"You will have read the answer of Lord Palmerston to the memorandum of

October 8. It is an important matter. His disdain for us is obvious,

and is not even disguised by forms or ceremonies. It seems, moreover,

that this feeling towards us has grown remarkably of late. None the

less the note has caused much embarrassment to M. Guizot, who had told

everybody that since his entry upon office the situation in England

had entirely changed and that Lord Palmerston was an altered

character. He summed up his views in these words: 'I have peace in my

pocket.' This is how he explained Lord Palmerston's note when he was

talking at the house of the President of the Chamber[141] two days

ago: 'Lord Palmerston has a theological mind; he will let no

objection pass without an answer, so that this note means nothing;

it is merely a question of principle.' M. Dubois, of the

Loire-Inférieure, who is a clever man, and a strong supporter of the

new Ministry, then took M. Guizot aside and told him that he would be

making a great mistake if he repeated that observation in the Chamber.

M. Guizot merely answered by repeating his statement, with which he

was so delighted that he caused it to be inserted that evening in his

own newspaper, _Le Messager_, in the form of a note at the foot of the

memorandum, merely suppressing the term 'theological.' At the same

time the incident has caused some stir, which has not yet died away,

and would make M. Guizot cut a ridiculous figure if things seemed what

they are in this country. The Ministry proposes to make peace, and

everybody thinks that it will be successful. After that it will

perish, for no obvious reason, in a hurricane; this also seems to be

generally believed. Then M. Molé, who now remains in isolation, will

come to power. He will probably be welcomed by every one, not because

he is any more popular in the Chamber than he used to be, but because

every one's energy is exhausted, while the King remains master. The

matter will depend upon the King, who is ill-disposed to M. Molé at

this moment, and uttered a remark concerning him which others

attribute to M. Guizot, but which is too good to come from more than

one source: 'M. Molé is an excellent looker-on, but is a bad actor.' I

have an idea that the remark is mine, and that some one stole it from

me five years ago.

[141] M. Sauzet.

"The Syrian campaign is decidedly favourable to the allies. The

English have displayed much energy. They are inducing the Turks to

strike hard, and everything is yielding before them; the force of

Ibrahim was a myth. At every moment we are expecting the news of the

capture of Saint-Jean d'Acre, which will be an important success both

here and there. The saddest part of it is that there is no certainty

concerning the possible safety of Egypt. Already rumours are present

of a probable revolt at Alexandria, of the assassination of the Pasha

by knife or poison; while you have seen that Lord Palmerston, with his

theological mind, no longer speaks of the deposition of the Pasha as

he did three weeks ago. There is no certainty that we shall not yield

upon that point here, and it would be a tremendous concession.

"So much for the present. I now turn to the past. Thiers has shrunk in

everybody's eyes: his timidity has been invariably as great as his

imprudence and his superficiality. He dismissed the French Consul at

Beyrout because he wished to serve the Pasha in Syria by calming the

revolt, and it has never been possible to induce him to send reliable

agents to Syria for the purpose of finding out the exact extent of

Ibrahim's power. Hence we have been deceived, and the attitude of

France has been guided by unrealised expectations. M. de Broglie

thinks that the King was greatly mistaken in dismissing the Ministry

of M. Thiers, because he would in any case have fallen a victim to

public ridicule at this moment. This opinion is based upon the fact

that if one stakes a large sum upon one card and it does not appear

the ridicule is universal. The person to whom he was speaking on the

matter yesterday evening thought, on the other hand, that while the

Chamber might fear war, it would never have been strong enough to

overthrow the Cabinet.

"The speech drawn up by Thiers did not propose a new levy of a hundred

and fifty thousand men, but merely wished to anticipate the new levy

by three months, whether for peace or for war, this being the levy

ordinarily made in the spring. Moreover, the tone of the speech was

quite moderate; but the fact is that neither he nor the King was

sincere and it was a mere pretext on either side.

"There was a Ministerial crisis, of which we had no suspicion, after

the capture of Beyrout. The Ministry wished to make a demonstration by

sending the fleet to Alexandria, but the King was opposed to this

idea. M. de Broglie was asked to mediate between the two parties, and

patched the matter up, on the theory that it was impossible at that

moment to appoint a permanent Ministry if those in power resigned upon

such a question. He was also opposed to the idea of sending a fleet to

Alexandria, believing that the measure was good in itself, as likely

to cause the allies anxiety while giving them no reason for complaint,

and thinking it a measure which an absolute Government would have

every right to carry out; but in French practice, on the other hand,

as soon as this measure had been executed, the Press would have driven

the fleet into action, whether they wished or not, and war would have

been the result. All this argument, in any case, is based upon the

fact that this measure or anything like it could only be carried out

by violent means of which the public must hear, such as a resignation,

a crisis, and so forth. If the matter had been quietly arranged with

the private knowledge of the King, the case would have been very

different. Moreover, M. de Broglie is by no means well disposed

towards the King. He says, however, that it is all a matter of

indifference to him apart from the outward disturbance; that he will

support any possible Ministry, that not only will he make no attempt

to overthrow them, but will not even try to shake their stability,

seeing that any of the said Ministries are always more reasonable than

the Chamber. In short, he says that he is part of the Ministerial

suite, an avowal which no one had yet ventured to make, and that he

greatly envies you the prospect of spending his winter in the country.

His calmness is quite Olympian, though tempered with bitter and

piercing irony.

"M. Guizot tells his friends in confidence that he has induced M. de

Broglie to accept the London Embassy. I believe nothing of the kind,

but I forgot to ask him yesterday evening. M. Molé seemed to me to be

utterly cast down; he is a kind of Jeremiah singing madrigals, and is

greatly changed."

_Rochecotte, November 22, 1840._--Yesterday my son-in-law wrote to his

wife saying that the diplomatic correspondence was read privately

before the Commission of the Address in the Chamber of Deputies. It

represents M. Thiers as an incompetent and impossible Minister, M.

Guizot as a wise ambassador and a dangerous auxiliary, Lord Palmerston

as a resolute and strong character; it shows that Thiers had

attempted to deceive and blind the eyes of every one and to take them

in, and was simply laughed at, as also was France. He also writes that

the Duc d'Orléans made his little impromptu speech before the Chamber

of Peers with admirable tact, grace, and nobility.

Another note has been received from Lord Palmerston, milder in tone

than the former, but still raising anxiety upon the Egyptian question.

M. Mounier has been officially sent to London to try and secure some

concession.

My son Valençay writes to me to say that Madame de Nesselrode is at

Paris for six weeks; that she will not appear at Court, and therefore

will not go into society, but will live quietly by herself, and is

delighted with her idea. I do not know whether Count Nesselrode will

be equally delighted.

_Rochecotte, November 23, 1840._--My son-in-law writes that M.

Walewski, who had been sent to Egypt as an envoy to Ibrahim, thought

that he was still writing despatches for the Ministry of March 1, and

had announced that in spite of all his efforts he could not induce

Ibrahim to pass the Taurus. This despatch seems to be causing a great

sensation.

_Rochecotte, November 24, 1840._--My son-in-law writes: "There is a

vague rumour that some arrangement will be made in Syria and Egypt

which will not be the ruin of the Pasha. This is in consequence of his

complete submission to the Powers, but we shall boast of it here, and

the majority will appear to believe it. For some time past there have

been terrible arguments between Thiers and Guizot, face to face, and

the worst of it is for them both that the bystanders support one of

them against the other; consequently they will dig the pit in which

they will both fall. Thiers is almost entirely ruined, and Guizot will

be in the spring after he has refused, as he will, to pave the way for

M. Molé, who will certainly enter upon office if the King wishes."

_Rochecotte, November 25, 1840._--I have been reading with admiration

the noble farewell of Queen Christina to the Spanish nation.[142] It

seems to belong to another time and to an age when there was still

something divine in the language of kings. This touching manifesto is

said to have been drawn up by Señor de Offalia, who has also left

Spain.

[142] This manifesto of Queen Christina to the Spanish nation

will be found in the Appendix.

_Rochecotte, November 26, 1840._--What a dreadful speech M. Dupin has

made! I am certainly the most peaceful creature in France, but I

cannot understand how any one can descend to such depths. A descent so

useless, so tactless, and so clumsy that it really seems as if he were

trying to win a wager.

The wife of the Marshal d'Albuféra tells me that the Comtesse de

Nesselrode met M. Thiers at her house, and that he put out all his

efforts to charm the Comtesse. Madame de Nesselrode takes such sudden

fancies that she might get excited even over M. Thiers.

The English have captured Saint-Jean d'Acre. Their little Queen has

been confined of a daughter.[143]

[143] Victoria, Crown Princess of Great Britain and Ireland, was

born on November 21, 1840. By her marriage with Prince Frederick

William of Prussia she afterwards became Empress of Germany. She

was the mother of the Emperor William II.

_Rochecotte, November 28, 1840._--The Duc de Noailles writes: "You

will see by reading the reports of yesterday's session in the Chamber

of Deputies the excitement which pervaded the assembly. This

establishes and confirms peace with disgrace. These events will be a

heavy burden upon the future of the present dynasty. I think that the

consequence at home will be a kind of reform in the Chamber, which

will produce a dissolution, and also another Chamber, in which we

shall be forced to endure a Left Ministry led by Thiers."

Madame Mollien writes to me: "Queen Christina is pretty; her

complexion is superb, her skin fine and white; she has a gentle look

and a clever and gracious smile, but those who wish to think her

charming must look no lower than her head; in full detail she is

almost a monstrosity, quite as much as her sister the Infanta. She

came to France unattended by any of her ladies, though the newspapers

are pleased to speak of some Doña, who, if she does exist, is probably

nothing but a chambermaid. At Paris there are some Spanish ladies who

will perform some kind of attendance upon her; at the present moment

the Duchess of Berwick is so acting. Her suite is composed of only two

men, who are both young; one especially, the Count of Raquena, does

not seem to be more than twenty. He is a little man with fair

moustaches, and looks like a comedy lieutenant. I do not know when the

Queen will start. She says she is very happy here. I am afraid she

will be too happy and stay too long. These royal visits always cause a

certain amount of disturbance, which soon wearies the inhabitants of

the Tuileries. She dines there every day, though she is staying in the

royal palace. Her interview with her sister was very cold, but it

passed off without any scene, and nothing more was expected."

The Duchesse de Bauffremont sent me news of the marriage of her

grandson with the second Mlle. d'Aubusson; the eldest daughter is

marrying Prince Marc de Beauvau. Gontran's marriage will not take

place for a year, as the young lady is only fifteen; she will be

enormously rich. Her mother is Mlle. de Boissy. Her father has been

ill for ten years, and his property is in the hands of executors.

Gontran is not yet nineteen, and a very handsome young fellow.

_Rochecotte, November 29, 1840._--The day before yesterday the

_Journal des Débats_ was very curiously filled with the speeches of M.

Passy and M. Guizot, throughout which M. Thiers must have felt himself

somewhat uneasy. On the whole these explanations are not very

creditable to the cleverness of any one except to the skill and the

dignified tenacity of Lord Palmerston. It appears to me that all the

French actors have emerged from the business somewhat bespattered,

including even the little Bourqueney.

_Rochecotte, November 30, 1840._--The discussions in the Chamber have

induced me to read the newspaper through, and I am not sorry, for it

is a curious drama, though one in which the situation is more

interesting than the people, whose appearance becomes ever more

threadbare as they adopt the most certain means of degradation, want

of straightforwardness, simplicity, and truth in their dealings.

Moreover, this discussion is like the Day of Judgment; whether they

like it or not, every one is stripped of his fine feathers, and truth

is forced to the forefront. Hitherto M. Villemain seems to me to speak

the truth in the most suitable and striking language, but he is only

in a position to speak for one side of the matter, though this, in my

opinion, is the side to which blame chiefly attaches.

_Rochecotte, December 1, 1840._--The Duc de Noailles tells me: "I had

a long talk yesterday with M. Guizot, and I told him that recent

events and all that discussion has brought forth will considerably

complicate the present situation for a long time. He thinks, on the

contrary, that the difficulties are only momentary, and that public

feeling upon this question will be as short-lived as it was upon the

Polish war eight years ago.[144] I also had a long talk with Berryer

concerning his speech; he is thinking it over, and has some good

ideas; his conclusion will probably give the Ministry a set-back. He

will say that war is obviously impossible at this moment, but that

peace as formulated by the Ministry is not acceptable to the Chamber,

and that the Address should be referred to a new commission. Odilon

Barrot and M. Dufaure have already proposed this idea, which might

easily become popular. I also met Thiers at the Chamber, and walked

about for ten minutes with him. I reminded him that I had already

prophesied the events that have come to pass, because in this great

business nothing could be done without alliances, while France was

united to an ally who was opposed to her interests and obviously

likely to abandon her. He replied that France even alone could have

prevented action, at the expense, however, of great energy and a

large display of force. He throws the whole responsibility upon the

King; he says that it is a case of inertia upon the throne, and that

with inertia in high places and also naturally ingrained in the

nation, nothing can be done; that if the Duc d'Orléans had been King

the course of events would have been different; that he would perhaps

have perished, but have perished with dignity, and would not have left

France in her present state of humiliation and hopelessness, in which

she will long continue. In any case, he is entirely devoted to the

Left, and M. Odilon Barrot drew the bonds tighter yesterday. Madame de

Lieven is, I think, really attached to Guizot, for she no longer goes

to the sessions of the Chamber, and confines herself to asking news of

them with much anxiety."

[144] A conflict arising from the revolution of July 1830 broke

out in Poland, where the Russians and the insurgents fought

terrible battles under the walls of Warsaw. On September 7, 1831,

Warsaw was obliged to capitulate in spite of a desperate

resistance, and the event caused great grief and sympathy

throughout France. An attempt was made to begin a revolt in Paris

and to overthrow the Ministry of Casimir-Perier, who had

recognised the impossibility of supporting Poland.

I now come to an extract from a letter from the Princesse de Lieven

herself: "Thiers seems to have decided that he will no longer serve

the King. He says that he will wait for the Duc d'Orléans. Syria is

lost for the Pasha. It is hoped and believed that he will yield to the

summons of the English Admiral Stopford. I suppose that the French

Government is advising him to do so; then the matter will be concluded

with no glory for France, we must admit, and with every credit to Lord

Palmerston. There are many people who strongly object to this latter

result. The Ministers here expect a decent majority of fifty or sixty

in favour of the Address, after which they will get on as well as they

can. M. Guizot seems very tired, but is full of courage. At Vienna

people are delighted with the change of Ministry and full of

confidence in the present Ministers. I have no news of public opinion

as yet from St. Petersburg. I am a little curious to hear what our

Russian public will say about this great affair which has been settled

without any active interference on the part of us Russians; it will

cause us some astonishment. You will probably ask me whether there is

a Russian public; the question is not unreasonable, but there is one,

as far as the East is concerned. When I was at London as Ambassadress

I ventured to call Turkey our Portugal; my own Court much appreciated

the epigram, but the English did not. No haste is shown here to

nominate a London Ambassador; I think they would prefer the Egyptian

business to be settled first. We shall certainly have to wait until

the middle of December. Madame de Flahaut does not know what to do,

torn as she is by the whims and fancies which are natural to her and

the extreme desire of her husband for a diplomatic post. The King

greatly wished his ambassadors to call upon Queen Christina in a body;

many of them felt scruples upon the point, but at length they decided

to go, regarding her as nothing more than the widow of Ferdinand VII.,

and in fact she is nothing more now. The Queen of England is said to

have had a very easy confinement, and will probably have seventeen

children like her grandmother. Madame de Nesselrode lives at the

Chamber of Deputies; she is in love with Thiers, and has joined the

Opposition extremists; she is finding life quite pleasant here. I see

very little of her as her time is taken up with the debates in the

Chamber and with theatres. My ambassador is crushed beneath the weight

of all the great Russian ladies who are grouped together in Paris. I

am sorry for him, for I can believe that it is entirely tiresome."

I would have been ready to make a bet that Madame de Nesselrode would

conceive a violent fancy for Thiers, if it were only to rival Madame

de Lieven's fancy for Guizot. After reading the speech of M. Barrot

and the series of invectives which he aimed directly at Guizot, I

began to wonder yesterday how such things could be said and heard

without leading to further explanations by means of swords and

pistols.

_Rochecotte, December 3, 1840._--The following are the most important

passages from the bulletin sent by M. de Salvandy, under date December

1, before and during the session of the Chamber. He says: "Have you

heard at Rochecotte a pleasant epigram by Garnier Pagès, who is to

speak to-day? 'I would strip them both, and their ugliness would then

be obvious.' This epigram very well sums up the situation. M. Thiers

retains his revolutionary attitude, but that is all; he remains

incompetent to many and impossible to all. M. Guizot is far from

having gained all that M. Thiers has lost. He has immense talent,

admirable strength of mind in times of storm, the gift of overaweing

all hostile revolts in the Assembly, and the art of raising the minds

of his audience to consider questions with him upon a higher plane and

from a wider point of view; these are his special advantages, though

he has never made the best of them. Yet he grows stronger, though he

raises no defences, and rests his power upon the majority without

permanently establishing it. The soil declines to be cultivated. M.

Thiers is like a mistress who is asked only to behave herself;

anything will be permitted to him, and his reputation will not suffer.

M. Guizot is the woman of strict morals who has been a failure and is

blamed for everything. This struggle between the Ambassador and the

Minister, in spite of attempts to soften it, does harm to the Chamber

and to public opinion. He is not even pardoned for his firm resolve to

abandon the principles of the Coalition, as if people would have

preferred him faithful to infidelity personified. The speech of

Dufaure seems to many people a manifesto intervening between the

Cabinet and M. Thiers; the action of Passy and Dupin in this direction

has caused much anxiety. My name is coupled with this movement because

no one imagines that Ministers in retirement are not displeased to be

employed. M. Molé is represented as hovering above all, although he

has no connection with the sphere in which the Ministry of May 12

predominates, for that Ministry, I think, regards it as a point of

honour to preserve its consistency by holding aloof from M. Molé, as

Jaubert thinks to remain consistent by retaining his seat among the

others, whom he wounds and annoys by his constant outcries against the

King and his enthusiasm for M. Barrot. Such is our position. The

ground seems to be crumbling beneath us. Alas for our country, which

should be strong and cannot be governed! Our Chamber is really the

OEil de Bœuf of the democracy.[145] Favourites, male and female,

disturb everything by their intrigues, and spend the time in

overthrowing one another, with the result that ruin is universal. I am

going to the Chamber, where MM. de Lamartine and Berryer will cross

swords, and shall close this letter there.

[145] An allusion to the OEil de Bœuf in the castle of

Versailles, where Court intrigues were hatched.

"_P.S._--Berryer has just spoken, a clever, brilliant, and perfidious

speech. He has protected Thiers by going straightway to the Tuileries.

There he has displayed his thunderbolts and launched anathemas against

M. Guizot the Ambassador, which have been definitely applauded three

times by the Assembly. M. de Lamartine is now rising to reply."

_Rochecotte, December 4, 1840._--The speech of M. Berryer shows the

state of the country from one point of view and that of M. de

Lamartine from another. These two speeches seem to me to be the most

brilliant effort on the part of one orator and the most lofty on the

part of the other that the whole discussion upon the Address has

produced. M. de Lamartine, for whom in general I have but a moderate

liking, greatly pleased me with his reply which seems to be wise, well

supported by facts, well thought out, and well delivered, with

excellent touches of straightforward feeling, which had its effect

upon the Assembly.

We are assured that the mission of M. Mounier to London is intended to

secure the help of England for the proposal of a marriage between the

innocent Isabella with her cousin Carlos, Prince of Asturias.

The remains of Napoleon have now been brought to Cherbourg. In Paris

no preparations are said to have yet been made for this ceremony,

which in my opinion will be very ridiculous.

_Rochecotte, December 5, 1840._--Yesterday I had a letter from M.

Royer Collard, from which the following is a striking extract: "A week

ago, madame, I was a prisoner in the Chamber, following a great debate

upon the Address with close interest. The audience have alternately

expressed dissatisfaction with the chief actors, but not from the same

point of view. The faults of Thiers are those of the Minister, and the

faults of Guizot those of the man. I do not know whether you noticed

in the newspapers that I was led to make a declaration in Guizot's

favour which he greatly needed, as he was in a difficulty, for no one

believed a word of what he was saying, although he spoke the truth.

The next day he came over to my place to thank me, boldly crossing the

whole Chamber for the purpose. I did not accept his thanks, and told

him that I had done nothing for him, but had been thinking only of

myself. He then buttonholed me in a corridor. I maintained a distant

attitude and refused to converse. The difference between the two men

is that Providence has not granted Thiers the power of distinguishing

between good and evil; Guizot has this power, but will not use it. He

is therefore the more guilty, but not, perhaps, the more dangerous. If

one could regard any decision of to-day as irrevocable, I should say

that they are both utterly ruined. I wish they were, but I am not sure

of it."

My son-in-law hears that the effect of Berryer's speech has been

tremendous. It seems to have dealt a death-blow to M. Guizot, and a

vigorous thrust in higher quarters. The Carlists are overjoyed. I am

inclined to think that they regard the event as more important than it

really is. Thiers loudly praises Berryer, and tells any one who will

listen to him that in point of art nothing is superior to it, and that

in 1789 no better performance was achieved.

The Princesse de Lieven, to whom some one related the thrust that

Guizot had received, answered that he had not been hit.

It is said that the ceremony in honour of the remains of Napoleon will

take place on the 15th of this month. How opportunely his ghost

arrives!

_Rochecotte, December 6, 1840._--I hear from a correspondent: "I have

no certain confirmation of Demidoff's death, but I know from a sure

source that he had a very unpleasant journey to Rome, and afterwards

some harassing interviews with the Cardinal's Secretary of State and

with the Russian Minister, after which he was obliged to leave the

Papal States, in accordance with orders. The consequent excitement

then caused him one of his worst attacks. Apparently he told a Greek

priest that his children would all be brought up in the Greek

religion, while he told the Catholic authorities that they would be

brought up as Catholics. Moreover, he said, with his usual assurance,

that with money anything could be gained from the Court of Rome, and

that he had sent a hundred thousand francs to the Pope for the

dispensations which he has procured. Cardinal Lambruschini, indignant

at this story, inserted an article in the _Gazette romaine_, which has

been circulated everywhere, and which denies the statement, affirming

very positively that M. Demidoff only paid ninety francs for his

dispensations--namely, the cost of their postage. The Russian Minister

then refused to intercede with the Roman Court on behalf of Demidoff.

Demidoff abused him, in consequence, and after all this fine

performance was obliged to leave Rome; and if he is not dead with fury

he is none the less in an awkward position."

_Rochecotte, December 7, 1840._--The chief news of the day is the

rejection of M. Odilon Barrot's amendment by a majority of more than a

hundred.

One or two clever epigrams current at Paris are these: MM. Jaubert and

Duvergier de Hauranne--in short, the Doctrinaire section that has gone

over to the Left--are known as the unrestrained schismatics from the

Doctrine. In other circles partisans of Mgr. Affre, the Archbishop of

Paris, are known as the _affreux_ (frightful). People must have their

joke.

_Rochecotte, December 9, 1840._--Madame Mollien informs me that, as

the Address is now voted, men's minds are beginning to turn to the

ceremony of the Remains, as the people of Paris call it. The expenses

of the ceremony will amount to a million; thousands of workmen are

busy day and night with preparations, and thousands of loafers spend

their time looking on until nightfall. What foolishness all this

comedy is, coming at such a time and in such circumstances! I think

that the rock of St. Helena would have been a more fitting sepulchre,

and perhaps a safer resting-place, than Paris, with its storms and

revolutions.

_Rochecotte, December 10, 1840._--M. Raullin writes to say that the

Stock Exchange gambling was discussed at the session of the Chamber,

and M. Thiers actually wept. He also says that the hatred and acrimony

which embroil all these people is quite unparalleled, and that it is

impossible to talk with any one unless you share their particular form

of madness. Thiers wished to fight a duel with M. de Givré, which was

prevented by Rémusat. M. Jaubert is also slightly infected by the

disease. Madame Dosne is in bed, a result of the effects of the last

session of the Chamber at which she was present. The revelations made

upon the subject of the Stock Exchange gambling have overwhelmed her.

M. de Saint-Aulaire writes from Vienna saying that he is going to

stand for election to the French Academy; he displays great disgust

with public affairs, and there is every probability that this feeling

will become general.

_Rochecotte, December 13, 1840._--Yesterday, as my solitude was more

complete than usual, I returned, as I constantly do, to my

recollections of the past. It occurred to me to write a few lines upon

certain mental characteristics of M. de Talleyrand, as follows:

His mind was strong, but his conscience was weak, for it needed

enlightenment. The age in which he lived, his education, and the

position into which he was forced were all incompatible with that

reflection which can illuminate the soul. His natural want of

sensitiveness also disinclined him for the serious work of

self-examination and left him in darkness. Thus his unusual mental

powers were entirely devoted to political interests. He was swept away

by the terrible movement of his age, and threw the whole of his

energies into it. If stress was required his energy was great; he

could live without repose and rest, and deprived others of it as well

as himself, but when he had attained his object he would relapse into

a lengthy indifference, upon which he cleverly prevented any

encroachment. He could be idle so gracefully that no one could disturb

him without self-reproach, but he had a keen and accurate eye for a

situation and a penetrating perception of its possibilities, while his

mind was tempered with excellent common sense. When he took action he

worked but slowly at first, but with rapidity and precipitation as the

crisis approached. The attitude of carelessness, which he abandoned as

little as possible, was most disastrous to him in private life, for he

carried it to excess. His door was always open, his rooms were

constantly invaded, while his indifference to the reliability and

moral worth of the men who made their way to him was deplorable. At

the same time he saw everything through his half-closed eyes, but he

took little trouble to judge men, and even less to avoid those of whom

he thought least. In conversation, if he felt no need of opposition,

he allowed people to talk or act as they would, but if he felt himself

attacked he was immediately aroused, and the answer was a crushing

blow; he overthrew his opponent on the spot, though he never retained

any bitterness of feeling for him. He speedily relapsed into his

indifference, and as easily forgot an impropriety as he sincerely

pardoned an insult. In any case, he was rarely called upon to defend

himself. His dignity was natural and simple, so well protected by his

reputation, his great past, and by the apparent indolence which was

known to be only a mask, that I have rarely seen even the worst

characters venture to show their true nature with him. I have often

heard him say with real satisfaction: "I was a Minister under the

Directory; all the hobnailed boots of the Revolution have tramped

through my room, but no one ever ventured upon familiarity with me."

He spoke the truth; even his nearest and dearest addressed him only

with respectful deference. I am, moreover, convinced that his

overpowering dignity was supported by a natural characteristic which

could be felt even beneath his indolence. This was a cool courage and

presence of mind, a bold temperament and instinctive bravery which

inspires an irresistible taste for danger in any form, which makes

risk attractive and hazard delightful. Beneath the nobility of his

features, the slowness of his movements, and his luxurious habits

there was a depth of audacious boldness which sometimes peeped out,

revealed a wholly different order of capacities, and made him by

force of contrast one of the most original and most attractive

characters.

_Rochecotte, December 14, 1840._--Among the letters which I received

yesterday I had one from Berlin from M. Bresson, who says: "Frankfort

is by no means a misfortune for Herr von Bülow; he has long desired it

for private reasons; the post ranks as at least equal to that of

London. The strange outcome of Eastern events has restored the credit

of those responsible for the negotiations. The men who made the

loudest outcry against Bülow are to-day warmest in his praises. We are

so indulgent to those who show daring that I am myself inclined to

regard them as correct. Humboldt has no political influence over the

King of Prussia; no one has any as yet, and it is impossible to say

exactly at present what attitude he will adopt. Some recent

nominations of members of the Pietists have slightly damaged his

popularity; his liking for them is not shared by the country. Lord

William Russell extends the area of his amusements more and more; he

is now divided between three ladies, one of whom attracts him with

some frequency to Mecklenburg. Prince Wittgenstein no longer takes any

share in public business; he has had several attacks and will not live

long. I need not tell you what I felt concerning the discussion upon

the Address; existing conditions make life abroad most unpleasant. Is

it true that Flahaut is going to Vienna to replace Saint-Aulaire? If

so, I shall certainly be left here. The wind of favour does not blow

in my direction. A certain street and house very well known to you are

not so well disposed to me as they were." This last passage alludes to

Talleyrand's residence in the Rue Saint-Florentin, where Madame de

Lieven now lives.

I am informed of the death of the young Marie de La Rochefoucauld,

daughter of Sosthène and granddaughter of the Duchesse Mathieu de

Montmorency. This poor woman has survived her contemporaries, her

children, and her grandchildren. Heaven has severely tried the high

courage and profound faith with which she is endowed.

I am also informed that at the much-talked-of ceremony of the Remains

the Queen and the Princesses will be in mourning as for Louis XVIII.

It seems that everybody is mad; the newspapers only speak of the

funeral, or rather of the triumphal procession and of the religious

honours which will everywhere be paid to the remains of Napoleon.

After all, Napoleon, twice in forty years, will have performed the

same service for the French. He will have reconciled them to religion,

for it seems that it is quite curious to see the crowds upon their

knees surrounding the clergy who bless these remains. Curious, too, is

the general wish that their hero should have the benediction of the

Church. Strange are the people who accept order personified in the

midst of actual anarchy for the sake of a revolutionary idea, for it

seems clear to me that there is no other motive for all these honours,

which are paid, not to the legislator, but to the usurper and to the

conqueror.

_Rochecotte, December 15, 1840._--Yesterday I had some news from

Madame de Lieven, the chief points of which I will copy: "Egypt is now

done for. Napier was rather violent, contrary to his instructions, but

at the same time he has succeeded. Napier wished to show his learning,

and is asking the Pasha to restore the reign of the Ptolemys, a

strange position for a vassal, but there it is. At Constantinople the

principle of hereditary succession will be recognised for his family,

and he will afterwards surrender the fleet. At London delight is great

and Lord Palmerston cannot contain himself. Relations between the two

countries remain very strained; it is not war, but cannot be called

peace. The discussion upon the Address has been forgotten in view of

the funeral of Napoleon; this will be a superb ceremony, and I hope it

will be nothing else.

"Queen Christina has gone, after making a conquest of your King. She

will go to Rome, but not to Naples, where her daughter has not been

recognised. The whole of Russian female society is here; five of the

palace ladies are at Paris and only four left at St. Petersburg. The

ambassadors have declared that they will not be present at the

funeral. Most of them have adopted this idea independently, but Lord

Granville asked for instructions; after some hesitation he was told

to do as the others did. The confinement of the Queen of England was

perfectly easy."

_Rochecotte, December 17, 1840._--We have not yet heard how the

funeral passed off at Paris the day before yesterday. Some uneasiness

prevailed. The Duchesse de Montmorency told me: "There is an idea of

attacking the English Embassy and wrecking the house. Some soldiers

have been placed within the residence and Lady Granville has moved. It

is estimated that eight hundred thousand people will be on foot. My

children went to the Pecq, and thought that everything was very well

conducted; there was a general silence when the boat came in, and all

heads were bared. General Bertrand was on the right of the coffin,

General Gourgaud on the left, M. de Chabot before it, and the Prince

of Joinville went to and fro giving orders and had all the decorations

removed which were not religious. The priests were there with

surplices and many candles, and there was nothing worldly or

mythological."

The newspapers speak of great excitement. I shall be delighted when

the evening post tells us how it has all gone off. I have written to

secure my grandson Boson a view of the ceremony. Foolish, incoherent,

contradictory, and ridiculous as it may be, still the solemn arrival

of the coffin brought back from St. Helena will be very imposing, and

he will be glad one day to have seen it. Unfortunately at his age he

will be merely impressed, and will be unable to draw any of the

strange conclusions which the sight should inspire--the complete

forgetfulness of the oppression and the universal maledictions with

which Europe resounded twenty-six years ago; to-day nothing remains

but the recollections of Napoleon's victories, which make his memory

so popular. Paris, proclaiming her eager love of liberty, and France,

humiliated before the foreigner, are doing their utmost to honour the

man who did most to reduce them to servitude and was the most terrible

of conquerors.

In the newspapers we have read a description of the decorations in the

Champs Elysées, with the row of kings and great men. The great Condé

at least should not have found a place among them. Condé offering a

crown to his grandson's assassin! What I think should be fine is the

hearse. I like the idea of Napoleon brought back to France on a

buckler....

_Rochecotte, December 18, 1840._--Yesterday we awaited the post most

anxiously, and by some fatality the box was broken and we had to go to

bed without letters. Fortunately my son Dino, who had been at Tours,

brought back a copy of a telegram received by the Prefect which said

that everything went off very well, apart from a small demonstration

by some fifty men in blouses, who tried to break through the lines in

the Place Louis XV., but were driven back.

_Rochecotte, December 19, 1840._--At last our letters have come.

Madame Mollien, who was at the Church of the Invalides in the King's

suite, says: "This ceremony was just as unpopular in the position

where I was placed as it was popular in the streets of Paris. For

every reason people are delighted that yesterday is over. Before

entering the church we met in a kind of room, or rather chapel without

an altar, which had already been used for the same purpose at the

funeral of the victims of Fieschi. The royal family, the Chancellor,

the Ministers, the Households, and even the tutors, waited together

for two hours. The time was chiefly spent in speculation upon the

progress of the procession and in attempts to derive some heat from

two enormous fireplaces that had been hastily constructed and avoid

the volumes of smoke which they belched into the room. Recollections

of the Emperor were conspicuous by their absence; people talked of any

subject except that. The Chancellor[146] was noticeable for his

cheerfulness and his comical outbursts against the smoke. The Queen

was feverish, but nothing could prevent her from accompanying the

King, and she went home from the Invalides really ill. I can tell you

nothing of the scene within the church. I was so shut in on my stand

that I saw nothing, and could hardly hear the beautiful mass by

Mozart, divinely sung."

[146] The Duc Pasquier.

The following is another account: "The hearse, in my opinion, was

really admirable; nothing could be more magnificent and imposing; the

departmental standards borne by subalterns made an excellent effect,

and the trumpets playing a simple funeral march in unison impressed me

deeply. I liked, too, the five hundred sailors from _La Belle Poule_,

whose austere appearance contrasted with the general splendour; but a

ridiculous effect was produced by the old costumes of the Empire,

which looked as though they had been brought out from Franconi's. The

progress of the hearse was not followed sufficiently closely by the

crowd, so that the people rushed along in too noisy a fashion. There

were some unpleasant shouts of 'Down with Guizot!' 'Death to the men

of Ghent!' Some red flags were also seen, and the _Marseillaise_ was

heard once or twice, but these attempts were immediately checked. The

Prince de Joinville has grown brown and thin, but he is handsome and

looked very well. He was warmly welcomed throughout the procession

yesterday."

The Duchesse d'Albuféra saw the procession pass from Madame de

Flahaut's house, who had invited the old ladies who had figured under

the Empire, the wife of Marshal Ney, the Duchesse de Rovigo, &c., with

a number of modern society figures or strangers. The eighty thousand

troops are said to have given the ceremony the aspect of a review

rather than of a funeral. The Marshal's wife reasonably disliked the

attitude of the people, which was neither religious nor impressive nor

respectful.

I have also a letter from M. Royer Collard, who says nothing about the

ceremony, at which he was not present; but in answer to a statement of

mine, expressing my astonishment at his silence concerning Berryer's

speech, he says: "If I were to give you my plain opinion of the

protagonists in the debate upon the Address, I should be tempted to

use very violent language. M. Berryer is supporting the cause of good

by evil methods, an imaginary good by what is certainly wrong, and the

cause of order by means of confusion. He has the outward graces of an

orator, but not the essential points. He makes no impression upon

men's minds, and nothing will be left to him but his name. You ask my

opinion of M. de Tocqueville. He has a fund of honest motives which is

not adequate for his purposes, and which he imprudently expends, but

some remnants of which will always be left to him. I am afraid that in

his anxiety to succeed he will wander into impossible paths by an

attempt to reconcile irreconcilable elements. He extends both hands

simultaneously, the right hand in welcome to the left, and the left

hand to ourselves, and regrets that he has not a third hand behind him

which he could offer unseen. He proposes to present himself for

election to the French Academy in place of M. de Bonald. My first vote

is promised to Ballanche, but he will have my second. His

opponents--for there is an opposition--say that his literary success

has already brought him into the Institute, the Chamber, and will give

him an armchair at Barrot's house, and that he can therefore wait."

Our hermit of the Rue d'Enfer displays a considerable spice of

malignity beneath his excellent qualities. The notion of a third hand

is very persuasive, a capital metaphor, in my opinion.

_Rochecotte, December 20, 1840._--The Duc de Noailles also sends me a

small account of the funeral, and says that the crowd of onlookers

watched the procession going by almost as if it were that of the

Bœuf-Gras, and that the people in the church were entirely absorbed

by the question of the cold and the business of wrapping themselves

up; that the service was confused and that the social spectacle was

the main point in everybody's mind. The obvious inference seems to me

to be that there are no more Bonapartists in France. The fact is that

there is nothing in this country except newspaper articles.

My son-in-law is told that a proposal is to be brought forward in the

Chamber to efface the figure of Henry IV. from the star of the Legion

of Honour and to replace it by the effigy of Napoleon. As a matter of

fact there will be nothing more extraordinary in destroying the image

of one's ancestor than in staining one's coat of arms.[147]

[147] An allusion to the deed to which Louis-Philippe placed his

signature in February 1831, the day after the Archbishop's

residence was destroyed and Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois was

plundered. M. Laffitte, who was too inclined to consider

resistance to sedition impossible, induced the Sovereign to

publish the following decree: "In future the State seal will

represent an open book, bearing these words, 'Charter of 1830,'

surmounted by a closed crown with a sceptre and a hand of justice

in saltire, and tricolour flags behind the escutcheon, with

inscription, 'Louis-Philippe, King of the French.'" Thus it was

that the lilies disappeared which had hitherto been represented

upon the State seal throughout the realm.

_Rochecotte, December 23, 1840._--I have a letter from M. de Salvandy,

of which the following are the essential points: "A note has arrived

from Lord Palmerston stating that Napier's convention has been

ratified, and guaranteeing the fact in the name of England.

"M. Thiers will be president of the Commission concerning the

fortifications, and will report their proceedings to the Chamber; thus

he will have the Cabinet on the stool of repentance and be able to

keep the Chamber in check. It thus appears that M. Thiers is by no

means so weak as was thought, and that M. Guizot's position is by no

means assured. In this general state of uncertainty anything is

possible. The credit of the Chamber is shaken by it within, and a

European disturbance may very well follow. Austria has presented a

very moderate note upon the question of armaments, but Germany will

not disarm."

M. de Salvandy says the same as my other correspondents with regard to

the funeral. He complains that there was too much gold, which was to

be seen in every possible position. Apparently those who arranged the

ceremony thought that it was the best means of representing glory. He

also said that nothing could be less religious than the religious

ceremony. This is natural when one has an archbishop who cannot walk

or pray or use incense. I notice in the _Moniteur_ a phrase which is

quite admirable: "The _De Profundis_ was sung by Duprez and the prayer

by the Archbishop."

M. de Salvandy says that during the ceremony M. Thiers was remarkably

hopeful at the outset, very angry at the conclusion, and preoccupied

throughout; apparently he had set his hopes upon a day which, thank

heaven, has been a failure. Even in the church he attempted to begin a

discussion with M. Molé concerning Napoleon's thoughts and chances

during the Hundred Days.

Now I have an extract from a letter sent by Frau von Wolff from

Berlin: "Hitherto nothing has disturbed the perfect harmony between

the Sovereign and his people; on political questions there is

practically no difference of opinion among them, so we are almost all

orthodox in this respect; but religious opinions are strongly divided,

and from this point of view the first steps of the King are watched

with some anxiety. It is to be hoped that the King will never

sacrifice true merit to sectarian prejudice. With regard to the new

nobility which the King has just created, it will be difficult for me

to give you a precise explanation, for the institution seems to be

still somewhat vague. The King hopes to obviate the inconvenience of a

poor nobility--and the Prussian nobility is usually poor--by

introducing new titles and attaching them to territorial estates, so

that the title will pass only to those children or descendants who

inherit land, and will become extinct if the succession leaves the

family. This idea has not been greatly appreciated so far. People fear

possible complications and entanglements and it is thought that the

institution will hardly survive, as it is not in harmony with Germanic

custom."

_Rochecotte, December 27, 1840._--The Duc de Noailles tells me that M.

de Tocqueville has withdrawn his candidature for the Academy. The Duc

has just been to dinner with M. Pasquier, where he met Mgr. Affre; he

speaks of him as a regular peasant; even the enemies of Mgr. de Quélen

noticed the difference at the ceremony in the Invalides. It was Mgr.

de Quélen who officiated for the victims of Fieschi. Mgr. Affre is an

appropriate prelate for this wretched age, which is so devoid of

dignity wherever it is looked for.

_Rochecotte, December 30, 1840._--I hear from Paris that a despatch in

a mild and friendly tone has arrived from Russia for communication to

the Government, saying that the isolation of France is regarded with

regret and that there is a readiness to begin the usual measures for

bringing France into the train of negotiations since a Conservative

Ministry has been re-established at Paris. The despatch was read to M.

Guizot and then to the King. Can it betoken a desire for a closer

union? I hardly think so, but I do think that there is a general wish

to avoid war in Russia as well as elsewhere; that there is a wish to

calm the feelings of France and induce her to disarm, and that

disarmament may follow elsewhere, for these general armaments are the

ruin of Europe.

APPENDIX

I

_Message from President Jackson of the United States_

Since the last session of the Congress the validity of our claims upon

France, as arranged by the treaty of 1831, has been recognised by both

branches of the Legislature, and the money has been voted for their

satisfaction, but I regret to be obliged to inform you that payment

has not yet been made.

A short summary of the most important incidents in this lengthy

controversy will show how far the motives, by which attempts are made

to justify this delay, are absolutely indefensible.

When I took office I found the United States applying in vain to the

justice of France for the satisfaction of claims the validity of which

has never been doubted, and has now been admitted by France herself in

the most solemn manner. The long-standing nature of these claims,

their entire justice, and the aggravating circumstances from which

they sprang, are too well known to the American people for a further

description of them to be necessary. It is enough to say that for a

period of ten years and more, with the exception of a few intervals,

our commerce has been the object of constant aggression on the part of

France, which usually took the form of condemning ships and cargo in

virtue of arbitrary decrees, contravening both international law and

the stipulations of the treaties, while ships were burnt on the high

seas, and seizures and confiscations took place under special Imperial

rescripts in the harbours of other nations then in French occupation

or under French control.

Such, as is admitted, has been the nature of our grievances,

grievances in many cases so flagrant that even the authors of them

never denied our right to satisfaction. Some idea of the extent of our

losses may be gained by considering the fact that the burning of

vessels at sea and the seizure and sacrifice in forced sales of

American property, apart from awards to privateers before condemnation

was pronounced, or without such formality, have brought the French

Treasury a sum of twenty-four millions of francs, apart from

considerable customs dues.

For twenty years this business has been the subject of negotiations,

which were interrupted only during the short period when France was

overwhelmed by the united forces of Europe. During this period, when

other nations were extorting their claims at the bayonet's point, the

United States suspended their demands in consideration of the

disasters that had overpowered the brave people to whom they felt

themselves bound, and in consideration of the brotherly help which

they had received from France in their own times of suffering and

danger. The effect of this prolonged and fruitless discussion,

disastrous both to our relations with France and to our national

character, was obvious, and my own course of duty was perfectly clear

to me. I was bound either to insist upon the satisfaction of our

claims within a reasonable period or to abandon them entirely. I could

not doubt that this course was most conformable to the interests and

honour of the two countries.

Instructions were therefore given from this point of view to the

Minister who was once more sent to demand satisfaction. When Congress

met on October 10, 1829, I considered it my duty to refer to these

claims and to the dilatory attitude of France, in terms sufficiently

strong to draw the serious attention of both countries to the matter.

The French Minister then in power took offence at the message, under

the idea that it contained a threat, upon which basis the French

Government did not care to negotiate. The American Minister refuted

the interpretation which the French authorities attempted to place

upon the message, and reminded the French Minister that the

President's message was a communication addressed not to foreign

governments, but to the Congress of the United States, and that in

this message it was his duty under the Constitution to provide this

body with information upon the state of the Union with reference both

to foreign as well as to domestic affairs. That if, again, in the

performance of this task he deemed it his duty to call the attention

of the Congress to the consequences which might result from strained

relations with another Government, one might reasonably suppose that

he acted under a sense of duty in thus frankly communicating with

another branch of his own Government, and not that he acted with the

object of threatening a foreign Power. The French Government was

satisfied and negotiations were continued. These were concluded by the

treaty of July 4, 1831, which partially recognised the justice of our

claims, and promised payment to the amount of twenty-five millions of

francs in six annual instalments. The ratifications of the treaty were

exchanged at Washington on February 2, 1832. Five days later the

treaty was presented to Congress, which immediately passed the Acts

necessary to secure to France the commercial advantages conceded to

her by the arrangement. The treaty had been previously ratified with

full solemnity by the King of France, in terms which are certainly no

mere formality: "We, regarding the above convention as satisfactory in

all and each of the conclusions which it contains, declare, both for

ourselves and for our heirs and successors, that it is accepted,

approved, ratified, and confirmed, and by these presents, signed with

our hand, we do accept, approve, ratify, and confirm it, promising

upon our faith and word as King to observe and to secure its

observance inviolably without contravention at any time and without

permitting direct or indirect contravention for any reason or pretext

whatsoever." The official announcement that ratifications had been

exchanged with the United States reached Paris while the Chambers were

in session. The extraordinary delays prejudicial to ourselves by the

introduction of which the French Government have prevented the

execution of the treaty, have already been explained to Congress. It

is sufficient to point out that the session then opened was allowed to

pass without any effort being made to obtain the necessary funds; that

the two following sessions also went by without any action resembling

a serious effort to secure a decision upon the question; and that not

until the fourth session, nearly four years after the conclusion of

the treaty, and more than two years after the exchange of

ratifications, was the law referring to the execution of the treaty

put to the vote and rejected.

Meanwhile the United States Government, in full confidence that the

treaty concluded would be executed in good faith, and with equal

confidence that measures would be taken to secure payment of the first

instalment, which was to fall due on February 2, 1833, negotiated a

bill for the amount through the Bank of the United States. When this

bill was presented by bearer the French Government allowed it to be

protested. Apart from the loss incurred by non-payment, the United

States had to meet the claims of the bank, which asserted infringement

of its interests, in satisfaction of which this institution seized and

still holds a corresponding amount from the State revenues.

Congress was in session when the decision of the Chambers was

communicated to Washington, and an immediate announcement of this

decision on the part of France was a step which was naturally expected

from the President. The profound discontent shown by public opinion

and the similar excitement which prevailed in the Congress, made it

more than probable that a recourse to immediate measures for securing

redress would be the consequence of any appeal made upon this question

to Congress itself.

With a sincere desire to preserve the peaceful relations which have so

long existed between the two countries, I wished to avoid this step if

I could be convinced that in thus acting, neither the interests nor

the honour of my country would be compromised. Without the most

complete assurance upon this point I could not hope to discharge the

responsibility which I assumed in allowing the Congress to adjourn

without giving it an account of the affair. These conditions seemed to

be satisfied by the assurances which were given to me.

The French Government had foreseen that the feeling in the United

States aroused by this second rejection of the credit vote would be as

I have described it, and prompt measures had been taken by the French

Government to anticipate the consequences. The King personally

expressed through our Minister at Paris his profound regret for the

decision of the Chambers and promised to send a ship of war with

despatches to his Minister here, forthwith authorising him to give

every assurance to the government and the people of the United States

that the treaty would be in any case faithfully performed by France.

The warship arrived and the Minister received his instructions.

Professing to act in virtue of these instructions he gave the most

solemn assurances that immediately after the new elections, and as

soon as ever the Chamber would allow, the French Chambers would be

convoked and that the attempt to obtain the necessary credit would be

renewed; that all the constitutional power of the King and his

Ministers would be exerted to secure this object. It was understood

that he pledged himself to this end, and this Government expressly

informed him that the question ought to be decided at a date

sufficiently near to enable Congress to learn the result at the

commencement of the session.

Relying upon these assurances, I undertook the responsibility of

allowing Congress to separate without offering any communication upon

the matter.

Our expectations, reasonably based upon promises so solemnly given,

were not realised. The French Chambers met on July 31, 1834, and

though our Minister at Paris urged the French Ministers to lay the

matter before the Chambers, they refused. He then insisted that if the

Chambers had been prorogued without coming to any conclusion in the

matter, they should be again convoked in time to enable their decision

to be known at Washington before the meeting of Congress. This

reasonable demand was not only refused, but the Chambers were

prorogued until December 29, a date so remote that their decision in

all probability could not have been obtained in time to reach

Washington before the Congress was forced to adjourn by the terms of

the Constitution. The reasons given by the Ministry for their refusal

to convoke the Chambers at a nearer date were afterwards shown to have

been by no means insurmountable, for the Chambers were convoked on

December 1 for the special purpose of considering home affairs, though

this fact did not become known to our Government until after the last

session of the Congress. As our reasonable expectations were thus

deceived, it was my imperative duty to consult Congress as to the

advisability of reprisals, in case the stipulations of the treaty were

not promptly carried out. For this purpose a communication was

indispensable. It would have been unworthy of us in the course of this

communication to refrain from an explanation of all the facts

necessary for an exact comprehension of the affair, or to shrink from

truth for fear of offending others. On the other hand, to have gone a

step further with the object of wounding the pride of a government and

a people with whom we have so many reasons to cultivate friendly

relations to our mutual advantage would have been both imprudent and

disastrous.

As past events had warned us of the difficulty of drawing up the most

simple statement of our grievances without wounding the feelings of

those who had become responsible for redressing them, I did my best to

prevent any interpretation of the message containing the

recommendations placed before Congress as a threat to France. I

disavowed any such design and further declared that the pride and the

power of France were so well known that no one would expect to extort

satisfaction by fear. The message did not reach Paris until more than

a month after the Chambers had met, and to such an extent did the

Ministry disregard our legitimate claims, that our Minister was

informed that the matter would not be made a Cabinet question when it

had been brought forward.

Although the message was not officially communicated to the Government

and although it contained definite declarations that no menace was

intended, the French Ministers determined to regard the conditional

proposal of reprisals as a threat and as an insult, which the national

honour made it their duty to reject.

The measures by which they proceeded to show their resentment of this

supposed insult were the immediate recall of their Minister from

Washington, the offer of passports to the American Minister at Paris,

and a declaration in the legislative Chambers that diplomatic

relations with the United States Government were suspended.

After they had thus avenged the dignity of France, they proceeded to

show their justice. For this purpose a law was immediately presented

to the Chamber of Deputies asking for the funds necessary to perform

the terms of the treaty. As this proposal afterwards became a law, the

terms of which are now one of the chief subjects of discussion between

the two nations, I am bound to retrace the history of this law.

The Financial Minister in his explanation alluded to the measures

which had been taken in answer to the supposed insult, and represented

the performance of the treaty as imperative upon the honour and

justice of France. As the mouthpiece of the Ministry he declared that

the message, until it had received the sanction of Congress, was

merely the simple expression of the President's personal opinion. On

the other hand he declared that France had entered into engagements

which were binding upon her honour. In accordance with this point of

view, the only condition upon which the French Ministry proposed to

consider the payment of the money was to defer this payment until it

was certain that the United States Government had done nothing which

could injure the interests of France, or, in other terms, that

Congress had not authorised any measure hostile to France.

At this moment the French Cabinet could not have known what was the

attitude or the decision of Congress, but on January 14 the Senate

decided that there was no reason for the moment to take any

legislative measures with reference to the business proceeding between

the United States and France, and no decision upon the subject was

made in the Representative Chamber. These facts were known at Paris

before March 28, 1835, when the Commission which had been considering

the bill of indemnity presented its report to the Chamber of Deputies.

This Commission repeated the opinions of the Ministry, declared that

the Congress had put aside the proposals of the President, and

proposed the adoption of the law with no other restriction than that

originally stated. The French Ministry and the Chambers thus knew that

if the position they had adopted, and which had been so frequently

stated to be incompatible with the honour of France, was maintained,

and if the law was adopted in its original form, the money would be

paid and this unfortunate discussion would come to an end. But this

flattering hope was soon destroyed by an amendment introduced into the

law at the moment of its adoption, providing that the money should not

be paid until the Government had received satisfactory explanations

concerning the President's message of December 2, 1834. What is still

more remarkable, the President of the Council[148] adopted this

amendment and consented to its insertion in the law. As for the

pretended insult which had induced them to recall their Minister and

send our Minister his passports, not until then did they propose to

ask for an explanation of this incident. The proposals and opinions

which they had declared could not reasonably be imputed to the

American people or government were put forward as obstacles to the

accomplishment of an act of justice towards this government and

people. They had declared that the honour of France required the

performance of an undertaking into which the King had entered unless

Congress adopted the proposals of the message. They were certain that

Congress had not adopted them and none the less they refused to

perform the terms of the treaty until they had obtained from the

President an explanation of an opinion which they had themselves

characterised as personal and ineffectual. The supposition that I had

intended to threaten or to insult the French Government is as

unfounded as any attempt to extort from the fears of that nation that

which its feelings of justice would have made it refuse, would have

been foolish and ridiculous; but the Constitution of the United States

obliges the President to explain to Congress the situation of the

country and the American people cannot admit the intervention of any

Government whatever upon earth in the free performance of the domestic

duties which the Constitution has imposed upon its public officials.

The discussions proceeding between the different branches of our

Government concern ourselves alone, and our representatives are

responsible for any words which they may utter only to their own

constituents and to their fellows in office. If, in the course of

these discussions, facts have been inaccurately stated, or wrong

inferences have been drawn from them, correction will necessarily

follow when the mistakes are perceived, from their love of justice and

their sense of self-respect; but they will never submit to be

questioned upon that matter as a right by any foreign Power. When

these discussions lead to action, then our responsibility to foreign

Powers begins, but it is then a national and not an individual

responsibility. The principle upon which a demand is issued for an

explanation of the terms of my message would also justify the claim of

any foreign Power to demand an explanation of the terms employed in a

committee report or in the speech of a member of Congress.

[148] At that time the Duc de Broglie.

It is not the first time that the French Government has taken offence

at messages from American presidents. President Washington and

President Adams, in the performance of their duties to the American

people, encountered ill-feeling on the part of the French Directory.

The grievance raised by the Minister of Charles X. and removed by the

explanations offered by our Minister at Paris, has already been

mentioned when it was known that the Minister of the reigning King

took offence at my message last year by interpreting it in a sense

which the very terms of it forbade. Our last Minister at Paris in

reply to the last note which showed dissatisfaction with the language

of the message, sent a communication to the French Government under

date January 28, 1835, which was calculated to remove all the

impressions that undue susceptibility might have received. This note

repeated and recalled to the attention of the French Government the

disavowal contained in the message itself of any intention to use

intimidation by threats; it declared in all truth that the message did

not contain either in words or intention any accusation of bad faith

against the King of the French; it drew a very reasonable distinction

between the right of complaining in measured terms of the failure to

perform the terms of the convention, and an imputation that the delay

in performance was due to evil motives; in short it showed that the

necessary exercise of this right was not to be regarded as an

offensive imputation. Although this communication was made by our

Minister without instructions and entirely upon his own

responsibility, my approbation has since made it a governmental act

and this approbation was officially notified to the French Government

on April 25, 1835. However, it produced no effect. The law was passed

with the unfortunate amendment, supported by the King's Ministers and

was definitely approved by the King.

The people of the United States are reasonably inclined to pursue a

pacific policy in their dealings with foreign nations; the people must

therefore be informed of the loyalty of their government to this

policy. In the present case this policy was carried to the furthest

limits compatible with due self-respect. The note of January 28 was

not the only communication which our Minister took the responsibility

of offering upon the same subject and from the same point of view;

when he found that it was proposed to make the payment of a just debt

dependent upon the accomplishment of a condition which he knew could

never be performed, he thought himself bound to make a further attempt

to convince the French Government that, if our self-respect and our

regard for the dignity of other nations prevented us from using any

language which might give offence, at the same time we would never

recognise the right of any foreign government to require an

explanation of communications passing between the different branches

of our public service. To prevent any misunderstanding the Minister

recalled the language used in a preceding Note and added that any

explanation which could be reasonably asked or honourably given, had

already been furnished and that the annexation of this demand to the

law as a condition, was not only useless but might be regarded as

offensive and would certainly never be fulfilled.

When this last communication, to which I called the special attention

of the Congress, was submitted to me, I conceived the hope that its

obvious intention of securing a prompt and honourable settlement of

the difficulties between the two nations would have been achieved, and

I therefore did not hesitate to give it my sanction and my complete

approbation. So much was due from me to the Minister who had made

himself responsible for the act. The people of the United States were

publicly informed of it and I am now communicating it to the people's

representatives to show how far the Executive power has gone in its

attempts to restore a good understanding between the two countries. My

approval would have been communicated to the French Government if an

official request for it had been received.

As the French Government had thus received all the explanations which

honour and principle could allow, we hoped that there would be no

further hesitation in paying the instalments as they fell due. The

agent authorised to receive the money was instructed to inform the

French Government of his readiness; by way of reply he was informed

that the money could not then be paid because the formalities required

by the act of the Chambers had not been fulfilled.

As I had received no official communication concerning the intentions

of the French Government, and as I was anxious to conclude this

disagreeable affair before the meeting of Congress, I instructed our

Minister at Paris to inquire into the final determination of the

French Government and if the due payment of the instalment was

refused, to return to the United States without further explanations.

The results of this last step have not yet reached our knowledge, but

we expect information daily. I trust that information may be

favourable. As the different powers in France have recognised the

justice of our rights and the obligations imposed upon them by the

treaty of 1831, and as no real cause remains as an excuse for further

delay, we may hope that France will at length adopt that course of

procedure demanded no less imperiously by the interests of the two

nations than by the principles of justice. When once the treaty has

been carried out by France, few causes of disagreement will remain

between the two countries, and in short there will be nothing that

cannot be surmounted by the influence of a pacific and enlightened

policy and by the influence of that mutual good will and those

generous recollections which will, we trust, then be revived in all

their early strength; but in any case, the question of principle which

has been raised by the new turn given to the discussion is of such

vital importance to the independent action of the government, that we

cannot abandon it or make it the subject of a bargain without

compromising our national honour. I need not say that such a sacrifice

will never be made by any act of mine. I will never stain the honour

of my country to relieve myself of my obligation to tell the truth and

to do my duty; nor can I give any other explanations of my official

act than those required by honour and justice. This determination, I

feel sure, will meet with the approbation of my constituents. My

knowledge of their character is very inadequate if the sum of

twenty-five millions of francs should outweigh for a moment in their

eyes any question which affects their national independence; and if

unfortunately a different impression should prevail they would rally,

I feel certain, about their chosen Government vigorously and

unanimously, and silence for ever this degrading imputation.

Having thus frankly submitted to the Congress the further steps which

have taken place since last session, in this interesting and important

affair and also the views of the Executive power concerning it, it

only remains for me to add, that as soon as the information expected

by our Minister has been received, it will become the subject of a

special communication.[149]

[149] From the _Journal des Débats of January 1, 1836_.

II

_Speech by the_ DUC DE BROGLIE, _President of the Council,

Chamber of Deputies in the Session of January 6, 1836, on the

subject of Poland_.

GENTLEMEN,

I do full justice to high ideals and the noble passions with which the

orator whom you have just heard has been inspired;[150] but I will

venture to remind him that he has not done full justice to the

Government and to the Ministry of 1831 in expressing his apparent

belief that the difficulties of that period prevented our Cabinet from

showing that interest in the Polish nation which a French Government

will always feel for Poland.

[150] M. Odilon Barrot.

At that moment, difficult and dangerous as it was, when the domestic

circumstances of France were very perplexing, the French Government

did for the Polish nation all that it was its duty to do. It did more

than any other nation, and if history ever reveals the diplomatic

correspondence of the French Government at that time, I venture to

think that full justice will be done to the illustrious man who was

then President of the Cabinet.[151]

[151] M. Casimir Perier.

What was done at that time in the interests of humanity and justice,

the Government has never ceased to do whenever it thought that its

intervention could be of any use to the population of Poland.

But in the presence of so enlightened a Chamber as this, it is

unnecessary to recall the fact that the intervention of a foreign

Power in the domestic administration of another state must be

conducted with every care and precaution. There is often a reason to

fear that such intervention, far from calming irritation and

exasperation and far from weakening political animosity, may arouse

these passions to greater power. In a word, such a task can only be

fulfilled by the constant exercise of care and precaution.

I trust that the Chamber will understand me if I say that the French

Government has never neglected any opportunity of intervening in the

interests of humanity, but the Chamber will also understand perhaps

that this is not the right moment for serving humanity and that it is

indeed against the wishes of the Chamber to press the Government to

further efforts in this place. It is to be feared that words actuated

by generous feeling may indeed produce an effect entirely contrary to

the sentiments which inspires them and may merely be translated abroad

into greater ill-feeling. There is a fear, in short, that the cause of

humanity may be betrayed in the very wish to serve it and without the

knowledge of those who desire to defend it (General cries of Hear,

Hear).

On this point I shall say no more. The former speaker has himself

pointed out the difference that should characterise the observations

of one who speaks for the Government, and those of an isolated member

of the Chamber. The Chamber will certainly understand that it is not

for me to reply severally to the observations which have been laid

before you, because any answer to these observations will have an

undue importance as coming from myself.

As to the other branch of the question, the existence of treaties

which the first speaker has discussed, and to which the second[152]

has also referred; I will speak upon the matter as shortly as I can.

As far as I know, absolutely no one in Europe would assert that

treaties should not be faithfully executed both in their letter and

their spirit, but in the article of the treaty to which the two

orators have referred, different principles are enounced; principles

which are not incompatible, and should indeed be reconciled; on the

one hand the Independence of Poland, and on the other the Union of

Poland with Russia. In this article the principle is laid down that

representation and certain national institutions should exist; but

execution has been delayed until we know what these institutions are

to be, and under what form they will be established.

[152] M. Saint-Marc Girardin.

This article was not drawn up with all the clearness that might have

been desired. The possibility is thus open that the several Powers who

signed the treaty of 1815 may interpret it in different senses, and

emphasise more or less the principles therein enounced. It may be--I

am only putting a hypothetical case--that the several Powers will not

agree upon the application of these principles, or upon the nature of

the action that lies before them. Are we to say that the moment a

difference of opinion arises, we should immediately have recourse to

force? The Chamber cannot countenance such an idea. The maintenance of

relations between the Powers is upon the same footing as the

maintenance of harmony between the public bodies. The mere fact that

divergence of opinion is possible is no reason for an appeal to force.

Discussion, reason, and time will enable the truth to prevail.

Well, gentlemen, I am confident that the Chamber will understand

without further words from myself upon the question now before it,

that there are divergences of opinion between the different Powers

upon certain points. We consider that negotiations, discussion, and

time will enable the truth to prevail, and we trust that upon this

point you will agree with us. (Loud applause.)[153]

[153] From the _Journal des Débats of January 7, 1836_.

III

_Eulogy upon_ COUNT REINHART, _delivered at the Academy of Moral

and Political Science, by the_ PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND, _in the

Session of March, 3, 1838_.

GENTLEMEN,

I was in America when the kindnes of my friends appointed me a member

of the Institute, and thus connected me with the study of Moral and

Political Science, to which society I have had the honour to belong

since its origin.

On my return to France my first care was to attend the sessions of the

Institute, and thus to show the members of that time, many of whom we

have every reason to regret, what pleasure I felt at finding myself

one of their number. During the first session at which I was present

the committee was reappointed, and I received the honourable post of

secretary. The six months' report which I drew up, with all the care

that I could bring to it, was perhaps of a too deferential character,

as I was giving an account of work to which I was a complete stranger.

It was work which doubtless had cost much research and much labour to

one of our most learned colleagues, and was entitled, "Dissertations

upon the Riparian Laws." At the same time in our public meetings I

delivered some lectures which I was then allowed to insert in the

Memoirs of the Institute. Forty years have elapsed since that date,

during which this chair has been forbidden to me, first by long

absences, and also by duties to which I was obliged to devote the

whole of my time, and I may add by the discretion which times of

difficulty make incumbent upon a man whose business is political;

and, finally, by the infirmities which old age usually brings or

aggravates.

But to-day I feel it necessary--and, indeed, regard it as a duty--to

appear for the last time in memory of a man known throughout Europe, a

man who was my friend, and who was our colleague since the formation

of the Institute. I come forward publicly to testify to our esteem for

his person and to our regret for his loss. His position and mine

enable me to reveal several of his special merits. His principal, but

not his sole title to glory consists in a correspondence extending

over forty years, necessarily unknown to the public, who will probably

never hear of it. I asked myself, "Who will speak upon that matter

within these walls? Who will have any reason to speak of it except

myself, who have known so much of it, who have been so pleased by it,

and so often helped by it in the course of the Ministerial duties

which I have had to perform under three very different reigns?"

Count Reinhart was thirty years of age and I was thirty-seven when I

first met him. He entered public life with a large stock of

information; he knew five or six languages, and was familiar with

their literatures. He could have attained celebrity as a poet or

historian or geographer, and in this latter capacity he became a

member of the Institute at the time of its foundation.

At that time he was already a member of the Academy of Science in

Göttingen. Born and educated in Germany, he had published in his youth

certain poems which had attracted the attention of Gessner, Wieland

and Schiller. At a later date, when his health forced him to take the

waters of Carlsbad, he was fortunate enough to meet and to know the

famous Goethe, who so far appreciated his taste and his knowledge as

to apply to him for information upon any outstanding features in

French literature. Herr Reinhart promised to keep him informed.

Undertakings of this nature among men of first-rate intellectual power

are invariably mutual, and soon become bonds of friendship. The

intimacy between Count Reinhart and Goethe gave rise to a

correspondence which is now being printed in Germany.

Having thus reached that time of life when a man must definitely

choose that career for which he thinks himself best fitted, we shall

see that Herr Reinhart formed a resolution by no means consistent with

his character, his tastes, his own position, and that of his family:

remarkable as the fact was for that age, in preference to the many

careers in which he could have been independent, he chose one in which

independence was impossible, and gave his preference to diplomacy. His

choice was a good one; he was fitted to occupy any post in this

profession, and filled all posts in succession and all with

distinction.

I will venture to assert that his early studies had fitted him

admirably for his profession. His work in theology especially had

brought him distinction in the seminary of Denkendorf and in the

Protestant faculty of Tübingen; it had given him a strength and

dexterity in argument which may be noted in every document from his

pen. Lest I should seem to be pursuing a paradoxical idea, I may

recall the fact that several of our great diplomatists were

theologians, and have all made their mark in history by their conduct

of the most important political affairs of their age. Cardinal

Chancellor Duprat was as completely versed in canon law as

jurisprudence, and fixed, in conjunction with Leo X., the principles

of the Concordat which in large part survives to-day; Cardinal

d'Ossat, notwithstanding the opposition of several great Powers,

succeeded in reconciling Henry IV. with the Court of Rome; his

surviving correspondence is still recommended for study to those of

our young men who propose to follow a political career; Cardinal de

Polignac, a theologian, poet, and diplomatist, after many unhappy

wars, was able to preserve the conquests of Louis XIV. to France by

the treaty of Utrecht.

Thus, too, amid theological books collected by his father, afterwards

Bishop of Gap, was begun the education of M. de Lionne, to whose name

fresh lustre has recently been added by an important publication.

The names which I have quoted will suffice to justify my idea of the

influence which I conceive to have been exerted upon Count Reinhart's

mind by the early studies to which his father's education had directed

him.

The varied and profound information which he had acquired qualified

him to perform at Bordeaux the honourable, if modest, duties of tutor

in a Protestant family in that town. There he naturally began

relations with several men whose talents, whose mistakes, and whose

death brought such renown to our first Legislative Assembly. Count

Reinhart was easily induced by them to enter the service of France.

I feel in no way obliged to follow in detail the many vicissitudes of

his long career. The numerous posts which were entrusted to him,

sometimes of importance, at other times of inferior rank, seem to have

followed in no consecutive order, and, indeed, to denote a want of

gradation which we could hardly understand at the present time; but in

that age neither positions nor persons were subject to prejudice. In

other times favour, and more rarely discrimination, called men to

eminent positions, but during the time of which I speak, for good or

for evil, positions were won by force, and such a system naturally

produced confusion.

Thus we shall see Count Reinhart as First Secretary to the London

Embassy; in a similar position at Naples; as Plenipotentiary Minister

to the Hanseatic towns, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck; head of the third

division in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary

Minister at Florence; Foreign Minister; Plenipotentiary Minister in

Switzerland; Consul-General at Milan; Plenipotentiary Minister for the

area of Lower Saxony; Resident in the Turkish provinces beyond the

Danube, and Chief Commissioner of commercial relations in Moldavia;

Plenipotentiary Minister to the King of Westphalia; head of the

chancery in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary

Minister to the Germanic Diet and to the free town of Frankfort; and,

finally, Plenipotentiary Minister at Dresden. How many posts, how much

work, and how many interests were thus confided to the care of one

man! And this at a time when talent seemed likely to be the less

appreciated, as war appeared to be the chief arbitrator in every

difficulty.

You will not expect me, gentlemen, to give you any detailed account

with dates of the works which Count Reinhart produced in the various

posts which I have just enumerated; such an account would need a

volume. I need only speak to you of the manner in which he fulfilled

his official duties, whether he was Head of a Department, Minister, or

Consul.

Count Reinhart had not at that time the advantage which he might have

had a few years later of seeing excellent models for his imitation;

but he was well aware what high and different capacities should

distinguish the head of a department of Foreign Affairs. His delicate

tact showed him that the habits of such a head should be simple,

regular, and retiring; that, remote from the uproar of the world, he

should live for business alone, and bring to it an impenetrable

secrecy; that while always ready to give an answer concerning facts

and men, he should have constantly present to his memory every treaty,

know the dates of them, their history, have a correct knowledge of

their strong points and their weaknesses, their antecedent and

consequent circumstances; that he should know the names of the chief

diplomatists and even their family relations; and that while using

this knowledge, he should be careful not to disturb the penetrating

self-esteem of the Minister, and that if he should ever induce that

Minister to share his own opinions, his success should remain

concealed. He knew that he could only shine by reflection elsewhere,

but he was also aware that so pure and modest a life would naturally

command every respect.

Count Reinhart's faculty of observation did not stop at that point. It

had shown him how unusual is the combination of qualities necessary

for a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Such a Minister must, in fact, be

endowed with a kind of instinct which will give him prompt warning and

prevent him from compromising himself before any discussion begins: he

must be able to appear frank while remaining impenetrable; must be

reserved and yet seem careless; must discriminate even in the nature

of his amusements; his conversation must be simple, varied,

attractive, always natural, and sometimes open. In a word, he must

never cease for a single moment in the twenty-four hours of the day to

be Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, unusual as these capacities are, they could hardly

be adequate if loyalty did not give them that support which they

almost always require. I am bound to mention the fact here in

opposition to a prejudice generally current. Diplomacy is not a

science of duplicity and trickery; if good faith is required anywhere,

it is especially necessary in political transactions, for it alone can

make them permanent and durable. Attempts have been made to identify

reserve with duplicity; good faith will never authorise duplicity, but

it may admit reserve, and reserve has the special faculty of

increasing confidence.

Dominated by a sense of honour and of his country's interests, by the

honour and interests of his Sovereign, by the love of liberty founded

upon a respect for order and uniform justice, a Minister of Foreign

Affairs, when he is equal to his task, occupies the highest position

to which any lofty mind could aspire.

Much as is required of a competent Minister, how much more is required

of a good Consul. The claims upon a Consul are infinitely varied and

are of a totally different order from those which may affect the other

officials of a Foreign Office. They require an amount of practical

experience which can only be acquired by a special education. Within

the area of their jurisdiction Consuls are required to perform for

their compatriots the duties of judges, arbitrators, and mediators;

often they are officers of the Civil State; they act as notaries, and

sometimes as Admiralty officers; they watch and report upon sanitary

affairs; their position enables them to give an accurate and complete

idea of the state of trade, of navigation, and of manufactures in the

country where they reside. Count Reinhart, who neglected nothing to

secure the accuracy of that information with which it was his business

to provide his Government, or the correctness of the decisions which

as a political agent, as Consul and Admiralty officer, he was obliged

to give, had made a profound study of international and shipping law.

This study had induced him to think that a time would come when clever

combinations would establish a general system of commerce and

navigation in which the interests of every nation would be respected,

and the basis of which would be so strong that not even war itself

could alter the principle of it, though it might interrupt some of its

results. He was also able to decide certainly and promptly all

questions of interchange, arbitration, conversion of money, weights

and measures, while no claims were ever raised in dispute of the

information which he provided or of the judgments which he delivered.

It is also true that the personal consideration which he enjoyed

throughout his career gave much influence to his intervention in any

matter which he conducted or in any dispute upon which he had to

pronounce.

Wide as a man's knowledge may be and vast as his capacity, the

complete diplomatist is but very rarely met with. Yet Count Reinhart

might have attained this distinction if he had had one additional

capacity. The clearness of his view and intelligence was admirable; he

could write an excellent account of anything that he had seen or

heard; his style was resourceful, easy, clever, and attractive. Of all

the diplomatic correspondence of that age, the Emperor Napoleon, who

had every right to be fastidious, showed a preference for the

despatches of Count Reinhart; but admirably as he wrote, he could only

express himself with difficulty. For action his intelligence required

more time than conversation could provide, and for the easy

reproduction of his mental speech he was obliged to work alone and

unaided. Notwithstanding this real inconvenience, Count Reinhart

always succeeded in performing his commissions thoroughly well. Whence

did he derive the inspiration which enabled him to succeed?

The source of his power, gentlemen, was a real and profound belief

which governed all his actions, the sense of duty. The strength of

this belief is not often entirely realised. A life entirely devoted to

duty is easily separated from ambition. Count Reinhart's life was

given up to the duties which he had to perform, nor was there in him

any trace of personal ambition or any claim to rapid promotion. The

religion of duty to which Count Reinhart was faithful all his life,

consists in perfect submission to the orders and instructions of

superiors; in constant vigilance added to much perspicacity, which

never leaves those superiors ignorant of what they ought to know; in a

strict adherence to truth in every official report, whether agreeable

or unpleasant; in an impenetrable discretion and a regularity of life

which secure confidence and esteem; in decorum of outward conduct and

in continual care to give the acts of his Government that colouring

and that interpretation demanded by the interest of the affairs under

his charge.

Though advancing age had warned Count Reinhart that it was time for

rest, he would never have asked to be relieved, fearing that he might

seem to show coldness in his pursuit of a career which had been

life-long. The royal kindness, with its invariable attention,

considered his necessities and gave this great servant of France a

most honourable post, by calling him to the Chamber of Peers. Count

Reinhart did not long enjoy this honour and died almost suddenly on

December 5, 1837. He was twice married, and had a son by his first

wife, who is now pursuing a political career. The best wish that we

can offer the son is that he may resemble his father as nearly as

possible.

IV

_Memorandum addressed by_ LORD PALMERSTON _to the French

Government and handed to_ M. THIERS _by_ Mr. BÜLWER _at the

beginning of September 1840_.

FOREIGN OFFICE, _August 31, 1840._

SIR,

Various reasons have prevented me from sending you earlier and

transmitting through you to the French Government certain observations

which Her Majesty's Government desire to make upon the Memorandum

which was handed to me on July 24 by the French Ambassador to this

Court, in reply to the Memorandum which I had handed to His Excellency

on the 17th of that month; but I am now able to fulfil this task.

Her Majesty's Government observes with great satisfaction the friendly

tone of the French Memorandum and its assurances of keen desire to

maintain peace and the balance of power in Europe. The Memorandum of

July 17 was conceived in a spirit no less friendly towards France, and

Her Majesty's Government is equally anxious that France should be able

to keep peace in Europe and prevent the smallest disturbance of that

equilibrium which now exists between the Powers.

Her Majesty's Government has been equally delighted to see the

declarations contained in the French Memorandum stating that France

wishes to act in concert with the other four Powers with reference to

the affairs in the Levant.

On this point the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government correspond in

every respect with those of the French Government: for, in the first

place, throughout the negotiations which have proceeded upon this

question for more than twelve months, the British Government has

constantly been anxious that a concert of the five Powers should be

established, and that all five should agree to a common line of

action; Her Majesty's Government though not bound to defer, as proof

of this desire, to the other proposals which have been made from time

to time to the French Government, and to which reference has been made

in the French Memorandum, can unhesitatingly declare that no European

Power can be less influenced than Great Britain by private views or by

any desire and hope of exclusive advantage which might arise in her

favour from the conclusion of the questions in the Levant. On the

contrary, in these matters the interests of Great Britain are

identical with those of Europe in general, and are based upon the

maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as

a guarantee for the preservation of peace and as essential to the

maintenance of the balance of power in general.

To these principles the French Government has promised its full

adherence, and offered it in more than one instance, especially in a

despatch from Marshal Soult, under date July 17, 1839. This despatch

was officially communicated to the four Powers. It has also offered

support in a collective note, dated July 27, 1839, and in the speech

of the King of the French to the Chambers in December 1839.

In these documents the French Government declares its determination to

maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under

the reigning dynasty as essential to the balance of power and as a

guarantee for the preservation of peace; in a despatch from Marshal

Soult the French Government has shown its resolution to oppose by

action and influence any combination which might be hostile to the

maintenance of this integrity and this independence.

Hence the Governments of Great Britain and of France are entirely

agreed upon the object towards which their policy should be directed.

The only difference existing between the two Governments is a

difference of opinion concerning the means regarded as most advisable

to obtain this common end. On this point, as the French Memorandum

observes, a difference of opinion may naturally be expected.

On this point a great difference of opinion has arisen between the two

Governments, which seems to have become stronger and more pronounced

in proportion as the two Governments have more completely explained

their respective views, and this fact for the moment prevents the two

Governments from acting in concert to attain their common purpose. On

the one hand, Her Majesty's Government has repeatedly pointed out her

opinion that it would be impossible to maintain the integrity of the

Turkish Empire and to preserve the independence of the Sultan, if

Mehemet Ali were to be left in possession of Syria, as the military

key of Asiatic Turkey, and that if Mehemet Ali were to continue to

occupy this province as well as Egypt, he would be able at any time to

threaten Bagdad from the south, Diarbekir and Erzeroum from the east,

Koniah, Brousse, and Constantinople from the north; and that the same

ambitious spirit which has driven Mehemet Ali under other conditions

to revolt against his Sovereign, would soon induce him hereafter to

take up arms for further invasions; and that for this purpose he would

always maintain a large army on foot; that the Sultan, on the other

hand, would be continually on guard against the possible danger, and

would also be obliged to remain under arms, so that the Sultan and

Mehemet Ali would continue to maintain arms upon a war footing for the

purpose of observing one another; that a collision would be the

inevitable result of these continual suspicions and mutual alarms, and

that even if there should be no premeditated aggression upon either

side, any collision of the sort would necessarily lead to foreign

intervention in the Turkish Empire, while such intervention, thus

provoked, would produce the most serious discord between the Powers of

Europe.

Her Majesty's Government has pointed out as probable, if not as

certain, an even greater danger than this, which would result from the

continued occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali; namely, that the Pasha,

trusting to military force and wearied by his political position as a

subject, would carry out an intention which he has frankly avowed to

the Powers of Europe that he would never abandon, and would declare

himself independent. Such a declaration upon his part would

incontestably amount to a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and,

what is more, this dismemberment might happen under such conditions as

would make it more difficult for the European Powers to act in concert

for the purpose of forcing the Pasha to withdraw such a declaration,

and more difficult than it is for them to-day to combine their forces

and oblige him to evacuate Syria.

Her Majesty's Government has therefore invariably asserted that the

Powers which are anxious to preserve the integrity of the Turkish

Empire and to maintain the independence of the Sultan should unite in

helping the latter to re-establish his direct authority over Syria.

The French Government, on the other hand, has asserted that if Mehemet

Ali were once assured of the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria

he would remain a faithful subject and become the strongest support of

the Sultan; that the Sultan could not govern if the Pasha were not in

possession of this province, the military and financial resources of

which would then be of greater use to him than if they were in the

hands of the Sultan himself; that every confidence might be placed in

the sincerity with which Mehemet Ali had renounced all ulterior views,

and in his protestations of faithful devotion to his Sovereign; that

the Pasha is an old man, and upon his death, even if his rights are

recognised as hereditary, the totality of his acquired power would

revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mohammedan countries,

of whatever nature, are in reality held only upon tenure for lifetime.

The French Government has also maintained that Mehemet Ali will never

be willing to evacuate Syria of his own accord and that the only means

by which European Powers could use force would be operations by sea

which would be inadequate, or by land which would be dangerous; that

these operations by sea would not expel the Egyptians from Syria and

would merely rouse Mehemet Ali to begin an attack upon Constantinople;

while the measures which might be taken in such a case to defend the

capital and in particular any operations on land undertaken by the

troops of the allied Powers to expel the army of Mehemet Ali from

Syria, would be more fatal to the Turkish Empire than the state of

things could possibly be which these measures would be intended to

remedy.

To these objections Her Majesty's Government replied that no reliance

could be placed upon the recent protestations of Mehemet Ali; that his

ambition is insatiable and would only be increased by success; and

that to provide him with the opportunity of invading, or to leave

within his reach the objects of his desire would be to sow the seeds

of inevitable collisions; that Syria is no further from Constantinople

than a large number of well-administered provinces are from their

capitals in other States and can be as well governed from

Constantinople as from Alexandria; that it is impossible for the

resources of this province to be of any use to the Sultan in the hands

of a governor who might turn them against his master at any moment and

that they would be more useful if they were in the hands or at the

disposal of the Sultan himself; that, as Ibrahim had an army at his

orders, he had also the means, upon the decease of Mehemet Ali, of

securing his own succession to any power of which the latter might be

possessed at his death; that it was not fit that the Great Powers

should advise the Sultan to conclude a public arrangement with Mehemet

Ali, with the secret intention of hereafter breaking the arrangement

upon the first occasion that might seem opportune.

None the less the French Government maintained its opinion and refused

to take part in an arrangement which included the use of coercive

measures.

But the French Memorandum laid down that in the course of recent

circumstances no positive proposal has been made to France upon which

she was called to explain her attitude and that consequently the

resolution which England communicated to her in the Memorandum of July

17, doubtless in the name of the four Powers, must not be considered

as actuated by refusals which France has not made. This passage

obliges me briefly to remind you of the general course of

negotiations.

The original opinion conceived by Her Majesty's Government, of which

the five Powers were informed, including France, in 1839, was that the

arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which might secure a

permanent state of peace in the Levant, would be of a nature to

confine the power delegated to Mehemet Ali to Egypt alone and would

re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan throughout Syria, both

in Candia and in all the towns of the Holy Land; thus interposing the

desert between the direct power of the Sultan and the province of

which the administration would be left to the Pasha. And Her Majesty's

Government proposed that by way of compensation for the evacuation of

Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive an assurance that his male

descendants should succeed him as governors in Egypt, under the

sovereignty of the Sultan.

To this proposal the French Government raised objections saying that

such an arrangement would doubtless be the best if there were any

means of executing it, but that Mehemet Ali would offer resistance and

that any measures of violence which the allies might employ to reduce

him, would produce effects which might be more dangerous to the peace

of Europe and to the independence of the Porte, than the actual state

of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could possibly be; that

although the French Government thus refused to agree to England's

plan, during the long space of time which had subsequently elapsed, it

had not proposed any plan of its own. Further, in September 1839,

Comte Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London,

proposed to draw a line from the east to the west of the sea, nearly

from Beyrout to the desert near Damascus and to declare that all the

land to the south of this line should be administered by Mehemet Ali

and that all to the north should be under the immediate authority of

the Sultan. The French Ambassador then gave Her Majesty's Government

to understand that if such an arrangement were admitted by the five

Powers, France would unite with the four Powers, in case of need, for

the use of coercive measures, with the object of forcing Mehemet Ali

to submission.

I pointed out to Comte Sébastiani that such an arrangement was open,

though in a less degree, to all the objections applicable to the

present relative position of the two parties and that consequently Her

Majesty's Government could not accede to it. I observed that it seemed

inconsistent on the part of France to express her willingness to force

Mehemet Ali to agree to an arrangement which would obviously be

incomplete and inadequate to secure the proposed object, while

objecting to coercive measures when they were proposed for the purpose

of forcing consent to the arrangement desired by Her Majesty, the

execution of which, as France admitted, would entirely fulfil the

desired object.

To these arguments Comte Sébastiani replied that the objections

advanced by the French Government to the employment of coercive

measures against Mehemet Ali, were founded upon considerations of

domestic government, and that these objections would be removed if

the French Government was enabled to prove to the nation and to the

Chambers that it had obtained the best possible conditions for Mehemet

All and that he had refused to accept them.

As this insinuation was not admitted by Her Majesty's Government, the

French Government communicated officially on September 27, 1839, its

own plan, which was that Mehemet Ali should become a hereditary

governor of Egypt and of all Syria, and governor for life of Candia,

surrendering nothing but the district of Adana and Arabia. The French

Government did not say a word as to its knowledge of Mehemet Ali's

inclination to adhere to this arrangement, nor did it declare that if

he refused to agree, France would take coercive measures to compel

him.

Obviously Her Majesty's Government could not consent to this plan,

which was open to more objections than the present state of things,

the more so as the gift to Mehemet Ali of the legal and hereditary

title to a third of the Ottoman Empire, which he now occupies only by

force, would have been to begin the positive dismemberment of the

Empire.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, being desirous to show its

readiness to come to an agreement with France upon these questions,

stated that it would yield its well-founded objection to any extension

of Mehemet Ali's power beyond Egypt and would join the French

Government in recommending the Sultan to grant to Mehemet Ali, apart

from the pashalik of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of

Syria, to be bounded on the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to

the southern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias, and by a line from

this point to the Gulf of Akaba, provided that France would join the

four Powers in coercive measures if Mehemet Ali refused this offer.

This proposal, however, was not accepted by the French Government,

which now declared its inability to join in coercive measures or to be

a party to an arrangement to which Mehemet Ali would not consent.

While these discussions were proceeding with France, separate

negotiations were in progress between England and Russia, of which

full details and information have been sent to the French Government.

Negotiations with France were suspended for a time at the outset of

this year, firstly because a change of Ministry was expected, and

secondly because a change of Ministry took place.

In the month of May, however, Baron von Neumann and myself resolved,

upon the advice of our respective governments, to make a last effort

with the object of inducing France to begin a treaty which was to be

concluded with the other four Powers, and we submitted to the French

Government, through M. Guizot, another proposal for an arrangement

between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. One objection put forward by the

French Government to the last proposals of England was that although

it was proposed to give Mehemet Ali the strong position extending from

Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, he would be deprived of the fortress of

Acre.

To overcome this objection Baron von Neumann and myself proposed that

the northern frontiers of the part of Syria to be administered by the

Pasha should extend from Cape Nakhora to the furthest point of the

Lake of Tiberias, thus including within the boundary the fortress of

Acre; and that the eastern frontier should extend along the western

coast of the Lake of Tiberias and thence to the Gulf of Akaba. We

declared that the government of this part of Syria could be granted to

Mehemet Ali for life only, and that neither England nor Austria would

consent to grant Mehemet Ali hereditary rights over any part of Syria.

I further declared to M. Guizot that I could go no further in the way

of concessions in the hope of securing the co-operation of France, and

that this was our last proposal. Baron von Neumann and myself

communicated these facts separately to M. Guizot: Baron von Neumann

first, and myself the next day. M. Guizot told me he would inform his

Government of this proposal and of the facts which I had laid before

him, and that he would let me know the answer as soon as he had

received it. A short time afterwards the plenipotentiaries of Austria,

Prussia, and Russia informed me that they had every reason to believe

that the French Government, instead of deciding upon the proposal for

themselves, had sent it to Alexandria to learn the decision of Mehemet

Ali; that the four Powers who had undertaken the business were thus

confronted, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali; that, apart from

the inevitable delay, this was an action which their respective courts

had never intended to take and one to which they would never consent;

and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries

in a very embarrassing position. I agreed with them that their

objections were justified with regard to the conduct which they

attributed to the French Government, but that M. Guizot had said not a

word to me of what would be done. Mehemet Ali had been informed that

the French Government at that moment was fully occupied with

parliamentary questions and could naturally ask for time before

sending an answer to our proposals, and that in any case delay could

do no great harm. About June 27, M. Guizot came to me and read me a

letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, containing the answer of the

French Government to our proposal. This answer was a formal refusal.

M. Thiers said that _the French Government positively knew that

Mehemet Ali would not consent to a division of Syria unless he were

forced to do so; that France could not co-operate in coercive measures

against Mehemet Ali under these conditions, and that therefore she

could not become a party to the proposed arrangement_.

As France had thus refused to yield to England's ultimatum, the

plenipotentiaries were bound to consider what steps should be adopted

by their Governments. The position of the five Powers was this: the

five had declared their conviction that in the interests of the

balance of power and of the peace of Europe it was essential to

preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under

the reigning dynasty; all five had declared that they would use all

their influence to maintain this integrity and this independence; but

France, on the one hand, insisted that the best means to secure this

result was to abandon the Sultan to the mercies of Mehemet Ali and to

advise him to submit to the conditions which Mehemet might impose upon

him in order to preserve peace _sine qua non_; while on the other side

the four Powers regarded any further military occupation of the

Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali as likely to destroy the integrity

of the Turkish Empire and to be fatal to its independence; they

therefore thought that it was advisable to confine Mehemet Ali within

narrower limits.

After about two months of deliberations, France not only refused to

consent to the plan proposed by the four Powers as an ultimatum upon

their part, but further declared that she would not become a party to

any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali did not voluntarily consent

without the use of force. It only remained then for the four Great

Powers to adopt as an alternative the principle laid down by France,

which consisted in the complete submission of the Sultan to the

demands of Mehemet Ali; or to act upon their principles and force

Mehemet Ali to accept an arrangement compatible in form with the

rights of the Sultan, and compatible in content with the integrity of

the Ottoman Empire. If the former alternative were adopted, the

co-operation of France would be secured; in the latter alternative the

hope of that co-operation must be abandoned.