CHAPTER III

REASON IN PRISON

(THE MIDDLE AGES)

ABOUT ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great

adopted Christianity. This momentous decision inaugurated

[52] a millennium in which reason was enchained, thought was enslaved,

and knowledge made no progress.

During the two centuries in which they had been a forbidden sect the

Christians had claimed toleration on the ground that religious belief is

voluntary and not a thing which can be enforced. When their faith became

the predominant creed and had the power of the State behind it, they

abandoned this view. They embarked on the hopeful enterprise of bringing

about a complete uniformity in men’s opinions on the mysteries of the

universe, and began a more or less definite policy of coercing thought.

This policy was adopted by Emperors and Governments partly on political

grounds; religious divisions, bitter as they were, seemed dangerous to

the unity of the State. But the fundamental principle lay in the

doctrine that salvation is to be found exclusively in the Christian

Church. The profound conviction that those who did not believe in its

doctrines would be damned eternally, and that God punishes theological

error as if it were the most heinous of crimes, led naturally to

persecution. It was a duty to impose on men the only true doctrine,

seeing that their own eternal interests were at stake, and to hinder

errors from spreading. Heretics were more

[53] than ordinary criminals and the pains that man could inflict on

them were as nothing to the tortures awaiting them in hell. To rid the

earth of men who, however virtuous, were, through their religious

errors, enemies of the Almighty, was a plain duty. Their virtues were no

excuse. We must remember that, according to the humane doctrine of the

Christians, pagan, that is, merely human, virtues were vices, and

infants who died unbaptized passed the rest of time in creeping on the

floor of hell. The intolerance arising from such views could not but

differ in kind and intensity from anything that the world had yet

witnessed.

Besides the logic of its doctrines, the character of its Sacred Book

must also be held partly accountable for the intolerant principles of

the Christian Church. It was unfortunate that the early Christians had

included in their Scripture the Jewish writings which reflect the ideas

of a low stage of civilization and are full of savagery. It would be

difficult to say how much harm has been done, in corrupting the morals

of men, by the precepts and examples of inhumanity, violence, and

bigotry which the reverent reader of the Old Testament, implicitly

believing in its inspiration, is bound to approve. It furnished an

armoury for the theory of

[54] persecution. The truth is that Sacred Books are an obstacle to

moral and intellectual progress, because they consecrate the ideas of a

given epoch, and its customs, as divinely appointed. Christianity, by

adopting books of a long past age, placed in the path of human

development a particularly nasty stumbling-block. It may occur to one to

wonder how history might have been altered —altered it surely would have

been—if the Christians had cut Jehovah out of their programme and,

content with the New Testament, had rejected the inspiration of the Old.

Under Constantine the Great and his successors, edict after edict

fulminated against the worship of the old pagan gods and against

heretical Christian sects. Julian the Apostate, who in his brief reign

(A.D. 361–3) sought to revive the old order of things, proclaimed

universal toleration, but he placed Christians at a disadvantage by

forbidding them to teach in schools. This was only a momentary check.

Paganism was finally shattered by the severe laws of Theodosius I (end

of fourth century). It lingered on here and there for more than another

century, especially at Rome and Athens, but had little importance. The

Christians were more concerned in striving among themselves than in

[55] crushing the prostrate spirit of antiquity. The execution of the

heretic Priscillian in Spain (fourth century) inaugurated the punishment

of heresy by death. It is interesting to see a non-Christian of this age

teaching the Christian sects that they should suffer one another.

Themistius in an address to the Emperor Valens urged him to repeal his

edicts against the Christians with whom he did not agree, and expounded

a theory of toleration. “The religious beliefs of individuals are a

field in which the authority of a government cannot be effective;

compliance can only lead to hypocritical professions. Every faith should

be allowed; the civil government should govern orthodox and heterodox to

the common good. God himself plainly shows that he wishes various forms

of worship; there are many roads by which one can reach him.”

No father of the Church has been more esteemed or enjoyed higher

authority than St. Augustine (died A.D. 410). He formulated the

principle of persecution for the guidance of future generations, basing

it on the firm foundation of Scripture—on words used by Jesus Christ in

one of his parables, “Compel them to come in.” Till the end of the

twelfth century the Church worked hard to suppress heterodoxies. There

was much

[56] persecution, but it was not systematic. There is reason to think

that in the pursuit of heresy the Church was mainly guided by

considerations of its temporal interest, and was roused to severe action

only when the spread of false doctrine threatened to reduce its revenues

or seemed a menace to society. At the end of the twelfth century

Innocent III became Pope and under him the Church of Western Europe

reached the height of its power. He and his immediate successors are

responsible for imagining and beginning an organized movement to sweep

heretics out of Christendom. Languedoc in Southwestern France was

largely populated by heretics, whose opinions were considered

particularly offensive, known as the Albigeois. They were the subjects

of the Count of Toulouse, and were an industrious and respectable

people. But the Church got far too little money out of this anti-

clerical population, and Innocent called upon the Count to extirpate

heresy from his dominion. As he would not obey, the Pope announced a

Crusade against the Albigeois, and offered to all who would bear a hand

the usual rewards granted to Crusaders, including absolution from all

their sins. A series of sanguinary wars followed in which the

Englishman, Simon de Montfort, took part. There were

[57] wholesale burnings and hangings of men, women and children. The

resistance of the people was broken down, though the heresy was not

eradicated, and the struggle ended in 1229 with the complete humiliation

of the Count of Toulouse. The important point of the episode is this:

the Church introduced into the public law of Europe the new principle

that a sovran held his crown on the condition that he should extirpate

heresy. If he hesitated to persecute at the command of the Pope, he must

be coerced; his lands were forfeited; and his dominions were thrown open

to be seized by any one whom the Church could induce to attack him. The

Popes thus established a theocratic system in which all other interests

were to be subordinated to the grand duty of maintaining the purity of

the Faith.

But in order to root out heresy it was necessary to discover it in its

most secret retreats. The Albigeois had been crushed, but the poison of

their doctrine was not yet destroyed. The organized system of searching

out heretics known as the Inquisition was founded by Pope Gregory IX

about A.D. 1233, and fully established by a Bull of Innocent IV (A.D.

1252) which regulated the machinery of persecution “as an integral part

of the social edifice in every city and every

[58] State.” This powerful engine for the suppression of the freedom of

men’s religious opinions is unique in history.

The bishops were not equal to the new talk undertaken by the Church, and

in every ecclesiastical province suitable monks were selected and to

them was delegated the authority of the Pope for discovering heretics.

These inquisitors had unlimited authority, they were subject to no

supervision and responsible to no man. It would not have been easy to

establish this system but for the fact that contemporary secular rulers

had inaugurated independently a merciless legislation against heresy.

The Emperor Frederick II, who was himself undoubtedly a freethinker,

made laws for his extensive dominions in Italy and Germany (between 1220

and 1235), enacting that all heretics should be outlawed, that those who

did not recant should be burned, those who recanted should be

imprisoned, but if they relapsed should be executed; that their property

should be confiscated, their houses destroyed, and their children, to

the second generation, ineligible to positions of emolument unless they

had betrayed their father or some other heretic.

Frederick’s legislation consecrated the stake as the proper punishment

for heresy. This

[59] cruel form of death for that crime seems to have been first

inflicted on heretics by a French king (1017). We must remember that in

the Middle Ages, and much later, crimes of all kinds were punished with

the utmost cruelty. In England in the reign of Henry VIII there is a

case of prisoners being boiled to death. Heresy was the foulest of all

crimes; and to prevail against it was to prevail against the legions of

hell. The cruel enactments against heretics were strongly supported by

the public opinion of the masses.

When the Inquisition was fully developed it covered Western Christendom

with a net from the meshes of which it was difficult for a heretic to

escape. The inquisitors in the various kingdoms co-operated, and

communicated information; there was “a chain of tribunals throughout

continental Europe.” England stood outside the system, but from the age

of Henry IV and Henry V the government repressed heresy by the stake

under a special statute (A.D. 1400; repealed 1533; revived under Mary;

finally repealed in 1676).

In its task of imposing unity of belief the Inquisition was most

successful in Spain. Here towards the end of the fifteenth century a

system was instituted which had peculiarities of its own and was very

jealous of

[60] Roman interference. One of the achievements of the Spanish

Inquisition (which was not abolished till the nineteenth century) was to

expel the Moriscos or converted Moors, who retained many of their old

Mohammedan opinions and customs. It is also said to have eradicated

Judaism and to have preserved the country from the zeal of Protestant

missionaries. But it cannot be proved that it deserves the credit of

having protected Spain against Protestantism, for it is quite possible

that if the seeds of Protestant opinion had been sown they would, in any

case, have fallen dead on an uncongenial soil. Freedom of thought

however was entirely suppressed.

One of the most efficacious means for hunting down heresy was the “Edict

of Faith,” which enlisted the people in the service of the Inquisition

and required every man to be an informer. From time to time a certain

district was visited and an edict issued commanding those who knew

anything of any heresy to come forward and reveal it, under fearful

penalties temporal and spiritual. In consequence, no one was free from

the suspicion of his neighbours or even of his own family. “No more

ingenious device has been invented to subjugate a whole population, to

paralyze its intellect, and to reduce it

[61] to blind obedience. It elevated delation to the rank of high

religious duty.”

The process employed in the trials of those accused of heresy in Spain

rejected every reasonable means for the ascertainment of truth. The

prisoner was assumed to be guilty, the burden of proving his innocence

rested on him; his judge was virtually his prosecutor. All witnesses

against him, however infamous, were admitted. The rules for allowing

witnesses for the prosecution were lax; those for rejecting witnesses

for the defence were rigid. Jews, Moriscos, and servants could give

evidence against the prisoner but not for him, and the same rule applied

to kinsmen to the fourth degree. The principle on which the Inquisition

proceeded was that better a hundred innocent should suffer than one

guilty person escape. Indulgences were granted to any one who

contributed wood to the pile. But the tribunal of the Inquisition did

not itself condemn to the stake, for the Church must not be guilty of

the shedding of blood. The ecclesiastical judge pronounced the prisoner

to be a heretic of whose conversion there was no hope, and handed him

over (“relaxed” him was the official term) to the secular authority,

asking and charging the magistrate “to treat him benignantly and

mercifully.” But this

[62] formal plea for mercy could not be entertained by the civil power;

it had no choice but to inflict death; if it did otherwise, it was a

promoter of heresy. All princes and officials, according to the Canon

Law, must punish duly and promptly heretics handed over to them by the

Inquisition, under pain of excommunication. It is to be noted that the

number of deaths at the stake has been much over-estimated by popular

imagination; but the sum of suffering caused by the methods of the

system and the punishments that fell short of death can hardly be

exaggerated.

The legal processes employed by the Church in these persecutions

exercised a corrupting influence on the criminal jurisprudence of the

Continent. Lea, the historian of the Inquisition, observes: “Of all the

curses which the Inquisition brought in its train, this perhaps was the

greatest—that, until the closing years of the eighteenth century,

throughout the greater part of Europe, the inquisitorial process, as

developed for the destruction of heresy, became the customary method of

dealing with all who were under any accusation.”

The Inquisitors who, as Gibbon says, “defended nonsense by cruelties,”

are often regarded as monsters. It may be said for them and for the

kings who did their will that

[63] they were not a bit worse than the priests and monarchs of

primitive ages who sacrificed human beings to their deities. The Greek

king, Agamemnon, who immolated his daughter Iphigenia to obtain

favourable winds from the gods, was perhaps a most affectionate father,

and the seer who advised him to do so may have been a man of high

integrity. They acted according to their beliefs. And so in the Middle

Ages and afterwards men of kindly temper and the purest zeal for

morality were absolutely devoid of mercy where heresy was suspected.

Hatred of heresy was a sort of infectious germ, generated by the

doctrine of exclusive salvation.

It has been observed that this dogma also injured the sense of truth. As

man’s eternal fate was at stake, it seemed plainly legitimate or rather

imperative to use any means to enforce the true belief—even falsehood

and imposture. There was no scruple about the invention of miracles or

any fictions that were edifying. A disinterested appreciation of truth

will not begin to prevail till the seventeenth century.

While this principle, with the associated doctrines of sin, hell, and

the last judgment, led to such consequences, there were other doctrines

and implications in Christianity which, forming a solid rampart against

the

[64] advance of knowledge, blocked the paths of science in the Middle

Ages, and obstructed its progress till the latter half of the nineteenth

century. In every important field of scientific research, the ground was

occupied by false views which the Church declared to be true on the

infallible authority of the Bible. The Jewish account of Creation and

the Fall of Man, inextricably bound up with the Christian theory of

Redemption, excluded from free inquiry geology, zoology, and

anthropology. The literal interpretation of the Bible involved the truth

that the sun revolves round the earth. The Church condemned the theory

of the antipodes. One of the charges against Servetus (who was burned in

the sixteenth century; see below, p. 79) was that he believed the

statement of a Greek geographer that Judea is a wretched barren country

in spite of the fact that the Bible describes it as a land flowing with

milk and honey. The Greek physician Hippocrates had based the study of

medicine and disease on experience and methodical research. In the

Middle Ages men relapsed to the primitive notions of a barbarous age.

Bodily ailments were ascribed to occult agencies—the malice of the Devil

or the wrath of God. St. Augustine said that the diseases of Christians

were caused by demons,

[65] and Luther in the same way attributed them to Satan. It was only

logical that supernatural remedies should be sought to counteract the

effects of supernatural causes. There was an immense traffic in relics

with miraculous virtues, and this had the advantage of bringing in a

large revenue to the Church. Physicians were often exposed to suspicions

of sorcery and unbelief. Anatomy was forbidden, partly perhaps on

account of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The opposition

of ecclesiastics to inoculation in the eighteenth century was a survival

of the mediaeval view of disease. Chemistry (alchemy) was considered a

diabolical art and in 1317 was condemned by the Pope. The long

imprisonment of Roger Bacon (thirteenth century) who, while he professed

zeal for orthodoxy, had an inconvenient instinct for scientific

research, illustrates the mediaeval distrust of science.

It is possible that the knowledge of nature would have progressed

little, even if this distrust of science on theological grounds had not

prevailed. For Greek science had ceased to advance five hundred years

before Christianity became powerful. After about 200 B.C. no important

discoveries were made. The explanation of this decay is not easy, but we

may be sure that it is to be sought in the

[66] social conditions of the Greek and Roman world. And we may suspect

that the social conditions of the Middle Ages would have proved

unfavourable to the scientific spirit— the disinterested quest of

facts—even if the controlling beliefs had not been hostile. We may

suspect that the rebirth of science would in any case have been

postponed till new social conditions, which began to appear in the

thirteenth century (see next Chapter), had reached a certain maturity.

Theological prejudice may have injured knowledge principally by its

survival after the Middle Ages had passed away. In other words, the harm

done by Christian doctrines, in this respect, may lie less in the

obscurantism of the dark interval between ancient and modern

civilization, than in the obstructions which they offered when science

had revived in spite of them and could no longer be crushed.

The firm belief in witchcraft, magic, and demons was inherited by the

Middle Ages from antiquity, but it became far more lurid and made the

world terrible. Men believed that they were surrounded by fiends

watching for every opportunity to harm them, that pestilences, storms,

eclipses, and famines were the work of the Devil; but they believed as

firmly that ecclesiastical rites were capable of coping with these

enemies. Some of the

[67] early Christian Emperors legislated against magic, but till the

fourteenth century there was no systematic attempt to root out

witchcraft. The fearful epidemic, known as the Black Death, which

devastated Europe in that century, seems to have aggravated the haunting

terror of the invisible world of demons. Trials for witchcraft

multiplied, and for three hundred years the discovery of witchcraft and

the destruction of those who were accused of practising it, chiefly

women, was a standing feature of European civilization. Both the theory

and the persecution were supported by Holy Scripture. “Thou shalt not

suffer a witch to live” was the clear injunction of the highest

authority. Pope Innocent VIII issued a Bull on the matter (1484) in

which he asserted that plagues and storms are the work of witches, and

the ablest minds believed in the reality of their devilish powers.

No story is more painful than the persecution of witches, and nowhere

was it more atrocious than in England and Scotland. I mention it because

it was the direct result of theological doctrines, and because, as we

shall see, it was rationalism which brought the long chapter of horrors

to an end.

In the period, then, in which the Church exercised its greatest

influence, reason was

[68] enchained in the prison which Christianity had built around the

human mind. It was not indeed inactive, but its activity took the form

of heresy; or, to pursue the metaphor, those who broke chains were

unable for the most part to scale the walls of the prison; their freedom

extended only so far as to arrive at beliefs, which, like orthodoxy

itself, were based on Christian mythology. There were some exceptions to

the rule. At the end of the twelfth century a stimulus from another

world began to make itself felt. The philosophy of Aristotle became

known to learned men in Western Christendom; their teachers were Jews

and Mohammedans. Among the Mohammedans there was a certain amount of

free thought, provoked by their knowledge of ancient Greek speculation.

The works of the freethinker Averroes (twelfth century) which were based

on Aristotle’s philosophy, propagated a small wave of rationalism in

Christian countries. Averroes held the eternity of matter and denied the

immortality of the soul; his general view may be described as pantheism.

But he sought to avoid difficulties with the orthodox authorities of

Islam by laying down the doctrine of double truth, that is the

coexistence of two independent and contradictory truths, the one

philosophical, and the other religious. This

[69] did not save him from being banished from the court of the Spanish

caliph. In the University of Paris his teaching produced a school of

freethinkers who held that the Creation, the resurrection of the body,

and other essential dogmas, might be true from the standpoint of

religion but are false from the standpoint of reason. To a plain mind

this seems much as if one said that the doctrine of immortality is true

on Sundays but not on week-days, or that the Apostles’ Creed is false in

the drawing-room and true in the kitchen. This dangerous movement was

crushed, and the saving principle of double truth condemned, by Pope

John XXI. The spread of Averroistic and similar speculations called

forth the Theology of Thomas, of Aquino in South Italy (died 1274), a

most subtle thinker, whose mind had a natural turn for scepticism. He

enlisted Aristotle, hitherto the guide of infidelity, on the side of

orthodoxy, and constructed an ingenious Christian philosophy which is

still authoritative in the Roman Church. But Aristotle and reason are

dangerous allies for faith, and the treatise of Thomas is perhaps more

calculated to unsettle a believing mind by the doubts which it

powerfully states than to quiet the scruples of a doubter by its

solutions.

There must always have been some private

[70] and underground unbelief here and there, which did not lead to any

serious consequences. The blasphemous statement that the world had been

deceived by three impostors, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, was current in

the thirteenth century. It was attributed to the freethinking Emperor

Frederick II (died 1250), who has been described as “the first modern

man.” The same idea, in a milder form, was expressed in the story of the

Three Rings, which is at least as old. A Mohammedan ruler, desiring to

extort money from a rich Jew, summoned him to his court and laid a snare

for him. “My friend,” he said, “I have often heard it reported that thou

art a very wise man. Tell me therefore which of the three religions,

that of the Jews, that of the Mohammedans, and that of the Christians,

thou believest to be the truest.” The Jew saw that a trap was laid for

him and answered as follows: “My lord, there was once a rich man who

among his treasures had a ring of such great value that he wished to

leave it as a perpetual heirloom to his successors. So he made a will

that whichever of his sons should be found in possession of this ring

after his death should be considered his heir. The son to whom he gave

the ring acted in the same way as his father, and so the ring passed

from hand to

[71] hand. At last it came into the possession of a man who had three

sons whom he loved equally. Unable to make up his mind to which of them

he should leave the ring, he promised it to each of them privately, and

then in order to satisfy them all caused a goldsmith to make two other

rings so closely resembling the true ring that he was unable to

distinguish them himself. On his death-bed he gave each of them a ring,

and each claimed to be his heir, but no one could prove his title

because the rings were indistinguishable, and the suit at law lasts till

this day. It is even so, my lord, with the three religions, given by God

to the three peoples. They each think they have the true religion, but

which of them really has it, is a question, like that of the rings,

still undecided.” This sceptical story became famous in the eighteenth

century, when the German poet, Lessing, built upon it his drama Nathan

the Sage, which was intended to show the unreasonableness of

intolerance.

A History of Freedom of Thought · 第 2 / 7 章