CHAPTER XIV

THE TWO AMERICAS AND THE RELATION OF SOUTH AMERICA TO EUROPE

Alexander Hamilton bade his fellow citizens to think continentally; and

Herodotus, in the short introduction prefixed to his history, explains

its theme as being an account of the relations of two great continents,

Europe and Asia, and of the reasons which produced such recurring

strife between them. Let us attempt to think a little of the southern

part of the Western world as a whole, in its relations as a continent

to the other continents, and especially to that continent with which it

is connected by a narrow neck of land, the Isthmus of Panama, and which

has drawn its name from the same navigator. The series of incidents

by which the name of a Florentine adventurer was given, first, to a

continent he probably did not discover, and then to another which he

never saw, is as curious as anything in geographical history.

Everybody knows that Christopher Columbus sailed out into the west in

search of new lands, expecting them to be a part of Asia, and that to

the day of his death, after four voyages, he believed that he had found

India.[124] In the last of those voyages, when he was wearily beating

up along the coast of Darien against the currents, he fancied himself

near the Straits of Malacca. It is natural, therefore, that neither he

nor his first successors in exploration should have given a name to

the new western land south of the Caribbean Sea, even when, some while

later, they had explored enough of it to recognize it for a continent.

They named particular regions, but a general name was not needed

because it was expected that the parts seen would turn out to be parts

of Asia. Then in 1497 other voyagers who sailed forth to explore said

that they found a new land, far off in the ocean to the southwest of

the Canary Islands. Next year Columbus discovered on the south side of

the Caribbean Sea the "Tierra Firma," which we call Venezuela. Americus

Vespuccius of Florence, one of the ship's company of the 1497 voyage,

wrote letters, giving an account of this (and of a later voyage, also)

to the new land far to the southwest, in which he described it as "a

New World, a New Fourth Part of the Globe," Europe, Asia, and Africa

being the other three. The letters made a great sensation; and one of

them was made the basis of a book called _Cosmographiæ Introductio_,

published in 1507, at St. Dié in France, by a certain Waldseemüller

(Hylacomylus), a professor there, who suggested that as Americus was

the discoverer of this Fourth Part of the World, it should be called

after him.[125] The book was read far and wide; the name took. It was

not intended to be applied to the lands west and south of the Caribbean

Sea, which between 1497 and 1507 had been discovered by Columbus and

others; still less to the lands discovered by John Cabot in the far

north, but to an entirely different piece of land much to the south and

east of what Columbus had discovered. But when all the lands bordering

on that part of the Atlantic had been sufficiently explored and the

records of the voyages compared, it appeared that the lands lying in

the part of the ocean to which the descriptions of Americus referred,

were, in fact, continuous with the coasts of the Caribbean and Gulf of

Mexico. Thereupon all the land from the Rio de la Plata (discovered in

1516) northward to the Isthmus of Panama, came to be included under the

name America, just because there was no other general name for what had

been, at least till 1513, when the Pacific was discovered by crossing

the Isthmus at Darien, still believed to be part of Asia. As soon as

the Pacific had been reached, and still more when the ever famous

voyage of Magellan had shewn that Asia lay thousands of miles further

away beyond the Pacific, a general name began to be wanted. Much later,

and again, just because there was no other competing name, the term

America was extended to include everything north of the Gulf of Mexico

up to the Arctic regions, and when the need was felt for distinguishing

the two parts, the words North and South were added. Although applied

earlier to the southern than to the northern continent, the name when

used alone now denotes to most Europeans the latter.

How much simpler and better it would have been if each continent had

received a name of its own. South America might have been called after

Columbus, as the first man who saw its _terra firma_, and North America

might have received the name of Cabotia or Pinzonia or Ponceana,

whichever navigator may be best entitled to be deemed its first and

true discoverer. How much trouble would have been saved and how many

mistakes avoided! Italian peasants would not have fancied that a cousin

who had gone to Buenos Aires was the near neighbour of another who

had gone to New York. Similarities would not have been imagined where

differences exist. The South Americans would not have resented the

assumption by the people of the United States of the name to which

they claim an equal right, and the people of the United States would

not have formed the habit of believing that the Spanish and Portuguese

speaking inhabitants of the southern continent are their affectionate

relatives, because they share in the same family name.

These, however, are vain regrets. The names have long been fixed,

though for a great while the Spaniards declined to talk of North

America. The thing is one instance among many to shew how much may

flow from a name which is itself the result of a mere accident.

Now let us turn from names to things, and consider in what respect the

two Americas, and their peoples, resemble and differ from one another,

and how far they constitute, politically or otherwise, one whole world

apart, and what are the relations of the southern, or Spanish and

Portuguese, continent to the other, now mainly Teutonic, continent,

and to the countries of Europe, and whether the term "Pan Americanism"

describes a fact or merely conveys an interesting aspiration. Some

points in the history of each continent may come out more clearly, and

become more significant when the two are compared, for the history of

each illustrates that of the other.

The physical structure of the two continents shews certain

similarities. Each is traversed from north to south by a great mountain

chain, sometimes breaking into parallel ridges and sometimes widening

out into high tablelands. In each this chain is much nearer to the

western than to the eastern coast, and in each there are volcanic

outbursts at various points along the lines of elevation, these being

more continuous and on a vaster scale in the southern continent. In

each there is, moreover, an independent mountain mass on the eastern

side, the Appalachian system in North America, the Brazilian highlands

in South America. Each has, nearer to its western than to its eastern

coast, a desert, and in that desert an inland river basin with lakes,

Great Salt Lake in Utah corresponding roughly to Lakes Titicaca and

Poopo in Bolivia. Each has two gigantic rivers, though the Mississippi

and St. Lawrence are not equal in volume to the Amazon and the Paraná.

The shores of both are washed by mighty ocean currents, but while the

Gulf Stream warms the east coast of the northern, the Antarctic current

chills the west coast of the southern, continent.[126] Their climates

are so far similar that in both the east side of the continent receives

more rain than the west, but South America, having its greatest breadth

in the tropics, lies more largely within the torrid zone.

It is, however, with the settlement and subsequent history of the two

continents that the real interest of the comparison begins. There are

three remarkable points of similarity, but the points of difference are

more numerous and instructive, and, in noting them, we shall see how

potent each point of difference has been in directing the course of

events and in forming the character of the communities that have grown

up.

The points of similarity are these. Both continents were when

discovered inhabited by races entirely unlike those of Europe, who over

the greater part of this area were in the savage state, but had in a

few regions favoured by nature made some progress towards civilization.

Both were conquered by Europeans, and easily conquered, owing to the

superiority of the invaders in arms and discipline. The peoples of both

(with one important exception in the northern and three unimportant

exceptions in the southern continent) ultimately revolted against the

kingdoms whence the European part of their population had come and have

ever since managed their own affairs as republics, seven republics in

North, eleven in South America.

Having noted these general resemblances in the fortunes of the two, let

us enquire what were the differences, natural and political, which made

the lines of their subsequent development diverge.

At this point, however, it is proper to leave off talking of North

and South America, for the southern part of the former continent

belongs historically and to some extent physically also, to the latter

continent. As Alexandre Dumas said in writing of his journey to Spain,

"Africa begins at the Pyrenees,"--it is a saying which the Spaniards

have never forgiven,--so we may say, "South America begins at the Rio

Grande del Norte." Mexico and the states of Central America down to the

Isthmus of Panama were parts of the Spanish colonial Empire, conquered,

settled, and administered in much the same way as the still larger

part of that Empire which lay farther south. We must, therefore, group

the regions that once belonged to that Empire under the general name

of Spanish, or, when it is desired to include Brazil (a Portuguese

country), "Latin" America, referring to the other parts of the northern

continent as "Teutonic America."[127]

The aboriginal tribes with which the English and French came in contact

when they settled the Atlantic coasts of North America were scattered

over a vast wooded region, lived mainly by the chase, and had formed no

habits of regular industry. They were mostly fierce fighters, proud and

dogged, unwilling to bear any control, and it was found impracticable

to make slaves of them, or use them for any kind of regular labour.

They were unfitted for it, and it would have cost the settlers more

effort to compel the Indians to cut down trees and till the ground than

to do the same things themselves. There was, accordingly, never any

question of Indian slavery or serfdom, either on the Atlantic coasts or

when the march of colonization advanced further inland, nor was there

more than a scanty intermarriage between the settlers and the natives.

Other reasons besides those connected with labour prevented any

admixture in these regions of the white with the native races. There

was little social intercourse, because the Indians, even the majority

of the less warlike tribes of Virginia and the regions south of

Virginia, were driven out, or retired, or died out. Their barbarous

way of life drew a sharp line between them and the white intruders.

The latter, moreover, brought their women with them, and had less

temptation to seek wives among the Indians. Thus it was only among the

French voyageurs and trappers of the region round and beyond the Great

Lakes that any mixed race grew up, half white, half Indian, and this

race has now almost disappeared.

In Spanish America, the case was quite different. Both in Mexico, in

parts of Central America, and in Peru there was a large sedentary

population of aborigines, cultivating the soil and trained to industry

during many generations. The Conquerors immediately turned them into

serfs, parcelling them out among the persons who received land grants,

and who thereafter lived on the produce of this semiservile labour.

The result was that whereas in Teutonic America there grew up, slowly

at first, a white agricultural population and ultimately a white

manufacturing population also, in Spanish America agriculture was

left almost entirely to the aborigines, and the pure white population

increased hardly at all, because few new settlers came. There appeared,

however, and that within two or three generations, a considerable

mestizo or half-breed population, which has come, after three

centuries, to constitute most of the upper class and practically the

whole of the middle class in all but two of the republics.

This was the beginning of the divergent careers of the two sets of

European colonists, Spaniards and Englishmen, a divergence which

ultimately gave to the social system of each set its own peculiar

structure. Two other circumstances helped to deepen the divergence.

One was the hot climate of most parts of Spanish America, which made

field labour, or, indeed, any kind of manual labour, more distasteful

to men of European stock than such labour was in the northern parts of

Teutonic America. The same cause, it need hardly be said, had much to

do with the importation of negroes on a vast scale into the southern

parts of the British North American colonies. Such an expedient was

less needed in Mexico and Peru, because they possessed (as already

remarked) a native population that could be reduced to serfdom. In

Spanish America, accordingly, all forms of labour connected with

land were left by the European settlers to the natives, and no white

peasantry grew up.

The other circumstance was that whereas in Teutonic America few or no

mines were discovered or worked for a long time after the country had

begun to be occupied, the Spaniards, having hit upon regions rich, some

of them in gold, many of them in silver, began greedily to exploit this

natural wealth and forced the natives to toil for them in this (to the

native particularly odious) kind of work. The destruction of human

life was terrible, but in those days life was little regarded. So was

the slave-trade terrible in the deaths it caused and the suffering it

inflicted, but the conscience of England was not stirred against it

till the end of the eighteenth century. The development of mining in

Spanish America, immense for the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth

centuries, when comparatively little was going on elsewhere, had many

effects for Spain and for the world. For Mexico and Peru the most

direct effect was to enrich a good many persons without any industrial

efforts put forth by themselves,[128] and to lead the settlers as

a whole to rely less upon agriculture than men did in the English

colonies. A luxurious style of living established itself in the city

of Mexico and in Lima, most unlike the frugal simplicity of Boston or

Providence, or even of Philadelphia or New York, in the eighteenth

century.

It has often been observed that whereas the men who went to the

northern English colonies were mostly small farmers or townsfolk of

the trading or artisan classes, the Spanish emigrants were mainly

adventurers, making gold and silver their first object, the acquisition

of plantations or mines to be worked by natives the second. This

stamped on Spanish colonial society what can hardly be called an

aristocratic character, for many of the emigrant-adventurers, like

the Pizarro brothers, sprang from a humble social stratum, but yet a

character which lacked both the sentiment of equality and a respect for

industry.

Not less marked than these social differences were those which belonged

to the sphere of government and administration. The English colonies

were for the most part left to govern themselves. Each had not only its

colonial assembly, but also local assemblies for towns and counties,

along with the English arrangements for securing justice in civil and

criminal matters by juries. Even the governors sent out from England,

where such there were, interfered but little with the power of the

colonists to regulate their own affairs. The Crown did occasionally

assert its prerogative, but these instances and the resistance which

arbitrary intervention evoked bear witness to the general adherence

to the principles of local self-government. In the Spanish colonies,

on the other hand, all power remained in the Crown, and was exercised

either directly from Spain by ordinances made or orders issued there,

or else through the viceroy or captain-general of each colony.

Lucrative posts were reserved for persons of Spanish birth, who

obtained them by court favour at home, or perhaps from a viceroy,

who had brought them out in his suite. In the field of religion the

contrast was even greater. Ecclesiastical power had in Spanish America

been almost equal to civil. Although the Crown of Spain yielded less

authority to the Pope in its transatlantic than it did in its European

dominions, the church as a whole, archbishops and bishops, the Orders

and the Holy Office, were, in America, an immense and omnipresent

force, with whom even viceroys had to reckon, for their influence was

great in the Court at home as well as over the minds and conduct of

the colonists. Society was saturated with clericalism, and a taint of

heterodoxy was more dangerous than one of disloyalty.

Putting all these things together, it can be seen how little in common

Teutonic America and Spanish America had when the colonial period ended

for each of them by its severance from the mother country. They were,

in fact, unlike in everything, except their position in the Western

Hemisphere. Few, and far from friendly, had been their relations.

There had been very little commercial intercourse but a great deal of

fighting. English and American buccaneers and pirates--the two classes

were practically the same--had been wont to prey upon Spanish colonial

commerce and pillage Spanish colonial cities. There probably remained

more aversion between the two races in America than in Europe, for in

their hostility to France during the eighteenth century the people

of Britain had almost forgotten their hostility to Spain. To the New

Englander or Virginian the colonial Spaniard had been a Papist and a

persecutor, to the colonial Spaniard his neighbours on the north were

pirates and heretics.

What change was made by the two wars against the two mother countries

and the independence which followed? It might have seemed likely that

now, when both parts of the New World were disconnected from the Old

and both had republican forms of government, they might begin to draw

together. Independence, though it came nearly forty years later to

Spanish America, made more difference there than it had done to the

English colonies. Those who had been kept in leading strings by Spain

were now left to their own devices. Ill-built and ill-steered had been

the vessel that carried their fortunes, but now they began to drift and

be tossed about with neither compass nor pilot. An era of civil wars

and military revolutions set in, which lasted in Mexico nearly half a

century, in Peru and Argentina still longer, and which seems to have

become chronic in some of the more backward states. While Teutonic

America was making enormous strides in population and prosperity,

intestine strife checked all progress, educational and material, in the

Spanish lands during two generations. It is to the last thirty years

of the nineteenth century that the development of Mexico, Argentina,

Chile, and Uruguay belongs. After the Latin-American countries had

become independent, there was no more commercial intercourse between

them and the United States than there had been in colonial days and

no more community of feeling. Warm sympathy had been expressed by the

latter with the colonies in their struggle against Spain, and the

declaration made by John Quincy Adams in concert with the English

George Canning against any interference by the Holy Alliance to support

the cause of monarchy in the New World, was gratefully welcomed

by the insurgents. But no friendship between English-speaking and

Spanish-speaking men grew up, and the war of the United States against

Mexico in 1846, undertaken not so much because there were grievances

against Mexico as from a desire to extend the area of slavery in the

United States, and strengthen the Slave Power itself, exposed United

States policy to suspicions that sank deep into the Spanish-American

mind.

From this consideration of the past relations of the two American

continents, let us return to the divergence of their fortunes. At the

time of the Discovery, the regions which passed under the rule of Spain

were richer, more advanced in the arts of life, and far more populous

than those whose settlement began with the expeditions of Champlain

and Raleigh. We have no data for guessing at the population of the New

World either in 1500 or in 1600, but at both dates there evidently

were in Mexico and Central America far more inhabitants than in all

the rest of the Northern Continent taken together. As regards South

America, the empire of the Incas alone probably contained from nine to

eleven millions[129] of persons, a number many times greater than that

of all the aborigines that at any one time dwelt between the Arctic

circle and the Gulf of Mexico. Even in 1800 the population of Mexico

alone, without counting South America, was far larger than that of the

United States and Canada. But from 1810, when the revolt of the Spanish

colonies began, down till 1860, the growth of those colonies was slow,

and in some there was even retrogression. Meanwhile the United States,

and latterly, Canada also, have been advancing with unexampled speed,

so that now their population, about 108 millions, far exceeds that of

all the Spanish republics in both continents. The hotter countries were

at one time more populous than the temperate; now the reverse holds.

If we regard wealth, there is, of course, no comparison at all between

Teutonic America, as it stands to-day, and the southern regions. Yet

Spain was long supposed to have got by far the best parts of the New

World, not so much because they had tropical productiveness, as in

respect of the quantity of the precious metals they contained. The

economic change from the sixteenth century to the twentieth which the

progress of natural science and mechanical invention has brought about

can hardly be better illustrated than by the changed importance which

coal, iron, and copper have for our time when compared with that which

gold and silver had in the days of Charles the Fifth.

When the North American colonies separated from England, they were a

small nation of less than three millions on the Atlantic coast. Thence

they spread out over the vast space beyond the Alleghany Mountains,

then across the Mississippi, finally over the Rocky Mountains to

the Pacific, remaining one nation over a territory thirty times

greater than that which had been actually settled at the time of the

Revolution. The same process happened later and on a smaller scale in

the dominion which remained to England in the north. The Canadians have

spread out from the banks of the St. Lawrence to Vancouver Island, also

remaining one people. Thus Teutonic America now consists of two nations

only.[130] How different the fate of the Spanish colonies. Scattered

over a space eight thousand miles long from San Francisco to Magellan's

Straits, in days before railways existed and with even steam navigation

in its infancy, they did not think of trying to maintain political

connection across vast distances, and naturally fell apart into many

independent states, roughly corresponding to the administrative

divisions of colonial days. The number of these states has varied from

time to time. At present there are six on the North American continent,

and ten on the South American, without counting Portuguese Brazil and

the three island republics of Cuba, San Domingo, and Hayti. Out of the

lands that obeyed Charles the Fifth, nineteen states have grown, all

(except Hayti) speaking Spanish, while the English-speaking peoples are

but two. Although the size of the territory occupied by these nineteen

is the primary cause of this multiplication of small nations, there are

other causes, also, political and social, which have been discussed in

an earlier chapter.[131] One bond of union they had, one solid basis

of common sentiment which, nevertheless, did not avail to hold them

together. They all professed the Roman Catholic faith and all obeyed

one spiritual sovereign at Rome, whereas among the men of English

speech in Teutonic America there were, and are, not only many Roman

Catholics, but also among the larger mass of Protestants many forms of

Protestantism, and no common ecclesiastical authority at all.

This summary review of the causes which have made the currents of

Spanish-American and Teutonic-American history run in different and

divergent channels may be closed by enquiring what the two divisions of

the New World have in common to-day.

They are alike in being (always excepting Canada) republican in

the outward forms of their governments; that is to say, there is

nowhere any official called a king. How far the governments of most

Spanish-American states are from being republican in spirit and working

everybody knows. To most men's minds, however, the form means a great

deal. In Spanish America itself people who acquiesce in transitory

dictatorships would be horrified at the idea of a hereditary sovereign,

however constitutional. And there are still many people in the United

States who find some virtue in the mere name of republic.

The two divisions are also alike in belonging to a New World; that

is to say, they have shaken loose from many ideas and habits that

belonged, and still more or less belong, to the Old World of Europe.

Spanish America has done this more completely than has Teutonic

America, because even in colonial days the ties of thought and feeling

which bound the colonists to Spain were really less strong than those

which connected the English of the United States with their mother

country, and because the latter were, when the separation came, in

a higher stage of institutional and intellectual development. The

most signal instance of the general American breach with the Old

World is the sense of social equality that now prevails alike in the

English-speaking and the Spanish-speaking peoples. The forms in which

this sense appears are not quite the same. Among the Spanish Americans

there is more external deference on the part of the humbler to the

higher placed, and the pure Indian is treated, and submits to be

treated, as a social inferior. In Chile, for instance, the _roto_, or

half-breed peasant, stands far more distinctly below the landowner than

the North American day labourer stands below his employer; though it

is his ignorance, not his mixed blood, that assigns this position to

him. But in both continents the complete absence of any artificial and

formal distinctions of rank is in striking contrast to the habits and

ideas that still hold in most parts of Europe.[132]

It must be added that these republics of the West have, politically

regarded, one important common characteristic. They constitute what

German historians call a "States-System" of their own; _i.e._ they take

no part in the politics of the Old World, but only in those of the New.

This is no longer true as respects the United States, for though they

do not interfere in questions purely European, and have touched those

of Africa only slightly in the Congo, and more effectively in Liberia,

which, indeed, they called into being, they have, by conquering the

Philippine Islands, made themselves an Asiatic power, and by annexing

Hawaii and one of the Samoan Islands, a Pacific power. Latin-American

republics, however, have (so far as I know) intervened neither in

European nor in Asiatic affairs, being content to attend strictly to

their own business, which is sufficiently absorbing.

Latin America consists of two separate state-systems. One includes

Mexico and the five small Central American republics, two of which,

Costa Rica and Salvador, are peaceful within and seldom embroiled

abroad, while the other three have had more chequered careers.

Members of this group have had plenty to do with the United States,

but seldom come into contact with the South American countries. The

little republic of Panama, which is virtually under the protection

of the United States, may now be deemed a "buffer state," between

Colombia and the republics to the north, nor does any Central American

republic possess a navy. The larger group is composed of the eleven

South American states. It presents some analogies to the Europe of the

eighteenth century in which there were several great powers "playing

the great game" against one another and against the smaller powers,

nominally in the interest of that so-called Balance of Power which was

to prevent any one from dominating the others, but often in reality

for the sake of appropriating territory, whenever a dynastic pretext

could be found. In this group there are three great powers, Argentina,

Brazil, and Chile; and when these three stand together, they can

keep all the rest quiet, especially if (as they may usually expect)

the United States throws its influence into the scale of peace. At

present these three are tolerably friendly, and there is no reason why

they should not remain so. Between them there exist no longer such

territorial controversies as disturb the repose of Ecuador, Colombia,

and Peru.[133] The politics of South America present an interesting

field for study, but it is one upon which I cannot now and here enter.

Some publicists have suggested that troubles might arise to affect

South America from without if Japan or China were to insist on flooding

her with their emigrants, and that if this were attempted against

one of the weaker South American republics, either the greater South

American Powers, or the United States, or both, might be tempted to

intervene. There are at present some Chinese and a very few Japanese

on the Pacific coast, but no more seem to have been arriving in recent

years. Any danger of this nature seems remote and improbable.

With these three things, however,--republican forms, social equality,

and detachment from European politics,--the list of the things which

the two Americas have in common ends. Far more numerous and more

important are the points in which they stand contrasted.

Many causes have gone to the making of the contrast. Race and religion,

climate and history have all had their share. The contrast appears

both in ideas and in temperament. The Spanish American is more proud

and more sensitive to any slight. He is not so punctilious in his

politeness as is the Spaniard of Europe, and is, indeed, in some

countries a little brusque or offhand in manners and speech. But he

feels a slight keenly; and he knows how to respect the susceptibilities

of his fellow-citizens. I will not say that he is more pleasure-loving

than the North American, for the latter has developed of late years a

passion for amusement which would have startled his Puritan ancestors.

But he is less assiduous and less strenuous in work, being, in this

respect, unlike the immigrant who comes from Old Spain, especially the

Asturian and the Gallego, who is the soul of thrift and the steadiest

of toilers. He is not so fond of commercial business, nor so apt

for it, nor so eager to "get on" and get rich. The process of money

making has not for him that fatal attraction which enslaves so many

capable men in the United States and (to a less degree) in England

and Germany, leading them to forget the things that make life worth

living, till it is too late in life to enjoy them. In South America

things are taken easily and business concerns are largely in the hands

of foreigners. The South American--and here I include the Mexican--is

an excitable being and prone to express his feelings forcibly, having

absorbed from the Indians none of their stolid taciturnity. He is

generally good natured and hospitable, and responds quickly to anything

said or done which shews appreciation of his country and its ways.

Private friendship or family relationship have a great effect on his

conduct, and often an undue effect, for one is everywhere told that the

difficulty of securing justice in these republics lies not so much in

the corruptibility of judges, as in their tendency to be influenced by

personal partiality. Things go by favour.

These contrasts of temperament between North and South Americans give

rise to different tastes and a different view of life, so that, broadly

speaking, the latter are not "sympathetic" either to the former or to

Englishmen.[134] To say that they are antipathetic would be going too

far, for there is nothing to make unfriendliness, nor, indeed, is there

any unfriendliness. But both North Americans and Englishmen are built

on lines of thought and feeling so different from those which belong to

South Americans that the races do not draw naturally together, and find

it hard to appreciate duly one another's good qualities.[135]

The use of nicknames has a certain significance. In South America a

North American or Englishman is popularly called a "Gringo," as in

North America a person speaking Italian or Spanish or Portuguese is

vulgarly called a "Dago." Neither term has any eulogistic flavour.

Thus we return to the question whence we started, and ask again whether

there is any sort of unity or community in the two Americas. Are the

peoples of these continents a group by themselves, nearer to one

another than they are to other peoples, possessing a common character,

common ties of interest and feeling? Or does the common American name

mean nothing more than mere local juxtaposition beyond the Atlantic?

Is it, in fact, anything more than a historical accident?

The answer would seem to be that Teutonic Americans and Spanish

Americans have nothing in common except two names, the name American

and the name Republican. In essentials they differ as widely as either

of them does from any other group of peoples, and far more widely than

citizens of the United States differ from Englishmen, or than Chileans

and Argentines differ from Spaniards and Frenchmen.

Nevertheless, juxtaposition has induced contact, though a contact

which we shall find to have been rather political than intellectual or

social. It is worth while to examine the attitude of each to the other.

When the Spanish colonies revolted[136] against the Crown of Spain,

the sympathy of the United States went out to them profusely, and

continued with them throughout the war and long after. Their victories

were acclaimed as victories won for freedom and for America, and

children were called after the name of Simon Bolivar, whose exploits in

Venezuela had early fixed upon him the attention of the world, and have

given him a fame possibly beyond his merits.

The struggling colonists were cheered by this as by the similar

sympathy that came to them from England. They were, as already

observed, grateful for the support given them by the diplomacy

of Canning and John Quincy Adams, and when they framed their

constitutions, took that of the United States for their model. Their

regard for the United States, and confidence in its purposes, never

quite recovered the blow given by the Mexican War of 1846 and the

annexation of California; but this change of sentiment did not affect

the patronage and good-will extended to them by the United States,

whose people, and for a time the English Whigs also, maintained their

touching faith that countries called republics must needs be graced by

republican virtues and were entitled to favour whenever they came into

collision with monarchies. This tendency of mind, natural in the days

when the monarchies of continental Europe were more or less despotic,

has begun to die down of late years, as educated men have come to look

more at things than at names, and as United States statesmen found

themselves from time to time annoyed by the perversity or shiftiness of

military dictators ruling Spanish-American countries. The big nation

has, however, generally borne such provocations with patience, abusing

its strength less than the rulers of the little ones abuse their

weakness. For many years after the achievement by the Spanish colonies

of their independence, a political tie between them and the United

States was found in the declared intention of the latter to resist any

attempt by European Powers either to overthrow republican government

in any American state or to attempt annexation of its territory. So

long as any such action was feared from Europe, the protection thus

promised was welcome, and the United States felt a corresponding

interest in their clients. But circumstances alter cases. To-day, when

apprehensions of the old kind have vanished, and when some of the South

American states feel themselves already powerful, one is told that

they have begun to regard the situation with different eyes. "Since

there are no longer rain-clouds coming up from the east, why should a

friend, however well-intentioned, insist on holding an umbrella over

us? We are quite able to do that for ourselves if necessary." In a very

recent book by one of the most acute and thoughtful of North American

travellers, there occurs a passage which presents this view:--

"Many a Chileno and Argentino resents the idea of our Monroe

Doctrine applying in any sense to his country and declares that we

had better keep it at home. He regards it as only another sign of

our overweening national conceit: and on mature consideration it

does seem as though the justification for the doctrine both in its

original and in its present form had passed. Europe is no longer

ruled by despots who desire to crush the liberties of their subjects.

As is frequently remarked, England has a more democratic government

than the United States. In all the leading countries of Europe the

people have practically as much to say about the government as they

have in America. There is not the slightest danger that any European

tyrant will attempt to enslave the weak republics of this hemisphere.

Furthermore, such republics as Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, Chile, and

Peru, no more need our Monroe Doctrine to keep them from being robbed

of their territory by European nations, than does Italy or Spain. If it

be true that some of the others, like the notoriously lawless group in

Central America, need to be looked after by their neighbours, let us

amend our outgrown Monroe Doctrine, as already suggested by one of our

writers on International Law, so as to include in the police force in

the Western Hemisphere those who have shown themselves able to practise

self-control."[137]

There is truth in this. The talk often heard in the United States

about the Doctrine has injured and is injuring her influence in South

America. It excites suspicion and alarm. It is taken to imply an intent

to claim a sort of protectorate over the other American republics, than

which nothing could more offend Spanish-American sentiment. The wisest

among American foreign ministers, such as Mr. Hay and Mr. Root, are

those who have least frequently referred to the Doctrine. To examine

this subject, however, would lead me into the field of politics, and

with politics I have nothing to do, seeking only to indicate the

influences of interest, of intellectual affinity, and of temperamental

sympathy which draw the peoples of Spanish America towards one or other

of the great peoples of the Northern Hemisphere.[138]

As regards the United States there is a balance between attraction and

suspicion. The South Americans desire good relations, and recognize

the value of her diplomatic action in trying to preserve peace between

those of their republics whose smouldering enmities often threaten to

burst into flame. On the other hand, as already observed, they are

jealous of their own dignity, not at all disposed to be patronized,

and quick to resent anything bordering on a threat, even when

addressed, not to themselves, but to some other republic. It is as the

disinterested, the absolutely disinterested and unselfish, advocate of

peace and good will, that the United States will have most influence

in the Western Hemisphere, and that influence, gently and tactfully

used, may be of incalculable service to mankind.

The matters in which these republics are wont to imitate or draw

lessons from the United States are education, especially scientific

and technical education, and engineering. Of the influence upon their

constitutions of the North American Federal Constitution I have

already spoken. Their publicists continue to follow with attention

the decisions given upon the application of its principles to new

conditions as they arise, and attach value to the opinions of North

American international jurists. Otherwise, there is little intellectual

affinity, and still less temperamental sympathy. The South Americans

do not feel that the name "American" involves any closer community or

co-operation with the great Teutonic republic of the north than it does

with any other people or peoples. They are just as much a race or group

of peoples standing by themselves as if the lands they occupy had been

that entirely detached continent out in the southern seas, supposed to

lie far away from all other continents, to which the name of Amerigo

Vespucci was first applied.

With whom, then, have the Spanish Americans real affinities of mental

and moral constitution? With the peoples of southern Europe. If anyone

likes to call them the "Latin" peoples,[139] there is no harm in the

term so long as it does not seem to ignore the fact that there exist

the greatest differences between Italians and Frenchmen and Spaniards,

for whoever has studied the history and the literature of those peoples

knows that it is only the existence of still more marked differences

between them and the Teutonic peoples that makes them seem to resemble

one another.

It might be supposed that the relations of the Spanish Americans would

be most close with their motherland, Old Spain. But these relations are

not intimate, and have never been so since the War of Independence.

Even in those old colonial days when the ports were closed to all

but Spanish vessels, in order to stop all trade, export and import,

except with the mother country, the days when Englishmen and Dutchmen

were detested as heretics, and Frenchmen as dangerous rivals, there

was an undercurrent of anti-Spanish feeling. It was chiefly due to

the practice of reserving all well-paid posts for natives of Spain.

The _criollos_, as they were called, men born in the colonies, were

naturally envious of the strangers, and resented their own exclusion

and disparagement. They suffered in many ways, economic as well

as sentimental, both from laws issued in Spain and from authority

exercised on the spot by men from Europe who did not share their

sentiments, treated them as socially inferior, and flouted their

local opinion. Accordingly, when the separation came, there was less

sense of the breaking of a family tie than there had been among the

North American colonists in the earlier stages of their revolution.

This antagonism to Spanish government was, of course, accentuated and

envenomed by the long duration of the struggle for independence, which

in Peru lasted for fifteen years, and in the course of which many

severities were exercised by the governors and generals who fought

for the Crown. As for the Indians, the oppressions they suffered and

the memory of the hideous cruelties with which the rebellion of Tupac

Amaru was suppressed, made the name of Spain hateful to them. After

the flag of Castile had ceased to fly anywhere on the continent, and

the last Spanish officials had departed, there were few occasions

for communication of any kind. Spain herself was in a depressed and

distracted state for many years after 1825. There is to-day little

trade between her and the New World, nor is there, except to Mexico and

Argentina, any large Spanish immigration. Where it does exist, it is

valued, for the men who come from northern Spain (as most settlers do)

are of excellent quality.

Family ties between colonists and the motherland had, moreover, become

few or loose. Seldom in Spanish America does one hear anyone speak

of the place his ancestors came from, as one constantly hears North

Americans talk of the English village where are the graves of their

forefathers. Seldom do South Americans or Mexicans seem to visit Spain,

either to see her ancient cities and her superb pictures or to study

her present economic problems. They do not feel as if they had much

to learn from her governmental methods, and her modern literature has

apparently little message for them. For the Spanish Americans there

seems to be no Past at all earlier than their own War of Independence.

In all these respects the contrast between the position of Spain

towards South America and that of Britain towards North America strikes

an Englishman with surprise. If that revival in Spanish literature and

art, of which there have recently been signs, should continue, and if

Spanish commerce should develop, the position may change, for the tie

of language will always have its importance.

I may add in this connection that among the educated classes of

Spanish America one finds few signs of that sort of interest in the

history of Old Spain which the best North Americans take in the

history of England. The former have no link of free institutions

brought from the old soil to flourish in a new one. Is it because the

Conquistadores were Spaniards, or because many of their deeds shock

modern consciences, or because it is felt that to honour them would

be an offence to Indian sentiment, faint as that sentiment is in

Mexico and still fainter in Peru, that there are in Spanish America no

statues or other honorific memorials of these brilliant and terrible

figures? Even the statue of Queen Isabella the Catholic, which stood in

Havana, was shipped back to Spain after the independence of Cuba had

been declared in 1898. There is no monument to Cortes in Mexico, nor

to Pizarro in Lima, nor (so far as I know) any statue of any of his

companions except one of Pedro de Valdivia, set up on the hill of Santa

Lucia in Santiago, where he built his fort and founded the capital of

Chile. On the other hand, Cuahtémoc or Guatemozin, the last of the

Aztec kings,[140] has a fine statue in the park that lies between the

city of Mexico and the castle palace of Chapultepec, and the name of

Caupolican, the Araucanian chieftain whom the Spaniards shot to death

with arrows, like St. Sebastian, is about to be commemorated by a

charitable foundation at Temuco in Chile.

Between Italy and Latin America there never were any direct relations

except, of course, ecclesiastical relations with Rome, until in recent

years Italian immigrants began to pour into Argentina and southern

Brazil. As many of these go backwards and forwards, and as swift

lines of ocean steamers have been established between Buenos Aires

and the ports of Italy, there is now a good deal of intercourse, but

this has not so far led to any closer connection either political or

intellectual. The Italian immigrants belong almost entirely to the

scantily educated classes, and have brought with them little that

is Italian except their language and their habits of industry. If,

however, the Italians, who, in Argentina, are now nearly one-third

of the population, do not too quickly lose their language and become

assimilated to the native Argentines, these people may not only form an

intellectual link between their old home and their new one, but may

give an impetus to the progress of art and music, perhaps of literature

also.

With England and Germany the commercial relations of most of the

South American countries are close and constant. Nearly £300,000,000

sterling of British capital ($1,500,000,000) have been invested in

railroads and otherwise in Argentina alone, besides very large sums

in Uruguay, Brazil, and some of the lesser countries. Many Englishmen

own ranches or farms in Argentina. Germans have done less in railroad

construction and in the acquisition of landed properties, but they run

lines of ocean steamers, and a great part of the commerce of the more

progressive republics is now in their hands. They take more pains than

do the English to master Spanish and understand the customs of the

land. The German army and its arrangements are taken as a model for

South American ministers and officers to follow, and a like deference

is paid to the British navy and its methods. Upon thought and art and

taste, however, neither of these countries exerts much influence.

Though a certain number of Argentines, Chileans, and Brazilians can

read English and a smaller number German, and though statesmen and

serious students appreciate the English political system and the German

administrative system, and follow the scientific work done in both

countries, books in these languages are not widely read. The members

of the English and German colonies in seaports like Buenos Aires,

Montevideo, Rio, and Valparaiso are personally liked and respected,

but they have not done much to popularize the ideas and habits and

tastes of their countries. The mental quality and the views of life are

essentially dissimilar. Between the peoples, there is little more than

reciprocal good-will and what Thomas Carlyle calls the "cash nexus."

English fashions are, however, followed in horse-racing and other

branches of sport.

There remains France. Her influence may be traced to several causes.

Though the North American Revolution of 1775-1783 had suggested to the

Spanish Americans the idea of separation from their mother country,

the French Revolution of 1789-1799 stirred their minds more deeply,

and the literature produced in France, both before and during those

years and still later, was the strongest and most novel intellectual

force that had ever fallen on these previously backward countries, as

well as upon those few colonists who visited Europe in the end of the

eighteenth century. Severed by a violent shock from Spain, the Spanish

Americans must needs turn elsewhere. French had for a century been the

one foreign language which was learnt by men who learnt any foreign

language. Whoever travelled to Europe needed it and the similarity of

its vocabulary to their own made it easier for them than any Teutonic

tongue. With England there was in those days very little intercourse,

with Germany and the United States still less, for commerce was

insignificant. Thus French established itself as what might be called

the gateway to European thought. French literature has, moreover, a

double attraction for the South Americans, including the Brazilians.

It gratifies their fondness for graceful and pointed and rhetorical

expression. Spaniards, like Frenchmen, love style, and French style

has for them a peculiar charm. With a great liking for what they call

"general ideas" they set less store by an accumulation of facts and

an elaborate examination of them than do the Germans or the English,

and prefer what may be called the French way of treating a subject.

In short, they have an intellectual affinity for France, for the

brightness of her ideas, the gaiety of her spirit, the finish of her

literary methods, the quality of her sentiment.

Then there is Paris. When South Americans began to be rich enough to

travel to Europe and enjoy themselves there, Paris became the Mecca

of these pilgrims of pleasure. Many a wealthy Argentine landowner,

many a Brazilian coffee planter, every dictator of a Caribbean

republic who, like Guzman Blanco of Venezuela, has drawn from the

public revenues funds to invest in European securities, goes to the

metropolis of fashion and amusement to spend his fortune there. All the

young literary men, all the young artists who can afford the journey,

flock thither. There is a large South American colony in Paris, and

through it, as well as through books and magazines, the French drama

and art, French ideas and tastes dominate both the fashionable and

the intellectual world in the cities of South America. The writers

of France have often claimed that there is something in the "French

spirit," in their way of thinking and their way of expressing thought,

which, distinctive of themselves as it is, has, nevertheless, a sort

of universality, or an adaptability to the minds of all men, that has

more than once in history given it an empire such as no other modern

literature has enjoyed. In and for South America this claim has been

made good, for here French influence reigns supreme.

All this has, of course, no more to do with the political relations of

these republics to foreign powers than has the ownership of Argentine

railways by British shareholders. But it is a further illustration of

the fact that South America has nothing in common with Teutonic North

America beyond the name and the form (in some countries an empty form)

of institutions called republican. She is much nearer to being an

Ibero-Celtic West European group of nations, planted far out in the

midst of southern seas.

But can the South Americans really be classed among south or west

European peoples? May they not be--if one can speak of them as a

whole, ignoring the differences between Chileans, Argentines, and

Brazilians--a new thing in the world, a racial group with a character

all its own?

This is their own view of themselves. It would need more knowledge

than I possess either to deny or to affirm it. They are all, except

Argentines and Uruguayans, largely Indian or (in Brazil) African in

blood. Even the Uruguayans and Argentines strike one as differing at

least as much from Spaniards as North Americans differ from Englishmen.

They give the impression of being still nations in the making, whose

type or types, both the common type of all Spanish America and the

special types of each nation, will grow more sharp and definite as the

years roll on and as life becomes for them more rich and more intense.

When this happens and the world of A.D. 2000 recognizes a definite

South American type (or types), may there be thence expected any

distinctively new contribution to the world's stock of thought, of

literature, of art? Each nation is in the long run judged and valued

by the rest of the world more for such contributions than for anything

else. There is a sense in which Shakespeare is a greater glory to

England than the empire of India. Homer and Virgil, Plato and Tacitus

are a gift made by the ancient world to all the ages, more precious,

because more enduring, than any achievements in war, or government,

or commerce. The opportunities for the growing up of new nations with

creative gifts specifically their own seem to be getting few because

the world is getting full; there is no more room for new nations.

That there is vitality and virility in the Spanish-American peoples

appears from the number of strong, bold, forceful men who have figured

in their history, including one the Mexican Juarez, of pure, and many

of mixed, Indian blood. Few, indeed, have shewn that higher kind of

greatness which lies in the union of large constructive ideas with

decisive energy in action, the Napoleonic or Bismarckian gift. In most

of the republics, political conditions have been so unstable as to give

little scope for constructive statesmanship. Still there is no want of

vigour, and it is something to have produced in San Martin one truly

heroic figure in whom brilliant military and political talents were

united to a lofty and disinterested character.

If Latin America has not yet produced any thinker or poet or artist

even of the second rank, this will not surprise anyone who knows what

was her condition before the War of Independence and what it has been

from that time till recent years. Could any one of those ancient sages

whom Dante heard in Limbo, speaking with voices sweet and soft, have

been brought back to earth and permitted to survey Europe as it was in

the welter of the tenth century, such an one might have thought that

art and letters, as well as freedom and order, had forever vanished

from the earth. Yet out of that welter what glories of art and letters

were to arise.

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