its superior; and every instance
of such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and
violation of the constitution of man.
All this is no more than the distinction, which everybody is acquainted
with, between _mere power_ and _authority_: only instead of being
intended to express the difference between what is possible and what is
lawful in civil government, here it has been shown applicable to the
several principles in the mind of man. Thus that principle by which we
survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and
actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some
influence--which may be said of every passion, of the lowest
appetites--but likewise as being superior, as from its very nature
manifestly claiming superiority over all others, insomuch that you cannot
form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment,
direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea--that
is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very
economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it
had right; had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would
absolutely govern the world.
This gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what course
of life we were made for: not only that our real nature leads us to be
influenced in some degree by reflection and conscience, but likewise in
what degree we are to be influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and
act agreeably to, the constitution of our nature: that this faculty was
placed within to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under
principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and
office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate
and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they
cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot
otherwise gratify--this makes no alteration as to the _natural right_ and
_office_ of conscience.
Let us now turn this whole matter another way, and suppose there was no
such thing at all as this natural supremacy of conscience--that there was
no distinction to be made between one inward principle and another, but
only that of strength--and see what would be the consequence.
Consider, then, what is the latitude and compass of the actions of man
with regard to himself, his fellow-creatures, and the Supreme Being? What
are their bounds, besides that of our natural power? With respect to the
two first, they are plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery, as
such, for himself; and no one unprovoked does mischief to another for its
own sake. For in every degree within these bounds, mankind knowingly,
from passion or wantonness, bring ruin and misery upon themselves and
others. And impiety and profaneness--I mean what every one would call so
who believes the being of God--have absolutely no bounds at all. Men
blaspheme the Author of nature, formally and in words renounce their
allegiance to their Creator. Put an instance, then, with respect to any
one of these three. Though we should suppose profane swearing, and in
general that kind of impiety now mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it
implies wanton disregard and irreverence towards an infinite Being our
Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of man as reverence and
dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty Being? Or suppose a
man guilty of parricide, with all the circumstances of cruelty which such
an action can admit of. This action is done in consequence of its
principle being for the present strongest; and if there be no difference
between inward principles, but only that of strength, the strength being
given you have the whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to
this matter. The action plainly corresponds to the principle, the
principle being in that degree of strength it was: it therefore
corresponds to the whole nature of the man. Upon comparing the action
and the whole nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no
unsuitableness, between them. Thus the _murder of a father_ and the
_nature of man_ correspond to each other, as the same nature and an act
of filial duty. If there be no difference between inward principles, but
only that of strength, we can make no distinction between these two
actions, considered as the actions of such a creature; but in our coolest
hours must approve or disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be
reduced to a greater absurdity.